

# MATILDE

Migration Impact Assessment to Enhance  
Integration and Local Development in  
European Rural and Mountain Regions

## **CLASSIFICATION OF MATILDE REGIONS.**

## **SPATIAL SPECIFICITIES AND THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS DISTRIBUTION**



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## **DELIVERABLE 2.1 - CLASSIFICATION ON SPATIAL SPECIFICITIES AND THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS DISTRIBUTION IN MATILDE REGIONS**

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## LIST OF ACRONYMS

BA - Bilateral Agreement  
BLA - Bilateral Labour Arrangement  
CAP - Common Agricultural Policy  
CEE - Central and Eastern Europe  
COVID-19 - Coronavirus Disease  
DEGURBA - Degree of Urbanisation  
EAFRD - European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development  
EC - European Commission  
EEA - European Economic Area  
EFGS - European Forum for Geography and Statistics  
EFTA - European Free Trade Association  
ENRD - European Network for Rural Development  
ERDF - European Regional Development Fund  
ESPON - European Spatial Planning Observation Network  
EU - European Union  
EU LFS - European Union Labour Force Survey  
fc. - Former country  
FUA - Functional Urban Area  
GDP - Gross Domestic Product  
GISCO - Geographical Information System of the Commission  
GVA - Gross Value Added  
ICT - Information and Communication Technology  
ISCED - International Standard Classification of Education  
LAU - Local administrative unit  
LEADER - Liaison entre actions de développement de l'économie rurale  
MATILDE - Migration Impact Assessment to Enhance Integration and Local Development in European Rural and Mountain Regions

MENA - Middle East & North Africa

MOU – Memorandum of Understanding

NASS - National Asylum Support Service administrated by the UK Government

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NEET - Young people neither in employment nor in education and training, aged 15-34

NGO – Non-Governmental Organisation

NHS - National Health Service

NID – New Immigration Destination

NUTS - Nomenclature des unités territoriales statistiques

OECD - Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

PPS – Purchasing Power Standards

RCI - Regions and Cities Illustrated

SGL - Services of General Interest

SME - Small and medium-sized enterprise

TCB – Third Country Born

TCN - Third Country National

UN - United Nations

UNESCO - United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation

UNHCR - United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

WWII – World War II

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report provides an **overview of the processes of immigration in European rural and mountain areas**, i.e. labour, forced, student, family and amenity/lifestyle migration. For this purpose, Section A presents a literature review of migration studies from various subdisciplines of the social sciences, e.g. demography, economy, geography, sociology and regional studies. Section A further presents the prevailing immigration processes, including a diachronic perspective, as well as the **framework for the description of MATILDE regions** based on socio-economic, socio-demographic and territorial indicators. Finally, **MATILDE regions are portrayed in terms of immigration of TCNs and spatial characteristics**.

In Section B, country and regional profiles are provided. As a basis for understanding current developments in MATILDE regions, for each region, the relevance of immigration phenomena and specific migration and integration policies in a given MATILDE country are presented from a historical perspective. Then, demographic, economic and migration-related developments in MATILDE regions are illustrated by means of a collection of statistical data from EUROSTAT and National Statistical Offices.

As a conclusion, **in Section C, patterns of immigration** of TCNs to MATILDE countries and **regions are classified** in light of wider structural transformations.

The portraits of the MATILDE regions show us that, historically, the MATILDE countries and regions have faced different phases of immigration, accompanied by economic and political transformation processes. Crucial points of change for most of MATILDE regions were marked by economic upswing and resulting labour shortages in the 1970s, which also affected rural areas. Specific national and regional economic constellations and contexts, e.g. economic clusters in a certain region, resulted in the highly selective influx of immigrants by means of respective border regimes and visa policies. In a globalised world, national and regional economic developments are affected by broader transformations, but also by single events. The economic and financial crisis in 2008, for instance, marked an important turnaround in migration dynamics especially in Southern Europe. After a phase of massive immigration, a phase of remigration to Latin American and African countries followed, due to lack of employment. Besides, in the 1990s and slightly before, immigration to European rural and mountain areas occurred in the course of the political transformations in former socialist and communist states. Recently, people have arrived in rural and mountain areas as a result of armed conflicts and (civil) wars, in places such as Afghanistan (since the 2000s), ex-Yugoslavia (in the 1990s), Iraq (in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s), Iran (in the 1980s), Somalia (since the 1980s), Syria and Venezuela (both since the 2010s). The placement of people in rural and mountain areas, e.g. of asylum seekers

or resettlement refugees, was and is often based on allocation schemes and dispersal policies (e.g. Austria, Finland, Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden and the UK). Nevertheless, the 2010 decade in particular is often seen as a time when some rural and mountain areas were first confronted with immigration of TCNs. Accordingly, some MATILDE regions may be classified as relatively novel destinations for TCNs immigration, i.e. **New Immigration Destinations** (NID) (Winders 2004, McAreavey 2018), whilst others have developed a certain migration history with continuous flows of immigrants that have led to a **path-dependency of regions** (Rodríguez-Pose & Berlepsch 2020). As a result of relationships forged during colonial times and spatial proximity to non-EU countries, specific migration regimes were established and are still upheld, e.g. between Spain and Latin American countries, between Italy and Spain and North African countries, or between Scandinavian countries and Russia.

The country reports and profiles of MATILDE regions, provided in Section B, show a huge **diversity of migrants** in rural and mountain areas, with regard to their socio-demographic profile, countries and regions of origin, as well as in their motivation for migrating, and their aspirations to stay. **Labour migration** is one important process in rural and mountain areas and is supported by more or less restrictive visa regulations in the individual countries. Temporary working permits are common, for instance, in the agricultural sector, for example in Southern Europe or Scandinavia, where migrant employment is marked by seasonality. The development of non-agricultural activities introduced new opportunities, among them an increasing demand for services related to an ageing population, in tourism, construction or the food industry and distribution. Finally, ethnic niches of employment are particularly relevant in rural areas. High-skilled migration is less relevant in rural areas, since apart from hidden champions, workplaces that need qualified employees are often scarce. Some occupations are highly gendered, e.g. men in construction or women in (health)care or specific agricultural activities such as berry picking. Migration for humanitarian reasons, i.e., **forced migration**, impacts on rural and mountain areas mostly as a result of dispersal policies. The ex-Yugoslavian, Iraqi or Somalian citizens who arrived in the 1990s were still reflected in the 2008 top ten TCN lists of the majority of MATILDE regions. Today, however, the share of Syrian and Iraqi, but also Afghan, Eritrean or Venezuelan citizens have also become important. The most recently arrived asylum seekers and refugees have challenged social cohesion at a very local level, but also increased awareness of issues of rural development. Forced migrants have had a remarkable impact on the shape of rural and mountain areas to date, with regard to population size for example, socio-demographic composition, housing and labour markets as well as the provision of social, educational and mobility infrastructures. Although **family migration** is well reflected in the numbers of issued entry permits and very important numerically, it is always interrelated with other processes of migration. The majority of family migrants have to prove that they have the means of subsistence, mostly via a relative already living in the country. **Student migration** is only important in those rural and mountain areas that have universities or

university campuses. The majority of people engaging in amenity/**lifestyle migration** are still EU citizens. However, either because regional economies are related to construction and real estate, or for historical reasons, TCNs become increasingly important at a regional and local level. Due to their relatively privileged socio-economic status, they can evoke massive implications with regard to local economies and social cohesion.

In light of wider demographic transformation processes in Europe, a negative crude birth rate is recorded in most MATILDE regions. Immigration of TCNs plays a key role for mitigating this process. As highlighted in Section C, the relevance of immigration for total population change in the period 2008-2018 is crucial. Whilst other MATILDE regions experienced this development earlier, in Germany and Austria, immigration resulted in a population turnaround in the second half of the decade, not least due to the arrival of asylum seekers. Besides, one can observe transformation processes in rural economies. **Diversification and especially tertiarization** characterises MATILDE regions to a different extent, resulting in shifts in shares of GDP and employment by sector. Whilst economic activities in some MATILDE regions are more focused on one sector, other regions have diversified as a result of restructuration and structural change in the last decades. Finally, changing rural economies have an impact on the attractiveness of the region for immigration, especially since immigration regimes are driven by economic demands to a certain extent.

On the basis of a statistical analysis conducted on the MATILDE database (deliverable 2.2), the **regions have been classified, based on their socio-economic performance** (positive vs. negative population growth) **and their territorial features** (“more rural” vs. “less rural”). By combining the categorisations, the **21 MATILDE regions** were classified into four groups:

- 1) **more rural & negative population growth** (Oberkärnten and Unterkärnten, both AT; Regen, DE; North Karelia, FI),
- 2) **more rural & positive population growth** (Bludenz-Bregenzerwald, AT; Ostrobothnia, FI; Neustadt an der Aisch-Bad Windsheim, DE; South Tyrol, IT; Hedmark and Oppland, both NO; Dalarna county, SE),
- 3) **less rural & negative population growth** (Haskovo, BG; Huesca, ES; East Ayrshire and North Ayrshire mainland, UK),
- 4) **less rural & positive population growth** (Klagenfurt-Villach and Rheintal-Bodenseegebiet, AT; Berchtesgadener Land, Garmisch-Partenkirchen and Oberallgäu, all DE; Metropolitan City of Turin, IT; Bursa, TR).



## INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

Author: Andrea Membretti, MATILDE Scientific Coordinator

### THE ROLE OF RURAL AND MOUNTAIN AREAS FROM A EUROPEAN REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE

Regions – as institutions in between State and local administrations – have assumed a leading role in the process of European integration in the recent past. In the 1990s, important developments and a number of optimistic predictions accompanied the “Europe of the Regions” perspective (Borras-Alomar et al. 1994), in which the main avenues of EU policy, seeking to overcome territorial inequalities, favour an active role of these *intermediate bodies* within the so-called multi-level governance approach (Amin & Thrift 1995; Conzelmann 1998; Piattoni 2009).

However, despite the importance of regions in the construction of the European Union as well as in its functioning, the 2000s witnessed a progressive reduction in their role, as European institutions directed attention away from these territorial actors (Caciaglia 2011). This is particularly true for **rural and mountain regions**. Despite relevant European policies and economic support provided to rural and mountain regions<sup>1</sup>, the feeling of being on the *margins* of economic and social policy is growing stronger in these areas. As Andrés Rodríguez-Pose states (2017), many European regions have long felt like *places left behind* or *places that don't matter*. It is no coincidence that in these territories, disaffection with European institutions is spreading, populism is growing, and xenophobic or movements inspired by Sovereignism are emerging.

Let us not forget that **half of the European land mass is classified as predominantly rural, and about 30% as mountainous**. The *marginalization of rural and mountain regions* is even more objectionable if we consider **Article 174 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union**, which states that the EU shall strengthen economic, social and territorial cohesion within the EU, in particular by “reducing disparities between the levels of development

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<sup>1</sup> Direct aid and market-related expenditure made up 31% of the total EU budget in 2010. Together with 11% for rural development, the total common agricultural policy (CAP) budget comprised 42% of the total EU budget. At the same time, the CAP budget shrunk relatively from 75% in 1984 to 37% of the total EU budget in 2017. See [https://ec.europa.eu/info/food-farming-fisheries/key-policies/common-agricultural-policy/cap-glance\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/info/food-farming-fisheries/key-policies/common-agricultural-policy/cap-glance_en)

of the various regions and the backwardness of the least favoured regions” It goes on to state that: “Among the regions concerned, particular attention shall be paid to rural areas, areas affected by industrial transition and regions suffering from severe and permanent natural or demographic handicaps, such as the northernmost regions with very low population density and island, cross-border and mountain regions”.

The role rural and mountain regions can play for Europe’s shared wealth and well-being is clear. The agricultural production, forests, water reserves, cultural heritage, diversity, languages and local autonomy in these areas make them irreplaceable.

Furthermore, in the face of the radical **changes imposed by the Covid-19** pandemic, what these regions have to offer in terms of differing modes of settlement, production and consumption is likely to be increasingly sought after, as their local systems are characterised by less anthropic pressure and more circular economies. As densely populated urban areas were hit hardest by the pandemic, social rarefaction of these regions connotes welcome resilience in times of such crises.

## IMMIGRATION AS A POTENTIAL AND A THREAT TO REGIONS *LEFT BEHIND*

The MATILDE (**M**igration **I**mp**A**ct **A**ssessment **T**o **E**nhance **I**ntegration and **L**ocal **D**evelopment in **E**uropean Rural and Mountain Regions) project and vision stem from the potential of rural and mountainous regions. Our aim is to improve our shared knowledge base and awareness of good practices so that we can **co-construct a Europe that leverages this tremendously underutilised heritage**, a pool of resources that must feed the progress of our entire continent as a whole, and not drift towards forms of local micro-protectionism.

When analysing the potential of these regions, **immigration** is one of the fundamental factors that must be considered (Perlik et al. 2019). Rural and mountain areas have been structurally losing inhabitants for decades; they suffer from chronic labour shortages and an increasingly ageing population, since young people often move to cities, whilst, simultaneously, others rural and mountain regions perform quite well, both socially and economically.

Naturally, the **arrival of new inhabitants** is a fundamental resource, when national and local policies are implemented to govern it. Today, immigration, especially international immigration from non-European countries (but also intra-EU and interregional immigration), is the main contribution to the **demographic stability** of marginalised regions, as well as a central factor for the functioning of entire sectors of **local economies**, from

agriculture to tourism, personal services to small and medium industries and crafts. It also has a major impact on housing and the reconversion of underused local real estate (Membretti & Lucchini 2018).

MATILDE investigates this phenomenon to understand how much it weighs on the development of rural and mountain regions without reducing it to a study of foreigner integration processes or to an identification of new policies that favour only newcomers.

For sound policies, we must acknowledge and address the challenges as well. Local populations and immigrants from EU countries as Third Country Nationals (TCNs), which are the focus of the MATILDE impact assessment, require policies for the inclusion of newcomers as well as public spaces of encounter and negotiation between cultures and needs. Equally important is the entitlement of local populations to preserve their own traditions compared to those of 'outsiders'.

The main purpose of this project, and the reason why it is implemented by a network in which local actors have as much weight as scientific ones, is to understand how immigration, in all its forms but especially from non-EU countries, affects the **overall development of these regions**.

Therefore, a first question leading the scientific research in the MATILDE project is:

How can we appropriately **analyse the social, economic and territorial roles of mountain and rural regions** within the European Union? How can an accurate and multi-dimensional description of **regional performance** improve public opinion and help local actors and policymakers, on different scales, understand these roles and enhance local resources to overcome marginalization?

A second question is:

How – on the basis of their recognised or potential resources and performance – can we **foster a new attractiveness of these rural and mountain territories**? Particularly in the **post Covid-19 era**, 'scattered living', the return to the local dimension, and re-peopling of remote and depopulated areas may well offer opportunities to develop new policies.

And finally, a third, correlated question is:

What is **the effective and potential contribution** of migration, and particularly of TCNs, **to regional development** in the framework of European integration? How could such contributions favour policies that would place rural and mountain regions at the centre of a reimagined European Union?

With these questions in mind, MATILDE intends to involve rural and mountainous European regions through a participatory reflection on their **capacity for resilience**, their **creative adaptation** to current and future challenges. The project's ambition is to stimulate the rethinking of the relationships between rural/mountain and urban dimensions, between local populations and newcomers. Through the assessment of regional performance and indicators, the project aims to **re-conceptualise and re-represent the active role of Third Country Nationals** in these contexts, based on a balanced analysis grounded in sound scientific research.

MATILDE develops an assessment of the socio-economic impact of Third Country Nationals in order to put at the centre of European public discourse one of the continent's greatest resources: rural and mountain areas and those who live in them, by birth, by choice, by necessity, by force or for a combination of reasons. The project's ambition is contributing to the construction of a new Europe, one whose focus is shifted to the inhabitants *that don't matter*, not based on their passport but on their geographical and territorial location.

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## STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT

Author: Stefan Kordel

MATILDE aims to show how migration impacts local development and territorial cohesion, with a specific focus on European rural and mountain regions. As a crucial prerequisite for Work Package 3 (social impact assessment of migration), Work Package 4 (economic impact assessment of migration), and Work Package 5 (case studies), the variety of spatial characteristics in each MATILDE region, representing the context of arrival and providing the basis for migrant's personal development and contribution to the region, and the diversity of migrants themselves will be outlined.

This report aims to:

- Provide an **overview of the processes of immigration in European rural and mountain areas**. For this purpose, migration studies literature from various subdisciplines of the social sciences, e.g. sociology, demography, geography and regional studies, will be considered. The prevailing immigration processes will be portrayed, including from a diachronic perspective, however, no differentiation will be provided between intra-EU mobility and TCN migration.
- Present the framework for the description of spatial characteristics of MATILDE regions. It will establish general criteria for the categorization of selected regions and introduce socio-economic, socio-demographic and territorial indicators.
- **Outline MATILDE regions** in terms of immigration of TCNs and spatial characteristics. First, the relevance of immigration phenomena and related migration and integration policies in a given MATILDE country, presented from a historical perspective, serves as a basis for understanding current developments in MATILDE regions. Second, demographic, economic and migration-related developments in MATILDE regions are illustrated by means of statistical data from EUROSTAT and collected at National Statistical Offices by partners. Regions are classified using existing typologies based on criteria such population density, spatial distribution of population (e.g. degree of urbanisation), whilst development-related indicators are considered in order to portray the heterogeneity of regions. Indicators and TCN secondary stock data are compiled for NUTS-2 and NUTS-3 scale. Involving partners in the interpretation of data ensured proper analysis. In the further course of the project, data on TCNs will be collected at the LAU2 level by all partners for their own region in order to explore differences at a local level.

## PART A

### 1. MIGRATION PROCESSES IN EUROPEAN RURAL AND MOUNTAIN AREAS

Authors: Stefan Kordel and Tobias Weidinger

European peripheral rural areas were long addressed as areas of out-migration and demographic decline. Accordingly, discourse around “rural flight” (Beetz 2016) predominated in scientific and political debates. More recently, however, immigration processes, including forced migration (asylum seekers, recognised refugees, resettled refugees), lifestyle and leisure-oriented movements as well as labour-induced migration have increasingly affected areas in Europe that are considered to be peripheral, rural or mountainous (Machold et al. 2013). In the European context, at least four English-language anthologies present a panorama of current processes of rural immigration from various disciplinary angles of the social sciences. While Kordel et al. (2018) provide an overview of the diversity of rural immigration (“Processes of immigration in rural Europe: the status quo, implications and development strategies”), Perlik et al. (2019, “Alpine refugees”) focus on mountainous regions, with a special emphasis on practitioners’ views. Jentsch & Simard (2009, “International Migration and Rural Areas Cross-National Comparative Perspectives”) also include North American and Russian case studies. An emphasis on the Mediterranean context is given by Corrado et al. (2016, “Migration and Agriculture: Mobility and Change in the Mediterranean Area”). The discussion is continued by McAreavey (2018, following Winders 2014), who introduced the concept of new immigration destinations (NIDs), i.e. relatively novel destinations for immigration that are characterised by a rapid change in (ethnic) diversity rather than by a large number of newcomers. NIDs are challenged by questions of integration, and simultaneously lack specific infrastructure and services. Thus, “migrants cannot benefit from the formal and informal support from pre-existing migrants’ networks; and the domestic population may be less familiar and open to accept diversity” (Natale et al. 2019: 7, cf. European Parliament Think Tank 2017). Additionally, mostly qualitatively oriented case studies have portrayed EU and cross-national perspectives on immigration to rural areas in specific countries, e.g. Kasimis & Papadopoulos (2005) for Greece, Corrado (2018) for Italy, Górny & Kaczmarczyk (2018) for Poland, Hedberg & Haandrikman (2014) for Sweden, and Morèn-Alegret & Solana (2004) for Spain.

For the respective group of Third Country Nationals (TCNs), no EU-wide studies have been carried out in rural and mountain areas at the time of writing (with the exception of Natale et al. 2019). This may be due to their relatively

small share of the population, although total numbers have remained relatively stable over the years, at about 2.7 million (ibid., cf. Table 1).

	Rural Areas	Cities	Towns
TCNs	2.9%	10.0%	6.0%
EU	2.6%	4.4%	4.2%

**Table 1. Share of migrants among total population, 2017**

*Source: Natale et al. 2019: 13*

However, the percentage of TCNs varies a lot among member states, with the highest absolute shares in Sweden (9.9%), Luxembourg (7.3%) and Croatia (6.5%). When compared to the total share of foreigners, the percentage of TCNs is highest in relatively new member states, such as Croatia, Poland, and the Baltic nations (Chart 1).






Figure 1.2 Share of migrants in rural areas by origin and Member States (2017).

Source: own elaboration of EU-LFS microdata.

Note: figures for Bulgaria, Malta, Romania and Slovakia should be considered with caution due to the limited (<50) number of observation in the EU-LFS.

### Chart 1. Share of migrants in rural areas by origin and Member States, 2017

Source: Natale et al. 2019: 14

In rural and mountain areas, an increasing number of migrants arrived and induced various demographic and socio-economic transformation processes (Bock et al. 2016; Kordel 2017). Migration plays a key role in demographic processes across Europe, even more so in rural and mountain regions experiencing demographic decline. While migrant employment in rural and mountain areas is marked by seasonality, geographic concentration and ethnic niches of employment, demographic changes - mostly rejuvenation - and the development of non-agricultural activities introduce new opportunities. Among them, an increasing demand for services related to an ageing population, in the touristic and construction sectors, and in the food industry and distribution. With migration studies

mostly centred on urban regions, there is a substantial lack of knowledge regarding the impact and development potential that international migration brings to rural and mountain regions. Notwithstanding the prominence of urbanisation as a global trend, migration to rural and mountain areas can play an important role for European rural regions (Kasimis 2010), by, among the other things, contributing to the revitalisation of local social and economic milieus, reducing territorial inequalities (Rodriguez-Pose 2018) and taking part in urban-rural interrelations. Rural and mountainous areas are constantly being transformed by newcomers. Thus, the 'rural' cannot be addressed as static but is instead subject to change and transformation, fostered by immigration and wider processes of globalisation and mobility (Woods & McDonagh 2011). **Migration increases diversity** in rural and mountain areas, creating opportunities for social. It can be a crucial element for attaining balanced territorial development, as defined in the UN Sustainable Development Goals (Target 11.a, "Strengthening development planning"). In this regard, migration contributes to the redefinition of flows between the two poles of the urban-rural continuum, including both tangible (e.g. economic, housing) and intangible assets (e.g. human and cultural capital). It should therefore be considered in EU, national and regional development planning aiming to reduce demographic and economic imbalances in rural areas (European Parliament Think Tank 2017). Similarly, the EC's Action Plan on the integration of TCNs considers the use of European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and European Regional Development Fund (ERDF).

Reasons why migration to rural areas should receive more political attention were formulated by Natale et al. (2019):

- Residential and territorial aspects: in particular, migrants residing in rural areas and working in extra-agricultural sectors may counteract the effects of depopulation and contribute to maintaining socio-economic viability in rural areas;
- Contributions by migrants in the agricultural labour market, who complement native labour resources;
- Specific needs of transient and temporary migrants in terms of integration measures;
- Different attitudes towards immigration in rural and metropolitan areas.

Whilst Natale et al. (2019) base their assumptions mostly on the presence of agricultural migrant workers, due to their focus on Southern Europe, rural and mountainous employment markets throughout Europe are much more diverse and cannot be reduced to this sector (e.g. Germany, cf. Meister et al. 2019). This also holds true for the diversity of migration processes and its protagonists.

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## DIVERSITY OF MIGRATION PROCESSES

Nowadays, a range of migration processes, resulting from the main drivers for movement, can be identified in European rural and mountain areas, encompassing forced migration for humanitarian reasons, working migration, and amenity/lifestyle migration (Kordel & Weidinger 2018). Associated with the aforementioned processes, but sometimes categorised as single processes due to the fact that countries provide specific visa types for them, are family and student migration as well as return migration. When considering the status quo of immigration processes to peripheral areas, **the socio-economic, socio-demographic and ethnic diversity of protagonists** have to be addressed (Woods 2007), and migration of both foreign and domestic citizens must be considered. A further characteristic of current migration processes is their **transient nature**. Migration processes cannot be defined as unidirectional and more or less permanent movements from place A to place B. Instead, more temporary movements currently characterise late modern societies and secondary migration or onward mobility have recently raised scientific interest (Kordel & Weidinger 2019). Rural and mountainous places, therefore, are not only destination contexts but often become transient places for people on the move, characterised by temporary fixations (Bell & Osti 2010). Accordingly, protagonists establish place attachments and belongings in various places (transnational social spaces, Glick Schiller et al. 1992; Faist et al. 2013; for further conceptual presuppositions for MATILDE, see Deliverable 2.4, MATILDE Conceptual framework).

In the following section, international immigration to rural and mountain areas will be outlined. For this introduction, no differentiation between internal EU migration and that of TCNs will be made, since we can assume that both types of international newcomers – irrespective of legal differences – evoke changes in rural places. Previous international migration processes may prepare rural places for future cohorts (cf. path-dependency and chain migration, D2.4). Moreover, the composition of foreign citizens may change due to dynamic structural influences (economic transformations etc.). Furthermore, the spatial structuration of arrival contexts vary among European rural areas. Spatial diversity, including regional or local characteristics of the housing or employment market as well as of the attitudes of the local population, may have an influence on migrants' daily lives and ultimately on their aspirations to stay (cf. D2.4). The relevant characteristics will be developed in Chapter 2.

According to the questions set in the introduction, we ask:

1. **Why** are particular migration phenomena relevant in rural and mountain areas?
2. **To what extent** is the immigration process relevant in rural and mountain areas, both quantitatively and qualitatively, bearing in mind potential changes evoked by immigration?
3. **What protagonists** take part in the migration phenomenon and how has the composition of immigrants changed over time?

Categorisations of migration processes, as applied in the following section, however, often refer to the main motivations for migration or national visa regulations. With an awareness of the fact that it neglects multiple and changing motivations over time, which are addressed as being embedded in structural and inter-generational contexts both at places of origin and destinations, the identification of migration phenomena helps to structure this report (for a critical debate on migrant categorisations, see MATILDE Deliverable 2.4).

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## LABOUR MIGRATION

International labour migration to rural and mountain areas has recently been discussed with regard to the agricultural sector (Natale et al. 2019), in light of political transformations, e.g. the EU enlargement in 2004 when people of new member states sought employment in Germany, Austria, Great Britain and Ireland (Traser 2006; Nienaber & Frys 2012), and in terms of a general economic upswing. Whilst free movement due to the European Treaties is the precondition for EU citizens working in other member states, legal preconditions for entering the EU from third countries vary among member states and will be explored in the country reports. In 2017, the EU granted a total of 3.2 million valid residence permits and 1 million first permits for remunerated activities (Eurostat 2020a, 2020b).

Migrants employed in the **agricultural sector** may contribute to sustaining certain types of agricultural production (Natale et al. 2019). In 2011, 2.7% of all people employed in agriculture were TCNs (EU migrants: 1.6%); since then, migrants have only been able to partially compensate for the loss of 1.3 million native agriculture workers (+ 83,700 TCNs, + 58,500 EU migrants; Natale et al. 2019). The gender structure of migrants employed in agriculture is characterised as male dominated: the share of men from non-EU European countries is 71%, whilst among Asians it is 81% and North African migrants working in agriculture are almost exclusively men (92%; Natale et al. 2019). High seasonality and specific patterns of demand result in a temporary and often irregular nature of employment. In 2017,

approximately 60% of TCNs employed in agriculture had temporary jobs and were generally more likely to hold temporary jobs than natives (Natale et al. 2019). Finally, an unequal distribution of migrant employment in agriculture among member states must be considered. It has a significantly more important role in Southern European states, as the following graph indicates:

In Southern Europe, immigration from MENA countries and Latin America affected rural areas where agriculture serves as a model economy (for Greece, see Kasimis & Papadopoulos 2005; for Portugal, see Fonseca 2008; for Spain, see Morén-Alegret 2008).

While agriculture has played a fundamental role in determining immigration flows in such countries (Natale et al. 2019), this sector also represents a first step into the rural employment market, while migrants also find work in poorly paid jobs in the manufacturing and service sectors, e.g. gastronomy, tourism, crafts and trades (Kasimis & Papadopoulos 2005). In most other EU member states, construction, tourism and domestic services play a more important role. For Germany, for instance, Meister et al. (2019) report a diversified rural employment market, which, simultaneously creates regional clusters.

For **sectors affected by labour shortages**, such as caregiving in areas with ageing populations, an external labour force is increasingly needed. Besides EU migrants from new member states, TCNs are also recruited to fill these roles. Rural municipalities and private organisations have started to engage in marketing efforts to attract qualified employees or trainees (for doctors from EU states, see Dolejš et al. 2016). Recruitment of seasonal workers in agriculture from other EU countries is supported by contractors and other intermediaries. TCNs are recruited by means of bilateral labour arrangements (BLAs), bilateral agreements (BAs) or memoranda of understanding (MOUs) as well as unilateral programs that allow employers to recruit necessary workers (Martin 2016).




Figure 1.3 Difference between the share of migrants in total population living in rural areas and the share of migrants in total population living in cities by Member State (2011-2017).

Source: own elaboration of EU-LFS microdata.

Notes: figures for Bulgaria, Malta, Romania and Slovakia should be considered with caution due to the limited (<50) number of observation in the EU-LFS.

**Chart 2. Difference between the share of migrants working in agriculture and the share of migrants in all other sectors, 2011-2017**

Source: Natale et al. 2019: 27


There are fewer migrants in knowledge-intensive sectors in rural and mountain areas as compared to cities in absolute numbers. However, like people placed in rural areas by state authorities or organisations, such as foreign soldiers or priests, they may have a substantial qualitative impact locally. Furthermore, economic reasonings predominate when people decide to return to rural places of birth if fairly paid employment is available.

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## FORCED MIGRATION

Against the backdrop of multi-layered crises on the Balkan Peninsula and in Iraq in the 1990s and in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and on the African continent in the 2010s, a considerable number of asylum seekers and resettled refugees arrived in Europe. Therefore, in 2017, the EU counted one million valid residence permits of individuals with refugee status and around 460,000 residence permits of individuals with subsidiary protection (Eurostat 2020a). At least for the duration of their asylum procedures, many of them were accommodated in peripheral areas of European countries (cf. Chart 3). Proietti and Veneri (2019) found that with respect to the total resident population, asylum seekers are on average less concentrated in predominantly urban regions. While asylum seekers are particularly concentrated in urban regions in Latvia and the UK, the opposite is true in Belgium, Ireland and Norway (ibid.).

These high shares of asylum seekers in rural regions is a result of **dispersal policies** that distribute asylum seekers to rural and mountain areas (e.g. Austria, Finland, Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Turkey and the UK, OECD 2016) or that assign a municipality or rural region to a humanitarian migrant after recognition of their status (e.g. Finland, Germany, Norway and Sweden, ibid.). Political justifications stem either from a policy of burden-sharing of costs and pressure on the housing market, or from the assumption of rural areas as a preferable site for integration (Weidinger 2018). Only Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Portugal and Sweden incorporate employment-related elements into the dispersal schemes for humanitarian migrants, since employment prospects within regions may differ (OECD 2016: 23).



**Chart 3. Distribution of Hosted Asylum Seekers and Resident Population by Type of TL3 Region**

*Source: Proietti & Veneri 2019: 172*

2 Data sources: Authors' elaborations on nationally provided data. \*FIN, FRA, GRC and NLD refer to 2017; AUT, BEL, CHE, ITA, LTV, NOR, POL and PRT refer to 2016; GBR, IRL and SWE refer to 2015; DEU was updated in 2015. The classification of TL3 per type was updated in 2013. Luxembourg is absent because it has only one TL3 subdivision. Slovenia is absent because it has only two typologies of TL3.



Besides dispersal policies, shelters and accommodations are frequently installed at peripheral locations (Tardis 2019; Gauci 2020). TCNs migrating for humanitarian reasons are main target groups of integration programmes, which are mostly offered territorially based and migrants can only make use of them at the locality where they were initially placed. However, secondary migration and onward mobility may challenge the implementation of such measures. Due to changing legal status, family reunification or acquiring a workplace, they move on, either to metropolitan areas, where they (assume to) receive support by relatives and better education and employment opportunities, or to small towns within the region (Weidinger 2018; Kordel & Weidinger 2019). Others instead stay in rural and mountain areas, since they have developed ties and attachment for various reasons (ibid.).

Whilst the citizenship of TCNs can only be an approximation of the numbers of forced migrants in rural and mountain areas, their legal status and type of residence permit may be more appropriate for determining their quantitative extent. However, changes of status may occur due to the different pace of asylum procedures in various member states. Both absolute numbers of forced migrants arriving in different member states and the composition by citizenship vary among member states and will be elaborated upon in the subsequent country reports. The same holds true for the specific group of unaccompanied minors.

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## STUDENT MIGRATION

Immigration for education purposes, in 2017, encompassed 1.2 million valid residence permits and around 530,000 valid first permits within the EU (Eurostat 2020a, 2020b). This type of immigration is mostly referred to as student migration. Many European universities implemented internationalisation strategies, focusing on attracting both EU students and TCNs. Whether rural and mountain areas are affected by student migration strongly depends on the application of **decentralisation policies** and the resulting instalment of higher education infrastructures or opportunities to commute to urban centres. In Germany, Sweden and Scotland, for instance, universities were founded in rural and mountain areas in the 1970s for development purposes<sup>3</sup>, whilst nowadays, federal research institutions and campuses of existing universities diffuse to rural areas<sup>4</sup>. The existence of infrastructures is a precondition for the existence of student-related immigration (except from students commuting to high priced

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<sup>3</sup> Exception is St Andrews University, Scotland, founded in 1413.

<sup>4</sup> However, no systematic geo-referenced information on the location and characteristics of these campuses is currently available (Poelman & Dijkstra 2018).

urban areas), yet, universities in rural areas are not present in every member state. A further issue concerns the temporary nature of student migration. To increase already high staying aspirations among high-skilled graduates and simultaneously prevent brain drain, companies, municipalities and regions have implemented strategies to foster the transition from university to work (e.g. Thuringian Agency for Skilled Personnel Marketing, ThAFF 2020). As such, student migration is highly associated with labour migration, since residence permits may change once students graduate.

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## FAMILY MIGRATION

For each of the phenomena described above, family-related migration processes are crucial, especially for TCNs, and accounted for 800,000 first residence permits and 7.7 million valid permits in 2017 in the EU (Eurostat 2020a, Eurostat 2020b). Whilst residence permits related to employment or humanitarian reasons frequently represent the entry to the EU for TCNs, family reunification often follows after a certain period of time or after a resident has been granted a certain status. When considering the types of residence permits, visas issued for family reasons often predominate in total numbers; specific urban-rural differences cannot be detected due to a lack of empirical studies. Marriage of TCNs with EU citizens is also subsumed under family migration. Within family migration, women are overrepresented, and shares are highest in Denmark and Norway (> 75%, OECD 2017). They often face difficulties combining integration activities or employment with childcare (ibid. 10), and gender roles and female labour participation rates in origin countries may also be explanations for low employment rates (ibid.). In addition, migrant families encompass young adults as well as older persons (ibid.).

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## AMENITY/LIFESTYLE MIGRATION

Conceptualised as consumption-led migration, amenity migrants often prefer peripheral mountain regions with high cultural and environmental quality (Moss & Glorioso 2014), for instance in the Alps (Steinicke et al. 2012) or low mountain ranges (Bartoš et al. 2008). Frequently associating migration with the desire for a better life, such individuals, i.e., lifestyle migrants (Benson & O'Reilly 2009, 2016; Benson & Osbaldiston 2014), are relatively affluent and most have the resources (e.g. time and money) to decide freely where they would like to live. On an intra-European scale, lifestyle migrants, mostly from Northern and Central Europe, prefer Mediterranean coastlines and hinterlands (for Spain, cf. Rodríguez 2001, Kordel 2016; for Portugal, cf. Sardinha 2015; for Malta, cf. Åkerlund 2013) as well as rural France (Benson 2011; Gruber et al. 2017). They are either (pre)retirees (Kordel 2015) or middle-aged persons or young families, who become economically active as part of their desired lifestyle (so-called lifestyle entrepreneurs, see Eimermann & Kordel 2018). Purchase of real estate is a common strategy and point of entry for

lifestyle-oriented TCNs, for instance in France or Spain (Stone & Stubbs 2007). Especially in the aftermath of the financial crisis, some countries, such as Bulgaria, Italy and Spain, introduced an investment visa that provides residency and the potential for EU citizenship to well-off TCNs in order to stimulate construction-based economies (for a critique, see European Commission 2019, cf. country reports on Spain and UK). Due to their privileged status, temporary presence and multilocal dwelling are characteristic of lifestyle-oriented TCNs. Despite their relatively small numbers, their impact on regional and local housing markets, as well as on local economies and social lives can be high, as reported by Kordel (2015) and further developed in the country reports.


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## 2. MATILDE REGIONS: SELECTION CRITERIA AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

Author: Andrea Membretti

### 2.1 PLACE MATTERS: DIMENSIONS AND INDICATORS TO ANALYSE SOCIO-ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AT THE REGIONAL LEVEL

The basic assumption that MATILDE operates under is that, especially in rural and mountainous EU regions, **'place matters'** (Massey 1994; Gieryn 2000; Dreier et al. 2014) and is the result of a continuous socio-cultural **negotiation**, between a variety of inhabitants and structures in territories, and involving different categories of inhabitants - old and new, temporary and permanent, nationals and foreigners (Membretti & Viazzo 2017).

This seems particularly evident in a world changed by the Covid-19 pandemic, where (hyper)mobility (both at inter- and intra-national/regional levels, including migration flows) has been largely limited and, at the same time, the local dimension has taken on a new and growing role: the result is, in many respects, a new **'compulsion to locality'** (Membretti 2020) on a global scale, whilst mobilities on the other hand have enabled the spread of the pandemic.

Geographical, structural and socio-territorial aspects of the existing local context influence the impact migration can have on society and the economy, in addition to enabling different forms of migrant inclusion and of societal enactment. **The local and spatial dimension frames the ongoing societal reproduction and change** (Goffman 1974), the different needs, the demand for services and the integration capacity shaping migrants' impact on the welfare system, the education, housing and labour market structures at different scales in the considered territories (Huddleston et al. 2013).

MATILDE therefore assumes that the initial conditions and specific structures of certain regions firstly, make the difference in terms of the settlement process of the individual migrant and secondly, have an impact on the quantitative and qualitative impact of migration processes on those territories. However, we assume that the presence of migrants also changes local contexts in several ways.

To analyse the role of space and place within these processes and to consider their **path-dependency** (Moulaert et al. 2013) with respect to the local dimension, MATILDE rural and mountain regions have been selected for their diversity in terms of: spatial dimension (location and border dimension); different institutional and legal systems



(migration regimes and degree of regional autonomy); physical and geographical characteristics; migration history; and, finally, socio-economic performance.

This local diversity affects their capacity to attract and integrate (or not) TCNs, as well as their ability to exploit the full potential of foreign presence for supporting local development. Identifying and assessing site-specific features and contextual factors of each region is therefore extremely relevant for studying migration processes from a territorial perspective.

For these reasons, MATILDE regions are classified based on their **territorial and socio-economic characteristics** as well as their **spatial distribution of TCNs**. The classification was carried out both by using **existing regional typologies** (based on criteria such as population density, degree of urbanisation and spatial distribution of population) and by **collecting specific structural and socio-economic indicators** (e.g. accessibility of infrastructures, employment sector, education).

## 2.2 GENERAL CRITERIA FOR THE IDENTIFICATION OF MATILDE REGIONS

First, regions were identified on the basis of the general questions mentioned above. Then, we selected territories that could be considered relevant case studies with respect to this main question:

How can we appropriately **analyse the social, economic and territorial roles of mountain and rural regions** within the European Union? How can an accurate and multi-dimensional description of **regional performance** improve public opinion and help local actors and policymakers, on different scales, understand these roles and enhance local resources to overcome marginalization?

To select the MATILDE regions, a first set of **five general criteria** was adopted that consider, 1) spatial criteria, 2) institutional and legal systems, 3) physical and geographical aspects, 4) migration history of the region and, 5) the socio-economic performance of the region, respectively.

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### CRITERION 1: SPATIAL POSITIONING


A first general criterion for selecting MATILDE regions was **spatial**. The main **migration routes** and the mass movement of people in recent decades guided the selection process (Mitchell et al. 2020; Parkes 2015). In fact, considering the wider European scale, MATILDE regions are ideally positioned on a diagonal line (with branches) that stretches along the **cardinal directions (north vs. west vs. east vs. south)** from southeast (Turkey and then

Bulgaria) to northwest (Scandinavian countries and the UK (Scotland). Turkey and Bulgaria represent the eastern pole of the diagonal, with Italy, Germany and Austria in the middle of this axis, the Scandinavian countries the northern pole, and Spain to the west. This line is more or less what connects countries in the Middle East (with Turkey in a strategic position for controlling - or not - the access of migrants to the EU) to the richest part of Europe, where migrants wish to go for labour reasons but also for greater protection as refugees. At the same time, the south-north direction of the diagonal connects Northern Africa to Europe, representing the direction of key migration routes<sup>5</sup>. This diagonal also reflects the geopolitical positioning of regions at the European level in terms of trans-regional interactions, and their specific political and socio-economic weight in the EU (See following Table and Map 1).

	Case study regions	Country	MATILDE regions (NUTS3 level)
1	Vorarlberg	Austria	Bludenz-Bregenzewald
			Rheintal-Bodenseegebiet
2	Carinthia		Klagenfurt - Villach
			Oberkärnten
3	Harmanli	Bulgaria	Haskovo
4	Ostrobothnia	Finland	Ostrobothnia
5	North Karelia		North Karelia
6	Bavaria	Germany	Berchtesgadener Land
			Garmisch-Partenkirchen
			Oberallgäu
			Neustadt an der Aisch-Bad Windsheim
			Regen
7	South Tyrol	Italy	South Tyrol
8	Metropolitan City of Turin		Turin
9	Gudbrandsdalen	Norway	Oppland
			Hedmark
10	Huesca	Spain	Huesca
11	Dalarna	Sweden	Dalarna
12	Bursa	Turkey	Bursa
13	North Ayrshire	United Kingdom	East Ayrshire and North Ayrshire mainland

<sup>5</sup> See for instance European Council of Foreign Relations, Mapping Migration project

[https://www.ecfr.eu/specials/mapping\\_migration](https://www.ecfr.eu/specials/mapping_migration)



**Map 1. Locating MATILDE regions**

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## CRITERION 2: INSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL SYSTEMS

A second general criterion for selecting MATILDE regions is based on their **different institutional and legal systems** that determine diverse systems of migration governance. This results in a varying distribution of the responsibility for formulating and implementing policies - including migration and integration policies - across national, regional and local levels: even if within the EU general framework, the MATILDE regions display differing degrees and configurations of **autonomy for decision-making about migration and integration policy in relation to the nation state**. They also present different approaches to migrant treatment, from the recognition of the status of refugee to concrete labour opportunities or family reunification possibilities, due to diverse **migration regimes** (Koslowsky 2010; OECD & European Commission 2015). Through the multi-level governance **approach**, selecting regions with different migration regimes allows considering regional specificities and appreciating the broad interactions between policies, their implementation and the role of different actors involved (Scholten 2013; Penninx & Garcés-Mascareñas 2016; Caponio & Jones-Correa 2017), as well as the differing mechanisms for policy dialogue and coordination, national strategy and objective, earmarked and sustainable financing for integration and reception, multi-level evaluation frameworks and joint indicators (OECD 2018). MATILDE regions have been identified within five macro-territorial and geographical systems according to OECD typology, which groups countries based on 'peer groups of countries with similar challenges concerning immigration and the integration of immigrants and their children' (OECD 2015: 29-31):

- Bulgaria and Turkey are emerging destinations with small immigrant populations (the proportion of foreign-born residents rose in the last years), with gate-keeping functions in the EU externalisation strategy;
- Italy and Spain are new destinations with many recent labour immigrants that came to fill low-skilled jobs in the first half of the 2000s up to the onset of the financial and economic crisis;
- Austria and Germany are longstanding destinations for lower-educated migrants ("guest workers" who arrived during the economic boom in the wake of WWII, later followed by family migrants), and have played a proactive role in setting the agenda for the management of forced migrants arriving to Europe in recent years;
- Finland, Norway and Sweden are destinations with significant recent and humanitarian migration (humanitarian migrants and their families are overrepresented at both ends of the education spectrum);
- The UK is a longstanding destination with many recent and highly educated immigrants, and a new situation triggered by Brexit.

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
### CRITERION 3: PHYSICAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL ASPECTS

A third general criterion for choosing MATILDE regions was their **physical and geographical aspects**, focusing on territories characterised to different degrees as **rural and/or mountainous**. Such characterisation was conducted on the basis of established classifications like DEGURBA and Mountain Typology (EUROSTAT 2019). At the same, the presence of significant urban poles was considered, in order to evaluate the impact of migration flows on both marginalised/remote areas and on rural-urban interactions. As shown in Map 2 in the following page, the regions are, for the majority, categorised as predominantly rural, with a smaller proportion of intermediate and predominantly urban areas. At the same time, a wide proportion of them are classified as mountain regions with respect to a significative percentage of the population living in the mountains and/or territory defined as mountainous (See Map 3). Specific attention was also paid to the role of **international borders** in defining the status of these territories; in fact, we chose both regions bordering other EU and EFTA countries as well as inland regions (See Map 4).

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
### CRITERION 4: MIGRATION HISTORY

A fourth criterion is related to the **migration history** of MATILDE regions. From this perspective, **longstanding and recent processes of migration (both immigration and outmigration)** were considered, especially within remote areas and including new immigration destinations (NID). In many cases, MATILDE regions have been places of departure for decades, and only recently turned into places of destination – hence framing diverse degrees of experiences and diverse articulation of the public discourse about migration. This means both a relevant history of international immigration - especially of TCNs, who migrate primarily for labour motivation or family reunification. At the same time, historical experiences have also been considered, such as expellees and displaced persons following WWII as well as from the 1980s on. More recent phenomena, in particular regarding the arrival or resettlement of asylum seekers and refugees after the 2015 “migration crisis”, also factored into the selection of MATILDE regions in order to represent different responses.




**Map 2. MATILDE regions according to Urban-Rural Typology**





**Map 3. MATILDE regions according to Mountain Typology**



**Map 4. MATILDE regions according to Border Typology**



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## CRITERION 5: SOCIO-ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE

A fifth and final criterion is related to the **socio-economic performance of the regions**. Given the intent of reflecting regional diversity in terms of overall performance, we have selected both regions that had a positive socio-economic situation (regarding population dynamics, education, services, GDP, etc.) and regions that have displayed a less favourable socio-economic situation in the last decade (2008-2018). The rationale for selecting specific dimensions and indicators is presented in the following section.

### 2.3. ANALYSING THE PERFORMANCE OF MATILDE REGIONS: TERRITORIAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS

Once selected on the basis of the above-mentioned general criteria, MATILDE regions were analysed using a set of dimensions and territorial and socio-economic indicators deriving from these criteria, in order to describe and categorise each region. Indicators and dimensions were selected having as a point of reference: a) the overall regional performances in terms of social and economic processes, accessibility features and governance and b) the realms of integration and inclusion of migrants, as proposed by Ager & Strang (2008, for a detailed elaboration see MATILDE Conceptual framework, D2.4.) and their impact on regional development processes. Data collection was conducted based on five **main dimensions**:

- Physical and Geographical
- Accessibility and Infrastructural
- Social
- Educational
- Economic

Indicators were selected according to preliminary research questions, that is, *to describe and analyse the social, economic and territorial role and performance of European mountain and rural regions*. They cover different aspects of the above-mentioned nexus between the territorial and socio-economic characteristics of the MATILDE regions; the sub-questions that guided the identification of specific indicators for each dimension are detailed below.

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#### PHYSICAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL DIMENSION

Indicators of the physical and geographic dimension were selected to guide the characterisation of MATILDE regions as urban/rural, mountain/non-mountain, and border/inland territories (EUROSTAT 2019). The proximity of urban poles was considered by including the Functional Urban Areas indicator, to grasp the existence of hubs that function as a service centre and workforce attraction pole. Finally, land use was considered as a proxy for economic activities, i.e. to measure the share of land devoted to agriculture, forestry and other categories of economic activity.

The characterisation of MATILDE regions based on these typologies allows us to define **how TCNs are distributed across MATILDE regions, in relation to their physical and geographical aspects**.

Indicators	Description & Relevance
<b>Typology of space</b>	
Rural-Urban Typology <sup>6</sup>	Indicates the share of the population living outside urban areas. Identifies rural contexts within the project area.
Mountain Typology	Indicates the share of the population living in mountain areas and the share of territory covered by mountains.
Bordering Regions	Identifies regions that have population within 25 km of a land border.
Functional Urban Areas (FUA)	Consists of a densely inhabited city and of a less densely populated surrounding area (commuting zone)
<b>Land Use</b>	
Corine Land Cover	Indicates the share of territory covered by agricultural fields. Inventory of land cover in classes (agriculture areas, artificial surface such industrial areas and settlements).

**Table 2. Physical and geographical dimension**

## ACCESSIBILITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE DIMENSION

Indicators of the accessibility and infrastructure dimension were selected in order to characterise MATILDE regions on the basis of Access to Services of General Interest, as this dimension interacts with the opportunities, aspirations and psycho-social attitudes of people who decide to settle down in rural and mountain regions.<sup>7</sup> Accessibility usually represents “the extent to which land-use and transport systems enable (groups of) individuals to reach activities or destinations by means of a (combination of) transport mode(s)” (Geurs et al. 2004). As such, the accessibility of a location (e.g. a municipality) is usually calculated by comparing an impedance indicator (e.g. travel time by car to a destination), with an attractiveness indicator (e.g. the population of the destination). In this case, an alternative way

<sup>6</sup> A critical elaboration on the explanatory power and limits of the typologies of space is discussed in D2.4.

<sup>7</sup> The source of data for this dimension is the ESPON PROFECY classification, see ESPON Profecy <https://www.espon.eu/inner-peripheries>

to calculate accessibility is proposed (Ferencsik et al. 2015). It is calculated as the weighted travel time by car to the closest service. The population of each origin location is used as weighting factor. The travel time by car weighted by the population shows the average travel time that an inhabitant needs to reach the closest service. Thus, this indicator is comparable among services and among different regions, while it cannot illustrate differences between municipalities within a region.

While considering access to services as a potential pull factor for TCNs arrival, resettlement and/or settling-down in MATILDE regions, we also acknowledge that migrant interests may differ compared to the general population: specific consumption habits, the need for legal advice, and religious sites are just a few examples. Different priorities in terms of Services of General Interest (SGI) shall therefore be kept in mind. Moreover, the data collected display the distance by private car, which often does not coincide with the life-worlds of TCNs, as they may be most inclined to rely on public transport, especially in the initial phases following their arrival.

Indicator	Description & Relevance
Access to <b>hospitals</b> , to <b>primary schools</b> , to <b>secondary schools</b> , to <b>train stations</b> , to <b>grocery stores</b> , expressed in travel time by car (different benchmarks apply to different services)	Represents a key factor of attractiveness of rural/mountain territories.

**Table 3. Accessibility and infrastructure dimension**

## SOCIAL DIMENSION

Indicators of the social dimension highlight population size and composition, as well as population changes taking place in MATILDE regions. This data enables us to consider the socio-demographic structure of mountain/rural areas, as a basis for assessing how social structure plays a role in attracting TCNs. “Empty spaces” are regarded in the literature as potential facilitators of settlement, work opportunities and integration; in line with this, this data serves to test the hypothesis that weak socio-demographic structure offers more ‘empty spaces’ and opportunities. Social rarefaction (low population density) and an ageing local population in particular may represent pull factors for the relocation of forced migrants as well as generating demand for care services that are largely provided by foreigners, including TCNs. Focusing on social indicators enables us to explore **how population change and immigration of TCNs in mountain and rural regions are connected**.

Indicators	Description & Relevance
<u>Population size and composition</u> Population size Population density Median age of population Old-age dependency ratio (>65/14-64) Young-age dependency ratio (<15/15-64) Aging Index (>65/<14) Crude birth rate Total fertility rate	Identifies population size and characteristics in relation to ageing processes and dependency.
<u>Population Change</u> Crude rate of natural population change Crude rate of net migration Crude rate of total population change	Useful for assessing depopulation trends and the impact of foreigners on demographic developments.

**Table 4. Social dimension**

## EDUCATIONAL DIMENSION

Indicators of education attainment and attendance in MATILDE regions allow us to take stock of human capital and to consider how education systems perform differently across MATILDE regions. By focusing on this dimension, the aim is to examine **how the level of education in mountain/rural areas relates to the needs of the labour market**. Data on TCNs education level show **how the education level of TCNs matches the labour market needs**. Finally, we also consider **the level of education in mountain/rural areas as an element that may impact attitudes towards TCNs**. The classification of educational activities is based on the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED). Data until 2013 are classified according to ISCED 1997 and data as from 2014 according to ISCED 2011. Data are presented for three aggregates as follows: Less than primary, primary and lower secondary education (Levels 0-2), Upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education (Levels 3-4) and tertiary education (Levels 5-8).

Indicators	Description & Relevance
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Percentage of NEETs</li> <li>Tertiary education attainment, 25-64</li> <li>Tertiary education attainment, 30-34</li> </ul>	Represents a proxy for the different skills and human capital within the regions; provides a proxy for the opportunities for young people offered by the education system.

**Table 5. Educational dimension**

## ECONOMIC DIMENSION

Indicators included in this section provide framework information about the economic structure and labour market performance of MATILDE regions. The results serve as a basis for highlighting distinctive regional features, regarded as framework conditions that may favour or contrast the arrival and settling down of TCNs. These indicators aim to define the attractiveness of a region based on its economic performance, which contributes to **defining its attractiveness for TCNs to settle down in the region**, temporarily or definitively. By considering the relative weight of different economic sectors, the aim is to explain **which categories of TCNs are more likely to be attracted and retained by a region, based on the regional economic structure**.

By considering employment and unemployment levels, we are able to **examine how labour market dynamics** interact with TCNs arrival and settling down. Finally, the **risk of poverty is considered as a proxy for inequalities within the region**, which may hinder TCNs willingness to settle down, as well as representing an obstacle for social and economic policies.

Indicators	Description & Relevance
<b>Economic structure</b>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Regional GDP per capita at purchasing power standards</li> <li>Regional Gross value added per economic sector at basic prices by NUTS3</li> <li>Regions in industrial transition – ESPON Regional Typology</li> </ul>	Indicate the general well-being of a region compared to others. Allow us to appreciate the relative weight of the different economic sectors.

Indicators	Description & Relevance
<b>Labour market</b>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Unemployment rate (15-64)</li> <li>Employment by sector</li> </ul>	<p>Useful for understanding two phenomena:</p> <p>a) the overall employment level, as well as the relative weight of different occupation sectors (primary, industrial, services);</p> <p>b) the size of businesses, which may be relevant for studying migration.</p>
<b>Poverty/social exclusion</b>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>People at risk of poverty or social exclusion</li> </ul>	<p>Relates to the social dimension of economic regional disparities, measured in term of relative poverty, i.e., indicating the share of individuals with an equivalised disposable income below the risk-of-poverty threshold, which is set at 60 % of the national median income.</p>

**Table 6. Economic dimension**

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## PART B

### 1. COUNTRY REPORT AUSTRIA

Author: David Spenger, with contributions from Marika Gruber and Ingrid Machold

Since the 1990s, Austria has been affected by significant changes within a broader international context, resulting in considerable effects on Austria's population structure. International migration towards Austria particularly increased due to the opening of former Soviet countries, as a result of the Balkan crisis between 1988 and 1993, Austria's accession to the European Union in 1995, and increased globalization and geopolitical changes. Since the millennium, almost all regions of Austria have profited from labour migrants, particularly from new EU-Member States and, more recently, from Third Countries (Faustmann & Skrivanek 2019). The positive international migration balance has contributed to a persistent population increase in Austria, which is also valid for the majority of its rural regions. Despite the preference of immigrants for larger cities, particularly Vienna, rural and mountainous areas are also affected by considerable immigration surpluses, which compensate for local population losses in most of these areas (Machold & Dax 2019). The increasing social diversity of people with different origins, languages and cultures also becomes visible in community life and is influencing the recognized norms and values of the local society (Machold & Dax 2017). While challenging the ostensible homogeneity in rural areas and changes socio-cultural structures at a local level, this fact also bears great potential to innovate regional policy (Machold & Dax 2014; ENRD 2016).

In contrast to statistical evidence and long tradition of immigration, Austria can be seen as a reluctant immigration country (Fassmann & Münz 1996; Hintermann 2009; Herzog-Punzenberger 2017). According to analyses provided by Hintermann (2019), migration history is a marginalized topic in the context of identity shaping of national narratives and is almost invisible in public space. However, due to the migration processes, the everyday picture in large and medium-sized Austrian cities reflects that the population has become culturally, ethnically, and religiously diverse over the years (Münz 2015). Although this trend towards more diversity could already be observed for several decades, results of a study on international migration processes in Austria (Machold et al. 2013) indicate that the integration of newcomers at a local community level in many instances has long been individualized. Newcomers, most of them

economic or labour migrants, have been expected to look after their own needs with regard to the labour market, housing, language learning, etc., without substantial community support. Their motives for relocating to a rural and mountainous community were dependent on factors such as employment, housing, social networks, and family reunion / marriage. Furthermore, reasons to stay in the region were importantly linked to good, accessible education, social infrastructure, and local involvement namely within community and ethnic groups (ibid.; Machold & Dax 2019). In a further study about the reasons for immigration and the motives for longer-term settlement, which was carried out in a rural district in Carinthia, migrant interviewees name in particular, neighbours, employers and colleagues as well as school friends of their children as important social contacts who also help with the start in the new community. However, a lack of German language skills makes contact and social integration into the local community considerably more difficult and almost half of the interviewees reported that it is not easy to establish contact with the local population in that rural district (Gruber 2014). The local level is the target of immigration and municipalities socio-spatial context of the coexistence of locals and immigrants; the place where institutions, sub-units and social spaces such as kindergartens, schools, cultural facilities, playgrounds, club rooms, housing estates and pubs can create encounter and integration. It is therefore not surprising that the first integration model was adopted at municipal level by the Vorarlberg city of Dornbirn in 2002 (Antalovsky et al. 2009).

Since 2001, structural embodiment for integration policies on provincial level helped to bundle resources and responsibilities of relevant departments, e.g. in Vorarlberg, where the Projektstelle “okay.zusammen leben” has been commissioned to implement integration policies in 2001, while Vienna already implemented responsibility for integration issue in administration in 1997 (Expertenrat für Integration 2015). On provincial level, Tyrol decided on a “vision” for integration in 2006 (first province in Austria and many others followed), whilst in 2010 the National Action Plan for Integration (NAP.I) has been introduced. To accompany and advise integration policy, the independent Expert Board for Integration has been established with the aim to critically reflect on the integration monitoring (e.g. Statistik Austria & Bundesministerium für Europa, Integration und Äußeres 2019), to discuss main topics in the annual integration reports (latest one: Expertenrat für Integration 2019) and to point out priorities in integration policy. The competences for migration policies are located in the Ministry of Interior, which oversees quota systems and awards residence permits based on the Settlement and Residence Act (NAG) and, in case residences below 6 months are concerned, the Alien Police Act (FPG). With the approval of the 20-point programme, which represents the further development of the National Action Plan for Integration (NAP.I), for the first time, the Austrian Expert Board for Integration names the promotion of local and municipal integration competence as a priority measure in the field of integration policy (Expertenrat für Integration 2011).

## LABOUR MIGRATION

Austria's first annual quota of foreign worker recruitment was initiated in 1962–63 based on the Raab-Olah Agreement (Matuschek 1985). Due to an increased demand for labour, bilateral recruitment agreements were established with Spain (1962), Turkey (1964) and former Yugoslavia (1966) and indicated the start of Austria's "guest worker" settlement period. Accordingly, in the two decades following, Yugoslavs and Turks became the first and second largest migrant groups in Austria. Along with the Vienna region, highly industrialized parts of western Austria located in the Alpine Arc, i.e. Vorarlberg, Tirol, and Salzburg, particularly benefitted from significant numbers of labour migrants from both countries (Mayerhofer et al. 2010). After the first oil crisis in 1973 (Bauböck & Perchinig 2006), Austria's economic slowdown restricted migration policy and opportunities to re-enter the country, which led to enhanced family reunifications.

The immigration of workers from third countries to Austria can be seen as highly regulated also today (Biffl 2019). The legal basis for immigration of Third Country Nationals to Austria is formed both by the Settlement and Residence Act (NAG) and by the Foreign Employment Act (AuslBG)<sup>8</sup>. Therefore, Third Country Nationals can obtain a work permit and long-term residence status by being accepted as a key skilled and professional worker<sup>9</sup>, or by being employed as a temporal or seasonal worker in the tourist or agricultural sector or as an au-pair. Regarding low-skilled labour migrants, working permits are subject to annual quota regulations (Gächter et al. 2015). Since 2011, however, au-pairs are exempted from the strict quota (Haidinger 2016). In 2011, Austria introduced a points-based labour migration scheme known as the Red-White-Red (RWR) card to identify high-skilled migrants from third countries (Faustmann & Skrivaneck 2019; Federal Ministry of Labour, Family and Youth & Federal Ministry of the Interior 2020). The RWR card is a permanent residence permit and tied to required preconditions in the aspects of educational qualifications, work experience, language skills and age (Biffl 2019; Migration platform 2020)<sup>10</sup>. Between

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8 Available at: [https://www.migration.gv.at/fileadmin/downloads/gesetzestexte/AuslBG\\_englisch\\_1\\_10\\_2017.pdf](https://www.migration.gv.at/fileadmin/downloads/gesetzestexte/AuslBG_englisch_1_10_2017.pdf) (accessed last, 27.04.2020)

9 This refers especially to people which obtain a qualification of work experience that is high in demand on the Austrian labour market and can secure an income that guarantees 60% of the maximum amount calculated for social insurance tax revenue (Haidinger 2016).

10 The points calculator for the admission criteria is available at: <https://www.migration.gv.at/en/service-and-links/points-calculator/> (accessed last, 27.04.2020)

2013 and 2017, an annual number of 1,100 RWR cards was issued on average.<sup>11</sup> They represent only a small share of the annual net inflow to Austria, which has amounted to more than 50,000 persons since 2012, mainly from other EU Member States (60%)<sup>12,13</sup>.

From a historical perspective, based on the political and economic developments described above, the number and share of foreign workers has increased substantially from 1% in the 1960s to 19% in 2017 (with fluctuation in the 1970s and 1980s). Looking at rural areas, seasonal jobs and employment in central economic sectors such as agriculture, mining, production, manufacturing and tourism were addressed as key pull factors, which attracted international workforce, until now. The country's varying economic and labour market structures have generated different needs and opportunities for migrant employment. Foreign workers play an important role in regional labour markets, with highest shares currently in the western provinces of Vorarlberg (17.4%), Tyrol (14.9%), and Salzburg (11.4%, Faustmann & Skrivanek 2019).

## FORCED MIGRATION

Refugee policy and the claim to be a country of asylum were basic principles of Austrian self-understanding. After the end of the Second World War, Austria became one of the most important transit countries for refugees. At that time, approximately 1.4 million foreigners lived in Austria, including more than half a million so-called displaced persons. In the following decades, i.e. between 1945 and 1990, about 650,000 people reached the country. Austria became an important destination for political refugees as a result of political crises in communist Eastern Europe and due to its geographical location, encompassing, for instance, Hungarian refugees in the years 1956/57, Czechs and Slovaks after the violent ending of the "Prague Spring" in 1968 or Poles in the 1980s. The majority of these refugees also used Austria as a corridor to emigrate from here to the USA, Canada or Australia (Bauer 2008). Due to the Yugoslav wars, e.g. in Croatia (1991-1995) and Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992-1995), millions of people were forced to flee, whilst neighbouring Austria became an important receiving country. According to Fassmann & Reeger (2008), the annual net migration of foreigners grew from +12,000 in 1985 to +85,000 in 1991 and remained rather high until 1994 (+13,200). Therefore, and in combination with labour migrants coming to Austria after the fall of the Iron

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11 Data from Ministry for Interior, Fremdenwesen Jahresstatistiken. <https://www.bmi.gv.at/302/Statistik/start.aspx> (accessed last, 08.06.2020)

12 This share dropped below 60% in 2015 and 2016 due to the increased inflow of refugees and exceeded 60% in 2017.

13 Data from Statistics Austria / Wanderungen (accessed last, 17.05.2018).

Certainly, immigration received a boost in Austria at that time. In the area of politics, the right-wing Freedom Party (FPÖ) could make use of “the foreigner theme” and supported the framing of “othering” against migrants. Due to their electoral success at that time, a general shift to the political right-wing could be observed and had its consequences also in migration policy: “Migration control, deportation of rejected asylum seekers and refoulement at the border were no longer stigmatized but turned into a quality factor behind successful politics” (Fassmann & Reeger 2008: 28). Most recently, wars in Syria, Iraq or Afghanistan have led to a new increase of asylum seekers and refugees in Austria.

In 2015, it was the explicit aim of the Federal State to uniformly establish accommodation facilities for asylum seekers across all Austrian regions with a municipality benchmark of 1.5% asylum seekers of total inhabitants. An Act (*Durchgriffsrecht, Bundesverfassungsgesetz über die Unterbringung und Aufteilung von hilfs- und schutzbedürftigen Fremden*) was introduced that enabled the constitutional power of the Federal State to bypass municipalities when establishing accommodation facilities, even in case provinces, districts or municipalities oppose such plans (*Durchgriffsrecht*) (Rutz 2017)<sup>14</sup>. Based on a quota system, which obligates all nine provinces (*Bundesländer*) of Austria to accommodate asylum seekers during their asylum proceedings, immigration of asylum seekers also takes place in rural areas (Machold & Dax 2017) and finally changes the composition of foreigners. In the rural Carinthian district of Hermagor, for instance, Afghans became the sixth most important migrant group (Gruber 2019). As a consequence, many regions in Austria have to deal with this topic and debating it has become inevitable (Machold & Dax 2017).

Looking at rural areas and considering in particular their diversity, recognized refugees are facing several challenges. The receptivity of the local population, local municipalities and also local tourism organisations are of vital importance (Pehm 2005, 2006, 2007).

According to a qualitative study conducted by Scheibelhöfer & Luimpöck (2016) in rural Burgenland, regional territorial inequality in Austria fosters already existing disadvantages of refugees with regard to access to the labour market, mobility, housing and migration advisory services. Therefore, they conclude that regional characteristics can be seen as an aspect of intersectionality in the context of discrimination. In this context, refugees are likely to develop agency, own strategies and networks to overcome structural disadvantages (ibid.). At an even smaller scale, local peculiarities become more evident. The example of Bezau in the federal district of Vorarlberg highlights the

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<sup>14</sup> The validity of this Act was limited to about three years, until the end of December 2018 (Art. 6) (Gruber 2015).

important role of key actors and the cooperation and mediation among them at the local level (Gretter et al. 2017). These principles are also followed by a working group of mayors during the “European Forum Alpbach”, who made use of the general topic of inequality to share experiences about migrant integration (Europäische Forum Alpbach 2016). They argue that the reception of more migrants and refugees is possible, but it needs a reflective process which has to be accompanied by sensitive leadership (Machold & Dax 2017). On a broader level, similar ideas are pursued by the Thematic group on care and integration of refugees of the Austrian Rural Network, which is consulting municipalities in policies and measures of integration (Fischer 2017). An educational initiative, the project of “Hand in Hand” in Tyrol also highlights the important role of mediation between refugees and actors of the host society. In this project, employees of different local companies act as mentors for immigrants and refugees by presenting their work (ENRD 2019)<sup>15</sup>. The attitude of local key actors can foster or delimit future perspectives for the integration of refugees and migrants in general. An example of the latter case can be observed in the district of Upper Austria where several mayors were taken opposition against the distribution practice of the government.

## STUDENT MIGRATION

The number of foreign students in Austria steadily increased over the last decades. In the winter term 2017/18, 76,000 foreign students were enrolled at universities (27% of all students) and around 9,000 at universities of applied sciences (18% of all students). The majority (72%) came from EU / EFTA countries, one third came from third countries. In the winter term 2017/18, most relevant Third Country Nationals (TCNs) who were studying in Austria were citizens from Bosnia-Herzegovina (~3,200), Turkey (~2,900), Serbia (~2,100), Russia (~1,600), Iran (~1,400), and China (~900) (Statistik Austria/Bundesministerium für Europa, Integration und Äußeres 2019). Unsurprisingly, the vast majority of international students live in Vienna, Graz, Innsbruck or Linz. Besides the obvious fact that most universities are located in urban areas, Prazeres et al. (2017) find this preference is also motivated by the promise of superior lifestyle, symbolic value and amenities. Looking at those few who choose to study in rural areas, their results reveal that study participants appreciate their choice as a means for distinction from “the mass popularity of urban destinations” (ibid.: 21). Therefore, it can be concluded that places are seen in the context of relational

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<sup>15</sup> The importance of work integration for refugees’ social inclusion in rural communities has been at the core of the Interreg EUMINT project (2018-2020), involving Tyrol (Wipptal region) together with Italian South Tyrol and Friuli Venezia-Giulia (<https://it-it.facebook.com/Eumintproject/>).

negotiation and are used in narratives of distinction: “[T]his is potentially either to add to existing symbolic capital or instead, a tactic to compensate for lower institutional prestige” (ibid: 21).

The impact of students who study and live in rural areas can indirectly be analysed by a study on the regional economic effects emanating from the Carinthia University of Applied Sciences (CUAS) as an example of a university which has locations in four small rural and medium-sized district towns in Carinthia (Spittal an der Drau, Feldkirchen, Villach, Klagenfurt). By creating value with the help of employees and other production factors, similar to an ordinary enterprise, CUAS generates value added, direct effects on economic performance and, employment and value added as well as indirect effects and secondary purchasing power effects on the regional economy. Moreover, CUAS increases the educational level of the graduates and thus contributes to the development of human capital. The study states that the total annual expenditure of the CUAS amounts to approximately EUR 18.5 million. This results in value-added effects in the narrower sense of around EUR 51 million and employment effects of about 580 person-years gross (Haber & Getzner 2008).


## FAMILY MIGRATION

In 2017, 38,932 people were holding visa because of family reasons. The highest numbers among them are third country nationals from Turkey (9,965), Bosnia-Herzegovina (4,914) and Serbia (4,752, Niederlassungs- und Aufenthaltsstatistik 2018). According to the migration platform of the Austrian government (2020), family members apply for the so called “Red-White-Red Card plus” in order to get a residence permit for family reasons. Eligible applicants for this type of visa are family members of RWR card holders, EU Blue Card holders, Third Country Nationals with a long-term residence title in Austria, holders of a “Red-White-Red Card plus”, holders of a “settlement permit for self-employed persons”, certain holders of a “settlement permit - special cases of dependent gainful occupation” or holders of a “settlement permit - researchers”. Requirements for application for RWR-Card-Plus encompass a monthly income of 1,398 € for a married couple in 2018/19. In addition, family members have to document a German language competence of A1 (according to the EU reference scale) when first applying to the card. After granting the permanent residence permit, family members have unlimited access to the labour market and require no working permit as it is regulated in the Foreign Employment Act (Biffl 2019, for more details see also Lukits 2016). Until now, however, no specific studies dealt with the situation of family migrants in rural and mountain area.



## AMENITY/LIFESTYLE MIGRATION

Those who are immigrating to remote areas for lifestyle reasons are mainly Austrians and EU-citizens. Regarding age groups, empirical results reveal that (pre)retirees, i.e. those aged 40-59 years and 60-74 years, are more likely to migrate to areas further away from towns often constituting popular tourist destinations, i.e. Carinthian lakes region, Kitzbühel region, Salzkammergut region or Seefeld and Mieming plateaus (cf. Map 5; Marik-Lebeck & Wisbauer 2009; Gruber et al. 2017; Gruber 2018; see also Perlik & Membretti 2018). In addition, as it was confirmed by a study conducted in a district in East Tyrol, regions may have a negative migration balance in general, but a positive one among those aged 55-74 years. Among them, Bender & Kanitscheider (2013) expected one third to half to be returnees. Until now, however, amenity migration of Third Country Nationals in Austria is not of high relevance.




**Map 5. Austrian municipalities preferred by over-50 years old for immigration from another Austrian district or from abroad, 1996–2010**

*Source: Bender & Kanitscheider 2012: 240*



## 1.1 VORARLBERG: TERRITORIAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE REGION

Author: Ingrid Machold, with support of Lisa Bauchinger



Map 6. Vorarlberg

## 1.1.1 GEOGRAPHICAL AND TERRITORIAL FEATURES OF VORARLBERG

<i>TERRITORIAL INDICATORS, 2018</i>	<i>Bludenz-Bregenzerwald</i>	<i>Rheintal-Bodenseegebiet</i>
Share of population living outside urban and intermediate municipalities	55%	7.7%
Share of population living in mountain areas	> 50%	> 50%
Share of territory covered by mountains	> 50%	> 50%
Share of territory covered by agricultural fields	8.2%	25.4%
Border region	Yes	Yes

**Table 7. Territorial Indicators, Vorarlberg**

*Data sources: Eurostat Border typology; Urban-Rural typology; Eurostat Mountain typology; Eurostat Corine Landcover; Eurostat Degree of Urbanization (DEGURBA)*

The province (*Land*) of Vorarlberg (NUTS 2 region: AT34) is the second smallest of the nine Austrian provinces, covering an area of 2,601 km<sup>2</sup>. It is the most western province of Austria and borders Switzerland, the Principality of Liechtenstein (*Fürstentum Liechtenstein*), Germany, the province of Tyrol (AT) and lies within the Alpine Arc (see also Map 7). Vorarlberg is member of the international conference of the regions surrounding Lake Constance (*Bodenseekonferenz*), which supports cooperation and collaboration between regional authorities and stakeholders of the neighbouring counties of Switzerland (Appenzell Ausserrhoden, Appenzell Innerrhoden, St. Gallen, Schaffhausen, Thurgau, Zürich), Germany (Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria), Principality of Liechtenstein and Vorarlberg. The International *Bodenseekonferenz* is the umbrella organization of all transnational cooperation initiatives including the Interreg programme Alpenrhein-Bodensee-Hochrhein, the Spatial development commission Bodensee, Think tank for Bodensee Region and many others.


Vorarlberg is divided into two NUTS-3 regions Bludenz-Bregenzerwald (AT341) and Rheintal-Bodenseegebiet (AT342), which are distinguished by quite different territorial characteristics (see also Table 7). Although the NUTS-3 regions differ in their spreading, topography and the socio-economic development, in both regions the share of population living in mountain areas is more than 50% and more than 50% of the surface is covered by mountain areas.

The NUTS-3 region Bludenz-Bregenzerwald comprises the political district of Bludenz and the judicial district of Bezau (part of the political district of Bregenz). It is located in the mountain area of the Eastern Alps with 55% of the

population living outside urban areas. The region Bludenz-Bregenzerwald is characterized by different mountain ranges which separate the valleys (such as the valley communities of Bregenzerwald, Montafon, Kleines und Großes Walsertal, Walgau and Klostertal) and complicates direct connections and accessibility of the valley communities. It is dominated by mountain landscapes with a manifold cultural and natural heritage. Large parts of the area are Natura 2000 regions, whilst the Great Walser Valley (*Großes Walsertal*) is UNESCO World Heritage. The “three-tier agriculture” (*Dreistufenlandwirtschaft*) of Bregenzerwald is also on the Austrian list of UNESCO intangible cultural heritage. Nature, mountain farming and tourism play a decisive role for the development of the region with 33% of the area lying above an altitude of 1,500m. The highest peak is Piz Buin with 3,312m. Because of the high share of mountains and non-culturable land (wasteland) the share of territory covered by agricultural surface is about 8.2%, mainly composed of extensively used alpine pastures.

NUTS-3 region Rheintal-Bodenseegebiet comprises the political districts of Feldkirch and Dornbirn and the judicial district of Bregenz (28% of Vorarlberg's surface). This region is dominated by the Rhine valley which is demographically and economically very prosperous with a high economic output. It is recognized as one of the metropolitan regions of Austria with only 7.7% of the people living outside urban areas. On the other hand, 25% of the territory is covered by agricultural surface, mostly intensively used grassland and cultivation areas. As this region is characterized by a very lively economic, demographic and settlement development with conflicting spatial demands, a participation process was started in 2004 to develop a common spatial development vision, the “Vision Rheintal” (ÖROK 2005). It is still the basis for concrete implementation projects but has been adopted to strengthen regional cooperation on a smaller scale.

## 1.1.2 ACCESSIBILITY FEATURES OF VORARLBERG



**Map 7. Population distribution and accessibility of hospitals in Vorarlberg**



<i>ACCESSIBILITY of selected Infrastructures, 2016</i>	<i>Bludenz-Bregenzerwald</i>	<i>Rheintal-Bodenseegebiet</i>	<i>MATILDE regions average, 2016</i>
Access to hospitals, travel time by car weighted by population (minutes)	16	6.7	14.2
Access to primary schools, travel time by car weighted by population (minutes)	5.3	2.9	5.9
Access to secondary schools, travel time by car weighted by population (minutes)	6.7	3.7	9.2
Access to train stations, travel time by car weighted by population (minutes)	10	4	10.5
Access to shops, travel time by car weighted by population (minutes)	3.6	2.4	5.2

**Table 8. Accessibility of selected Infrastructures in Vorarlberg, 2016**

*Data source: ESPON Profecy 2018*

Map 7 shows travel times to the closest hospital by car and the distribution of population across the region. The difference between the urbanized and densely populated region Rheintal-Bodenseegebiet and the predominately rural region Bludenz-Bregenzerwald is quite visible. Three (out of four) regional centres are located within the Rheintal-Bodenseegebiet and accessibility by car is over-average in all key indicators listed in Table 8 above. On the other hand, high traffic volume in the road network particularly during rush hours may worsen potential accessibility rates. Public transportation is well developed with a main train connection in the Rhine Valley, Walgau and Klostertal (main railway connection from Vienna to Zurich) but also regularly operating bus connections also in the rural parts of Vorarlberg (Amt der Vorarlberger Landesregierung 2019).

Most hospitals are located in Rheintal-Bodenseegebiet which calls for a weighted travel time of only 6.7 minutes by car. A sole provincial hospital is located in the regional centre of Bludenz and particularly serves the inhabitants of the political district of Bludenz, while inhabitants of the Bregenzerwald rather choose the geographically easier accessible hospitals in regional centres of the Rheintal-Bodenseegebiet. Therefore, the weighted travel time by car is above the MATILDE regions average (16 minutes in Bludenz-Bregenzerwald compared to 14.2 minutes). In general, municipalities are still well-equipped with primary and secondary schools, acknowledging the importance of small schools in primary education also in remote parts of the region Bregenzerwald (Bechtold 2012; Raggl et al. 2015). With regard to higher secondary schools, the distribution is scarce. Only two high schools are located in the region Bludenz-Bregenzerwald (in the municipalities Bludenz and Egg). Weighted travel time to train stations is also

slightly below average in Bludenz-Bregenzerwald compared to the MATILDE regions average. This is due to the fact that many small villages are located in the neighbourhood of the main railway connection to Vienna, although stops may not be in use most of the times. The average travel time to shops is low in both NUTS-3 areas. Given the urban background this is of no surprise in Rheintal-Bodenseegebiet. The good provision with shops in Bludenz-Bregenzerwald is due to its high touristic orientation on the one hand, and the high willingness and awareness of the local population in some villages to support small groceries in their municipality – in some case via alternative financial transfers – on the other hand (Kaufmann 2012).

### 1.1.3 SOCIAL FEATURES OF VORARLBERG

<i>DEMOGRAPHIC INDICATORS<sup>16</sup></i>	<i>Bludenz-Bregenzerwald, 2018</i>	<i>Rheintal-Bodenseegebiet, 2018</i>	<i>BB, Variation (2008-18)</i>	<i>RB, Variation (2008-18)</i>	<i>National average, 2018</i>	<i>EU27 average, 2018</i>	<i>MATILDE regions average, 2018</i>
Population size	91,399	300,342	+3.5%	8.3%	-	-	425,252
Population density (inhabitants per km <sup>2</sup> )	49.4	444.5	47.4-49.4	408.6-444.5	107.1	105.3	102
Median age of population (years)	42	41.4	0.5*	0.6*	43.2	43.1	45

16 \* This is calculated only for the period 2014-2018; \*\* Minimum and maximum values recorded in the period considered.

<i>DEMOGRAPHIC INDICATORS<sup>16</sup></i>	<i>Bludenz-Bregenzer wald, 2018</i>	<i>Rheintal-Bodensee-gebiet, 2018</i>	<i>BB, Variation (2008-18)</i>	<i>RB, Variation (2008-18)</i>	<i>National average, 2018</i>	<i>EU27 average, 2018</i>	<i>MATILDE regions average, 2018</i>
Old-age dependency ratio	26.1	25.5	1.2*	1.4*	27.9	30.5	33
Young-age dependency ratio	24.1	24	0.8*	-0.1*	21.6	24.1	23
Aging Index	108.8	105.6	1.8	5.6	129.9	124	148
Crude birth rate	10.2	11.2	0	0.8	9.7	9.8	9.1
Total fertility rate	1.6	1.7	0.04 *	0.08 *	1.47*	1.54	1.58
Crude rate of natural population change (‰)	1.6	3.6	1.3 / 3.4**	2.9 / 3.7**	0.2	-1.0	-1.7
Crude rate of net migration (‰)	3.8	3.3	-6.9 / 13.5**	1 / 11.1**	4	2.6	3.6
Total population change (‰)	5.3	6.9	-4.1 / 15.3**	4.6 / 14.4**	4.1	1.6	1.9

**Table 9. Demography indicators of Vorarlberg, 2018**

*Data sources: Eurostat, Population (Demography, Migration and Projections)*

## DEMOGRAPHY


Within the two NUTS-3 areas of Vorarlberg the distribution of population is quite in contrast to the proportion of the surface area. While the Rheintal-Bodenseegebiet covers only 28% of the overall area of Vorarlberg, 77% of the population (about 300,000 people) settle there. The population density is highly above the national average (445 inhabitants per km<sup>2</sup> compared to 107 in Austria, see also Table 9) and refers to the classification of the Rheintal-Bodenseegebiet as a metropolitan area. Quite the contrary is the demographic situation in Bludenz-Bregenzerwald, where 23% of the overall population of Vorarlberg settle with a population density well below the Austrian average (50 inhabitants per km<sup>2</sup>).

Both regions convey a positive average annual change in population between 2008 and 2018 of 0.3% in Bludenz-Bregenzerwald and 0.8% in Rheintal-Bodenseegebiet. However, looking a little bit more in depth, the number of inhabitants living in Bludenz-Bregenzerwald **was slightly decreasing** from 2008-2014. This was particularly due to a negative migration balance during these years and stagnating birth rate. The region Rheintal-Bodenseegebiet on the other hand shows a continuously high growth rate of total population. **Inhabitants increased** from 277,247 in 2008 to 300,342 in 2018 particularly because of the positive migration balance during the past few years.

Since the Second World War, immigration is an important part of the overall positive demographic development in Vorarlberg. In the 1950s, internal labour migrants from economically weaker provinces of Austria (Carinthia and Styria) dominated, since the 1970s, Vorarlberg has particularly attracted labour migrants from Turkey and former Yugoslavia working in textile and construction industry. Since then, the population of Vorarlberg has become more diverse with regard to immigrants from old and new EU member states and more recently from other third countries than Turkey (inter alia refugees). Migrants not only settle in the Rhine Valley but also in smaller mountainous valleys according to the location of industrial plants and the touristic development of the community (Barnay & Manahl 2003/2017).

The share of foreigners has been continuously growing in both NUTS-3 regions between 2008-2018, from 11.9% to 16.4% in Bludenz-Bregenzerwald and from 12.8% to 17.7% in Rheintal-Bodenseegebiet. Focusing on the share of TCNs of the overall inhabitants, the refugee movements in the 2010s are quite perceivable. From slightly declining development in the years 2008-2014 (more or less 5% of the overall inhabitants in Bludenz-Bregenzerwald and 8% in Rheintal-Bodenseegebiet are TCNs) the share of TCNs increased to 6.1 in Bludenz-Bregenzerwald and 9.1% in Rheintal-Bodenseegebiet in 2018 (see also Chart 4 and Chart 5).






**Chart 4. Third Country Nationals over total population in Bludenz-Bregenzerwald, 2008-2018**

*Data source: Statistik Austria STATcube*


Population composition in the Vorarlberg NUTS-3 regions is younger compared to the national average and MATILDE regions average, with Rheintal-Bodenseegebiet even slightly younger than Bludenz-Bregenzerwald. This can be derived from all population composition indicators of Table 9. A telling indicator is the ageing index that exemplifies the comparably young population structure of Vorarlberg. While the national average is about 130 (and average MATILDE regions about 148), in Bludenz-Bregenzerwald it is 109 and 106 for Rheintal-Bodenseeregion. The same is true for the old age dependency ratio, which is lower in both regions (about 26) compared to national average (about 28) and average MATILDE regions (about 33). The birth rate is higher than the national average of 9.7 births per 1,000 inhabitants, with 10.2 in Bludenz-Bregenzerwald and 11.2 in Rheintal-Bodenseegebiet and quite stable since the last 10 years. The fertility rate, which indicates the average number of children per woman with 1.6 (Bludenz-Bregenzerwald) and 1.7 (Rheintal-Bodenseegebiet) is above national and Matilde regions average but far below the 2.1 threshold needed to sustain current population numbers.



**Chart 5. Third Country Nationals over total population in Rheintal-Bodenseegebiet, 2008-2018**


*Data source: Statistik Austria STATcube*

Looking at the migration balance, in both NUTS-3 regions, a remarkable peak can be observed in the year 2015 due to the high inflow of asylum seekers at that time to Austria (see also Chart 6 and Chart 7). Vorarlberg, like all other Austrian provinces (*Bundesländer*) was obligated to accommodate asylum seekers during their asylum proceedings based on the national quota-system. A closer look to the internal and international migration processes reveals that until 2015 Bludenz-Bregenzwald has lost many inhabitants particularly Austrians but also foreigners to the neighbouring and economically more prospering Rheintal-Bodenseeregion. The generally **positive migration balance** is based on international immigration. This counts also for Rheintal-Bodenseeregion. The main difference compared to Bludenz-Bregenzwald is the much higher influx of foreigners in absolute numbers. Migration balance for Austrian nationals is also negative in Rheintal-Bodenseegebiet, particularly due to their high numbers of international outmigration.



**Chart 6. Migration Balance in Bludenz-Bregenzerwald, 2008-2018**

*Data sources: Statistik Austria STATcube*




**Chart 7. Migration Balance in Rheintal-Bodenseegebiet, 2008-2018**

*Data sources: Statistik Austria STATcube*

## DEMOGRAPHY: FOCUS ON TCNS


In the region of Bludenz-Bregenzerwald, the development of the numbers of TCNs grew from 10,409 in 2008 to 16,005 in 2018. Beside this overall increase in numbers, which is a result from the refugee influx starting in 2015, from 2008 to 2014, the number of TCNs in the region was continuously decreasing (see chart 8). Reasons for the decrease during this period of time can be returns to the home country due to lack of identification and/or discrimination in the country of immigration, retirement, economic development in the home countries and the need of proximity to family members in the home country. Other reasons can be migration within the province of Vorarlberg or to another province of Austria, due to education, training or job opportunities. Moreover, the decline of TCNs can also be explained due to approved naturalisation.



**Chart 8. Number of Third Country Nationals in Bludenz-Bregenzerwald, 2008-2018**

*Data source: Statistik Austria STATcube*

In the region of Rheintal-Bodensee, the development of the numbers of TCNs grew from 22,408 in 2008 to 27,347 in 2018. Beside this overall increase in numbers, from 2008 to 2014, the number of TCNs in the region was very stable. The graph indicates that the highest growth rates were found in the years 2015 to 2017 (see Chart 9).



**Chart 9. Number of Third Country Nationals in Rheintal-Bodenseegebiet, 2008-2018**

*Data source: Statistik Austria STATcube*

## IMPORTANT NATIONALITIES IN BLUDENZ-BREGENZERWALD

As Table 10 shows, citizens from Turkey, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia (and Montenegro) remain the most important groups of TCNs in the region of Bludenz-Bregenzerald, comparing 2008 and 2018. The migration history with these countries dates back to the 1990s and the Yugoslav wars. The case of Turkish citizens can be explained by a tradition of migration, basically starting from the guest worker program in the 1960s. However, in the forthcoming years, the migration of Turkish and Ex-Yugoslavian nationalities became increasingly heterogeneous, and labour migration was accompanied by family reunification, marriage and educational migration (Hahn & Stöger 2014). At the same time, migrants from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Turkey returned to their home countries, when they reached retirement age (Reinprecht 2009). Another reason for remigration of Turkish nationalities to their home country can be the lack of employment prospects due to the consequences of the economic collapse of the economic crisis in 2008/2009. For the second generation, reasons, like increased standard of living in Turkey, regular contact with family members and relatives in the home country, high level of religiousness, good knowledge of the Turkish language and low identification with the country of immigration are associated with an increased readiness to return (Fokkema 2011). Additionally, TCNs from countries which are currently involved in wars such as Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria, gained in relevance.

2008			2018		
1	Turkey	2,162	1	Turkey	1,743
2	Bosnia and Herzegovina	1,186	2	Bosnia and Herzegovina	994
3	Serbia and Montenegro (fc)	664	3	Syrian Arab Republic	755
4	Russian Federation	199	4	Serbia	431
5	Brazil	193	5	Afghanistan	371
6	North Macedonia	75	6	Russian Federation	212
7	Ukraine	65	7	Iraq	207
8	Armenia	45	8	Brazil	138
9	Thailand	38	9	Somalia	113
10	P.R. China	30	10	North Macedonia	87

**Table 10. Total number of Third Country Nationals by citizenship (TOP10) in Bludenz-Bregenzerwald, 2008-2018**

*Data source: Statistik Austria STATcube*

## IMPORTANT NATIONALITIES IN RHEINTAL-BODENSEEGEBIET

As Table 11 shows, citizens from Turkey are the far most relevant group in the region of Rheintal-Bodenseegebiet. One explanation for this fact can be found in the migration tradition, starting from the guest worker program in the 1960s. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia (and Montenegro) remain the second and third most important groups of TCNs in the region. The migration history with these countries dates back to the guest worker recruitment during the 1960s and the Yugoslav wars. More recently, TCNs from countries, which are currently involved in wars, gained of relevance. Therefore, citizens from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq or Somalia appear in the list of TOP-10 nationalities in 2018.

2008			2018		
1	Turkey	12,145	1	Turkey	11,457
2	Serbia and Montenegro (fc)	3,970	2	Serbia	3,305
3	Bosnia and Herzegovina	3,110	3	Bosnia and Herzegovina	2,772
4	Russian Federation	752	4	Syrian Arab Republic	1,782
5	Brazil	221	5	Russian Federation	1,524
6	P.R. China	192	6	Afghanistan	1,274
7	North Macedonia	188	7	Kosovo	415
8	Thailand	181	8	Iraq	365
9	Philippines	145	9	Somalia	359
10	United States	122	10	Brazil	322


**Table 11. Total number of Third Country Nationals by citizenship (TOP10) in Rheintal-Bodenseegebiet, 2008-2018**

*Data source: Statistik Austria STATcube*

Among the various countries of origin of refugees, citizens of the Russian Federation, but more specifically Chechens, have represented a large group of asylum seekers in Austria since 2002. Due to an extremely repressive regime and massive human rights violations in the autonomous republic of the Russian Federation, the numbers of Chechens in Austria further increased in recent years (Schmidinger 2009). The increased migration to the Rheintal-Bodenseegebiet is explained by its urbanised character, which is in general more attractive to migrants due to higher job and education opportunities.

## AGE AND GENDER STRUCTURE IN BLUDENZ-BREGENZERWALD

The age structures of Austrian nationals and TCNs in Bludenz-Bregenzerswald differ in a pronounced way (see Chart 10). TCNs are much younger than the Austrian population in Bludenz-Bregenzerswald with the highest difference in the age groups of the 15-29 years and the 30-44 years-old inhabitants where TCNs have a share of 24% respectively 27% compared to Austrian nationals with about 17% in both age groups. Particularly men from third countries are of younger age (15-29 years) as the age pyramid in Chart 11 reveals. This may refer to comparatively high mainly male and mainly young asylum seekers who arrived during 2015 and 2016 in Bludenz-Bregenzerswald and male labour migrants working in construction industries. Female TCNs are especially well represented in the age group of the 30-44 years.




**Chart 10. Age structure by nationalities in Bludenz-Bregenzerwald, 2019**

*Data source: Statistik Austria STATcube*


The total number of female TCNs in Bludenz-Bregenzerwald was 2,764 in 2018, which is a share of 47%. While the absolute number of female TCNs grew from 2008 to 2018, its share decreased from 48.8% in 2008 to 47.0% in 2018 (see also Chart 12). In particular, it decreased from 2015 to 2016 after the arrival of mainly male asylum seekers and increased afterwards as a result of family reunion to humanitarian migrants.





**Chart 11. Age pyramid in Bludenz-Bregenzerwald, 2018**

*Data source: Statistik Austria STATcube*




**Chart 12. Share of female Third Country Nationals in Bludenz-Bregenzerwald, 2008-2018**

*Data source: Statistik Austria STATcube*

## AGE AND GENDER STRUCTURE IN RHEINTAL-BODENSEE


The age structure of Austrian nationals and TCNs in Rheintal-Bodenseegebiet shows more even characteristics compared to the one of Bludenz-Bregenzerwald. However, also in this region the share of younger age groups is considerably higher with a peak of 29% in the age group of the 30-44 years old TCNs compared to 18% Austrian nationals in the same age group. This refers to the fact that immigration of TCNs in Rheintal-Bodenseegebiet is an “old” phenomenon with many jobs and housing opportunities. Gender differences in the age groups are not so marked with the largest group in the age group of the 30-44 years for both sexes (see also Chart 13 and Chart 14).



**Chart 13. Age structure by nationalities in Rheintal-Bodenseegebiet, 2019**


*Data source: Statistik Austria STATcube*

The total number of female TCNs in Rheintal-Bodenseegebiet is 13,010 in 2018, which is a share of 47.6%. While the absolute number and also the share of female TCNs steadily grew from 2008 to 2015, it declined between 2016 and 2017 as a result of the influx of mainly male asylum seekers. For 2018, a slight increase can be noticed, which can be explained by family reunifications with sponsors living in Austria for humanitarian reasons (see also Chart 15).



**Chart 14. Age pyramid in Rheintal-Bodenseegebiet, 2018**

*Data source: Statistik Austria STATcube*



**Chart 15. Share of female Third Country Nationals in Rheintal-Bodenseegebiet, 2008-2018**

*Data source: Statistik Austria STATcube*

## 1.1.4 EDUCATIONAL FEATURES OF VORARLBERG

Education attainment of total population in Vorarlberg, 2018 <sup>17</sup>	<i>Vorarlberg</i>	<i>Variation 2008-2018</i>	<i>MATILDE regions average</i>
NEETS	6.9%*	6.7%-9%*	9.2%
Tertiary education attainment 25-64 (% , percentage points)	21.6%	11.4	31.1%
Tertiary education attainment 30-34 (% , percentage points)	32.4%	12.3	37.5%

**Table 12. Education attainment of total population in Vorarlberg, 2018**


*Data source: Eurostat, edat\_lfse\_22, edat\_lfse\_04, edat\_lfse\_12, NUTS2 level*

The case that there is no university in Vorarlberg, is often discussed when it comes to tertiary education attainment (Kramer 2016). It is below the national average and also well below the MATILDE regions average. Particularly when older cohorts (25-64 years) are included in the calculations, their tertiary education attainment of only 22% is low compared to 31% of MATILDE regions average. In younger cohorts (30-34 years) a catching up process is perceivable. Reasons are the expanded offer of applied university courses and the increasing educational level in general.

There are no data available regarding different education levels in the region of Bludenz-Bregenzerwald, therefore data from the corresponding NUTS2-region Vorarlberg had been taken into account. There are clear differences between the education level of TCNs and the level of population as a whole. While TCNs show the highest share in primary or less than primary education, the total population has the highest share in secondary or upper secondary education level. In addition, a growing tendency of people obtaining tertiary education can be documented for the region (2008: 13.6%, 2018: 25.3%, see also Chart 16).


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<sup>17</sup> \*Latest data available: 2017



**Chart 16. Education level, total population and Third Country Nationals in Vorarlberg, 2008-2018**

*Data source: Eurostat*



**Chart 17. Share of young NEETS (15-34y/o) in Vorarlberg and Austria, 2008-2018**

*Data source: Eurostat*

The NEET rate (young people neither in employment nor in education and training, aged 15-34) of the total population of Vorarlberg can be characterized as very stable between 2008 and 2018 and closely follows the national trend (see also Chart 17). The NEET rate of TCNs in Austria shows a highly different level. Although in 2018 (22.2%) it is at the lowest level since 2008 (27.5%), it remains at a much higher level than the rate of the total population (9.4% in 2018). When taking into account national data (*FABA – frühe BildungsabbrecherInnen*), which has the same meaning but a different data base, analysis on regional level confirm that more than 30% of the young people that originate from third countries are not integrated in the education system. To a rising share, this particularly concerns young male, but is also fact for young females compared to Austrian nationals of the same age. This high percentage was already perceivable in 2014 (before the refugee crisis) and even more so in 2015 (Steiner et al. 2019).

### 1.1.5 ECONOMIC FEATURES OF VORARLBERG

<i><b>ECONOMIC INDICATORS, 2017</b></i>	<i><b>Bludenz-Bregenzwerald (BB)</b></i>	<i><b>Rheintal-Bodenseegebiet (RB)</b></i>	<i><b>BB, Variation 2008-2017</b></i>	<i><b>RB, Variation 2008-2017</b></i>	<i><b>National Average (2017)</b></i>	<i><b>EU-27 average (2017)<sup>18</sup></b></i>	<i><b>MATILDE regions average (2017)</b></i>
<b>Regional GDP per capita at PPS</b>	43,700	41,600	0.4%	1.3%	38,100	29,800	29,624
<b>Regional Gross value added: primary sector (% , percentage points)</b>	1%	0%	-0.1	-0.1	1%	2% (7,098.5 million euro)	4%
<b>Regional Gross value added: secondary sector (% , percentage points)</b>	36%	40%	-3.3	0.2	29%	27% (99,067.3 million euro)	30%

18 Missing data for France for Regional Gross Value Added and Employment by sector: Average has been therefore calculated on the basis of 26 Member States.

<i>ECONOMIC INDICATORS, 2017</i>	<i>Bludenz-Bregenzerwald (BB)</i>	<i>Rheintal-Bodenseegebiet (RB)</i>	<i>BB, Variation 2008-2017</i>	<i>RB, Variation 2008-2017</i>	<i>National Average (2017)</i>	<i>EU-27 average (2017)<sup>18</sup></i>	<i>MATILDE regions average (2017)</i>
<b>Regional Gross value added: tertiary sector (% , percentage points)</b>	63%	60%	3.4	-0.2	70%	71% (263,863 million euro)	66%


**Table 13. Economic indicators in Vorarlberg, 2017**

*Data sources: Eurostat Gross domestic product (GDP) at current market prices by NUTS 3 regions; OECD Gross domestic product (GDP); Eurostat Gross value added at basic prices by NUTS 3 regions*

## ECONOMIC STRUCTURE

Vorarlberg (and its NUTS-3 regions) is an economically prospering region with the second highest regional gross domestic product per capita (after South Tyrol/Bolzano) compared to other MATILDE regions (see also Table 13 and Chart 18). The regional GDP of Bludenz-Bregenzerwald and Rheintal-Bodenseegebiet is also well above the Austrian average (43,700 and 41,600 compared to 38,100 in 2017), although these averages may hide considerable differences between intensive touristic destinations (like Lech am Arlberg) and other municipalities.

Historically, Vorarlberg was one of the earliest developed industrial regions of Austria. Because of its lack of exploitable raw materials and the less favourable conditions for agriculture, industrial development with a domination of textile industry occurred already at the beginning of the nineteenth century based on cottage-industry. Textile industry was very important until the 70s of the last century (Melichar 2016) when it lost its importance due to high competition from low-wage countries and the general effects of the world-wide economic crisis of that time. Following this collapse, the structure of sectors and industries changed considerably. Vorarlberg recovered from this drop of specified industrial production and diversified its production accordingly (Lukesch et al. 2010). With regard to the last ten years, the economy of Vorarlberg has been constantly growing until 2015, when it stagnated on a comparably high level.



**Chart 18. Gross Domestic Product trends in Vorarlberg, 2008-2017**

*Data source: Eurostat, Gross domestic product (GDP) at current market prices by NUTS 3 regions*

## LABOUR MARKET

The driving forces behind the general favourable economic development are related to the following factors: Vorarlberg is still an important industrial site in Austria, with the highest relative share of people employed in industry in Austria (76 in 1,000 inhabitants) (WKV 2019). Accordingly, the secondary sector is well developed with a regional gross value added of about 36% in Bludenz-Bregenzerwald and even 40% in Rheintal-Bodenseegebiet (compared to the national average of 29% and MATILDE regions average of 30% in this sector) and a high share of employment in this sector (32% in both NUTS-3 regions, see also Table 14 and Chart 19). In the last years, the production of metal goods and mechanical engineering has been a dominant factor as it covers 61% of the overall industrial production in Vorarlberg (without construction sector, WKV 2019). Other relevant branches are electronic engineering (16%) and the production of foodstuff and beverages (13%). Although textile industry has been reduced to 11% of the overall industrial production in Vorarlberg, it still covers 23% of the Austrian production. Other factors that influence the success of the economic output are the economic connectedness with the neighbouring countries due to its borders to Germany, Switzerland and Liechtenstein, leading to high export rates, and a high share of innovation measured in patent applications (Lukesch et al. 2010).



<i>LABOUR MARKET INDICATORS<sup>19</sup></i>	<i>Bludenz-Bregenzerwald</i>	<i>Rheintal-Bodenseegebiet</i>	<i>BB, variation 2008-17</i>	<i>RB, variation 2008-17</i>	<i>National Average (2017)</i>	<i>EU-27 average (2017)</i>	<i>MATILDE regions average (2017)</i>
Unemployment rate (%/percentage points)	3.2%	4%	-0.5	-0.2	5.5%	8.1%	8.4%
Employment in primary sector (% , thousands of employees)	5% (2.4)	1.4% (2)	-11.1	-9	4%	5% (353.98)	5% (6.75)
Employment in secondary sector (% , thousands of employees)	32% (14.8)	32.3% (47.5)	+9.7	+10	22%	23% (1,584.74)	26% (36.19)
Employment in tertiary sector (% , thousands of employees)	63% (29.6)	66.3% (97.6)	+10.5	+13	74%	71% (4,830.33)	69% (97.63)
People at risk of poverty or social exclusion (%/percentage points)	18% (average 2008-2018)		-0.2		18.7 % (average 2008-2018)	21.6%	17.3%


**Table 14. Labour Market indicators in Vorarlberg, 2008-2017**

*Data sources: Unemployment: OECD Labour indicators, small regions TL3 and large regions TL2; National Statistical Institutes; Eurostat, Unemployment rates by sex, age, citizenship and NUTS 2 regions; Eurostat, People at risk of poverty or social exclusion by NUTS 2 regions, Eurostat Total Unemployment rate*

The **primary sector** plays a minor role in regional gross value added (1% or less) and employment, although mountain farming and regional (milk) production and value chains (e.g. cheese) are important for the regional perception and identity. Share of employment in this sector reaches only 1% in Rheintal-Bodensee and 5% in Bludenz-Bregenzerwald with a negative growth rate of about minus 10% in both NUTS-3 regions. While the secondary sector shows well above rates in gross value added and employment, the development of the tertiary sector is below average with 63% of the gross value added in Bludenz-Bregenzerwald and 60% in Rheintal-

19 Missing data for France for Regional Gross Value Added and Employment by sector: Average has been therefore calculated on the basis of 26 Member States.


Bodenseegebiet. However, the development shows different characteristics. While in Bludenz-Bregenzerwald the share of the tertiary sector is increasing (and decreasing in secondary sector) its development is quite stable in Rheintal-Bodenseegebiet. This points to the growing importance of tourism in Bludenz-Bregenzerwald. Winter tourism is still of higher relevance than summer tourism with over 5 million overnight stays, about 90% of them in Bludenz-Bregenzerwald. Summer tourism on the other hand counts for 4 million overnight stays, about 20% in Rheintal-Bodenseegebiet. Besides tourism which counts for 7% of the tertiary gross value added in Vorarlberg, particular trading (12%) and property and housing sector (10%) characterize the sector (WKV 2019). Employment in tertiary sector is slightly higher in Rheintal-Bodenseegebiet (66% compared to 63% in Bludenz-Bregenzerwald) due to its lively trading sector.



**Chart 19. Employment by sector in Vorarlberg, 2017**

*Data source: Elaboration by EURAC based on data from Eurostat, Employment (thousand persons) by NUTS 3 regions.*

These economic trends led Vorarlberg to comparably low unemployment rates in the past 10 years (see also Chart 20). Albeit, the financial crisis was noticeable in 2008 in higher unemployment rates in the following years (with a peak in 2009 in Rheintal-Bodenseegebiet of 6.1%), since 2013 the unemployment rate has only been 4% or below in both NUTS-3 regions and thereby slightly below national and MATILDE regions average. Due to its high export orientation, the region of Rheintal-Bodenseegebiet shows higher susceptibility to international fluctuations and crises than Bludenz-Bregenzerwald.




**Chart 20. Unemployment rate trends in Vorarlberg, 2008-2017**

*Data sources: OECD.stat, Labour indicators, small regions TL3 and large regions TL2; Eurostat, Total unemployment rate; National statistical offices of MATILDE countries. Unemployment rate of TCNs, 2018)*

The share of population at risk of poverty in Vorarlberg (no data for NUTS-3 regions available) is considerably high compared to the other provinces of Austria and in particular in the years between 2014-2017 with a share of 22% of the inhabitants living in risk of poverty. However, this share is fluctuating between 11.1% in 2011 and 23.2% in 2016 while in 2018 it depicts the Austrian average of 18%. Because of its particularly high fluctuation margin of the confidence interval of over 10% (due to the small random sample) this indicator is not reliable or able to reflect on the actual situation of the risk of poverty in Vorarlberg.

## LABOUR MARKET: FOCUS ON TCNS

On NUTS-3 level, no data is provided for employment rates of TCNs. Therefore, the NUTS2-region Vorarlberg had been taken into account. The following figure indicates that the employment rate of both the total population and TCNs is steadily growing in the respective period. For the total population, it increased from 72.2% in 2008 to 76.8% in 2018. Although the employment rate of TCNs remains at a lower level, it could list a growth from 56.7% in 2008 to 63.2% in 2018 due to the good economic development of these years (Wirtschaftszeit 2014). Upward trends particularly of the machinery and metal industry may have generated more jobs available also for TCNs. Peak year was 2016 with 64.6%.



**Chart 21. Development of employment rates in Vorarlberg, 2008-2018**

*Data source: Eurostat*

Looking at the specific employment patterns in Austria, data reveal that nearly one third of all individuals are working part-time (see also Table 15). In the part-time employment, there is not much difference between TCNs (26.6%) and the total population of Austria (27.3%). Looking at rural areas, the difference is quite big (TCNs: 22.7%; total: 26.9%) and may be explained by the overall lower employment of women in rural areas and of migrant women in particular. Since it is mainly women who work part-time due to care responsibilities for children and elderly people, a gender effect can be identified. Besides, the highest differences between the employment structure of TCNs and the total population can be identified for temporary employments. In rural areas, this difference is even more remarkable. This fact could correspond to the general distribution of migrants to employment sectors. The sectors with the highest proportions of migrants in 2018 were accommodation and catering (men: 50%; women: 40%) and business services (e.g. cleaning services; men: 44%; women: 51%). In addition, men with a migration background were employed above average in the construction industry (28%) and in transport (32%, Statistik Austria 2019b). Since jobs in the hospitality industry, construction or even agriculture are seasonal employments and people in cleaning are often only employed on a case-by-case basis, the higher proportion of temporary employments especially in rural areas could be explained.

Interestingly, also the rate of self-employment highly differs between TCNs and the total population, which may be due to higher self-employment of Austrians in agriculture and tourism but could also be attributed to certain


qualifications that are needed to open a trade. Furthermore, the trade regulations and access requirements are also difficult for non-migrants to keep track of. In addition, trade licences must be paid (Binder 2016).

2018	Total Austria		Rural areas	
	TCN	TOTAL	TCN	TOTAL
Part-time employment	26.6%	27.3%	22.7%	26,9%
Self-employment	6.3%	10.4%	n/a	11.8%
Temporary employment	10.5%	9.1%	13.3%	8.9%

**Table 15. Special employment patterns for total population and Third Country Nationals by degree of urbanization in Austria, 2018**

*Data source: Eurostat*

The unemployment rates of the total population of Vorarlberg and Austria remain at a stable low level. Nevertheless, it was found that in the last five years, Vorarlberg was performing better than the Austrian average as the unemployment rates were lower from 2013 on. Therefore, in 2018, the unemployment rate of Vorarlberg was 3.4% (compared to 4.9% in Austria overall). The level of unemployed TCNs, however, remained at a noticeable higher level and even grew from 10.7% in 2008 to 14.6% in 2018 (see Chart 22).




**Chart 22. Unemployment rate trends in Vorarlberg, 2008-2017**

*Data sources: OECD.stat, Labour indicators, small regions TL3 and large regions TL2; Eurostat, Total unemployment rate; National statistical offices of MATILDE countries. Unemployment rate of TCNs, 2018)*

## 1.2 CARINTHIA: TERRITORIAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE REGION

Author: Marika Gruber, with contributions from Birgit Aigner-Walder, Jessica Pöcher, Rahel Schomaker and Kathrin Stainer-Hämmerle



Map 8. Carinthia



### 1.2.1 GEOGRAPHICAL AND TERRITORIAL FEATURES OF CARINTHIA

<i>TERRITORIAL INDICATORS</i>	<i>Klagenfurt-Villach</i>	<i>Oberkärnten</i>	<i>Unterkärnten</i>
Share of population living outside urban and intermediate municipalities	41.4%	71%	74.9%
Share of population living in mountain areas	> 50 %	> 50 %	> 50 %
Share of territory covered by mountains	> 50 %	> 50 %	> 50 %
Share of territory covered by agricultural fields	22.5%	12%	28.8%
Border region	Yes	Yes	Yes

**Table 16. Territorial Indicators of Carinthia, 2018**

*Data sources: Eurostat Border typology; Urban-Rural typology; Eurostat Mountain typology; Eurostat Corine Landcover; Eurostat Degree of Urbanization (DEGURBA)*

The province (*Bundesland*) of Carinthia (NUTS2 region: AT21) is the fourth largest of nine provinces in Austria and covers an area of 9,536.56 km<sup>2</sup> (Statistik Austria 2019a). However, with 58.8 persons per km<sup>2</sup> (cadastral area), Carinthia had the lowest population density in 2017 (Statistik Austria 2020). It remained equally low in 2019 (Amt der Kärntner Landesregierung, Landesstelle für Statistik 2019).

Carinthia is the southernmost province of Austria and borders Italy and Slovenia (see Map 8). The three-nation triangle (*Dreiländereck*), where three nations and cultures meet, is located in the municipality of Arnoldstein. The “Dreiländereck” (1,506 metres altitude) is also the name of the mountain located at that point of intersection and since Carinthia is known for its mountains, it is not surprising that Austria’s highest mountain, Großglockner (3,798 m.a.s.l.) can also be found in Carinthia (Gruber et al. 2018). The Klagenfurt basin and the valleys of Carinthia are framed by mountains. The most important mountain ranges are the “High Tauern” and the “Gurktal Alps” in the north, the “Carnic Alps” and the “Karawanks” in the south and the “Saulpe” and “Koralpe” in the east. Carinthia is not only a land of mountains, but also of lakes: 1,270 lakes and other stagnant waters, most of them with drinking water quality. The largest and most famous lake in Carinthia is the “Wörthersee”. Other large lakes are the “Lake Millstatt”, the “Lake Ossiach” and the “Weissensee”.

From the administrative point of view, Carinthia is structured into eight districts (Feldkirchen, Hermagor, Klagenfurt-Land, Spittal an der Drau, St. Veit an der Glan, Villach-Land, Völkermarkt and Wolfsberg) and two cities with their own

Charta (Klagenfurt, the capital of Carinthia, and Villach). In total, Carinthia comprises 132 municipalities (Statistik Austria 2019a).

Carinthia is structured into three NUTS3-regions (all data for the year 2019): Klagenfurt-Villach (AT211), Oberkärnten (AT212) and Unterkärnten (AT213). All three regions are border regions and their territories are covered more than 50% by mountains. Over 50% of the population lives in mountain areas. The NUTS3-region Klagenfurt-Villach includes the two largest cities in Carinthia (Klagenfurt and Villach), whilst only 41.4% of its population lives outside urban areas. This is quite different with both the other NUTS3-regions Unterkärnten and Oberkärnten, where the majority of the population (74.9% and 71.0%) lives outside urban areas. Because of the geographical surface with its high share of mountains and non-culturable land, the share of territory covered by agricultural surface in the NUTS3-region Oberkärnten is the lowest compared to the other two regions (12.0% versus 28.8% in Unterkärnten and 22.5% in Klagenfurt-Villach, see Table 16). Farming in Carinthia is predominantly family-based. For 26% it is the main occupation, while 66% pursue it as a side-line activity. Almost 80% of the farms cultivate less than 20ha of agricultural land (excluding alpine pastures), with an average of 8.5ha of agricultural land per farm, showing the small-scale structure of Carinthian agriculture. Due to the natural production conditions, cattle farming is the main production direction in Carinthian agriculture (Landwirtschaftskammer Kärnten 2020).

Due to the history of the province, the issue of minorities (Slovenian ethnic group) plays an important role. In the Carinthian Provincial Government, a separate department deals with the topic "Ethnic Groups, Human Rights and Regional Cooperation" (Amt der Kärntner Landesregierung 2020b).


As the Carinthian municipalities are facing major challenges such as demographic change and an increasing burden of tasks despite ever-scarcer budgetary resources, attempts are being made to create larger local units by merging and increasing cooperation between municipalities (intermunicipal cooperation, Amt der Kärntner Landesregierung 2020c). Due to the geographical closeness, there is also economic cooperation with neighbouring countries, e.g. the New Alpe-Adria Network of Chambers, a cooperation between the Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Crafts from Carinthia, Styria, Slovenia, the Italian regions of Friuli-Venezia Giulia and Veneto and the Croatian provinces of Istria and Primorje-Gorski Kotar (APA OTS 2019), or the cross-border Carinthian-Italian cooperation within the LEADER programme for rural development between the Local action groups (*Lokale Aktionsgruppen*) Hermagor (district in Carinthia, Austria) and Euroleader (Tolmezzo, Italy) and Open Leader (Pontebba, Italy). They also developed their own cross-border development strategy (Leadermanagement Region Hermagor 2020).



### 1.2.2 ACCESSIBILITY FEATURES OF CARINTHIA

The Map in the following page shows travel times to the closest hospital by car and the distribution of population across the region. The difference between the urbanized NUTS3-region Klagenfurt-Villach and the rural regions Oberkärnten and Unterkärnten is quite visible in the better accessibility of the mentioned infrastructure. In general, municipalities are still well equipped with primary and secondary schools, acknowledging particularly the importance of small schools in primary education also in remote parts of Carinthia. The maintenance of small schools is a recurring theme. A political representative in Carinthia called the primary schools in the villages as the navel of the rural area, because culture, customs, club life and church could also profit from it (APA-OTS 2005).

In comparison to the MATILDE regions average, the access to hospitals, primary and secondary schools, train stations and shops in the region Klagenfurt-Villach is much, in some cases by half better, e.g. accessibility to train stations is half as short than in MATILDE regions average (see also Table 17). This is due to the good infrastructure (schools, hospitals, shops, motorways and train connections) of the cities Klagenfurt and Villach. Three motorways run through the province: the Süd Autobahn (A2), the Tauern Autobahn (A 10), and the Karawanken Autobahn (A 11). The most important railway lines are the Southern Railway and the Tauern Railway. The city of Villach is an important traffic junction (Amt der Kärntner Landesregierung 2020a). Looking at the region of Oberkärnten, it corresponds approximately to that of MATILDE regions average, apart from access to train stations, which is lower in Oberkärnten. The better access to train stations is also true for the region of Unterkärnten. Efforts have been made to maintain the connection of the municipalities to the public transport network (train and bus).



**Map 9. Population distribution and accessibility of hospitals in Carinthia**

Where this is not possible, public-private partnerships are set up as associations that offer mobility services such as "GO.MOBIL" in many Carinthian communities (GO-MOBIL 2020). However, the accessibility of hospitals in Unterkärnten is much more difficult (22.8 minutes) compared to the MATILDE regions average (14.2 minutes), the average for Oberkärnten (14.2 minutes) and the region Klagenfurt-Villach (7.8 minutes), where two regional hospitals are located. For the whole region of Unterkärnten there is only one regional hospital available (Landeskrankenanstalten-Betriebsgesellschaft – KABEG 2020).

<i>ACCESSIBILITY of selected infrastructures</i>	<i>Klagenfurt -Villach</i>	<i>Oberkärn- ten</i>	<i>Unterkärn- ten</i>	<i>MATILDE regions average, 2016</i>
Access to hospitals, travel time by car weighted by population (minutes)	7.8	14.2	22.8	14.2
Access to primary schools, travel time by car weighted by population (minutes)	3.1	5.8	6.2	5.9
Access to secondary schools, travel time by car weighted by population (minutes)	4.8	8.9	8.6	9.2
Access to train stations, travel time by car weighted by population (minutes)	4	9	7	10.5
Access to shops, travel time by car weighted by population (minutes)	2.8	5.4	5.5	5.2

**Table 17. Accessibility of selected infrastructures in Carinthia, 2016**

*Data source: ESPON Profecy 2018*

### 1.2.3 SOCIAL FEATURES OF CARINTHIA

<i>DEMOGRAPHIC INDICATORS<sup>20</sup></i>	<i>Klagenfurt - Villach</i>	<i>KV, Variation (2008-18)</i>	<i>Ober-kärnten</i>	<i>OB, variation 2008-18</i>	<i>Unter-kärnten</i>	<i>UK, variation 2008-18</i>	<i>National average</i>	<i>EU average</i>	<i>MATILDE regions average</i>
Population size	286,579	4.4%	124,389	-4.4%	149,930	-3.6%	-	-	425,252
Population density (in. per km <sup>2</sup> )	146.6	140.4/ 146.6**	30.6	30.6/ 31.8	44.7	44.7/ 46.4	107.1	105.3	102
Median age of population	46.2	1*	47.3	1.8*	46.7	1.5*	43.2	43.1	45
Old-age dependency ratio (>65/14-64)	31.9	1.8*	35	2.8*	32.8	2.2*	27.9	30.5	33
Young-age dependency Ratio	20.4	0.5*	20.6	-0.1*	21.3	0*	21.6	24.1	23
Aging Index (>65/<14)	156.7	4.4	170.5	14.2	154.3	10.7	129.9	124	148
Crude birth rate (births per 1000 inhabitants)	8.3	-0.2	8.1	0.1	8.3	-0.3	9.7	9.8	9.1
Total fertility rate (new-born per woman)	1.39	0.01*	1.5	-0.05*	1.5	0.09*	1.47*	1.54	1.58
Crude rate, natural population change (‰)	-2.3‰	-2.3/ -1.2**	-2.6‰	-3.2‰ / -1.3‰	-3.4‰	-3.4‰ / -0.9‰	0.2	-1.0	-1.7
Crude rate of net migration (‰)	5.6‰	2.6/ 11.2**	1.5‰	-4.1‰ / 3.8‰	-1.8‰	-4.8‰ / 3.8 ‰	3	2.6	3.6
Crude rate of total population change (‰)	3.3‰	0.8/ 9**	-1.1 ‰	-5.9‰ / 1.1‰	-5.2‰	-6.3‰ / 1.1‰	4.1	1.6	1.9

**Table 18. Demographic indicators of Carinthia, 2018**

*Data sources: Eurostat, Population (Demography, Migration and Projections)*

<sup>20</sup> \* This is calculated only for the period 2014-2018 \*\* Minimum and maximum values recorded in the period considered.


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## DEMOGRAPHY

Considering the social features, again huge differences between Klagenfurt-Villach and Oberkärnten/Unterkärnten can be identified. While **Klagenfurt-Villach gains in population** and shows a “younger” population measured by the median age or the old-age dependency ratio, **Oberkärnten and Unterkärnten face a decreasing population**. As primarily younger people migrate to other provinces in Austria (Aigner-Walder & Klinglmair 2015) or more urban regions in Carinthia, the median age as well as the old-age dependency ratio in Oberkärnten and Unterkärnten is higher. In general, Carinthia is the only province in Austria which is generally facing a stagnating/decreasing population, primarily due to a **negative balance of internal migration** (Aigner-Walder & Klinglmair 2015). Migration cannot compensate for the birth deficit in Carinthia, which is also revealed for the considered rural regions Oberkärnten and Unterkärnten in the table above. The total fertility rate, with levels of 1.4 and 1.5 (clearly below replacement rate), gives evidence for the importance of migration for population growth.


The MATILDE region Klagenfurt-Villach is – not following the general trend for Carinthia – characterized by a highly positive population development from 2008-2018. The attractiveness of the Klagenfurt-Villach region can be attributed to the fact that Klagenfurt-Villach represents the prospering central area of Carinthia and offers better infrastructure and job opportunities. The number of people living in the region grew from 274,537 in 2008 to 286,579 in 2018 (Table 18).

Looking at the migration balance, two noticeable peak years in 2015 and 2016 can be observed, which were directly related to the immigration of asylum seekers. In contrast, the migration balance of nationals remained stable at more or less zero between 2008 and 2018 (see also Chart 24).



**Chart 23. Development of total population in Carinthia, 2008-2018**

*Data sources: Eurostat, Statistik Austria STATcube*




**Chart 24. Migration balance in Klagenfurt-Villach, 2008-2018**

*Data source: Eurostat*



## DEMOGRAPHY: FOCUS ON TCNS

In 2018, the **share of TCNs** living in the region of Klagenfurt-Villach (5.9%) was lower than the average of Austria (7.9%). In absolute terms, the number of Third Country Nationals slightly increased in the period under consideration (2008-2018). The highest growth rate can be observed from 2015-2016, being directly linked to the inflow of asylum seekers in these years (see also Chart 25).



**Chart 25. Development of TCNs in Klagenfurt-Villach in particular and Carinthia in total, 2008-2018**

*Source: Eurostat*

## IMPORTANT NATIONALITIES IN KLAGENFURT-VILLACH

As Table 19 shows, citizens from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia (and Montenegro) remain the most important group of TCNs in the region of Klagenfurt-Villach, comparing 2008 and 2018. The migration history from these countries dates back to the 1990s and the Yugoslav wars. Although numbers of TCNs from China, India, Turkey or Russia were also increasing in this period, in particular TCNs from countries which are currently hit by civil wars or social unrest, or are involved in wars – factors that led to the increase of exit migration in terms of flight – make the lion share in this group. Therefore, it can be assumed that most of TCNs coming from Afghanistan, Syria and Iraq are migrating for humanitarian reasons.

2008			2018		
1	Bosnia and Herzegovina	5,035	1	Bosnia and Herzegovina	5,369
2	Serbia and Montenegro (fc)	1,651	2	Afghanistan	1,495
3	Russian Federation	667	3	Serbia	1,273
4	Turkey	368	4	Syria	1,228
5	P.R. China	180	5	Russian Federation	837
6	India	177	6	Kosovo	572
7	North Macedonia	171	7	Turkey	395
8	United States	169	8	P.R. China	382
9	Egypt	151	9	Iraq	349
10	Ukraine	129	10	India	321


**Table 19. Total number of Third Country Nationals by citizenship (TOP10) in Klagenfurt-Villach, 2008-2018**

*Data source: Statistik Austria STATcube*

## AGE AND GENDER STRUCTURE


The total number of female TCNs in Klagenfurt-Villach was 7,352 in 2018, which is a share of 45.9 %. While the number of female TCNs steadily grew from 2008 to 2018, its share remained relatively stable until 2014 and declined between 2015 and 2016 when mainly male asylum seekers arrived (see also Chart 26). In the following years the share slightly increased, which can be explained basically by family reunifications with sponsors living in Austria for humanitarian reasons.





**Chart 26. Age structure by nationality in Klagenfurt-Villach, 2019**

*Data source: Statistik Austria STATcube (2019d)*



**Chart 27. Share of female Third Country Nationals in Klagenfurt-Villach, 2008-2018**

*Data source: Statistik Austria STATcube*

## 1.2.4 EDUCATIONAL FEATURES OF CARINTHIA

Education attainment of total population in Carinthia, 2018 <sup>21</sup>	<i>Carinthia</i>	<i>Variation 2008-2018</i>	<i>MATILDE regions average</i>
<b>NEETS (% , percentage points)</b>	6%*	-0.8	9.2%
<b>Tertiary education attainment 25-64 (% , percentage points)</b>	30.6%	14.4	31.1%
<b>Tertiary education attainment 30-34 (% , percentage points)</b>	36.5%	15.5	37.5%

**Table 20. Education attainment of total population in Carinthia, 2018**

*Data source: Eurostat, edat\_lfse\_22, edat\_lfse\_04, edat\_lfse\_12, NUTS2 level*

Comparing the Austrian provinces, in 2017 Carinthia had the lowest percentage of persons between 25 and 64 who have only completed compulsory schooling, including those who have not even completed compulsory schooling (13.9%, compared to Austrian average of 18.0%, Statistik Austria 2019c). At the same time, compared to other provinces, the share of persons who have completed an apprenticeship is also highest in Carinthia (40.1%; Austrian average: 34.1%). These two figures are mutually dependent: the possibility of an apprenticeship and thus of vocational training after compulsory schooling means that there are fewer people who only have a compulsory school leaving certificate. The proportion of school-leavers with a Matura level (vocational secondary school and grammar school) is 14.7% in Carinthia, which is almost in line with the Austrian average of 14.8%. In contrast, the share of university graduates in Carinthia is lowest after Vorarlberg and Upper Austria at 12.5% (Austrian average: 15.2%). If the proportion of people who have completed tertiary education (College, Academy, University) is put together, it can be seen that the 15.7% proportion in Carinthia is below the average for Austria (18.3%, Statistik

<sup>21</sup> \*Latest data available: 2017

Austria 2019c). One reason for this may be the out-migration of young people to other provinces for study reasons, especially to Vienna and Styria (University city of Graz), who then graduate there and stay there after their studies.

Carinthia has a good range of tertiary education: university, university of applied sciences, teacher training college and university of music. Nonetheless, the proportion of people with tertiary education attainment in the Carinthian regions is a bit lower than the average of the MATILDE regions. This is true for the people aged between 25 and 64 years (30.6%; MATILDE regions average: 31.1%) as well as for the younger generation between 30 and 34 years old (36.5%; MATILDE regions average: 37.5%). One reason for this may be that practical apprenticeship training in Carinthia has a long tradition and is of great importance. The importance of apprenticeship will even increase (again), as Carinthia has a great shortage of skilled workers. According to an economic survey conducted by the Chamber of Labour in 2019, one third of Carinthian companies were unable to fill the vacancies. Skilled workers are mainly needed in the construction and tourism sectors (ORF Kärnten 2019). In the last few years, apprenticeship with the possibility to gain a general qualification for university entrance (*Matura*) has been promoted, so that graduates not only have career opportunities in the craft trades, but also for further studies.

People with a migration background living in Austria are disproportionately represented in the highest and lowest educational strata, while the population without migrant background has completed the intermediate level of education (apprenticeship and vocational school training, an Austrian specificity) more often than average. These differences in the educational structure are reflected constantly over time, although in recent decades there has been a significant increase in both the Austrian and the foreign population educational level (Statistik Austria/Bundesministerium für Europa, Integration und Äußeres 2019).


In 2018, around 7% of 15-24-year olds were neither employed nor in education or training (NEETs). Young people without a migration background were affected by 5%, young people with migration background by 11%. With 12%, the proportion of NEETs among TCNs is significantly higher than for young people with a migration background from EU countries (8%, Statistik Austria/Bundesministerium für Europa, Integration und Äußeres 2019). The share of NEETs in Austria has fluctuated in recent years from 9.1% (2004) to 6.8% (2018, Statistik Austria 2020). In the Carinthian regions, the NEETs rate is a bit lower (6.0%) than the Austrian average and is a good deal lower than the MATILDE regions average of 9.2%. One explanation for this could be the greater use of apprenticeship opportunities in Carinthia and the pressure to complete an education or an apprenticeship could be stronger for young people, especially in rural areas.

Due to the lack of data on NUTS3-level, the following graph shows the education level of the NUTS2-region of Carinthia, to which Klagenfurt-Villach, Ober- and Unterkärnten belong. The education level of TCNs highly differs from that of the total population. Besides the lack of data of tertiary education of TCNs (only available for 2016 and 2017), a high share of primary education or less than primary education of TCNs can be noticed. Looking at the education level of the total population instead, it can be observed a slightly but continuous decrease of the primary education level (2008: 20.5%; 2018: 15.7%). At the same time, the share of people with tertiary education level was growing strongly (2008: 13.6%, 2018: 28.5%).

The NEET rate of Carinthia<sup>22</sup> (young people neither in employment nor in education and training, aged 15-34) can be characterized as very stable between 2008 and 2018 and follows very closely the national one (see also Chart 29). The NEET rate of TCNs in Austria shows a highly different level. Although in 2018 (22.2%) it is at the lowest level since 2008 (27.5%), it remains on a much higher level than the rate of the total population (9.4% in 2018).


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<sup>22</sup> Due to lack of data on NUTS3 level, data are presented for the respective NUTS2 region, i.e. Carinthia, to which Klagenfurt-Villach, Ober- and Unterkärnten belong.



**Chart 28. Education level among total population and TCNs in Carinthia, 2008-2018**

*Data source: Eurostat*



**Chart 29. Share of young NEETs (15-34y/o) in Carinthia and Austria, 2008-2018**

*Data source: Eurostat*

## 1.2.5 ECONOMIC FEATURES OF CARINTHIA


<i>ECONOMIC INDICATORS, 2017</i>	<i>Klagenfurt-Villach</i>	<i>Ober-kärnten</i>	<i>Unter-kärnten</i>	<i>Klagenfurt-Villach, variation 2008-17</i>	<i>Ober-kärnten, variation 2008-17</i>	<i>Unter-kärnten, variation 2008-17</i>	<i>National Average (2017)</i>	<i>EU-27 average (2017)<sup>23</sup></i>	<i>MATILDE regions average (2017)</i>
Regional GDP per capita at PPS	36,800	25,300	28,500	-0.1%	0.2%	1%	38,100	29,800	29,624
Regional Gross value added: primary sector (% , percentage points)	1%	4%	4%	0.03	0.02	0.41	1%	2% (7,098.5 million euro)	4%
Regional Gross value added: secondary sector (% , percentage points)	29%	29%	44%	0.73	-3.59	0.17	29%	27% (99,067.3 million euro)	30%
Regional Gross value added: tertiary sector (% , percentage points)	70%	67%	53%	-0.77	3.57	-0.60	70%	71% (263,863 million euro)	66%

**Table 21. Economic indicators in Carinthia, 2017**

*Data sources: Eurostat Gross domestic product (GDP) at current market prices by NUTS 3 regions; OECD Gross domestic product (GDP); Eurostat Gross value added at basic prices by NUTS 3 regions*

<sup>23</sup> Missing data for France for Regional Gross Value Added and Employment by sector: Average has been therefore calculated on the basis of 26 Member States.

As the table on economic features reveals, there are significant regional differences in the regional economic development between Klagenfurt-Villach and Oberkärnten/Unterkärnten. These differences can mainly be laid back to spatial and structural causes, as Klagenfurt-Villach can be categorized as a rather urban region, while Oberkärnten and Unterkärnten are rural areas with structural deficits. Apart from the lower regional GDP per capita, this is reflected by the economic structure in the sense of a lower relevance of the tertiary sector in regional gross value added (see also fig. 5). Additionally, it should be mentioned that Carinthia in general has a GDP per capita below the Austrian average (38,001 in 2017). Moreover, the GDP per capita of Oberkärnten und Unterkärnten is below the European average (EU-27: 29,800 in 2017) and the MATILDE average (see also Chart 30).



**Chart 30. Gross Domestic Product trends in Carinthia, 2008-2017**

*Data source: Eurostat, Gross domestic product (GDP) at current market prices by NUTS 3 regions*

## LABOUR MARKET

<b>LABOUR MARKET INDICATORS<sup>24</sup></b>	<b>Klagenfurt-Villach</b>	<b>Oberkärnten</b>	<b>Unterkärnten</b>	<b>Klagenfurt-Villach, variation 2008-17</b>	<b>Oberkärnten, variation 2008-17</b>	<b>Unterkärnten, variation 2008-17</b>	<b>National Average (2017)</b>	<b>EU-27 average (2017)</b>	<b>MATILDE regions average (2017)</b>
Unemployment rate (%/percentage points)	5.1%*	4.6%*	4.2%*	1.3 *	0.9 *	1 *	5.5%	8.1%	8.4%
Employment in primary sector (%, thousands of employees)	3% (4.1)	10% (4.8)	11% (6.8)	-21.1%	-23.8%	-8.1%	4%	5% (353.98)	5% (6.75)
Employment in secondary sector (%, thousands of employees)	19% (27.9)	24% (11.8)	32% (20.2)	-1.4%	-15.1%	-8.6%	22%	23% (1,584.74)	26% (36.19)
Employment in tertiary sector (%, thousands of employees)	78% (116.7)	66% (32.9)	57% (36.3)	5.3%	2.8%	7.1%	74%	71% (4,830.33)	69% (97.63)
People at risk of poverty or social exclusion	16.3 (average 2008-2018)			5.9			18.7 % (average 2008-2018)	21.6%	17.3%


**Table 22. Labour market indicators for Carinthia, 2008-2017**

Data sources: Unemployment: OECD Labour indicators, small regions TL3 and large regions TL2; National Statistical Institutes; Eurostat, Unemployment rates by sex, age, citizenship and NUTS 2 regions; Eurostat, People at risk of poverty or social exclusion by NUTS 2 regions, Eurostat Total Unemployment rate

24 Missing data for France for Regional Gross Value Added and Employment by sector: Average has been therefore calculated on the basis of 26 Member States.



As for Austria, but also the EU27-average and the MATILDE regions average, the **primary sector** is the least significant in terms of the number of dependent employees. As the Table 22 and Chart 31 show, for the rural NUTS3-regions Unterkärnten and Oberkärnten, however, the primary sector (especially agriculture) is more important than for the NUTS3-region Klagenfurt-Villach region. The **secondary sector** (production) plays an important role for Carinthia. The most important industries for Carinthia are the manufacturing of goods, especially in 2019 the construction industry (16,138 employees), the technology sector (15,698 employees, of which 6,694 in electrical engineering and electronics and 6,542 in mechanical engineering), the manufacture of metal products (4,209 employees) and the food, feed, beverage and tobacco industry (3,285 employees) (Kärntner Wirtschaftsförderungs Fonds – KWF 2020). The share of employed persons in the secondary sector is particularly high in the NUTS3-region Unterkärnten (32%) compared to the Austrian average (22%) and compared to the EU27-average (25%) as well as the MATILDE regions average (26%). While in the secondary sector, construction is very important in all three NUTS3 regions (Klagenfurt-Villach: 6,630 employees; Oberkärnten: 4,309 employees; Unterkärnten: 5,111 employees), there are great differences e.g. for the production of goods in electrical engineering and electronics (Klagenfurt-Villach: 5,429 employees; Oberkärnten: 60 employees; Unterkärnten: 1,194 employees) (Kärntner Wirtschaftsförderungs Fonds – KWF 2020). In the NUTS3-region Klagenfurt-Villach, this is due to big (high-)technology enterprises (some of which operate worldwide) such as Infineon. In the rural regions of Oberkärnten (1,201 employees) and Unterkärnten (1,438 employees), the production of wood products is particularly important (in comparison Klagenfurt-Villach: 237 employees) (Kärntner Wirtschaftsförderungs Fonds – KWF 2020).



**Chart 31. Employment by sector in Carinthia, 2017**


*Data source: Elaboration by EURAC based on data from Eurostat, Employment (thousand persons) by NUTS 3 regions.*

However, the most important sector with 153,942 employees in 2019 in Carinthia is the **tertiary sector** (service sector). The most important branches are the public administration (58,011 employees), trade & repair (32,067 employees), business services (22,748; among them in particular scientific/technical services with 7,334 employees) as well as accommodation and gastronomy (14,571 employees) (Kärntner Wirtschaftsförderungs Fonds – KWF 2020). Compared to Austria as a whole (74% of employed persons), EU27-average (68% of employed persons) and MATILDE regions average (69% of employed persons), the tertiary sector is most important for the NUTS3-region Klagenfurt-Villach (78% of employed persons). The public administration is especially important for the NUTS3-region Klagenfurt-Villach (40,817 employees) as there are the office of the Carinthian provincial government and the two large municipal administrations of the provincial capital of Klagenfurt and Villach are located.

When employment by sector is considered, the decline in agricultural and forestry enterprises (primary sector) becomes visible. In 1995, there were 22,231 farms, in 2010 there were only 18,174 and by 2016 this number had fallen to 17,475 farms (Statistik Austria 2018). This also leads to a reduction in the number of people working full-time in agriculture, more people pursue agriculture as a sideline. When it comes to the secondary sector, a strong decline in employment (-15.1%) in the mentioned observation period can be recognised for the NUTS3-region Oberkärnten.

This development corresponds with the closure of a shoe factory (Gabor) in the district Spittal an der Drau, which employed many people in production (DiePresse.com 2010).

As shown in Chart 32, during the period 2009-2019, unemployment in Carinthia and in the three NUTS3 regions was at a low level in general. In a comparison of the three regions, Unterkärnten always had the lowest unemployment rate, which was also lower than the Carinthian average. This may be explained by a relatively stable production sector. A slightly higher unemployment rate was recorded in Carinthia in general and the three NUTS3-regions with 6% and slightly more than 6% respectively, especially in 2015 and 2016. Overall, however, the unemployment rate was below the EU27-level and the MATILDE regions average throughout the period under review.



**Chart 32. Unemployment rate trends in Carinthia, 2008-2017**


*Data sources: OECD.stat, Labour indicators, small regions TL3 and large regions TL2; Eurostat, Total unemployment rate; National statistical offices of MATILDE countries. Unemployment rate of TCNs, 2018)*

## LABOUR MARKET: FOCUS ON TCNS

For Klagenfurt-Villach, no data are provided for employment rates of TCNs. Therefore, NUTS2-region Carinthia had been taken into account. The following figure indicates that the employment rate of the total population remained stable. A more dynamic development can be seen in the employment rate of TCNs in the respective period. While it increased from 54% in 2008 to 62.6% in 2013, it decreased to 51.1% in 2016. It can be concluded that this decline


corresponds with the high inflow of asylum seekers and refugees in the years 2014-2016. Currently, the rate is increasing again.

While the unemployment rate of the total population of Carinthia and Austria remained at a stable low level, the rate of unemployed TCNs was on a noticeable higher level (see also Chart 34). Indeed, the rate grew in the respective period from 10.7% in 2008 to 14.6% in 2018.



**Chart 33. Development of employment rates in Carinthia, 2008-2018**

*Data source: Eurostat*



**Chart 34. Unemployment rate trends in Carinthia, 2008-2018**

Data sources: OECD.stat, Labour indicators, small regions TL3 and large regions TL2; Eurostat, Total unemployment rate; National statistical offices of MATILDE countries. Unemployment rate of TCNs, 2018

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## 2. COUNTRY REPORT BULGARIA

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During the communist era, the Bulgarian government strictly controlled movements of people. The regime only permitted three main groups to enter and stay in the country: Firstly, international students from the Middle East, Central Asia, Southeast Asia and Africa that were granted scholarships at Bulgarian universities, secondly, political refugees who were basically activists from neighbouring countries like Turkey or Greece, who had the same ideological beliefs, and thirdly, citizens of the Soviet Union, mainly from Russia and Ukraine, who came as skilled industrial workers or as international students (Krasteva et al. 2011; Staikova 2013; Krasteva 2018a, 2018b). The main purpose of immigration policy was to support political interests by the immigration of left-wing intelligence and to foster relations with communist “brother” states (Krasteva 2014). Accordingly, in the 1980s, the Bulgarian government started a guest worker program with Vietnam through which Vietnamese workers came to support the construction industry (Krasteva et al. 2011; Krasteva 2018b). After political upheaval in 1989, Bulgaria’s migration policy fundamentally changed and the country opened up its borders for entry and exit (Staikova 2013). Due to the economic transformation at that time, accompanied by high inflation, unemployment, and political instability, mostly young people between 20 and 35 left rural and mountain areas for the cities, where there were study opportunities as well as a lack of high-skilled workers and technical know-how. Others, instead, decided to emigrate in search of better personal opportunities (Mancheva & Troeva 2011; Staikova 2013; Petrunov 2014). As a consequence, still today emigrants outnumber immigrants by 8.6 times and currently 2.9 million Bulgarians live abroad, while only 150,000 foreign born live in Bulgaria (Pew 2017; Krasteva 2019). While emigrants’ demographic, social, educational and democratic capital was lost (ibid.), the emigration of Bulgarians also contributed to the country’s development through significant remittances (ibid.). In 2017, for instance, those money transfers were higher than the foreign direct investment (1,152.6 million euros vs. 901.9 million €, ibid.). Despite this new potential, the economic and political chaos of that time also created a favourable environment for the emergence of crime groups. The latter sought to make profit of people’s desire for work and organized human trafficking (Petrunov 2014).

This tendency of emigration of both high-skilled and low-skilled workers was intensified by the accession of Bulgaria to the European Union in 2007 (Mancheva & Troeva 2011). Therefore, albeit small scale<sup>25</sup>, immigration processes

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<sup>25</sup> Still in 2017, compared with all EU-member states and EFTA-countries, Bulgaria has the second lowest rate of immigrants (3.6/1,000 inhabitants, Eurostat 2017).

were out of attention of society, experts and politicians (ibid.; Staikova 2013)<sup>26</sup>. According to Krasteva et al. (2011), immigrant inflows consist of EU citizens who benefit from their right to freedom of movement as well as TCNs from former Soviet countries such as Russia, Ukraine or Armenia (Miceva 2006), and Asia, Near and Middle East and North Africa. Among TCNs, especially forced migrants have an important impact on the political discourse (Bobeva et al. 2019, see also chapter on forced migration).

Only recently, Bulgaria considered migration policy a government priority. The “Strategy for Immigration and Integration” was formulated not before 2008, emphasising economic emigration and integration of foreign citizens. The successor strategy called “National Strategy on Migration, Asylum and Integration” (2011-2020) focusses on security aspects instead (Staikova 2013; Krasteva 2014). Both strategies also reveal that Bulgaria follows a selective migration policy and clearly highlight types of desired immigrants. These are Bulgarian citizens, foreigners of Bulgarian origin and highly-qualified migrants (Staikova 2013). According to Haksöz (2017), these policies favour assimilation and the construction of a nation-state based on ethnic, linguistic and religious preferences.

With regard to statistical data on migration phenomena in Bulgaria, there is a lack of access to reliable and up-to-date information (Krasteva 2014). According to the Open Society Institute Sofia (2010), “Bulgaria is the only EU country that does not have comparable annual statistics on migration” (ibid. 52)<sup>27</sup>. Although several local institutions provide data on different aspects of migration situations, there is no accessible and centralized system for collecting data on migration flows (Staikova 2013; Krasteva 2014).

## LABOUR MIGRATION

The accession to the European Union caused a liberalisation of the labour market and facilitated foreigners’ access to Bulgaria. Due to a shortage of high-skilled workers, unsurprisingly, one of the goals of the National Strategy on Migration, Asylum and Integration (2011-2020) is to attract highly-skilled labour force from abroad. While trade unions are willing to protect the local workforce and continue to support restrictions, employers claim for the expansion of the so-called list of professions (shortage jobs). This list is extended by more and more groups every year and addresses mainly engineers and technical engineers (Bobeva et al. 2019).

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26 An exception is the edited volume from Krasteva (2005) titled “Immigration in Bulgaria”.

27 Cited from Krasteva (2014), original version in Bulgarian.

In addition, Bulgaria allows the recruitment of short-term foreign workers in the tourism sector, who are permitted to work up to 90 days a year and for whom employers are not obliged to submit documents of qualification beforehand. Right after the establishment of this liberalization, the amount of seasonal workers doubled from 3,215 in 2017 to 6,700 in 2018 (ibid.). The migrants mainly arrived from neighbouring third countries like Moldova and Ukraine and worked in summer resorts or to a lower amount in winter resorts. According to Bobeva et al. (2019), this practice will be extended as there is an increasing interest from employers in agriculture as well.

One phenomenon of labour migration related to post-communist dynamics is the immigration of Chinese citizens that cannot be explained by neoclassical theories, but that is a result of economic opportunities, social and cultural affinities and diplomatic and bilateral frameworks of both countries (Krastreva 2018b). Immigrants work as merchants or in restaurants or, to a smaller extent, practice traditional Chinese medicine. Chain migration plays an important role as they often adopt already existing shops of relatives or friends (ibid.). In addition, Chinese investments became visible e.g. in the village of Malomir, Yambol region, where they were growing vegetables (Darik News 2011).

## FORCED MIGRATION

Bulgaria signed the Geneva Convention on refugees in 1993, created the State Agency for Refugee and started accepting asylum applications and assigning refugee status as important steps of the process of democratization and future EU integration. Until the most recent crisis and conflict constellations, especially in Syria and Iraq in the 2010s, however, Bulgaria had only few experiences with forced migration and asylum seekers in particular. Therefore, the country was caught unprepared both financially and administratively (Dimitrova et al. 2018; Bobeva et al. 2019). Insufficient reception capacities, lack of basic sanitary facilities, medical aid and subsistence resulted in the UNHCR's call (January 2014) for the suspension of Dublin transfers of already dispersed asylum seekers to the country until further examination (Nancheva 2016). However, in the update of April 2014, UNHCR maintains that "serious gaps remain in the national asylum system but numerous improvements have been made to reception conditions and the asylum procedure since the beginning of the year" (2014: 3). It goes on to conclude that "a general suspension of all Dublin transfers to Bulgaria is no longer justified" (ibid.). According to UNHCR data, 2016 was the year with most people entering the country for humanitarian reasons (33,923 asylum seekers, refugees and stateless persons). Latest statistics count 21,210 persons of concern (UNHCR 2019). Regarding countries of origin of asylum seekers, Afghanistan (27,808 persons between 1.1.1993 and 29.02.2020), Syria (22,249) and Iraq (20,426)

predominated in the last 27 years (State Agency for Refugees 2020). Thus, recent asylum seekers can rely on already existing immigrant communities (Krasteva 2019).


Studies from Nancheva (2016) and Krasteva (2020) show that refugee reception in Bulgaria is embedded in the context of securitization policy, (re-)bordering and of constructing migrants as a “physical and ontological threat” (Nancheva 2016: 549). The process of othering and its narrative framing cause that policies aim at “protection *from* asylum seekers, rather than at protection *of* asylum seekers” (ibid: 550). As a consequence, refugees and asylum seekers face exclusionary practices (Nancheva 2016). For the duration of the asylum procedure, asylum seekers are either accommodated in an open asylum centre, run by the State Agency for Refugees (SAR) or in a closed centre at the outskirts of Sofia, which is managed by the Directorate on Migration of the Ministry of Interior. The open centres of Harmanli and Banya are located in rural areas (AIDA/ECRE-Report 2019). On-site, the public perception of asylum seekers and refugees is highly influenced by the abovementioned framings. Protests have become regular occurrences especially in towns and villages, where new Reception and Registration Centres (RCC) have been set up by SAR since 2013 (ibid.; Bobeva 2017). After recognition of refugee status, the ineffectiveness of integration policies, the negative framing and the securitization policy cause challenges for recognized refugees and limit both their integration opportunities and their future prospects to stay in the country. Thus, only a couple of hundred refugees per year decide to remain in the country (Iliev/UNHCR 2017), while “at least 80-90% of people applying for asylum in Bulgaria move on or plan to move on to Western countries” (ibid: 17). There are no official data on people who granted refugee status remaining in the country. However, the representative of UNHCR in Bulgaria estimates an amount of 1,000 to 2,000 recognised refugees and humanitarian status holders who are staying in Bulgaria (Krasteva 2019).

Looking at access to housing, refugees in Bulgaria in general and in rural areas in particular mostly are not able to rent apartments or social housing due to refusal from local people and continue to stay in RCCs up to six more months after recognition of refugee status without receiving food there (Nancheva 2016). Nancheva (2016) presents a case of the village Rozovo from April 2014, where three families were physically chased away, actively supported by the local mayors of Rozovo and a nearby town. Similar experiences are reported from the town of Belene, where the local catholic priest invited a Syrian family with a refugee status, but due to the opposition of small extremist groups, the family had left the town (Capital 2017). The city council of Harmanli, in addition, opposed the decision of the State Agency for Refugees to enlarge the refugee camp (Haskovo Live 2017). Therefore, according to Iliev / UNHCR (2017), the majority is located in the capital Sofia. In terms of access to the labour market, hurdles can be seen in terms of lacking information about how to seek employment, lacking knowledge of Bulgarian language and lacking recognition of foreign credentials (Council of Europe 2018). Iliev / UNHCR (2017), in addition, identified less



developed social networks and discrimination, difficulties to secure housing as well as poor individual health conditions as further barriers. While data provided by the National Revenue Agency show that in 2015 only 175 men and 7 women (2016: 136 men and 26 women) have had a working contract, the study of Iliev /UNHCR (2017) revealed that the actual number of those who work is far bigger. Up to 60% of asylum seekers and refugees work without a contract, i.e. in great risk of exploitation. According to CATRO (2018), potentials for their labour market integration are especially considered for agriculture, processing industry, transport and construction sector as well as hospitality industry. Considering their challenges of decreasing population and demand for working force with suitable skills, regionally, the North-West and the North-East could profit the most from successful labour market integration of refugees (ibid.).

## STUDENT MIGRATION



**Chart 35. Development of number of foreign students in Bulgarian Universities, 2015-2020**

*Data source: National Statistical Institute 2020b*

Following the priorities of the National Strategy on Migration, Asylum and Integration (2011-2020), student immigration is considered a desired form of highly skilled migration. However, the procedure to obtain student visa remains complicated, while stays in the country after graduation are not promoted (Bobeva et al. 2019). According to Chart 35, numbers of foreign students in higher schools are especially increasing since 2015/2016. Simultaneously, the number of residence permits granted to TCNs for education and study only rose at a low level from 911 in 2014

to 1,267 in 2018 (National Statistical Institute 2019). 16,280 foreign students attended Bulgarian universities during the academic year 2019/20, which is a 5.5%-increase compared to the previous year and a 43.0%-increase compared to 2015/2016. Most important countries of origin are Greece (23.7% of the total numbers), UK (16.1%), Germany (8.8%), Ukraine (6.3%), and Turkey (6.0%, National Statistical Institute 2020a). The number of PhD students is 558 or 8.7% of the total number, originating from Greece (19.2% of the total numbers), North Macedonia (9.5%), Albania (9%, National Statistical Institute 2020b). Attracting foreign students is considered an important factor for the development of the respective university cities and regions. For rural and mountain areas, however, student migration is not of particular importance.

## FAMILY MIGRATION


TCNs and stateless persons entering and residing legally (for shorter or longer periods) in Bulgaria for family reasons are one of the seven target groups of the National Strategy on Migration, Asylum and Integration (2011-2020). However, no action plan has been adopted and no funding has been allocated for their integration. In 2018, 3,792 residence permits for family reasons were granted to TCNs in total, thereof 2,200 for 6 to 12 months and 1,441 for 12 months and more (National Statistical Institute 2019). Until now, no specific studies were carried out about family migrants in rural and mountain areas, yet it is assumed that family migration is closely linked to labour and forced migration.

## AMENITY/LIFESTYLE MIGRATION

At the Black Sea Coast of Bulgaria, second home ownership of foreigners is an important issue. Russians are the biggest group owning real estate at the Black sea coast (Krasteva 2018a). In 2018, the Association of Real Estate Brokers reported to a Bulgarian media that there is a growth of inquiries from French, German, Belgian and other residents of Western Europe to buy property on the Bulgarian Black Sea coast (Novinite 2018, Trud 2018, BNT 2019) as well as in picturesque rural and mountain areas such as Bansko in the Southeast (for a study on British citizens, see Kaneff 2008). Meanwhile, the Association pointed out an outflow of Russians, which it explained with the ongoing economic sanctions against Russia at that time. Brokers stated that due to the outflow of Russians, there was a general decline in transactions in 2017 compared to the previous year, adding that active Russian participation on the market is not expected 'any time soon' (Novinite 2018, Trud 2018, BNT 2019). Nevertheless, statistical data on the matter are not available and therefore, it is difficult to analyse new trends.

## 2.1 HASKOVO: TERRITORIAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE REGION

Authors: Anna Krasteva, Stephanie Bogomilova and Evelina Staikova



Map 10. Haskovo

## 2.1.1 GEOGRAPHICAL AND TERRITORIAL FEATURES OF HASKOVO


<i>TERRITORIAL INDICATORS</i>	<i>2018</i>
Share of population living outside urban and intermediate municipalities	12.8%
Share of population living in mountain areas	Non-mountain region
Share of territory covered by mountains	Non-mountain region
Share of territory covered by agricultural fields	52.8%
Border region	Yes

**Table 23. Territorial Indicators of Haskovo, 2018**

*Data sources: Eurostat Border typology; Urban-Rural typology; Eurostat Mountain typology; Eurostat Corine Landcover; Eurostat Degree of Urbanization (DEGURBA)*

The rural specificity of the Haskovo region (see also Map 10) is illustrated by the high percentage of territory covered by agricultural fields (52.8%), where wine, fruits, vegetables and tobacco are cultivated. The population, on the other hand, is mainly urban with only 12.8% living outside urban areas (see also Table 23).

## 2.1.2 ACCESSIBILITY FEATURES OF HASKOVO



**Map 11. Population distribution and accessibility of hospitals in Haskovo**

Haskovo is an average MATILDE region in two regards: access to hospitals (14.7 versus 14.2 minutes, see also Map 11) and train stations (11 versus 10.5 minutes, see also Table 24). This is not least an effect of the density of the road network in the district, which was above average in 2015 not least due to the launch of the “Maritsa” highway in the same year, which is connected with the “Trakiya” highway (Institute of Market Economics). Haskovo differs significantly from the average MATILDE region concerning access to primary schools (11.5 versus 5.9 minutes), to secondary schools (16.9 versus 9.2 minutes), and to shops (9.7 versus 5.2 minutes).

<i>ACCESSIBILITY of selected infrastructures</i>	<i>Haskovo, 2016</i>	<i>MATILDE regions average, 2016</i>
Access to hospitals, travel time by car weighted by population (minutes)	14.7	14.2
Access to primary schools, travel time by car weighted by population (minutes)	11.5	5.9
Access to secondary schools, travel time by car weighted by population (minutes)	16.2	9.2
Access to train stations, travel time by car weighted by population (minutes)	11	10.5
Access to shops, travel time by car weighted by population (minutes)	9.7	5.2

**Table 24. Accessibility of selected infrastructures in Haskovo, 2016**

*Data source: ESPON Profecy, 2018*



## 2.1.3 SOCIAL FEATURES OF HASKOVO

<i>DEMOGRAPHIC INDICATORS<sup>28</sup></i>	<i>2018</i>	<i>Variation (2008-2018)</i>	<i>National average</i>	<i>EU average</i>	<b>MATILDE regions average</b>
<b>Population size</b>	231,276	-8.95%	-	-	425,252
<b>Population density (<i>inhabitants per km<sup>2</sup></i>)</b>	42	42 – 45.8 **	63.9	105.3	102
<b>Median age of population (<i>years</i>)</b>	45.6	0.5*	44.1	43.1	45
<b>Old-age dependency ratio (&gt;65/14-64)</b>	35	2.9*	32.5	30.5	33
<b>Young-age Dependency Ratio</b>	22.9	2*	22	24.1	23
<b>Aging Index (&gt;65/&lt;14)</b>	153.1	-0.2	147.9	124	148
<b>Crude birth rate (<i>births per 1000 inhabitants</i>)</b>	7.9	-1.1	8.9	9.8	9.1
<b>Total fertility rate (<i>new-born per woman</i>)</b>	1.62	-0.02*	1.56	1.54	1.58
<b>Crude rate of natural population change (‰)</b>	-8.5	-8.5/-5.6**	-6.6	-1.0	-1.7
<b>Crude rate of net migration (‰)</b>	-5.2	-5.2/2.5**	-0.6	2.6	3.6
<b>Crude rate of total population change (‰)</b>	-13.6	-13.6/-5.4**	-7.1	1.6	1.9

**Table 25. Demographic indicators of Haskovo, 2018**

*Data sources: Eurostat, Population (Demography, Migration and Projections)*


<sup>28</sup> \*Variation calculated only for the period 2014-2018.

\*\* Minimum and maximum values recorded in the period considered.



## DEMOGRAPHY


The MATILDE region Haskovo is characterized by a high **population decline** (see Chart 36). While in 2010, 253,127 people lived in the region, its numbers decreased to 228,141 in 2018. For reasons of pessimistic future economic perspectives, age-selective out-migration takes place. A 2018 report on regional profiles in Bulgaria states that despite the fact that the demographic picture in the district of Haskovo is deteriorating at a fast pace, it could be concluded that the aging of the population in the area follows the general trends in the country (Institute for Market Economics 2018). Notwithstanding, 2016 marked a sharp slowdown of emigration from the area. The share of urban population in the district is close to the average, but the density of the population is significantly lower (1,079 people per sq. km in urban areas versus 1,537 people per sq. km in the country, Institute for Market Economics 2018). According to local experts, no specific policies for mitigation the demographic decline are implemented by local authorities.



**Chart 36. Development of total population in Haskovo, 2010-2018**

*Data source: Eurostat*

In Haskovo, the **migration balance remained negative** in the period under consideration. Nevertheless, for 2014 and 2015 a positive trend could be observed (see Chart 37). One explanation for the positive migration balance during these years was the high inflow of asylum seekers and refugees, however no specific data are available for foreigners or TCNs.



**Chart 37. Migration balance total population in Haskovo, 2010-2018**

*Data source: Eurostat*

## DEMOGRAPHY: FOCUS ON TCNS

According to the 2018 annual report of the National Statistical Institute on the population and demographic processes in Haskovo district, 29,559 people have changed their usual place of residence from abroad to Bulgaria. This includes returning Bulgarian citizens, who return for family reasons, as well as foreigners with a residence permit or status. Haskovo also hosts a reception centre nearby (Gauci 2020).

The highest share of immigrants is from Turkey (29.9%), the Russian Federation (11.0%) and Germany (7.2%, National Statistical Institute – Territorial Bureau South 2019).


Due to lack of data, no specific characterization for TCNs can be provided.

## AGE AND GENDER STRUCTURE

Due to lack of data, no specific characterization for the age structure and gender structure of TCNs can be provided. According to local experts, no significant gender imbalances are observed.

## 2.1.4 EDUCATION FEATURES OF HASKOVO

The comparison of the education level of the total population in Bulgaria and the total population of NUTS2-region Yuzhen tsentralen<sup>29</sup> shows that the level in Yuzhen tsentralen is slightly lower compared to the national scale. While 26.1% hold a primary or less than primary education in 2018 (26.1% compared to 21.5%), the level of secondary or upper secondary education is similar (53.5% versus 53.6%). The level of tertiary education is lower than the national average (20.4 versus 24.8%, see also Chart 38).



**Chart 38. Education level of total population in Yuzhen tsentralen, 2008-2018**

*Data source: Eurostat*

<sup>29</sup> Since EUROSTAT data only can be provided on NUTS-2-level, the NUTS-2 Yuzhen tsentralen, where Haskovo belongs to, was selected.

## 2.1.5 ECONOMIC FEATURES OF HASKOVO

<i><b>ECONOMIC INDICATORS<sup>30</sup></b></i>	<i><b>2017</b></i>	<i><b>Variation 2008-2017</b></i>	<i><b>National average (2017)</b></i>	<i><b>EU average (2017) *</b></i>	<i><b>MATILDE regions average (2017)</b></i>
<b>Regional GDP per capita at purchasing power standards</b>	8,200	1.1%	14,900	29,800	29,624
<b>Regional Gross value added: primary sector</b>	11%	-2.9 percentage points	5%	2% (7,098.5 million euro)	4%
<b>Regional Gross value added: secondary sector</b>	27%	-5 percentage points	28%	27% (95,398 million euro)	30%
<b>Regional Gross value added: tertiary sector</b>	63%	+7.9 percentage points	67%	71% (254,090 million euro)	66%

**Table 26. Economic indicators in Haskovo, 2017**

*Data sources: Eurostat Gross domestic product (GDP) at current market prices by NUTS 3 regions; OECD Gross domestic product (GDP); Eurostat Gross value added at basic prices by NUTS 3 regions*


## ECONOMIC STRUCTURE

The economic and labour market panorama of the region could be summarized in two opposite characteristics – low GDP per capita, but also low unemployment. The regional GDP per capita (8,200) is way lower than the national one (14,900), and also below the EU average (29,800), and MATILDE regions average (29,624, see also Table 26). On the positive side, the regional unemployment (3.1%) is way lower than the national one (6.2%), the EU average (8.1%), and MATILDE regions average (8.4%).

The most negative indicator is the very high percentage of people at risk of poverty and social exclusion – 43.8%, almost double than the EU average (22.5%), more than double than the MATILDE regions average (18.7%) and also

<sup>30</sup> Missing data for France for Regional Gross Value Added and Employment by sector; Average has been therefore calculated on the basis of 26 Member States.

higher than the national average (38.9%). The trend of GDP during the last decade (2008-2017) illustrates a rather lagging region in comparison to the national, and especially to the average GDP of EU and MATILDE regions (see also Chart 39).



**Chart 39. Gross Domestic Product trend in Haskovo, 2008-2017**

*Source: Eurostat, Gross domestic product (GDP) at current market prices by NUTS 3 regions.*

## LABOUR MARKET


<i>LABOUR MARKET INDICATORS</i>	<i>2017</i>	<i>Variation 2008-2017</i>	<i>National average (2017)</i>	<i>EU average (2017) *</i>	<i>MATILDE regions average (2017)</i>
Unemployment rate (%/percentage points)	4.7%	-1.7	6.2	8.1 %	8.4%
Employment in primary sector (% thousands of employees)	31.5% (31.5)	-15.5%	19%	5% (353.98)	5% (6.75)
Employment in secondary sector (% thousands of employees)	23.8% (23.8)	-27.7%	25%	23% (1,584.74)	26% (36.19)
Employment in tertiary sector (% thousands of employees)	44.7% (44.8)	-4.5%	56%	71% (4,830.33)	69% (97.63)
People at risk of poverty or social exclusion (%/percentage points)	48.3%	-5.2	38.9%	22.5%	18.7%

**Table 27. Labour Market indicators in Haskovo, 2017**

*Data sources: Unemployment: OECD Labour indicators, small regions TL3 and large regions TL2; National Statistical Institutes; Eurostat, Unemployment rates by sex, age, citizenship and NUTS 2 regions; Eurostat, Employment (thousand persons) by NUTS3 regions; Eurostat, People at risk of poverty or social exclusion by NUTS 2 regions.*

In Haskovo, employment in the **primary sector** (32%) is more than six times higher than in the MATILDE regions (5%) and significantly higher than the national (19%) and EU average (7%, see Table 27 and Chart 40). The **secondary sector** (24%) is similar to the one of MATILDE regions (26%) and EU average (25%). The **tertiary sector** predominates in terms of employment. The comparison with the national level illustrates the rural specificity of the MATILDE region: in the latter, the primary sector occupies the second place concerning employment while at national level the secondary sector plays the same role.

Due to the financial and economic crisis, the employment rate of 15 to 64 years old in Haskovo declined until 2011, however kept up since then (see also Chart 41).



**Chart 40. Employment by sector in Haskovo, 2017**


*Data source: Elaboration by EURAC based on data from Eurostat, Employment (thousand persons) by NUTS 3 regions*



**Chart 41. Development of employment rate in Haskovo, 2008-2018**

*Data source: Eurostat*

With only small fluctuations, the unemployment rate of the region follows the national trend, i.e. the pre-crisis, financial and economic crisis and post-crisis. The following graph presents the development of the unemployment rate at both the national level and in Haskovo. The development of the unemployment rates was highly dynamic in the period under consideration. In Haskovo it ranged from 15.9% in 2011 to 4.7% in 2017 (4.3% in 2018).



**Chart 42. Unemployment rate trends in Haskovo, 2008-2017**


*Data sources: OECD.stat, Labour indicators, small regions TL3 and large regions TL2; Eurostat, Total unemployment rate; National statistical offices of MATILDE countries.*

## LABOUR MARKET: FOCUS ON TCNS

For Haskovo, there are no data provided for the employment rate of TCNs. In order to give an idea of the general situation of TCNs in Bulgaria and the regional situation of employment in Yuzhen tsentralen, the following graph presents the development of the employment rates of TCNs on national level and the total employment rates of both Bulgaria and Yuzhen tsentralen. In the period under consideration, a general positive trend can be observed. Interestingly, since 2014 an opposite trend between TCNs and the total population can be noticed. While the employment rate of the total population was steadily growing, the employment rate of TCNs is slightly decreasing (see Chart 43). There are a few positive examples of migrant labour in the local economy, e.g. refugee from Harmanli



open camp work in greenhouses in Haskovo region. Some migrants also work in food industry, e.g. in a cookies factory, or even barber shops or small other shops run by migrants. According to local experts, the majority of migrants prefers to work in commerce and call centres, and not so much in agriculture.



**Chart 43. Employment rate in Yuzhen Tsentralen, 2008-2018**

*Data source: Eurostat*

In the following table, the special employment patterns of rural Bulgaria and total Bulgaria are compared, i.e. part-time employment, self-employment and temporary employment. It should be highlighted that the share of all three types of employment are higher in rural areas than in the country's average. Due to lack of data, no specific characterization for TCNs can be provided.

2018	Total Bulgaria		Rural areas	
	TCN	TOTAL	TCN	TOTAL
Part-time employment	n/a	1.8%	n/a	3.6%
Self-employment	n/a	10.6%	n/a	12.2%
Temporary employment	n/a	4.0%	n/a	9.3%

**Table 28. Special employment patterns for the total population and Third Country Nationals by degree of urbanization in Bulgaria, 2018**

*Data source: Eurostat*

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### 3. COUNTRY REPORT FINLAND

Author: Stefan Kordel, with contributions from Jussi Laine, Daniel Rauhut, Pirjö Pöllänen and Olga Davydova-Minguet

Around the 1990s, domestic urban-rural migration predominated in Finland and a tradition of counter-urbanisation was established. As Pehkonen (2005) stressed, moving to the countryside was associated with increasing quality of housing and better environment for children as well as financial reasons (see also chapter on lifestyle migration). In terms of international immigration, however, Finland has been a country of emigration until the end of 20<sup>th</sup> century. Initial immigration processes with larger numbers could be observed subsequent to post-socialist transformation processes, when people from neighbouring Russia and Estonia arrived (see also Kraus & Pietikäinen 2009), who represent the major groups of foreign-born population even today (20% resp. 16%, OECD 2018). Simultaneously, asylum seekers from Ex-Yugoslavia and Somalia sought shelter in Finland in the 1990s (ibid.). After years where asylum requests hovered between 3,000-4,000, in 2015/16, the number of asylum seekers from Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria increased remarkably and reached 38,100 persons (see also chapter on forced migration). Given the country's traditionally restrictive refugee policy, the number can be considered as remarkably high, as it ranked Finland among the top-five countries in asylum applications per capita in the EU (Laine & Rauhut 2018). However, not all asylum seekers have the right to remain in Finland, as the acceptance rate in 2016 was only 27%, which is low by international standards. As a consequence, despite close to 44,000 asylum applications since the start of 2015, the number of persons granted international protection over this period remains under 14,000 (OECD 2018).

At the end of 2019, according to Statistics Finland (2020a), there were 423,494 persons with foreign background living in Finland. Of them, 209,108 or one-half lived in Greater Helsinki. Among the largest groups with foreign background, those with Somali background, 79 per cent, and those with Indian background, 70 per cent, have concentrated in Greater Helsinki.

The immigration tradition to Finland is relatively young (Mikkola & Huerta Morales 2017) and reached a peak in 2015 and 2016 due to the immigration of asylum seekers. Consequently, modifications of migration and integration policies were introduced. These encompassed restrictions to immigration (e.g. granting asylum or family reunification) and adjustments to the integration process (Act on the Integration of Immigrants and Reception of Asylum Seekers 1999). On national level, the Finnish Immigration Service (Migri, under the Ministry of Interior) is responsible for granting residence permits, processing asylum procedures, and operating reception centres for asylum seekers, whilst the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment coordinates the integration of newly arrived immigrants (Act on the Promotion of Immigrant Integration 2011). Finally, the Ministry of Education and

Culture coordinates skills assessment. At regional and local level, municipalities can negotiate with TE offices (Centres for Economic Development, Transport and the Environment) about allocation and quota for those receiving international protection and are responsible for providing basic services afterwards. Moreover, they are responsible for the development and implementation of the integration plans, provide basic education and childcare. Also operating on municipal level, the Public Employment Service (TE offices) organizes labour market integration including literacy training (OECD 2018).

According to the integration guidelines set by the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment (2016), four phases characterise current integration process: early stage services, initial assessment, integration plan and integration training. The Finnish Immigration Service provides initial orientation for allocated asylum seekers. Crucial to the integration of TCNs, and asylum seekers in particular, is assessment of skills and, subsequently, identification of gaps to be filled. After this assessment, an integration plan is created, usually for a duration of three years, with possible extension to five years. The Immigrant Barometer evaluates the Finnish integration process for TCNs from selected countries, i.e. Russia, Estonia, Thailand, China, Iraq, Somalia, Turkey. The Barometer's results ranked job and language skills as most important factors of integration. Migrant's needs are best met in terms of day care and child health (Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment 2012).

Like in other Nordic countries, natural birth rates are low and slightly population growth mostly depends on the high positive net migration rate. Common national policy is to consider immigration as solution to ageing population and depopulation in rural areas (Mikkola & Huerta Morales 2017). Accordingly, the relatively young foreign-born population – 85% of whom are between the ages of 15 and 64 – represent an important resource. This is particularly true in those regions in which the native-born population is shrinking. Alongside the implications of population ageing on the economic vitality and growth of Finland, the changing population structure also has far-reaching implications for the sustainability of the pension, healthcare, and education systems. And while migration is rarely a long-term solution to population ageing, ensuring that the foreign-born working-age population is able and ready to work represents not only an urgent challenge but an important opportunity (OECD 2018). In order to make integration more successful, newly established policies aim at emphasising the economic potential of immigrants, whilst labour migrants are the target group (see next section).

## LABOUR MIGRATION

The Immigrant Integration Act (2010), i.e. the “Act on the Promotion of Immigrant Integration (1386/2010)” addresses all immigrants. It also covers labour migrants, yet is not limited to them only. Participation in the labour market has been addressed as a common goal in Finnish immigrant integration policy for a while (Weide 2009). Since 2018, under the General Government Fiscal Plan, the awareness of the potential positive role of immigration for the economy, but also for public finances was highlighted. Besides, the integration to the global economy should be strengthened, also by a Talent Boost programme, which seeks to attract international talents (OECD 2018). Moreover, the process of issuing working permits to international specialists, holding a university degree and having special skills, was accelerated and the first permit is usually issued for two instead of one year. For start-up entrepreneurs, a specific residence permit was introduced (Ministry of Interior 2020). Besides specialists, mostly from IT sector, special emphasis is put on temporary working migrants to be hired in agriculture in general and berry picking in particular. Under the Aliens Act, people can enter Finland without a visa if they perform certain tasks regulated in a list. Usually the work involves picking or harvesting of berries, fruits or vegetables (Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment 2020). Similar to Sweden, berry pickers are mainly from Thailand. As a consequence of COVID-19 induced closing of the borders in 2020, Finnish Farmers’ Associations highlighted a lack of around 10,000 seasonal workers, whilst various ministries considered to recruit workers e.g. from Ukraine and Russia (Foreigner.fi 2020). Previous research by Könönen (2011) and Pöllänen and Davydova-Minguet (2017) point out that care and medicine, i.e. physicians, are potential sectors for Russian migrants in North Karelia in the East of the country, where Russian speakers are a minority (see also Pöllänen 2013). Simultaneously, Swedish speaking health workers are sought after along the Western coast, where the role of the Swedish language is more prominent.

In contrast to other Nordic states, Finland has recovered from a financial and economic crisis in 2008 much slower. To date, whilst employment among native born population has returned to pre-crisis level, employment rates among foreigners is still lagging behind (OECD 2018).

## FORCED MIGRATION


The arrival of people from ex-Yugoslavia and Somalia in Finland in the 1990 was the first experience Finland made with regard to humanitarian migration. In 2015, a dramatic increase took place in terms of first-time asylum applications and Finland recorded a high number of first time applicants per capita (5,876, compared to Sweden 16,016 and Germany 5,441) (Laine & Rauhut 2018). The majority (63%) were Iraqis, mostly under the age of 35 and male (ibid.).



The majority of asylum seekers lives in asylum centres, which numbers increased substantially in 2015 (28 to 212), not only in the densely populated South, but also in rural areas in the East and North of Finland (see also Map 12). Whilst an established dispersal policy results in the placement of asylum seekers also in rural areas, municipalities can decide whether they want to host asylum seekers or not (Mikkola & Huerta Morales 2017). As a consequence, only some municipalities experience a high share of asylum seekers (see map below). As Laine & Rauhut (2018) point out, the host population in smaller communities in rural areas has less multicultural experience. Thus, the settlement of asylum seekers has sometimes resulted in a defensive local reaction. Alongside the proliferation of anti-immigrant sentiments and harassments, the populist Finns Party gained more influence in public debates. In a study on Iraqi refugees, Koikkalainen et al. (2019) stressed that idealized visions of Finland were partly disappointed since asylum applications were refused or took a long time. Moreover, asylum seekers in rural areas and remote towns, made experiences of being confined. Especially those „who had arrived in the northern part of the country, via Sweden or Russia, soon attempted to make their way south, which they expected to be warmer but which was also where most people lived and most services were to be found” (Laine & Rauhut 2018: 71).


Compared to Sweden or Norway, Finland hosted much less unaccompanied minors (around 3,000 in 2017), whilst 65% of them came from Afghanistan. With regard to the spatial distribution, the number of unaccompanied minors per 1,000 children is particularly high in some sparsely populated municipalities (Karlsdottir et al. 2018, see also Map 13).

The Integration policies described above mostly target humanitarian migrants. Punctual evidence is given for some rural areas, e.g. Punkalaidun, a rural municipality in South-West Finland, where LEADER projects explicitly address immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees. An immigration coordinator focuses on problem-solving and bridge-building between the newcomers (from Myanmar and Syria) and local residents by means of social activities as well as education and employment (AEIDL n.y.).



**Map 12. Asylum seekers in Nordic countries by municipality in March 2017**

*Source: Karlsdottir et al. 2018: 26*



**Map 13. Unaccompanied minors in Nordic countries by municipality in May 2016**

*Source: Karlsdottir et al. 2018: 32*

## STUDENT MIGRATION

The number of international students who moved to Finland steadily grew until 2016 and stagnated afterwards. This development is most likely due to the introduction of tuition fees for university students from outside the EU in the autumn of 2017. While a vast majority of the short-term exchange students comes from other EU member states, the share of non-EU students has become higher when long-term degree students are considered. Based on the granted residence permit applications by international students during the recent years, the largest number of applicants have come from China and Russia (EDUFI 2019a; Statistics Finland 2020b). When looking at foreign degree students enrolled in higher education, students of Asian origin now exceed the number of students of European origin (ibid.). According to the figures provided by EDUFI (2019b), the most common citizenships of foreign degree students studying at universities in 2018 were Vietnam, Russia, China, Nepal, India and Bangladesh.

To support the entry and integration of international university students in Finland, the Ministries of Education and Culture as well as of the Interior set up a cooperation group on 22 March 2020. The group is expected to make suggestions on how to strengthen cross-administrative cooperation and how to increase networking and information flow in order to attract more foreign students to Finland, but about retain them once their training is finished. Until now, student migration is only relevant in the regional centers in rural areas, where universities are located.

## FAMILY MIGRATION


Family migration in Finland is always linked to those forms of immigration previously discussed. For holders of residence permits for work, families may usually apply for a residence permit on the basis of family ties. Thus, the spatial distribution is expected to be similar. However, no specific statements can be made for rural and mountain areas.

## AMENITY/LIFESTYLE MIGRATION

Like in other Nordic states, lifestyle-related migration processes mostly derive from the tradition of second homes, representing simple ways of living with small-sized dwellings (Müller 2007; Pitkänen 2008) or patterns of counter-urbanisation (Adamiak et al. 2017). A trend towards an internationalisation of this phenomenon can be observed when looking at the real estate market. While in other Scandinavian contexts, people from Central Europe, e.g. Germany, purchased real estate, the peculiarity in Finland is that buyers from Russia predominate. In 2008, 83% of

all foreign second home purchases were made by Russians (in total: 789, Lipkina 2013). In light of the low share of foreign real estate purchase of around 1% nationwide, Russian second home owners (SHO) remain insignificant in quantitative terms. However, Pitkänen (2011) observed growing public and media interest, dominated by negative sentiments. For Russian citizens, second home ownership is closely linked to the specific cultural connotation of a *datcha*, which is widely acknowledged as a common social practice (Lipkina 2013). As the following map indicates, Russian SHOs concentrate in counties along the Finish-Russian border.






**Map 14. Share of Russians in the Finnish property market 2003-2011**

*Source: Lipkina 2013: 301*

### 3.1 OSTROBOTHNIA: TERRITORIAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE REGION

Authors: Jussi Laine and Daniel Rauhut



Map 15. Ostrobothnia

### 3.1.1 GEOGRAPHICAL AND TERRITORIAL FEATURES OF OSTROBOTHNIA

<i>TERRITORIAL INDICATORS</i>	<i>2018</i>
Share of population living outside urban areas	52.1%
Share of population living in mountain areas	Non-mountain region
Share of territory covered by mountains	Non-mountain region
Share of territory covered by agricultural fields	21.5%
Border region	No

**Table 29. Territorial indicators of Ostrobothnia**


*Sources: Eurostat Border typology; Urban-Rural typology; Eurostat Mountain typology; Eurostat Corine Landcover; Eurostat Degree of Urbanization (DEGURBA).*

Ostrobothnia<sup>31</sup> is a NUTS-3 level region forming a narrow, 230 km long and only about 20–50 km wide coastal strip along the shoreline of the Gulf of Bothnia (Baltic Sea, see also Map 15 and Table 29). Together with Satakunta, Pirkanmaa, Central Finland and Southern Ostrobothnia, it forms a part of the NUT2 region Western Finland. Ostrobothnia consists of 15 municipalities, of which six have city status. The region has two strong urban areas: Vaasa (approx. 68,000 inhabitants) on the coast of the central part of the province, which is the centre of the whole province. Jakobstad (19,208 inhabitants) is a distinct regional centre in the northern part of the region. In the south, Kristiinankaupunki, Kaskinen and Närpiö, form a three-pole, network-like regional centre based on extensive co-operation. Approximately 80 villages complement the regional structure.

<sup>31</sup> The Swedish name of the region is Österbotten, while the Finnish one is Pohjanmaa.



### 3.1.2 ACCESSIBILITY FEATURES OF OSTROBOTHNIA



**Map 16. Population distribution and accessibility of hospitals in Ostrobothnia**

<i>ACCESSIBILITY of selected infrastructures</i>	<i>Ostrobothnia, 2016</i>	<i>MATILDE regions average, 2016</i>
Access to hospitals, travel time by car weighted by population (minutes)	10.7	14.2
Access to primary schools, travel time by car weighted by population (minutes)	5.4	5.9
Access to secondary schools, travel time by car weighted by population (minutes)	11.4	9.2
Access to train stations, travel time by car weighted by population (minutes)	17	10.5
Access to shops, travel time by car weighted by population (minutes)	5.2	5.2

**Table 30. Accessibility of selected infrastructures in Ostrobothnia, 2016**

*Data source: ESPON Profecy 2018*

In the early 1990s, the Finnish health care system experienced its first marketisation and New Public Management reforms, with a second wave 2009-2010 (Smith & Rauhut 2019). A third major reform was set to be implemented in 2019. As the reform violated the Finnish constitution, it was called off (Rauhut & Smith 2020). During the second part of the 2010s, the Swedish speaking hospital in Vaasa was closed by the former Finnish government (Österbottens Tidning 2015). However, the present government re-opened it so that the Swedish speaking majority population in Ostrobothnia did again have an advanced health care facility offering services in their mother tongue (Hufvudstadsbladet 2019, see also Map 16).

The Finnish welfare system has undergone a gradual but fundamental change in recent decades. At the core of this change has been the role of local government and the emergence of a clear centralisation agenda which sees responsibility and budgets decentralised while regulatory authority is recentralised (Kettunen 2016). Health and education service provision each display elements of universality and spatial variation in accessibility terms. The location of schools and the trend towards centralisation disadvantages the inhabitants of peripheral metropolitan districts or those from large rural municipalities in the north and east of the country. Children's travel time to school is now significantly longer, potentially affecting their well-being (Ramin 2015; Salonen & Bernelius 2017, see also Table 30 and access to secondary schools, 11.4 minutes vs. 9.2 minutes as MATILDE regions average).

Ostrobothnia struggles with the same centralisation problems as all other rural regions in Finland: distances to services become longer and longer in rural areas. The service provision is good in Vaasa and Jakobstad, but there is room for improvement in the rural parts of Ostrobothnia. In the present policy program of the region, two of the four overarching aims address accessibility to services and welfare provision (Österbottens förbund 2017).

### 3.1.3 SOCIAL FEATURES OF OSTROBOTHNIA

<i>DEMOGRAPHIC INDICATORS<sup>32</sup></i>	<i>2018</i>	<i>Variation (2008-2018)</i>	<i>National average (2018)</i>	<i>EU average (2018)</i>	<b>MATILDE regions average (2018)</b>
<b>Population size</b>	180,945	3.4%	-	-	425,252
<b>Population density (inhabitants per km<sup>2</sup>)</b>	23.3	22.6 / 23.4**	18.1	105.3	102
<b>Median age of population (years)</b>	41.9	0.4*	42.7	43.1	45
<b>Old-age dependency ratio (&gt;65/14-64)</b>	37.1	3.9*	32.2	30.5	33
<b>Young-age Dependency Ratio</b>	28.9	1*	25.9	24.1	23
<b>Aging Index (&gt;65/&lt;14)</b>	128.7	9.6	132.1	124	148
<b>Crude birth rate (births per 1000 inhabitants)</b>	9.7	-2.2	8.6	9.8	9.1
<b>Total fertility rate (new-born per woman)</b>	1.7	-0.3*	1.4	1.54	1.58
<b>Crude rate of natural population change (‰)</b>	-0.2	-0.2 / 3.3**	-1.3	-1.0	-1.7
<b>Crude rate of net migration (‰)</b>	-0.6	-2.7 / 4.3**	2.1	2.6	3.6

32 \*This is calculated only for the period 2014-2018. \*\* Minimum and maximum values recorded in the period considered.

<i>DEMOGRAPHIC INDICATORS<sup>32</sup></i>	<i>2018</i>	<i>Variation (2008-2018)</i>	<i>National average (2018)</i>	<i>EU average (2018)</i>	<i>MATILDE regions average (2018)</i>
<b>Crude rate of total population change (‰)</b>	-0.8	-2.7 / 6.5**	0.9	1.6	1.9

**Table 31. Demographic indicators of Ostrobothnia, 2018**

*Data source: Eurostat, Population (Demography, Migration and Projections)*


## DEMOGRAPHY

The MATILDE region Ostrobothnia is characterized by a **slightly positive population development** from 2008 to 2018 (See Table 31 and Chart 44). Ostrobothnia is one of the two Finnish regions with a Swedish-speaking majority of 51.2% - the other being the constitutionally monolingual province of Åland. The region contains thirteen bilingual municipalities and two that are exclusively Finnish speaking. Earlier forecasts (2012) predicted the population of Ostrobothnia to continue to grow faster than the Finnish average. It actually did so until 2019, but the early 2020 figures already suggest a declining trend. During the last years, much of the growth in Ostrobothnia resulted from the rapid growth in the Vaasa region, followed by the Pietarsaari region, i.e. the regions that are already the most populous and urban. However, according to Statistics Finland's population forecast, the population of Ostrobothnia will decrease in the coming decades. The population is expected to grow in only three municipalities: Luoto, Vaasa and Närpiö. The best prediction among the regions is foreseen in the Vaasa region, where the population is expected to decrease only slightly.

The population dependency ratio, i.e. the number of working-age people in relation to children and the elderly, is also declining in Ostrobothnia, but not as much as elsewhere in the country. However, the variation between municipalities is large, i.e. more rural municipalities tend to have higher ratios, while more urban areas have younger population.


The population of Ostrobothnia increases thanks to the surplus of both natural growth and immigration. Considering internal migration, Ostrobothnia continuously loses inhabitants. However, positive migration balance results from immigration of foreigners. Whilst migration balance was negative for nationals in most of the years, people with foreign citizenship immigrated to Ostrobothnia and fostered positive balance, which is a result of the very

international industrial scene there. The migration balance remained relatively stable between 2008 and 2018, as the following graph indicates (see also Chart 45).



**Chart 44. Third Country Nationals over total population in Ostrobothnia, 2008-2018**

*Data sources: Eurostat*



**Chart 45. Migration balance in Ostrobothnia, 2008-2018**

*Data source: Eurostat*

The large number of immigrants is visible in public space and creates an international atmosphere, which often appears as a positive factor in measuring the attractiveness of the regions. Multilingualism is an attraction factor and a strength that gives the international companies in the landscape a competitive advantage, like in the MATILDE region South Tyrol.

The population of Ostrobothnia is socially active. The percentage of people who are active in any club, organisation, association, hobby group or spiritual community is clearly higher than in the whole country on average. This manifests itself in a dynamic association and cultural life. Joint operations create networks and confidence, i.e. social capital, which is considered one of Ostrobothnia's key assets.

Moreover, the region of Ostrobothnia actively invests in activities aiming at integrating immigrants and stimulate opportunities for work for immigrants. The main purpose is that immigrants become genuinely involved in society and working life. An essential part of this whole is that tolerance is promoted while combating discrimination and racism.

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## DEMOGRAPHY: FOCUS ON TCNS

In line with the development on national Finnish level, the total number of TCNs in Ostrobothnia steadily grew within 2008-2018 from 3,624 to 6,607. The share of TCNs among total population is slightly higher in Ostrobothnia (3.7%) compared to Finland as a whole (2.3%, 2018). The highest growth rate of TCNs in Ostrobothnia can be observed from 2008-2009.

The MATILDE region Ostrobothnia is characterised by a variety of people with foreign citizenship, whilst a change in quantitative terms and with respect to its composition can be observed from 2008 to 2018 (See Table 32). Considering TCNs, in 2008, the TOP10 of foreign citizenships included countries which were involved in armed conflicts or civil wars some years ago and are thus expected to be sources of humanitarian migration processes, e.g. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Somalia, Serbia and Montenegro, Sudan, Iraq as well as Iran. With some of these countries, Finland has a long-lasting migration history, such as Somalia (from the 1990s on), Vietnam or the Russian Federation. Especially citizenship holders from P.R. China and Thailand are, to a certain extent, holders of working permits.

While some nationalities remained quite stable over time in absolute numbers, e.g. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Russian Federation, but also P.R. China and Somalia, others increased remarkably. Amongst them are Vietnam, but also Syria and Iraq, the latter as a consequence of the most recent armed conflicts in both MENA countries. Compared to the national/NUTS-0 scale, which points to people with Russian citizenship as the most important nationality in total

numbers by far, Ostrobothnia has a slightly different composition. Remarkable is the high share of individuals with Vietnamese citizenship – nearly 15% of total country's Vietnamese people live in Ostrobothnia.

2008			2018		
1	Bosnia and Herzegovina	420	1	Vietnam	887
2	Russian Federation	308	2	Syria	531
3	Somalia	282	3	Bosnia and Herzegovina	486
4	Iran	241	4	Ukraine	446
5	Sudan	214	5	Iraq	338
6	Vietnam	190	6	Thailand	305
7	P.R. China	188	7	Somalia	302
8	Serbia and Montenegro (/fc)	144	8	Russian Federation	300
9	Thailand	134	9	Afghanistan	274
10	Iraq	104	10	P.R. China	193


**Table 32. Total number of Third Country Nationals in Ostrobothnia**

*Data source: Statistics Finland*

## AGE AND GENDER STRUCTURE

Since 2016, the development of the population in Ostrobothnia has been clearly weaker than before, especially due to the increased domestic migration loss and the declining birth rate. In 2018, 17.3 % of the total population was under 15 years old, 60.0 % between 15 and 64, and 22.7 % 65 years old or older. Due to lack of provision of data on NUTS-3 level, no specific characterization can be provided here.

The total number of female TCNs in Ostrobothnia was 3,060 in 2018, which is a share of 46.2% (cf. share of females of total population is 49.4%). While the number of female TCNs steadily grew from 2008 to 2018, its share remained relatively stable (see also Chart 46).



**Chart 46. Share of female Third Country Nationals in Ostrobothnia, 2008-2018**

*Data source: Statistics Finland*

### 3.1.4 EDUCATIONAL FEATURES OF OSTROBOTHNIA


The education level of TCNs differs remarkably from the total population in Western Finland (Länsi Suomi, see also Chart 47)<sup>33</sup>. The share of people with lower education, i.e., less than primary, primary and lower secondary education (levels 0-2), is much higher among TCNs and has not decreased in the last ten years.

The NEET rate (young people, aged 15-34 neither in employment nor in education and training) differs between total population and TCNs on national level, however, approximated more recently. The total NEET rate for Western Finland, remained relatively stable over time (see also Chart 48).

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
<sup>33</sup> Since EUROSTAT data only can be provided on NUTS-2 level, the NUTS-2 Länsi-Suomi, where Ostrobothnia belongs to, was selected.





**Chart 47. Education level among Third Country Nationals and total population in Western Finland**

*Data source: Eurostat*



**Chart 48. Share of young NEETS (15-34y/o) in Western Finland and Finland, 2008-2018**

*Data source: Eurostat*

### 3.1.5 ECONOMIC FEATURES OF OSTROBOTHNIA

<i>ECONOMIC INDICATORS<sup>34</sup></i>	<i>2017</i>	<i>Variation 2008-2017</i>	<i>National average (2017)</i>	<i>EU average (2017)<sup>EU</sup></i>	<i>MATILDE regions average (2017)</i>
<b>Regional GDP per capita at purchasing power standards</b>	31,400	-0.4%	33,100	29,800	29,624
<b>Regional Gross value added: primary sector</b>	5%	1.2 percentage points	3%	2% (7,098.5 million euro)	4%
<b>Regional Gross value added: secondary sector</b>	39%	-3.7 percentage points	28%	27% (95,398 million euro)	30%
<b>Regional Gross value added: tertiary sector</b>	56%	2.5 percentage points	69%	71% (254,090 million euro)	66%

**Table 33. Economic indicators in Ostrobothnia, 2017**


*Data sources: Eurostat Gross domestic product (GDP) at current market prices by NUTS 3 regions; OECD Gross domestic product (GDP); Eurostat Gross value added at basic prices by NUTS 3 regions.*

34 Missing data for France for Regional Gross Value Added and Employment by sector; Average has been therefore calculated on the basis of 26 Member States.

## ECONOMIC STRUCTURE

Finland is one of the most “rural” countries in Europe (Eurostat 2017; World Bank 2019). Within the EU, economic success is usually linked to urban environments and easy access. This is not fully the case in Finland: the economy here has been doing quite well even if a significant part of the population lives in areas which are both rural and poorly accessible. Rural areas in Ostrobothnia are better connected than some other parts of the country, though. Still, it is quite remarkable that we have seen that fairly equitable conditions for growth and success can be created independent from the type of region and specific location.

According to the OECD’s (2008) definition of rural areas, Finland ranks fifth in terms of the share of territory covered by predominantly rural (PR) regions (89%) and ranks second both in terms of population that they host (53%) and in GDP produced within these regions (45%). Ostrobothnia’s regional GDP per capita expressed in purchasing power standards (PPS) has been increasing during the 2010s, and in 2018 it was 30,800, standing below the national average (33,700) but above the EU-28 average (30,400) (Eurostat 2020, See Chart 49).



**Chart 49. Gross Domestic Product trend in Ostrobothnia, 2008-2017**

*Data sources: Eurostat, Gross domestic product (GDP) at current market prices by NUTS 3 regions.*

Ostrobothnia has a longstanding industrial tradition, hosts the biggest energy sector cluster among the Nordic countries, and, furthermore, has a broad range of service-oriented industry-related branches. Today, the region can

be classified as an innovative growth area with a focus on the creation of a knowledge-based and environmentally friendly economy. From its strong innovation environment many SMEs as well as numerous international companies benefit. The most important sector in Ostrobothnia is the renewable energy branch that includes bio energy and wind power. Another major branch is the sea cluster including fishing.

Further sectors of significance are metal industry, plastic industry, and environmental technology. Those have deep connections with the energy cluster. In addition, more service-oriented branches have been developed, including in particular industry related services such as ICT, media, industrial design, maintenance of energy production systems, and welfare services. Companies in Ostrobothnia are predominantly SMEs but also many big international companies are located there. The importance of the region of Ostrobothnia is also increasing (CEC 2019).

Ostrobothnia's business life is diverse and sub-regionally differentiated. The city of Vaasa, as a regional centre and a university city, is the number one-centre in the entire province, and its nationally significant position is strengthened by diverse large companies operating in the global market. The Vaasa region is one of the most competitive regions in Finland, and one of the few economic regions where industrial workplaces have increased during the 2000s. The strengths of the region are the manufacturing of machinery, equipment, and electrotechnical products, the energy sector, transport, trade, banking and insurance services. About half of the working-age population of the entire province lives and works in Vaasa.

The Jakobstad region in the north has a very viable and resilient regional economy. Entrepreneurship and family businesses are a specific. The strengths of the region are diverse industry (including pulp and paper, metal, mechanical and chemical, boat industry, plastics and food industry), comprehensive services and good transport connections. The importance of Jakobstad is strengthened by close cooperation with the Kokkola region in the neighbouring Central Ostrobothnia.

In Kyrönmaa (towards inland), the basic industries, such as timber and metal industry and the car trade have been the most successful. The southern coastal area of Suupohja, Kristiinankaupunki, Kaskinen and Närpiö form a three-pole, network-like regional centre based on extensive co-operation. The region relies on basic industries (forestry, paper and pulp, metal) and has had the weakest development. The regional gross domestic product has grown quite slowly during the 2000s in this part of Ostrobothnia. Although job opportunities have declined, the industrial structure in the southern parts of the region still has its main focus on primary production and industry. The proportion of jobs in the service industries, on the other hand, is relative smaller than in Finland on average (Österbottens förbund 2017), largely due to the more rural characteristics of the region.


## LABOUR MARKET

<i>LABOUR MARKET INDICATORS</i>	<i>2017</i>	<i>Variation 2008-2017</i>	<i>National average (2017)</i>	<i>EU average (2017)</i>	<i>MATILDE regions average (2017)</i>
Unemployment rate (%/percentage points)	7.1%	2.4	8.6%	8.1 %	8.4%
Employment by sector: primary (% , thousands of employees)	7.5% (6.5)	-13.3%	4% (90.9)	5% (353.98)	5% (6.75)
Employment by sector: secondary (% , thousands of employees)	30.5% (26.2)	-8.9%	23% (577.1)	23% (1,584.74)	26% (36.19)
Employment by sector: tertiary (% , thousands of employees)	62% (53.1)	3.5%	74% (1,893.8)	71% (4,830.33)	69% (97.63)
People at risk of poverty or social exclusion (average 2008-2018, %/percentage points)	12%	-0.5	15.7%	21.6%	17.3%

**Table 34. Labour Market indicators in Ostrobothnia, 2017**

*Data sources: Unemployment: OECD Labour indicators, small regions TL3 and large regions TL2; National Statistical Institutes; Eurostat, Unemployment rates by sex, age, citizenship and NUTS 2 regions; Eurostat, People at risk of poverty or social exclusion by NUTS 2 regions.*


The share of employment (workers from 15 to 64 years old) in agriculture, forestry and fishing, in Western Finland, in 2018, (4.9%) exceeds the national (3.7%) as well as the EU average level (3.9%, see also Table 34 and Chart 50). **Agricultural activity** is significant, especially in Ostrobothnia encompassing crops and dairy cattle mainly. Although **employment in industry** has declined slightly in recent years, Ostrobothnia is the most industry-oriented region in Finland, with almost 30% of the labour force working in industrial activity in 2017, compared to 23% at national level (Eurostat 2020).



**Chart 50. Employment by sector in Ostrobothnia, 2017**

*Data source: Eurostat, Employment (thousand persons) by NUTS 3 regions*

The residents of Ostrobothnia feel relatively good when it comes to well-being and health. The proportion of people who experience a good quality of life is slightly higher than on average throughout the country. One of the most important factors that promotes the well-being of the population and prevents exclusion is work and an efficient labour market. Ostrobothnia has for a long time had a high employment and low unemployment compared to the rest of the country. It is, however, alarming that unemployment among young people and immigrants, as well as long-term unemployment, has continuously increased during the 2010s. The very good unemployment benefits and the related social services may explain why the risk of poverty is below EU and MATILDE averages.




**Chart 51. Unemployment rate trends in Ostrobothnia, 2008-2017**

*Data sources: OECD.stat, Labour indicators, small regions TL3 and large regions TL2; Eurostat, Total unemployment rate; National statistical offices of MATILDE countries*

## LABOUR MARKET: FOCUS ON TCNS

In Western Finland, the employment rate of TCNs is noticeable lower compared to the total population (see Chart 52). Compared to the total population, the share of TCNs, who are employed part-time or temporary is much higher, whilst self-employed TCNs are less frequently (see also Table 35). For rural areas, self-employment is, in general, more widespread, which is related to farming and rural tourism. The special employment patterns of TCNs in Finland is illustrated in the following chart.



**Chart 52. Development of employment rates in Western Finland, 2008-2018**

*Data source: Eurostat*


2018	Total Finland		Rural Areas Finland	
	TCN	TOTAL	TCN	TOTAL
Part-time employment	22,3%	15,0%	n/a	14,1%
Self-employment	8,9%	11,6%	n/a	16,6%
Temporary employment	26,1%	16,2%	n/a	14,8%

**Table 35. Special employment patterns for total population and Third Country Nationals by degree of urbanization in Finland, 2018**

*Data source: Eurostat*

Whilst the unemployment rate in Western Finland followed the nationwide developments from 2008 to 2018, the unemployment rate of TCNs in Finland quadrupled that of the populations, yet it was decreasing recently (see also Chart 53). In rural areas in Finland, the unemployment rate corresponded to the nationwide share (6,7%).






**Chart 53. Unemployment rate trends in Western Finland, 2008-2018**

*Data source: Eurostat*

### 3.2 NORTH KARELIA: TERRITORIAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS

Author: Jussi Laine, with contributions from Tobias Weidinger and Stefan Kordel



Map 17. North Karelia

### 3.2.1 GEOGRAPHICAL AND TERRITORIAL FEATURES OF NORTH KARELIA

<i>TERRITORIAL indicators</i>	<i>2018</i>
Share of population living outside urban areas	46.7%
Share of population living in mountain areas	Non-mountain region
Share of territory covered by mountains	Non-mountain region
Share of territory covered by agricultural fields	5.1%
Border region	Yes

**Table 36. Territorial indicators of North Karelia, 2018**

*Data sources: Eurostat Border typology; Urban-Rural typology; Eurostat Mountain typology; Eurostat Corine Landcover; Eurostat Degree of Urbanization (DEGURBA)*


North Karelia<sup>35</sup> is a vast, yet sparsely populated region in eastern Finland – and the easternmost region of continental EU (see also Map 17 and Table 36). It borders the regions of Kainuu, North Savo, South Savo and South Karelia, and shares 300 km of international border with the Russian Federation (Republic of Karelia). The region of North Karelia is made up of 12 municipalities, of which five have city status, with the city of Joensuu (76,543 inhabitants) being the capital of the region.

The region is classified as predominantly rural (Eurostat 2018) as more than half of its population lives in rural areas, i.e. in municipalities with less than 10,000 inhabitants. In the table above we refer to data that has been calculated based on municipalities, which also includes grid cells that are counted as rural. Hence, the actual share of population living in rural cells is higher than 46.7%.

The region is categorized as a border region, yet this figure shall be handled carefully when considering the region's proneness to migration and commuting flows. The entire region has only one border crossing point. Elsewhere, the border is strictly controlled and practically closed. Hence, living in close proximity to the border does not mean easy access to cross it. The border in question is not only a state border, but also a part of the EU external border as well as that of the Schengen area. It is also important to bear in mind that the border used to be heavily militarized and controlled during the Cold War, with heavily controlled border zones extending deep inland on both sides. Hence, living close to the border has not been preferred or even possible.

<sup>35</sup> The Finnish name of the region is Pohjois-Karjala, the Swedish one instead is Norra Karelen.

### 3.2.2 ACCESSIBILITY FEATURES OF NORTH KARELIA



**Map 18. Population distribution and accessibility of hospitals in North Karelia**

<i>ACCESSIBILITY of selected infrastructures</i>	<i>North Karelia, 2016</i>	<i>MATILDE regions average, 2016</i>
Access to hospitals, travel time by car weighted by population (minutes)	29.3	14.2
Access to primary schools, travel time by car weighted by population (minutes)	8.8	5.9
Access to secondary schools, travel time by car weighted by population (minutes)	19.1	9.2
Access to train stations, travel time by car weighted by population (minutes)	15	10.5
Access to shops, travel time by car weighted by population (minutes)	7.2	5.2

**Table 37. Accessibility of selected infrastructures in North Karelia, 2016**

*Data source: ESPON Profecy, 2018*

In Finland, the services are commonly divided to three categories on the basis of how services are financed and organised. There are three pillars of welfare state: public services, private services and third sector (NGO) based services. Basically, any service can be produced by any of these three actors. When we think about people's everyday life, in North Karelia all these services are important for one to be able to cope with everyday life.

Public services are mainly referring to education, social and health services. In the Finnish system, every municipality is responsible for its services. However, some services are organised through federations of municipalities. In North Karelia, for instance, there is only one regional hospital, which is run by a federation of all North Karelian municipalities and situated in Joensuu. Almost all the surgeries and intensive care are produced by this central hospital. The distance from the farthest locations of rural North Karelia to the central hospital can be approximately 200 km (see also Map 18, max. 2 hours by car, average is 29.3 minutes versus 14.2 minutes as MATILDE regions average). The public transportation from rural locations to Joensuu is limited.

In rural areas in North Karelia the distance to health care services varies from the municipality to municipality. In some municipalities, the social and health care sector is privatized and private sector service providers are offering care services in municipality centres, so the distance to the service can be few kilometres, but it can also be over 100 km (1.5 hours by car in the municipality of Ilomantsi for example). Private sector is mainly providing elderly care services, but in some municipalities also basic health care is in whole or in part run by private sector service providers.

Schools in North Karelia, as well as everywhere in Finland are organised (mainly) by the public sector. Schools/basic education is one of the main services provided by the public sector in Finland. In North Karelia, municipalities are

geographically large, but the number of inhabitants, especially inhabitants of younger generations, children or young people, is low, so in rural municipalities the schools are sparsely located, which means that pupils have long distances to schools, which explains the long travel times (see also Table 37, 8.8 respectively 19.1 minutes) compared to the MATILDE regions average (5.9 respectively 9.2 minutes).

The transportations to comprehensive schools are organised by municipalities, by taxi or by bus. It means that in some rural municipalities small children need to spend several hours per day in vehicles. In rural areas the nearest comprehensive school can be tens of kilometres away, and the journey to school can take maximum 3 hours per day (so 1.5 hours per one side journey). However, each municipality has its own comprehensive school or schools, and those are situated in municipality centres or bigger villages.

The vocational and upper secondary schools are not in all municipalities. Students of vocational and high schools need to travel to Joensuu (the centre of the region) or other bigger municipalities, which accommodate these schools, so similarly, the travelling from home to school can last several hours per day. In addition to the University of Eastern Finland and the University of Applied sciences, which provide higher education services, vocational education is organized by the Riveria vocational school owned by the federation of North Karelian municipalities. The units of Riveria function are situated in Joensuu, Outokumpu, Nurmes, Valtimo, Lieksa and Kitee.

### 3.2.3 SOCIAL FEATURES OF NORTH KARELIA

DEMOGRAPHIC INDICATORS <sup>36</sup>	2018	Variation (2008-2018)	National average (2018)	EU average (2018)	MATILDE regions average (2018)
Population size	162,986	-2.25%	-	-	425,252
Population density (inhabitants per km <sup>2</sup> )	9.2	9.2 / 9.4	18.1	105.3	102
Median age of population (years)	47.4	0.6*	42.7	43.1	45
Old-age dependency ratio (>65/14-64)	40.9	6*	32.2	30.5	33
Young-age Dependency Ratio	23.5	0.1*	25.9	24.1	23

<sup>36</sup> \*This is calculated only for the period 2014-2018.



<b>Aging Index (&gt;65/&lt;14)</b>	174.1	25.5	132.1	124	148
<b>Crude birth rate (births per 1000 inhabitants)</b>	7.5	-1.6	8.6	9.8	9.1
<b>Total fertility rate (new-born per woman)</b>	1.38	0.4*	1.4	1.54	1.58
<b>Crude rate of natural population change (‰)</b>	-5.2	-5.2 / -0.6	-1.3	-1.0	-1.7
<b>Crude rate of net migration (‰)</b>	0.6	-2.1 / 1.7	2.1	2.6	3.6
<b>Crude rate of total population change (‰)</b>	-4.6	-6.7 / 0.2	0.9	1.6	1.9

**Table 38. Demographic indicators of North Karelia, 2018**


*Data source: Eurostat, Population (Demography, Migration and Projections)*

## DEMOGRAPHY

In North Karelia there are over 160,000 inhabitants (see also Table 38), however most of them are concentrated in the main city, Joensuu with approximate 77,000 inhabitants. The capital city is a municipality which consists of urban and rural areas as rural municipalities have united, with the main town Joensuu. Because of the universal Finnish welfare state system, municipalities are responsible for organizing public services (e.g. schools, day care, elderly care, health services) for people living in their areas. This also means that municipalities are in very different situations regarding this responsibility. During past decades, Finland has been facing major reforms in the public sector, one of the most topical reforms being the social and health service reform, which is still unfinished. In order to be able to react to these reforms and changes in public sector, the rural municipalities joined the main town Joensuu and lost most autonomy.

The population in North Karelia is ageing, i.e. one fourth of the total population is over 65 years old. The dependency ratio is clearly higher than the national average, while when the share of young people is considered, the situation is the opposite. However, the population in Joensuu is younger than in the region in general, which is partly explained by the campus of the University of Eastern Finland and the campus of the North Karelia Polytechnics (University of Applied Sciences). The data on natural demographic change suggest a sharp decline in birth rates. A total of 1,083 children were born in North Karelia in 2019, which is the lowest figure in the history of statistics. The questionable record was now set for the fifth time in a row. Back in 2014, a total of 1,567 children were born. The number of births fell at a rapid rate in five years, with as many as 484 children, or 30.9%. Although the number of deaths (2,025) was slightly lower last year than in 2018 (2,056), natural demographic change (-942) was also the largest in statistical history due to the low number of births. The decrease in the number of births is due to the decrease in total fertility both in North Karelia and at the level of the whole country, i.e. not, for example, the emigration of people of

childbearing age. In 2019, the total fertility rate measuring birth rate in Finland was the lowest ever, 1.35 children per woman. In 2015, the total fertility rate in Finland was still 1.71, which is, of course, well below the population guarantee rate of 2.1. The MATILDE region is characterized by a **slightly negative population development** from 2008-2018 (See Chart 54).




**Chart 54. Third Country Nationals over total population in North Karelia, 2008-2018**

*Data sources: Eurostat*

The migration balance remained relatively stable between 2008 and 2018, as the following graph indicates. However, the positive migration balance results from **positive migration balance of foreigners**, whilst negative balance can be observed for Finnish nationals, especially in most recent years. In 2019 in North Karelia, inter-municipal migration, was 612 people in minus. However, the record positive net immigration (+507) compensated for the situation, leaving a migration loss of 105 people for the total migration movement. This is slightly down from the previous year. The total figures for the whole decade add up to the migration gain of 793 people in North Karelia. The change is considerable compared to the previous decade (2000-2009), when the corresponding figure was 3,691 people on minus (Statistics Finland 2020a).





**Chart 55. Migration balance in North Karelia, 2008-2018**

*Data source: Eurostat*

## DEMOGRAPHY: FOCUS ON TCNS

In line with the development on national Finnish scale, the total number of TCNs in North Karelia steadily grew within ten years from 2,067 to 3,040 (2008-2018). The share of TCNs among total population is slightly lower in this region: 1.9%, whilst in Finland it is 2.8% (2018). The highest growth rate of TCNs in North Karelia can be observed from 2009-2010 (9.5%) following the great recession in Russia.

The immigration to North Karelia started mainly after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. In 2018, there were 3,774 foreign citizens in North Karelia. However, this situation is based on citizenship and there are more people with foreign/foreign language background in North Karelia. Due to its border situation, the biggest foreign-born population in North Karelia are Russian speakers, people with Russian background or even Russian citizenship or dual citizenship. Their numbers even increased slightly over time (see also Table 39). Regionally, Russian-speakers in Finland are concentrated in the capital area and the other big cities: more than 40% (31,307) of Russian-speakers live in the capital city region (Helsinki). Nevertheless, Russian speakers have also concentrated in Finland's border areas to uphold transnational ways of living (e.g. Davydova-Minguet & Pöllänen 2020; see also Pöllänen 2013). Actually, in the Eastern Finnish rural border areas, the significance of Russian speakers is manifested both in statistics and in the everyday reality. Russian-speakers are even more visible and important in border areas of North

Karelia. For example, in the municipality of Tohmajärvi, which is the one of the North Karelian fieldwork locations, Russian speakers comprise 4% of the population, whereas in Helsinki their share is 2.8% of the total population (Varjonen et al. 2017). Additionally, it is important to realize that in the capital area, Russian speakers merge in the big foreign-born population, whereas in Tohmajärvi they represent the dominant majority of the immigrants. Notably in the Eastern rural areas of Finland, Russian speakers portray the face of immigration in general.

With fairly lower numbers, TCN from countries involved in civil wars and where people were threatened by persecution, are important in North Karelia. More recently, people from countries, which were not present in this region in former times, increased in numbers, e.g. Syrians and Pakistanis and thus fostered diversification of North Karelia. During the past two decades, some reception centres were operated in different locations in rural small towns of Lieksa and Kitee. Even though many refugees move away from North Karelia to the bigger cities of Southern Finland, for some of them, especially for families, North Karelia seems to be an attractive destination, and they have settled in different locations of North Karelia, e.g. in Lieksa there is a relatively large community of Somalis. Compared to the NUTS-0 scale, people with Iraqi and Russian citizenships are underrepresented here.

2008			2018		
1	Russian Federation	1,449	1	Russian Federation	1,644
2	Somalia	116	2	Thailand	154
3	Thailand	68	3	Syria	126
4	Kazakhstan	37	4	Bangladesh	94
5	United States	33	5	Turkey	78
6	P.R China	33	6	Somalia	77
7	Turkey	28	7	Iraq	67
8	Bosnia and Herzegovina	26	8	P.R China	58
9	Bangladesh	25	9	Pakistan	50
10	Vietnam	16	10	Vietnam	42


**Table 39. Total number of Third Country Nationals by citizenship (TOP 10) in North Karelia, 2008-2018**

*Data source: Statistics Finland*

## AGE AND GENDER STRUCTURE

Russian form by far the largest group of immigrants, close to half of the total, followed by Somalis and Thais. Immigrants are mainly young adults. Therefore, immigration has a balancing effect on the age structure of the province. Due to lack of data provision on NUTS-3 level, no specific characterization can be given here.

According to the recent survey made by the municipality of Joensuu, in 2018, there were 3,774 foreign citizens in North Karelia, with somehow even gender division. The total number of female TCNs in North Karelia was 1,592 in 2018, which is a share of 52.4% (cf. share of female over total population in 2019 was 50.2%). While the number female TCNs steadily grew from 2008 to 2018, its share slightly decreased from 58.7% to its current rate (see also Chart 56).



**Chart 56. Share of female Third Country Nationals in North Karelia, 2008-2018**

*Data source: Statistics Finland*

### 3.2.4 EDUCATIONAL FEATURES OF NORTH KARELIA

The education level of TCNs differs remarkably from the total population in North & East Finland. The share of people with lower education, i.e., less than primary, primary and lower secondary education (levels 0-2), is much higher among TCNs, but has slightly decreased to 2011, remaining stable until 2017, but is increasing since then.




Chart 57. Education level among TCNs and total population in North & East Finland, 2008-2018

Data source: Eurostat




Chart 58. Share of young NEETS (15-34y/o) in North & East Finland and Finland, 2008-2018

Data source: Eurostat

The NEET rate (young people, aged 15-34 neither in employment nor in education and training) differs between total population and TCNs on national level, however, approximated more recently. The NEET rate for total population in North & East Finland slightly increased previously, but dropped more recently and is almost on national average in 2018 (see also Chart 58).

### 3.2.5 ECONOMIC FEATURES OF NORTH KARELIA

<i>ECONOMIC INDICATORS<sup>37</sup></i>	<i>2017</i>	<i>Variation 2008-2017</i>	<i>National average (2017)</i>	<i>EU average (2017)</i>	<i>MATILDE regions average (2017)</i>
Regional GDP per capita at purchasing power standards	25,100	0.6%	33,100	29,800	29,624
Regional Gross value added: primary sector (%, percentage points)	8%	+1	3%	2%	4%
Regional Gross value added: secondary sector (%, percentage points)	27%	-4.6	28%	27%	30%
Regional Gross value added: tertiary sector (%, percentage points)	66%	+3.6	69%	71%	66%

**Table 40. Economic indicators in North Karelia, 2017**

*Data sources: Eurostat Gross domestic product (GDP) at current market prices by NUTS 3 regions; OECD Gross domestic product (GDP); Eurostat Gross value added at basic prices by NUTS 3 regions.*

37 Missing data for France for Regional Gross Value Added and Employment by sector; Average has been therefore calculated on the basis of 26 Member States.

## ECONOMIC STRUCTURE

The economic structure of North Karelia is boosted by diverse economic areas (see also Table 40). In the region, there are several strength sectors such as forestry and forest machine industry, security/lock industry, bioenergy, nanotechnology, photonics, the metal, plastic and composite industries, ICT, environmental engineering, food manufacturing and mining. The construction sector has also been strong in North Karelia, namely in Joensuu region during past decade(s) (Regional Council of North Karelia). Moreover, construction has been lively due to public projects (e.g. schools, the parking hall in Joensuu city centre) and private based housing construction.

In addition to **the region's traditionally strong industries**, the competence-based growth industries of the future, forest bio economy and new technologies and materials, have taken off in North Karelia due to the active research carried out at the University of Eastern Finland located in Joensuu. The headquarters of the European Forest Institute is situated in Joensuu. The region's undisputable strength is forest bio economy which is geared towards more innovative utilisation of the vast forest resources. More than 500 companies whose operations involve bio economy can be found in the region. Employing more than 6,000 people, the turnover of these companies is 2 billion euros. In addition, there are more than 600 experts employed in this field in the region: researchers, developers, trainers and administrative employees.

North Karelia invests in the welfare of people and the environment. The carbon footprint of North Karelians is 36% smaller than that of an average Finn. Renewable energy accounts for 64% of the total energy consumption, which is high even on an international scale. North Karelia is also a model area in energy self-sufficiency: approximately 63% of the energy consumed is produced in the region.

According to the Regional Council of North Karelia the exports play an important role in the development of the region's industry (Regional Council of North Karelia). Before COVID-19 impacted negatively, more than half of North Karelian industrial output were exported. In North Karelia the regional GDP per capita at purchasing power standards was 25,100 in 2017 (see also Chart 59).


Besides industry, North Karelia has some exceptional benefits in comparison to other rural areas in Finland. North Karelia is a border region featuring a 304 km long border with Russia, and the fourth busiest border crossing point (Niirala-Värtsilä) of the whole Finnish-Russian border is situated in the area of North Karelia. The border crossing

point has crucial meaning for the whole area in terms of economy and also in the terms of everyday life. Niirala-Värtsilä has more than 1.2 million annual border crossings.<sup>38</sup> The close proximity of Russia and the well-functioning border crossing point are the strength points of North Karelia, and in the region there is a lot of cross-border cooperation, research and innovation activities build around Russia and border. The big Russian markets are close by and Russian tourists contribute to the growth of the region's tourism, commerce and services.

The other regional feature is the relatively strong concentration on the **education sector**. The educational institutions of the capital city of North Karelia Joensuu include e.g. Karelia University of Applied Sciences (4,000 students), University of Eastern Finland, Joensuu campus (8,300 students) and a number of vocational colleges and upper secondary schools. These are particularly popular among international students, coming as exchange students from the EU countries and third countries. Recent years' cuts in education sector funding have had an impact in North Karelia. The situation is however ambivalent, because on the one hand, a challenging funding situation has strengthened the North Karelian education sector: e.g., the University of Eastern Finland decided to move the education of teachers from Savonlinna to Joensuu. This will bring more students to North Karelia, and will impact the economic development of Joensuu region, e.g. housing industry and building up new infrastructure (Regional Council of North Karelia).

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<sup>38</sup> This was before the CORONA restrictions. In June 2020, the border was closed for passengers and remained only open for cargo traffic.



**Chart 59. Gross Domestic Product trends in North Karelia, 2008-2017**

*Data source: Eurostat, Gross domestic product (GDP) at current market prices by NUTS 3 regions*

## LABOUR MARKET


The unemployment rate varies in different municipalities in North Karelia (for an overview, see Table 41). The unemployed jobseekers' share of the workforce is highest in Ilomantsi municipality being 18.1 % and lowest in Kontiolahti being 10.1%, while in Joensuu it is 14.1% (Työllisyyskatsaus 2020).



<i>LABOUR MARKET INDICATORS</i>	<i>2017</i>	<i>Variation 2008-2017</i>	<i>National average (2017)</i>	<i>EU average (2017)*</i>	<i>MATILDE regions average (2017)</i>
Unemployment rate (%/percentage points)	11.8%	1.1	86%	8.1 %	8.4%
Employment in primary sector (% thousands of employees)	7.3% (4.7)	-20.8%	4% (90.9)	5% (353.98)	5% (6.75)
Employment in secondary sector (% thousands of employees)	24.7% (16.2)	-10.7%	23% (577.1)	23% (1,584.74)	26% (36.19)
Employment in tertiary sector (% thousands of employees)	68% (44.6)	3%	74% (1,893.8)	71% (4,830.33)	69% (97.63)
People at risk of poverty or social exclusion (%/percentage points)	19.4% (average 2008-18)	-3.4	15.7%	21.6%	17.3%


**Table 41. Labour Market indicators in North Karelia, 2017**

*Data sources: Unemployment: OECD Labour indicators, small regions TL3 and large regions TL2; National Statistical Institutes; Eurostat, Unemployment rates by sex, age, citizenship and NUTS 2 regions; Eurostat, People at risk of poverty or social exclusion by NUTS 2 regions.*



**Chart 60. Employment by sector in North Karelia, 2017**

Data source: Elaboration by EURAC based on data from Eurostat, Employment (thousand persons) by NUTS 3 regions.




**Chart 61. Unemployment rate trends in North Karelia, 2008-2017**

Data sources: OECD.stat, Labour indicators, small regions TL3 and large regions TL2; Eurostat, Total unemployment rate; National statistical offices of MATILDE countries.


## LABOUR MARKET: FOCUS ON TCNS

As the following chart indicates, the employment gap between TCNs and total population was constant during the period 2008-2018, ranging about 30%. The unemployment rate in North & East Finland (Pohjois-ja-Itä-Suomi) was higher than on national average, but approximated more recently (see also Chart 63).



**Chart 62. Development of employment rates in North Karelia, 2008-2018**

*Data source: Eurostat*



**Chart 63. Unemployment rate trends in North & East Finland and Finland, 2008-2018**

*Data source: Eurostat*

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## 4. COUNTRY REPORT GERMANY

Authors: Tobias Weidinger and David Spenger, with contributions from Stefan Kordel

Since Second World War, rural areas in (Western) Germany are characterised by out-migration to cities due to economic transformations, indicated, for instance, by mechanisation in agriculture and demand for workforce in industrial centres. Simultaneously, in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, when labour migrants e.g. from Turkey, Morocco, Tunisia and Yugoslavia moved to West Germany in the course of the Guest worker programme, they only rarely arrived in rural areas (except from regions where industry was established, e.g. Southern Hesse, Boos-Krüger 2005; Engel 2013). Immigration of contract workers from friendly socialist states in the former German Democratic Republic remained low until the 1980s (Weiss 2011). Instead, migration to rural areas at that time was often a result of dispersal policies and mandatory distribution to the countryside. Starting in the 1980s, for instance, Germany received increasing numbers of repatriates and late repatriates of German descent (*Aussiedler*) as well as Jewish refugees from Poland, Romania and the Soviet Union, where they suffered ethnically based discrimination or persecution (Klekowski von Koppenfels 2009). To restrict this immigration flow, the German government limited the immigration to certain countries of origin in 1992, implemented annual quotas (1993) and considered German language skills as prerequisites (1996, *ibid.*). To overcome concentration processes in urban areas, reception centres were intentionally located in rural areas (Wenzel 2004) and places of residence were assigned for at least two years for people reliant on social welfare until 2009 (Haug & Sauer 2007). As a result of the Yugoslav wars in the 1990s and early 2000s and the Syrian civil war in the 2010s, for instance, the influx of asylum seekers to Germany rose and both asylum seekers and resettlement refugees were accommodated in rural areas in particular (Kordel & Weidinger 2019, see also chapter on forced migration). After EU enlargement in the mid-2000s, especially EU-migrants from Eastern Europe filled a lack of workforce in understaffed professions in rural areas such as agriculture, construction, tourism and care (see also chapter on labour migration). Parallel to the on-going out-migration of young people (in Eastern Germany especially women, Wiest & Leibert 2013), in the last years, re-migration and multi-local living arrangements could be detected among urban middle-classes (Fuchs et al. 2017, Kordel 2017, see also chapter on lifestyle migration).

According to the UN migration report from 2017, Germany is now the third most popular country for migration on an international level, following the USA and Saudi Arabia (United Nations 2017). In spite of this statistical evidence, there is an ongoing debate about the political acknowledgement of Germany as a country of immigration (*Einwanderungsland*). To this day, this designation is still officially denied (Eltges



& Strubelt 2019). However, in 2007 the first National Plan for Integration (*Nationaler Aktionsplan Integration, NAP-I*) was launched by the Federal Government. NAP-I is currently under revision and will have a special focus on peculiarities of settlement and integration in rural areas.

In Germany, regional disparities on various scales continue to exist, especially with regard to the relationship between urban and rural areas, which is discussed in Germany since the 1980s under the term “equivalent living conditions” (*Gleichwertige Lebensverhältnisse*). In 2018, the Commission for Equivalent Living Conditions<sup>39</sup> was installed to evaluate and narrow regional disparities, strengthen cohesion between East and West and as well as between remote rural and urban areas. In May 2019, the commission presented main objectives for future development. In this context, the role and potential of migrants, however, was only considered little and was basically related to safeguarding infrastructure by means of the additional needs of refugees and immigrants.

## LABOUR MIGRATION

In several sectors of the German economy, there is a high demand for qualified workers, which cannot be met by nationals or EU citizens. Therefore, the immigration of labour migrants to Germany focusses on highly qualified migrants of key sectors and leaves little legal immigration opportunities for working or training purposes for low-qualified persons (SVR 2018). Labour migration is regulated in the 2005 immigration law (*Zuwanderungsgesetz*), while certain EU directives, e.g. concerning the EU Blue Card (*Blaue Karte EU*, 2012), were adopted in national law since then. From 2015 to 2020, the so-called West Balkan regulation (*Westbalkan-Regelung*) provides further temporally limited legal immigration opportunities for individuals from West Balkan countries (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, North Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia), who arrived as asylum seekers in the 2010s following the suspension of Visa requirements in 2009 and 2010. In March 2020, the Skilled Immigration Act (*Fachkräfteeinwanderungsgesetz*) was implemented to end the current two-tier system, which gave preference to graduates over skilled workers without a higher-education degree (Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and

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<sup>39</sup> The Commission consisted of the Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community (BMI), the Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth (BMFSFJ), the Federal Ministry of Food and Agriculture (BMEL), all 16 federal states (Länder), the three federal commissioners (for Culture and Media; for Migration, Refugees and Integration; for the new federal states) and the three communal umbrella organizations.


Community 2020). With this law, both graduates of higher education and workers who have completed quality vocational training were provided access to the labour market, if they had a job offer (no precedence checks (*Vorrangprüfung*) were necessary anymore). In addition, visa for jobseekers of up to six months are being granted. Finally, in the last ten years, bilateral agreements with a number of third -countries such as China, Georgia, Kosovo, Morocco, the Philippines, Tunisia or Vietnam were initiated by governmental organisations to recruit interns, apprentices and employees in various sectors such as construction engineering, health care or hospitality industry on an experiment basis (SVR 2018).

Although EU-citizens predominate the group of labour migrants in Germany, the relevance of Third Country Nationals has increased over the last years. Statistical data provided by the Federal employment agency show that the share of employees from third countries among all employees subject to social insurance contributions increased from 4.1% (June 2015) to 5.8% (June 2019, own calculations based on Statistik der Bundesagentur für Arbeit 2015, 2019b). In rural areas in spring 2019, TCNs constituted to 4.0% among all employees subject to social insurance contributions and 7.9% of all marginally employed persons working there (own calculations, based on the Thuenen typology of rural areas, Küpper 2016, and Statistik der Bundesagentur für Arbeit 2019a). For the specific group of TCNs holding temporary residence permits, a share of 25.9% was located in rural areas in 2018 (own calculations, based on the Thuenen typology and Statistisches Bundesamt Destatis 2020).

Already before the EU-enlargement in 2004, Germany had bilateral agreements with Eastern European countries to recruit seasonal workers for agriculture and forestry, hospitality industry and landscape gardening for up to six months (Dietz 2016; SVR 2018). Between 1991 and 2011 there was an annual inflow of approximately 300,000 (former) TCNs employed as seasonal workers with the vast majority working in agriculture. Accounting for 60% of all incoming workers, Poland was the dominant country of origin in 2011. However, the number of Polish people decreased significantly due to socio-economic developments in Poland and better working opportunities elsewhere in Europe (Dietz 2016; Fiałkowska & Piechowska 2016). It has to be taken into account that although countries of origin of seasonal workers were already de jure members of the European Union (enlargement of 2004 or 2009), free movement of workers was only established in 2011 (for Bulgaria and Romania in 2012, Dietz 2016). Due to the implementation of the EU Seasonal Workers Directive in 2017, residence permits are no longer needed in case of present work permits (SVR 2018), leading to the difficulty to estimate the amount of seasonal workers (Späth et al. 2018).

For agriculture and forestry, Späth et al. (2018) found that in 2016 about 44,000 individuals worked seasonally, especially during the summer months (total employment in 2016: 352,000). Between 2012 and 2016, the majority

was from Eastern Europe, while also 2.7% stemmed from third countries (non-seasonal workers: 1.8%, see also Chart 64). Nearly 50% of them were women, while most of them were between 35 and 54 years. Core areas of seasonal workers are advantageous agricultural regions in the Southwest, i.e. Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland, Baden-Württemberg and Hesse, where asparagus, strawberry and wine are harvested in particular (see also Becker 2010). Several experts argue that the big demand for workers cannot be fulfilled by EU-migrants and more possibilities for incoming workers from third countries are needed. Therefore, the employment agency (BA) is currently negotiating bilateral agreements with Eastern European countries such as Georgia or the Balkan states (WELT 2020). Due to the COVID-19 crisis, it became obvious that entry bans also prevented the arrival of seasonal workers. Therefore, charter flights were established to bring workers to the farms (Agrarheute 2020).



**Chart 64. Regular and seasonal workers according to nationality (average 2012-2016)**

*Source: own elaboration based on Späth et al. 2018: 46*

Hospitality industry offered 146,000, mostly part-time seasonal jobs in 2016, especially during summer months (total employment in 2016: 1,748,000). Between 2012 and 2016, the majority were German nationals, while also 13.1% stemmed from third countries (non-seasonal workers: 12.8%, Späth et al. 2018, see also Chart 64. 57.3% were women, while most of them were quite young, i.e. between 18 and 24 years. Since some of the tourism hotspots are located in rural areas, e.g. on the German coast, the low-mountain ranges (*Mittelgebirge*) and in the Alps, core areas were Schleswig-Holstein in the North as well as North Rhine-Westphalia and Hesse in the West.

Horticulture and landscape gardening, in turn, provided seasonal jobs for 6,000 seasonal workers, especially during the summer months and most of them part-time only (total employment in 2016: 141,000). Between 2012 and 2016, the majority were German nationals, while also 9.0% originated from third countries (non-seasonal workers: 6.8%, Späth et al. 2018, see also Chart 64.. One fifth of them were women, while most of them were between 35 and 54 years old. Regionally, the share of seasonal workers among all workers was highest in Saxony-Anhalt and Bavaria.

Another important group of labour migrants who needs to be highlighted are international care workers, both in institutions and private households. In 2018, 154,000 foreign care workers worked in German institutions, a number that nearly doubled compared to 2013. Foreigners constitute of 9% of all care workers, while the majority is from third countries (Mediendienst Integration 2019). Especially numbers of individuals from the Balkan rose after the implementation of the West Balkan regulation (7,600 in 2013 to 24,200 in 2018, *ibid.*). Due to the fact that many of them work undocumented and without official qualification in private households, their number can only be estimated. Von der Malsburg & Isfort (2014) expected about 150,000 migrants especially from Middle and Eastern Europe. Private care could be especially relevant in rural areas characterized by prior out-migration of relatives who are now lacking as potential caregivers. Thus, regionally, the demand of workers caring older people is especially higher in those areas, which are affected by population decline and ageing (BBSR 2011). Simultaneously, there is also a lack of physicians, especially in rural areas, where also spa towns are located. Thus, it can be explained why there are 49,000 foreign doctors in Germany, representing 12.4% of all physicians (Mediendienst Integration 2019). Half of them originate from other European countries, mostly from Romania (4,300), while one fourth stems from Asia, mostly from Syria (3,900, see also chapter on forced migration).

Apart from “regular” labour migration, Germany also experiences different forms of “accidental migration”, i.e. immigration of foreigners in general and TCNs in particular, which is regulated by institutions and therefore brings them to rural areas more or less “accidently”. On the one hand, accidental migration encompasses soldiers, military personnel and their families, who are stationed in Germany on the basis of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and the Supplementary Agreement (SA) to the NATO SOFA. The by far largest group are US-Americans, encompassing more than 35,000 soldiers and about 11,000 civil servants at the end of 2018 (Defense Manpower Data Center 2019). While most of them are statistically “invisible” as they do not have to register themselves on-site, they have an important regional and local significance in rural areas. The regional foci are both the South West with the Kaiserslautern Military Community (Rhineland-Palatinate), representing the largest U.S. military community outside of

the United States (e.g. Anslinger 2015; Deutscher Bundestag 2017), and the South with the U.S. Army Garrison (USAG) Bavaria, representing one of the largest U.S. bases outside the United States. During their stay of up to a few years (interrupted by field campaigns and trainings), soldiers and their families either live “on-post”, i.e. on the military base, or “off-post”, i.e. in the surrounding municipalities, and make substantial contributions to local economies and the welfare of a region. In June 2020, media reported a potential withdrawal of 9,500 US soldiers from rural Germany (Redaktionsnetzwerk Deutschland 2020).

Accidental migrants, on the other hand are made up of international priests. Due to shortage of domestic candidates for the priesthood, the Catholic Church asked bishops and religious superiors abroad, mostly in India and Poland, to send priests to catholic regions situated in rural Germany – often for the duration of at least five years. In 2017, the 2,403 priests constituted a share of 17.7% among all priests (Deutsche Bischofskonferenz 2018). Due to regional differences in the religious denominations of the population, the regional focus of their employment is in the West and South of the country. An empirical study among foreign priests in 2011 revealed that language barriers were considered as main problem, while also 28% of respondents from Africa reported of experiences with racism (average: 16%, Gabriel et al. 2011). The presence of international priests can be of vital importance for rural societies, since encounters with foreigners, who are mostly considered as elites in traditional societies, may evoke changes.

## FORCED MIGRATION

Since 1974, asylum seekers are distributed to the Federal States for the duration of the asylum procedure according to the allocation scheme “*Königsteiner Schlüssel*”. The allocation scheme is based on tax revenues and population size of the Federal States and is renewed and adjusted by the Federal Council (*Bundesrat*) every year (Boswell 2003, *Asylum Law*). After spending up to three months (later six months) in the allocated state reception centres, they are distributed again within the Federal States according to state legislations until their asylum procedure is legally decided and thus arrive in rural areas. In 2016, a residence rule of three years was further implemented for recognized refugees, who received recognition after January 1, 2016, and who did not have a job nor were in vocational training, saying that the place of residence has to be located within the Federal State, where the refugee was already accommodated during his or her asylum procedure. The Federal States are allowed to issue even stricter regulations, for instance, prescribe a place of residence within an administrative district, a rural district (*Kreise/Landkreise*) or a municipality or city even (positive residence obligation). Prerequisites for this placement of a

recognized refugee, however, encompass the availability of appropriate housing, sufficient language learning opportunities and a local labour market, which provides an excellent chance to become employed. Conversely, the Federal States can also impose a ban to prevent moving to a specific municipality or city (negative residence obligation, Kordel & Weidinger 2020; Weidinger 2020, accepted).

For evaluating impacts of this particular group, staying aspirations are highly relevant. So far, population numbers and empirical studies identified the following migration patterns for recognised refugees: Rural-urban migration to ethnic kinship and social networks, rural-urban-rural migration due to the above mentioned residence rule as well as various problems experienced in cities, and urban-rural migration, especially to small towns due to the availability of housing as well as of family and friends who already lived on-site (Mann et al. 2018; Weidinger 2018). Many of the refugee families who remained in the countryside moved from the rural municipalities to small towns as these were better connected to cities and offered more infrastructures at short distances (Weidinger 2018). Both during and after the asylum procedure, asylum seekers and refugees were very mobile in everyday lives and regularly visited friends and relatives in other parts of Germany, went grocery shopping or attended religious feasts in urban centres (Kordel & Weidinger 2019). Staying in the rural, thus, is strongly interrelated to rural-urban everyday mobility. Regionally, individuals with residence permits for humanitarian reasons concentrate in Northern and Western Germany, especially in cities in Lower Saxony and North Rhine-Westphalia, while in Southern Germany a heterogeneous picture prevails, i.e. having rural districts with higher and lower shares among the total population in geographic proximity. In 2018, about 46% of individuals with residence permits for humanitarian reasons lived in rural areas (own calculations, based on the Thuenen typology and Statistisches Bundesamt Destatis 2020; Kordel & Weidinger 2020; see also Rösch et al. 2020). Internationally renowned and widely discussed places of reception in rural areas were Altena (North-Rhine Westphalia, OECD 2018) and the Hofheimer Land (Bavaria; Galera et al. 2018).

With regard to housing in rural areas, refugees experienced externally imposed redistribution between state accommodations, while later difficulties were mostly about how to access appropriate private housing (Weidinger & Kordel, under review). Mechanisms of exclusion were related to the negotiation between individual and family-related residential aspirations about where and how to live, as well as to structural aspects such as the pattern of local housing markets or the unwillingness of landlords to let to refugees. Excluding mechanisms in terms of housing access and strategies to overcome exclusion were highly interlinked with refugees' agency, resources and further realms of integration, e.g. access to employment (ibid.).

While recognised refugees do not face any restrictions in terms of labour market access, asylum seekers and individuals with a tolerated stay permission (*Geduldete*), i.e. individuals who are obliged to leave the country but

their departure is temporarily not feasible, are allowed to work three months after arrival at the earliest, but need an employment permit<sup>40</sup>. In the first fifteen months in some regions with high unemployment precedence checks are mandatory even. A facilitated access is only foreseen for certain jobs as qualified workers and in case of qualified vocational trainings<sup>41</sup>. Until now, refugees often gained access to the labour market by means of temporary employment agencies and worked in the hospitality industry, commerce, automotive trade and manufacturing. Quality vocational training is mostly in commerce, construction and manufacturing (Statistik der Bundesagentur für Arbeit 2019a). Insufficient German language competencies as well as lack of credentials are reported as labour market barriers (Statistik der Bundesagentur für Arbeit 2019c). For further qualification, asylum seekers and recognised refugees can enrol in German universities, if they fulfil language requirements, being able to get a financial student assistance (BAföG) after spending 15 months in the country (ibid.). However, especially refugees residing in rural areas, face difficulties in terms of access to universities.

## STUDENT MIGRATION

Due to the decline in labour force potential, international students are seen as “future professionals”. Therefore, Germany provided liberal measures for students to remain in the country, e.g. enable them to find a job up to 18 months after end of study or provide them with a permanent residence after two years of reasonable work or self-employment (SVR 2015). In 2017, around 220,000 individuals with temporary residence permits for educational reasons were registered in Germany, with Chinese (~34.000), Indian (~15.000), Russian (~11.000), Cameroonian, Ukrainian, Iranian and Turkish citizens (~7.000 each) being the largest groups (DAAD & DZHW 2018). While

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40 Individuals from so-called safe countries of origin, where the Federal Government (Bundesregierung) is of the opinion that individuals are not persecuted for political reasons nor treated inhumanly, are not allowed to work during the whole duration of the asylum procedure. So-called safe countries of origin are Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Ghana, Kosovo, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Senegal and Serbia.

41 For those who started vocational training during their asylum procedure but had a negative outcome of the asylum procedure, the tolerated stay for the purpose of vocational training (Ausbildungsduldung) since 2016 provides the opportunity to finish the vocational training and work two more years in the same profession. For those individuals with a tolerated stay, who already worked for a specific time and meet several other requirements, e.g. with regard to language competency, date of arrival or situation of children, the tolerated stay for working professionals (Beschäftigungsduldung) since 2020 offers 30 months. Within this time, the individual cannot be deported, while after that time, he or she can apply for a residence permit for well-integrated adults, for instance.



universities are usually located in urban areas, especially dependances of existing universities and new universities of applied sciences were established also in rural areas in the past years (e.g. Ansbach, Deggendorf, Schwäbisch Hall or Straubing). However, in 2018, only about 21% of the foreigners with respective residence permits were living in rural areas (own calculation, based on the Thuenen typology and Statistisches Bundesamt Destatis 2020). No studies were carried out so far regarding the situation of TCNs studying in rural areas or commuting to universities in cities.

## FAMILY MIGRATION

Spouses and underaged kids who want to join their partners in Germany need to obtain a visa or a residence permit, while for TCNs who join other TCNs additional requirements apply: accommodation which is large enough for the family, funds to cover sufficient health insure and basic knowledge of German language. However, exceptions from the latter aspect are offered to EU Blue Card holders, highly qualified workers, research scientists, university graduates and nationals of Australia, Canada, Israel, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and the US. Spouses of Third Country Nationals have an unlimited access to the labour market. Humanitarian migrants, i.e. those granted refugee protection as well as those entitled to asylum, are permitted to privileged family reunification, if the application is filed within three months after the entitlement to protection has been granted. For refugees under subsidiary protection, family reunification was suspended from 2016 to 2018, while from then on, it was based on a discretionary decision and was limited to only 1,000 visas per month for spouses and under-aged kids as well as parents of minors, while convicts are excluded. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic the limit of visas was not reached lately (ZEIT Online 2020).

In 2019, individuals from third countries with temporary residence permits for family reasons were mainly from Turkey (121,980), Syria (107,010), Kosovo (56,865), Russia (41,305) and India (32,400, Statistisches Bundesamt Destatis 2020). In addition, it is worth mentioning that family migration also derives from marriages with individuals from Southeast Asia. Overall, in 2018, about 34% of individuals with temporary residence permits for family reasons lived in rural areas (own calculation, based on the Thuenen typology and Statistisches Bundesamt Destatis 2020). Until now, no studies were carried out regarding the situation of TCN who arrived in rural areas for family reasons.

## AMENITY/LIFESTYLE MIGRATION

Amenity/Lifestyle migration in Germany is a predominantly domestic phenomenon. Especially Germans, who are looking for a “rural idyll” (Dirksmeier 2008), e.g. (pre)retirees, move to coastal regions, rural spa towns as well as mountain areas in the Alps or the *Mittelgebirge* that were regularly visited as tourists previously (Weidinger & Kordel



2015). In addition, the surroundings of Berlin are sought after by this group (Born et al. 2004). Apart from that, right-wing settlers bought land and maintain ecological agriculture, upheld handicraft and traditions and engage themselves politically and culturally (Röpke & Speit 2019). Regarding TCNs, this type of migration is only bound to certain places in the Alpine region, which became temporary refuges for celebrities (Süddeutsche 2019; Merkur 2020).

## 4.1 BAVARIA: TERRITORIAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE REGION

Authors: Tobias Weidinger and Stefan Kordel

Within the MATILDE region Bavaria (NUTS 1), five rural districts (NUTS 3) from different administrative districts (NUTS 2) were chosen, i.e. Berchtesgadener Land (BGL), Garmisch-Partenkirchen (GAP) and Oberallgäu (OA) in the Alps, Neustadt an der Aisch-Bad Windsheim (NEA) in Northern Bavaria, and Regen (REG) in the low mountain range area called Bayerischer Wald bordering the Czech Republic in Eastern Bavaria.

### 4.1.1. TERRITORIAL FEATURES OF THE REGION


#### 4.1.1.1 TERRITORIAL FEATURES OF ALPINE DISTRICTS

<i>TERRITORIAL INDICATORS</i>	<i>2018</i>		
	<i>Berchtesgadener Land</i>	<i>Garmisch-Partenkirchen</i>	<i>Oberallgäu</i>
Share of population living outside urban areas	23%	36.3%	44.2%
Share of population living in mountain areas	> 50 %	> 50 %	> 50 %
Share of territory covered by mountains	> 50 %	> 50 %	> 50 %
Share of territory covered by agricultural fields	23,7%	15.1%	40.3%
Border region	Yes	Yes	Yes


**Table 42. Territorial indicators of Alpine districts, 2018**

*Data sources: Eurostat Border typology; Urban-Rural typology; Eurostat Mountain typology; Eurostat Corine Landcover; Eurostat Degree of Urbanization (DEGURBA).*

The rural districts Berchtesgadener Land (BGL), Garmisch-Partenkirchen (GAP) and Oberallgäu (OA) are located in the eastern part of the Alps at the national border to Austria (cf. Maps 19 and 20). Berchtesgadener Land is part of Euregio Salzburg – Berchtesgadener Land – Traunstein, which was established in 1998, while Garmisch-Partenkirchen belongs to the Euregio Zugspitze-Wetterstein-Karwendel, which was founded in the same year. Oberallgäu is part of the Euregios Bodensee and via salina. Both were established in 1997. GAP and OA are also part of the metropolitan region Munich.



**Map 19. Berchtesgadener Land**



**Map 20. Oberallgäu and Garmisch-Partenkirchen**

BGL, GAP and OA are each classified as a mountain area, covering an area of 839.9 km<sup>2</sup> (BGL), 1,012.2 km<sup>2</sup>, (GAP) and 1,528 km<sup>2</sup> (OA). Therefore, not all parts are habitable and economically viable. On the other hand, it should be noted that the mountain landscape, with more than 50% covered with mountains has become a driver for a flourishing year-round tourism industry (see also Table 42).

All three districts are classified as intermediate as less than half of its population lives in rural areas, i.e. in municipalities with less than 10,000 inhabitants, while the rest lives in the main urban centres such as Bad Reichenhall or Freilassing (for BGL), Garmisch-Partenkirchen and Murnau (for GAP) or Altusried, Immenstadt im Allgäu and Sonthofen (for OA). The city of Kempten situated in the northern part of OA, however, is an independent city and thus, does not belong to the district.


BGL, GAP and OA are each classified as a mountain region with regard to the share of population living in mountain areas and landcover. Addressing the latter, Berchtesgadener Land and Garmisch-Partenkirchen are characterised by lower shares of agricultural surface (22.3% and 19.3%), compared to Oberallgäu (45.6%), where a strong focus on grassland farming as well as alpine farming can be detected, whilst forest cover in 2017 was more or less equivalent (48.9% for BGL, 50.5% for GAP and 35.1% for OA, Bayerisches Landesamt für Statistik 2020). BGL is home to a biosphere reserve that encompasses the whole area of the district as well as to a national park. GAP contains the biggest moor landscape in Central Europe and the largest shore-based conservation area in Germany, whilst Oberallgäu has several protected areas including the Allgäu Hochalpen.

Despite the rural character of the regions, the main cities Bad Reichenhall and Freilassing (BGL), Garmisch-Partenkirchen (GAP) as well as Sonthofen (OA) are important urban centres with more than 15,000 inhabitants. With regard to daily commuting, both regions are well-connected with Salzburg in Austria (for BGL), Munich (for GAP) and Kempten (OA) by means of trains and motorways.

All three Alpine districts have a relatively low population density ranging from 88.3 (GAP) to 102 (OA) to 126.3 inhabitants/km<sup>2</sup> (BGL), while the national average of Germany is 234.7 and the one of the MATILDE regions is 102. For GAP, this is in line with the average over the Alpine region of approximately 74 inhabitants per square km (Elmi & Streifeneder 2018: 14), while in BGL effects of suburbanization of the city of Salzburg are observable.



#### 4.1.1.2 TERRITORIAL FEATURES OF NORTHERN BAVARIAN DISTRICT



**Map 21. Neustadt a.d. Aisch – Bad Windsheim**

TERRITORIAL INDICATORS	2018
	Neustadt an der Aisch- Bad Windsheim
Share of population living outside urban areas	70.9%
Share of population living in mountain areas	Non-mountain region
Share of territory covered by mountains	Non-mountain region
Share of territory covered by agricultural fields	67.6%
Border region	No

**Table 43. Territorial Indicators of Northern Bavarian district, 2018**

*Data sources: Eurostat Border typology; Urban-Rural typology; Eurostat Mountain typology; Eurostat Corine Landcover; Eurostat Degree of Urbanization (DEGURBA)*

The rural district of Neustadt a.d. Aisch – Bad Windsheim (NEA) is located in Northern Bavaria, between Wuerzburg in the North, Nuremberg in the East and Ansbach in the South. NEA is part of the metropolitan region Nuremberg (cf. Map 21). Covering an area of 1,267.6 km<sup>2</sup>, NEA is classified as a non-mountain area (see also Table 43). Therefore, all parts are habitable and economically viable. The region is classified as predominantly rural as more than half of its population lives in rural areas, i.e. in municipalities with less than 10,000 inhabitants, while the rest lives in the main urban centres Neustadt a.d. Aisch and Bad Windsheim.

When it comes to landcover, in 2017, 28.5% of the district was covered by forests, while 57.0% was used for agriculture (Bayerisches Landesamt für Statistik 2020) with a strong focus on cultivation of sugar beets, fruits and wine in the western part of the district and fish farming (especially carps) in ponds in the eastern part of the district.

Despite the rural character of the region, the main cities Neustadt a.d. Aisch and Bad Windsheim are important urban centres with more than 10,000 inhabitants. With regard to daily commuting, many people regularly frequent the neighbouring cities (clockwise) Wuerzburg, Herzogenaurach, Erlangen, Fuerth, Nuremberg and Ansbach (Göler 1994).

NEA has a relatively low population density of 78.9 inhabitants per square km, while the national average of Germany is 234.7 and the one of the MATILDE regions is 102.

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
#### 4.1.1.3 TERRITORIAL FEATURES OF EASTERN BAVARIAN DISTRICT

The rural district of Regen (REG) is situated in Eastern Bavaria alongside the border with the Czech Republic and is part of the low mountain range Bavarian forest (cf. Map 22). Regen is part of the Euregio Bayerischer Wald-Böhmerwald-Mühlviertel with Austria and Czech Republic, which was founded in 1993 as well as part of the tri-national *Europaregion Donau-Moldau* (European region Danube-Vltava), established in 2012.

Covering an area of 974.9 km<sup>2</sup>, Regen is classified as a mountain area. Therefore, not all parts are habitable and economically viable. On the other hand, it should be noted that the mountain landscape, with more than 50% covered with mountains has become a driver for a flourishing year-round tourism industry (see also Table 44).

The region is classified as predominantly rural as more than half of its population lives in rural areas, i.e. in municipalities with less than 10,000 inhabitants, while the rest lives in the main urban centres Regen, Viechtach and Zwiesel.





Map 22. Regen

<i>TERRITORIAL INDICATORS</i>	<i>2018</i>
	<i>Regen</i>
Share of population living outside urban areas	56.3%
Share of population living in mountain areas	>50%
Share of territory covered by mountains	>50%
Share of territory covered by agricultural fields	31.4%
Border region	Yes


**Table 44. Territorial Indicators of Eastern Bavarian district, 2018**

*Data sources: Eurostat Border typology; Urban-Rural typology; Eurostat Mountain typology; Eurostat Corine Landcover; Eurostat Degree of Urbanization (DEGURBA)*

When it comes to landcover, in 2017, 63.4% of Regen is covered by forests, while 25.3% was used for agriculture (Bayerisches Landesamt für Statistik 2020) with a strong focussing on grassland farming. Parts of the district also belong to the first German national park Bavarian forest. The region is characterised by commuting patterns to the Danubian plain, e.g. Deggendorf or even farther. Regen has a relatively low population density of 79.9 inhabitants per square km (while the national average of Germany is 234.7 and the one of the MATILDE regions is 102). One reason for this is the mountainous topography.


## 4.1.2 ACCESSIBILITY FEATURES OF THE REGION

### 4.1.2.1 ACCESSIBILITY FEATURES OF ALPINE DISTRICTS



**Map 23. Population distribution and accessibility of hospitals in Berchtesgadener Land**





**Map 24. Population distribution and accessibility of hospitals in Oberallgäu and Garmisch-Partenkirchen**

The maps above show travel times to the closest hospital by car and the distribution of population in the Alpine MATILDE regions and make the differences between urban and rural areas visible. The provision of services and goods of daily use is functioning in most municipalities. The average weighted travel time of hospitals amounts 7.2 minutes (BGL), 9.3 (GAP) and 8.2 minutes (OA) by car.

Municipalities are well equipped with primary schools, even if they are located in peripheral areas of the region. On average, people need 4.0 minutes by car (in BGL, 3.8 in GAP, 4.5 in OA) to the next primary school and also secondary schools have a high accessibility. They are accessible within 5.6 minutes by car (in BGL, 6.5 in GAP, 5.2 in OA), which is not a big difference to the primary schools.

Compared to other MATILDE regions, the Alpine regions BGL, GAP and OA record one of the lowest average travel times to shops weighted by the resident population. Although services are well accessible by car, certain population groups (e.g. elderly, migrants and students) are dependent on public transport, which has lower flexibility. This is particularly addressed as a disadvantage for TCNs, who cannot afford a private car, especially in the early phase following their arrival and settlement.

In West-East direction, the district BGL is crossed by the main railway connection with Austria, i.e. the one from Munich to Salzburg, with the junction station Freilassing, where two branch railways, one from the Northern part of the district and one from the Southern part, meet. The main railway connection and the Southern branch railway are part of the suburban train system of Salzburg (*S-Bahn Salzburg*). A transnational, linked transport system (*Verkehrsverbund*) is currently under discussion. Railway stations are accessible on average within 5 minutes by car, which is similar to other investigated mountainous regions in Austria and Italy. All of them are frequented at least on an hourly basis during week-time.

Garmisch-Partenkirchen is situated alongside the railway connection Munich-Mittenwald(Innsbruck) with the junction stations Murnau and Garmisch-Partenkirchen. The branch railway from Murnau to Oberammergau connects the northwestern part of the district. The branch railways from Garmisch-Partenkirchen to Griesen and the Zugspitze, instead, connect the southwestern parts of the district. Apart from regional trains, the main railway connection is also used for a highspeed connection (ICE train) from Dortmund to Innsbruck. Railway stations are accessible on average within 4 minutes by car, which is similar to other investigated mountainous regions in Austria and Italy. All of them are frequented at least on an hourly basis during week-time.

In East-West direction, Oberallgäu is crossed by the railway connection Munich-Lindau(-Zurich) with the junction stations Kempten and Immenstadt. The branch railway from Kempten to Neu-Ulm and from Kempten to Pfronten

connect the northern and eastern parts of the district, while the branch railway from Immenstadt to Oberstdorf connect the southern parts of the district. Apart from regional trains, the main railway connection is also used for an EC train from Munich to Zurich (-Basel). Railway stations are accessible on average within 7 minutes by car, which is similar to other investigated mountainous regions in Austria and Italy. All of them are frequented at least on an hourly basis during week-time.

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
#### 4.1.2.2 ACCESSIBILITY FEATURES OF NORTHERN BAVARIAN DISTRICT

According to the map above, in Neustadt a.d. Aisch – Bad Windsheim, the provision of services and goods of daily use is functioning in most municipalities. The average weighted travel time of hospitals amounts 10.1 minutes by car.

Municipalities are well equipped with primary schools, even if they are located in peripheral areas of the region. On average, people need 6.5 minutes by car to the next primary school and also secondary schools have a high accessibility. They are accessible within 6.0 minutes by car, which is even less than to the primary schools.

Compared to other MATILDE regions, Neustadt a.d. Aisch – Bad Windsheim records a low average travel times to shops weighted by the resident population. Despite infrastructures are well accessible by car, certain population groups (e.g. elderly, migrants and students) depend on public transport, which has lower flexibility. In 2019, an evaluation of public transport in NEA was launched by the administrative district office.


In East-West direction, Neustadt a.d. Aisch – Bad Windsheim is crossed by the main railway connection Nuremberg-Wuerzburg with the junction station Neustadt a.d. Aisch. In South-North direction, NEA is crossed by the main railway connection Treuchtlingen-Wuerzburg with the junction station Steinach (bei Rothenburg). The branch railway from Neustadt to Steinach and the one from Veitsbronn-Siegelsdorf to Markt Erlbach connect the central parts of the district and the southern parts of the district. Railway stations are accessible on average within 7 minutes by car. All of them are frequented at least on an hourly basis during week-time.



**Map 25. Population distribution and accessibility of hospitals in Northern Bavarian district**



#### 4.1.2.3 ACCESSIBILITY FEATURES OF EASTERN BAVARIAN DISTRICT



**Map 26. Population distribution and accessibility of hospitals in Eastern Bavarian district**



In the Eastern Bavarian MATILDE region Regen, the provision of services and goods of daily use is also functioning in most municipalities. The average weighted travel time of hospitals amounts 9.8 minutes by car (see also Map 26).

Equipment with primary schools is good on municipal level. On average, people need 4.8 minutes by car to the next primary schools. Secondary schools also have a high accessibility, as they can be reached within 6.6 minutes by car.

Compared to other MATILDE regions, Regen records low average travel times to shops weighted by the resident population. Population groups (e.g. elderly, migrants and students) reliant on public transport, however, face lower flexibility, especially if they are not located close to a station of the “forest railways” (*Waldbahn*) Plattling-Bayerisch Eisenstein and its branch railways, i.e. from Zwiesel to Bodenmais and Zwiesel to Grafenau, connecting the northern parts of the district, or from Gotteszell to Viechtach, connecting the western parts of the district. At the border station Bayerisch Eisenstein/Železná Ruda one can change to connecting trains to Klatovy or even Prague. Railway stations in the district are accessible on average within 6 minutes by car. Except the connection from Zwiesel to Grafenau, all of them are frequented at least on an hourly basis during week-time.

<i>ACCESSIBILITY of selected infrastructures</i>	<i>Berchtes-gadener</i>	<i>Garmisch-Parten-kirchen, 2016</i>	<i>Ober-allgäu,</i>	<i>Neustadt a. d. Aisch- Bad Winds-</i>	<i>Regen, 2016</i>	<i>MATILDE regions average, 2016</i>
Access to hospitals, travel time by car weighted by population (minutes)	7.2	9.3	8.2	10.1	9.8	14.2
Access to primary schools, travel time by car weighted by population (minutes)	4.0	3.8	4.5	6.5	4.8	5.9
Access to secondary schools, travel time by car weighted by population (minutes)	5.6	5.2	6.5	6.0	6.6	9.2
Access to train stations, travel time by car weighted by population (minutes)	5	4	7	7	6	10.5

Access to shops, travel time by car weighted by population (minutes)	3.6	3.3	4.1	4.8	4.6	5.2
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**Table 45. Accessibility of selected infrastructures in Bavaria, 2016**

*Data source: ESPON Profecy 2018*

To sum up, all of the five districts have access to infrastructures above the MATILDE regions average (see also Table 45). Only NEA displays a below average access in terms of primary schools, which is related to the big spatial extent of the district.

## 4.1.3 SOCIAL FEATURES OF THE REGION

### 4.1.3.1 SOCIAL FEATURES OF ALPINE DISTRICTS

<i>DEMOGRAPHIC INDICATORS<sup>42</sup></i>	<i>Berchtesgadener Land</i>		<i>Garmisch-Partenkirchen</i>		<i>Oberallgäu</i>		<i>National average (2018)</i>	<i>Eu27 average (2018)</i>	<i>MATILDE regions average (2018)</i>
	<i>2018</i>	<i>Variation 2008-2018</i>	<i>2018</i>	<i>Variation 2008-2018</i>	<i>2018</i>	<i>Variation 2008-2018</i>			
<b>Population size</b>	105,052	2.61%	88,155	1.5%	154,568	2.57%	-	-	425,252
<b>Population density (inh./km<sup>2</sup>)</b>	126.7	120.2 / 126.7**	88.3	83.1 / 88.3**	102	97.3 / 102	234.7	105.3	102
<b>Median age of population (years)</b>	46.6	0.5*	48.3	0.7 *	47.2	0.9 *	46	43.1*	45*
<b>Old-age dependency ratio (&gt;65/14-64)</b>	37	0.9*	39.9	0.2*	35.1	1.4*	32.8	30.5	33*
<b>Young-age Dependency Ratio</b>	19.9	0.4*	19.9	0.2*	20.6	-0.1*	20.7	24.1	23
<b>Aging Index (&gt;65/&lt;14)</b>	185.8	0.2*	200	-0.8*	170.5	7.8	158.5	124	148
<b>Crude birth rate (births per 1000 inhabitants)</b>	9.3	1.8	9.7	2.8	9.4	1.6	9.5	9.8	9.1

42 \*This is calculated only for the period 2014-2018. \*\* Minimum and maximum values recorded in the period considered.


Total fertility rate ( <i>new-born per woman</i> )	1.6	0.13*	1.8	0.3*	1.7	0.1 *	1.57	1.54	1.58
Crude rate of natural population change (‰)	-1.7	-4.2 / -1.7	-2.5	-4.9 / -2.5	-0.8	-2.3 / -0.4	-2.0	-1.0	-1.7
Crude rate of net migration (‰)	8	1.8 – 11.9	6	0.4 / 20.9	5.9	-0.1 / 12.8	4.8	2.6	3.6
Crude rate of total population change (‰)	6.4	-2.2 / 9	3.5	-4.5 / 16.8	5.1	-2.2 / 11.1	2.7	1.6	1.9

**Table 46. Demographic indicators of Alpine districts, 2018**

*Data sources: Eurostat, Population (Demography, Migration and Projections)*


## DEMOGRAPHY

In line with the development in Upper Bavaria (NUTS 2) and Swabia (NUTS 2), the **population** in Berchtesgadener Land, Garmisch-Partenkirchen and Oberallgäu **slightly increased** since the last census in 2011 (cf. figures TCNs over total population in BGL, GAP and OA, 2008-2018). The positive crude rate of total population change in the districts is a result of positive crude rate of net migration (see also Table 46). This specificity is reflected in the migratory flows. Since Berchtesgadener Land and Garmisch-Partenkirchen are well connected to Munich and Salzburg and also due to their landscape attractiveness, domestic immigration to the three Alpine districts predominates. In line with national trends, the percentage of foreign citizens in the total number of immigrants has increased in the last twenty years.




**Chart 65. Third Country Nationals over total population in Berchtesgadener Land, 2008-2018**

*Data source: Statistisches Bundesamt (Federal Statistical Office of Germany)*



**Chart 66. Third Country Nationals over total population in Berchtesgadener Land, 2008-2018**

*Data source: Statistisches Bundesamt (Federal Statistical Office of Germany)*




**Chart 67. Third Country Nationals over total population in Oberallgäu, 2008-2018**

*Data source: Statistisches Bundesamt (Federal Statistical Office of Germany)*


As the table indicates, the absolute numbers and the share of TCNs increased, especially since 2015. Over the last ten years, the migration balance in the three Alpine districts was turning more positive and peaked in 2015, when many asylum seekers arrived (see also charts 68-70).

Since 2010, the **positive migration balance is a result of immigration** of foreigners due to the fact that migration balance of nationals was positive on a small level only during the period considered.




**Chart 68. Migration balance in Berchtesgadener Land, 2008-2018**

*Data source: Bayerisches Landesamt für Statistik (Statistical Office of Bavaria)*



**Chart 69. Migration balance in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, 2008-2018**

*Data source: Bayerisches Landesamt für Statistik (Statistical Office of Bavaria)*



**Chart 70. Migration balance in Oberallgäu, 2008-2018**

*Data source: Bayerisches Landesamt für Statistik (Statistical Office of Bavaria)*



## DEMOGRAPHY: FOCUS ON TCNS

In line with the development on the national level, the total number of TCNs in the three Alpine districts (nearly) doubled. The biggest growth was after the immigration of asylum seekers in 2015, who were then allocated to the rural districts. The share of TCNs among total population is lower in Berchtesgadener Land (4.3%), Garmisch-Partenkirchen (6.0%) and Oberallgäu (3.4%) compared to the national average (7.4%, 2018).

The three districts in Upper Bavaria and Swabia are characterised by a variety of people with foreign citizenship, whilst a change regarding quantitative terms and with respect to its composition can be observed from 2008 to 2018 (see Tables 47, 48 and 49). In 2008, the TOP10 of foreign citizenships included countries with whom Germany had a long-lasting migration history, such as Turkey.

While numbers of individuals from the United States in Berchtesgadener Land remained quite stable over time in absolute numbers, other increased remarkably. Amongst them are individuals from the Russian Federation (+96.6%), Bosnia and Herzegovina (+115.8%) and Kosovo (+2004.2%). In addition, especially asylum seekers and family members from Afghanistan, Syria, Nigeria and Iraq arrived in the rural district.

2008			2018		
1	Turkey	515	1	Bosnia and Herzegovina	520
2	Serbia and Montenegro (fc)	372	2	Kosovo	505
3	Bosnia and Herzegovina	241	3	Turkey	430
4	Russian Federation	117	4	Afghanistan	415
5	United States	116	5	Syria	390
6	Kazakhstan	105	6	Russian Federation	230
7	Northern Macedonia	64	7	Serbia	210
8	Thailand	48	8	Nigeria	205
9	Ukraine	39	9	Iraq	135
10	Kosovo	24	10	United States	130

**Table 47. Total number of Third Country Nationals by citizenship (TOP10) in Berchtesgadener Land, 2008-2018**

*Data source: Statistisches Bundesamt (Federal Statistical Office of Germany)*

In Garmisch-Partenkirchen, numbers of Turkish nationals, which have a share of 19.6% of all TCNs, remained quite stable over time in absolute numbers, whilst other increased remarkably. Amongst them are individuals from the United States (+54.6%) as a result of the USAG (United States Army Garrison) Bavaria – Garmisch Community, Bosnia and Herzegovina (+169.2%), Kosovo (+169.2%) and the Russian Federation (+226.1%). Most relevant in terms of numbers, however, were asylum seekers and family members from Syria, Afghanistan and Nigeria as well as people from Kuwait, assumably well-off second homeowners, who arrived in GAP.

2008			2018		
1	Turkey	1,213	1	Turkey	1,040
2	Serbia and Montenegro (fc)	303	2	United States	450
3	United States	291	3	Syria	400
4	Bosnia and Herzegovina	104	4	Afghanistan	345
5	Russian Federation	92	5	Russian Federation	300
6	Vietnam	46	6	Bosnia and Herzegovina	280
7	Thailand	40	7	Nigeria	235
8	North Macedonia	38	8	Kosovo	220
9	Canada	30	9	Kuwait	175
10	Kosovo	30	10	Serbia	135

**Table 48. Total number of Third Country Nationals by citizenship (TOP10) in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, 2008-2018**

*Data source: Statistisches Bundesamt (Federal Statistical Office of Germany)*

In Oberallgäu, numbers of individuals from Thailand and the United States remained rather stable, while Russians and Bosnians increased remarkably (+54.6%, +58.9%). In addition, also asylum seekers and family members from Syria, Afghanistan, Nigeria and Eritrea arrived there.

2008			2018		
1	Turkey	2,047	1	Turkey	1,665
2	Yugoslavia (fc)	167	2	Syria	390
3	Bosnia and Herzegovina	129	3	Afghanistan	315
4	Thailand	108	4	Kosovo	295
5	United States	99	5	Nigeria	215
6	Russian Federation	97	6	Bosnia and Herzegovina	205
7	Vietnam	72	7	Eritrea	185
8	Ukraine	69	8	Serbia	160

2008			2018		
9	Serbia and Montenegro (fc)	59	9	Russian Federation	150
10	Serbia (incl. Kosovo) (fc)	57	10	Thailand/United States	115


**Table 49. Total number of Third Country Nationals by citizenship (TOP10) in Oberallgäu, 2008-2018**

*Data source: Statistisches Bundesamt (Federal Statistical Office of Germany)*

## AGE AND GENDER STRUCTURE

All three districts are ageing societies, whilst the Ageing Index is higher than national average. For the specific group of TCNs, no statistical data are provided on NUTS-3 level. Qualitative evidence, however, indicates that especially recently arrived asylum seekers and refugees are younger people with effects on rejuvenation of the region's demography.

The total number of female TCNs in Berchtesgadener Land was 2,145, which is a share of 46.7% in 2018. The number and share in Garmisch-Partenkirchen and Oberallgäu were similar (2,420, 45.7%; 2,570, 48.2%). While the number of female TCNs in the districts especially grew in the last five years, the share fell after the arrival of mainly male asylum seekers but rose again due to family reunification (see also chart 71).



**Chart 71. Share of female Third Country Nationals in Alpine districts, 2008-2018**

*Data source: Statistisches Bundesamt (Federal Statistical Office of Germany)*

#### 4.1.3.2 SOCIAL FEATURES OF NORTHERN BAVARIAN DISTRICT

DEMOGRAPHIC INDICATORS <sup>43</sup>	Neustadt an der Aisch- Bad Windsheim				
	2018	Variation 2008-2018	National average (2018)	Eu27 average (2018)	MATILDE regions average (2018)
Population size	99,641	0.5%	-	-	425,252
Population density ( <i>inhabitants per km<sup>2</sup></i> )	78.9	76.9 / 78.9	234.7	105.3	102
Median age of population (years)	46.6	0.7*	46	43.1*	45*
Old-age dependency ratio (>65/14-64)	31.2	1.6*	32.8	30.5	33*
Young-age Dependency Ratio	20.5	0.1*	20.7	24.1	23
Aging Index (>65/<14)	152.6	7.7	158.5	124	148
Crude birth rate ( <i>births per 1000 inhabitants</i> )	9.2	1.2	9.5	9.8	9.1
Total fertility rate ( <i>new-born per woman</i> )	1.7	0.2*	1.57	1.54	1.58
Crude rate of natural population change (‰)	-2	-3.5 / -2	-2.0	-1.0	-1.7
Crude rate of net migration (‰)	9.2	-3.1 / 12.3	4.8	2.6	3.6
Crude rate of total population change (‰)	7.2	-6 / 9.6	2.7	1.6	1.9

**Table 50. Demographic indicators of Northern Bavarian district, 2018**

*Data sources: Eurostat, Population (Demography, Migration and Projections)*


## DEMOGRAPHY

In derogation from the general development in Middle Franconia (NUTS 2), which faced a continuous population increase since the last census in 2011 (mostly in the core of the metropolitan region, i.e. Nuremberg, Fuerth, and Erlangen), the population in Neustadt a.d. Aisch-Bad Windsheim started to **slightly increase not before 2012** (cf. Chart 72, TCNs over total population in Neustadt a.d. Aisch – Bad Windsheim, 2008-2018). In 2018, despite negative

43 \*This is calculated only for the period 2014-2018.


crude rate of natural population change, the population is growing, mostly due to immigration. In some municipalities in the Eastern parts of the district, acceptable commuting distances to Nuremberg result in periurbanisation and domestic migration, whilst immigration of TCNs mostly contributes to the high rates of immigration, and peaked in 2015 when many asylum seekers arrived.

Over the last ten years, the **migration balance** in Neustadt an der Aisch – Bad Windsheim in Middle Franconia was **turning positive** in 2011 (see also Chart 73). The positive migration balance, since then, is a result of immigration of foreigners, because the migration balance of nationals was slightly negative – except in 2016.



**Chart 72. Third Country Nationals over total population in Neustadt an der Aisch-Bad Windsheim, 2008-2018**

*Data sources: Statistisches Bundesamt (Federal Statistical Office of Germany)*



**Chart 73. Migration balance in Neustadt an der Aisch - Bad Windsheim, 2008-2017**

*Data source: Bayerisches Landesamt für Statistik (Statistical Office of Bavaria)*

## DEMOGRAPHY: FOCUS ON TCNS

In line with the development on the national level, the total number of TCNs in Neustadt an der Aisch – Bad Windsheim doubled, while the biggest growth was after the immigration of asylum seekers in 2015. The share of TCNs among total population is much lower in the rural district (3.4%) compared to the national average (7.4%, 2018). The district of Neustadt an der Aisch – Bad Windsheim in Middle Franconia is characterised by a variety of people with foreign citizenship, whilst a change regarding quantitative terms and with respect to its composition can be observed from 2008 to 2018 (see Table 51). In 2008, the TOP10 of foreign citizenships included countries with whom Germany had a long-lasting migration history, such as Turkey.

2008			2018		
1	Turkey	678	1	Syria	670
2	United States	200	2	Turkey	555
3	Russian Federation	109	3	Iraq	360
4	Kazakhstan	70	4	United States	205
5	Thailand	57	5	Russian Federation	185
6	Serbia (incl. Kosovo) (fc)	55	6	Ukraine	125

7	Bosnia and Herzegovina	35	7	Serbia	110
8	Ukraine	35	8	Bosnia and Herzegovina	90
9	Philippines	34	9	Ethiopia	85
10	P.R. China	24	10	Thailand	75

**Table 51. Total number of Third Country Nationals by citizenship (TOP10) in Neustadt an der Aisch – Bad Windsheim, 2008-2018**


*Data source: Statistisches Bundesamt (Federal Statistical Office of Germany)*

While numbers of individuals from Thailand or the United States as a result of the USAG (United States Army Garrison) Bavaria – Ansbach Community remained quite stable over time in absolute numbers, others such as Russian, Bosnian and Ukrainian citizens increased remarkably (+69.7%, +157.1%, +257.1%). Most relevant, however, is the increase of people from Syria and Iraq, who arrived in the rural district as asylum seekers, stayed there or immigrated from other places.

## AGE AND GENDER STRUCTURE

Ageing in Neustadt an der Aisch – Bad Windsheim is reflected in the Ageing Index (cf. Table 50). For the specific group of TCNs, no statistical data are provided on NUTS-3 level.

The total number of female TCNs in Neustadt a.d. Aisch – Bad Windsheim was 1,550, which is a share of 45.9% in 2018. While the number of female TCNs in the districts nearly doubled in the last five years, the share fell after the arrival of mainly male asylum seekers (see also Chart 74).



**Chart 74. Share of female Third Country Nationals in Neustadt an der Aisch - Bad Windsheim, 2008-2018**

*Data source: Statistisches Bundesamt (Federal Statistical Office of Germany)*

#### 4.1.3.3 SOCIAL FEATURES OF EASTERN BAVARIAN DISTRICT

<b>DEMOGRAPHIC INDICATORS<sup>44</sup></b>	<b>Regen</b>				
	<b>2018</b>	<b>Variation 2008-2018</b>	<b>National average (2018)</b>	<b>Eu27 average (2018)</b>	<b>MATILDE regions average (2018)</b>
<b>Population size</b>	77,489	-3.4%	-	-	425,252
<b>Population density (inhabitants per km<sup>2</sup>)</b>	79.7	78.2 / 82	234.7	105.3	102
<b>Median age of population (years)</b>	47.5	0.8*	46	43.1*	45*

<sup>44</sup> \*This is calculated only for the period 2014-2018.




Old-age dependency ratio (>65/14-64)	33.6	2.5*	32.8	30.5	33*
Young-age Dependency Ratio	19.1	0.2*	20.7	24.1	23
Aging Index (>65/<14)	176	11.7	158.5	124	148
Crude birth rate ( <i>births per 1000 inhabitants</i> )	8.1	0.7	9.5	9.8	9.1
Total fertility rate ( <i>new-born per woman</i> )	1.5	0.1*	1.57	1.54	1.58
Crude rate of natural population change (‰)	-4.4	-5.3 / 3.4	-2.0	-1.0	-1.7
Crude rate of net migration (‰)	6.5	-2 / 11.8	4.8	2.6	3.6
Crude rate of total population change (‰)	2.2	-6.4 / 7.1	2.7	1.6	1.9

**Table 52. Demographic indicators of Eastern Bavarian district, 2018**

*Data sources: Eurostat, Population (Demography, Migration and Projections)*

## DEMOGRAPHY


Whilst Lower Bavaria (NUTS 2) faced a continuous population increase since the last census in 2011, the population in Regen started to **slightly increase** not before 2015 (cf. Chart 75, TCNs over total population in Regen, 2008-2018). In 2018, despite negative crude rate of natural population change, the population is growing, mostly due to immigration of TCNs and allocated asylum seekers and refugees in particular (see also Table 52).



**Chart 75. Third Country Nationals over total population in Eastern Bavarian district, 2008-2018**

*Data sources: Statistisches Bundesamt (Federal Statistical Office of Germany)*

Over the last ten years, the **migration balance** in Regen in Lower Bavaria was **turning positive** in 2012 and peaked in 2015, when many asylum seekers arrived (see also Chart 76).



**Chart 76. Migration balance in Eastern Bavarian district, 2008-2018**

*Data source: Bayerisches Landesamt für Statistik (Statistical Office of Bavaria)*

The positive migration balance, since then, is a result of immigration of foreigners due to the fact that migration balance of nationals was slightly negative – except in 2017.

## DEMOGRAPHY: FOCUS ON TCNS

In line with the development on the national level, the total number of TCNs quadrupled from a low level, while the biggest growth was after the immigration of asylum seekers in 2015. The share of TCNs among total population is much lower in the rural district (2.8%) compared to the national average (7.4%, 2018).

The district of Regen is characterised by a variety of people with foreign citizenship, whilst a change regarding quantitative terms and with respect to its composition can be observed from 2008 to 2018 (Table 53). While numbers of individuals from Thailand or the Ukraine remained quite stable over time in absolute numbers, others increased remarkably. Amongst them are especially asylum seekers and family members from Syria, who represent 50.9% of all TCNs, Iraq, Afghanistan and Nigeria.

2008			2018		
1	Serbia and Montenegro (fc)	101	1	Syria	1,120
2	Russian Federation	56	2	Russian Federation	80
3	Thailand	44	3	Kosovo	70
4	Turkey	37	4	Iraq	65
5	Kazakhstan	36	5	Afghanistan	55
6	Ukraine	27	6	Thailand	55
7	United States	20	7	Nigeria	50
8	P.R. China	19	8	Albania	45
9	Brazil	13	9	Ukraine	45
10	Bosnia and Herzegovina	9	10	Serbia	40


**Table 53. Total number of Third Country Nationals by citizenship (TOP10) in Regen, 2008-2018**

*Data source: Statistisches Bundesamt (Federal Statistical Office of Germany)*

## AGE AND GENDER STRUCTURE

Ageing in the district of Regen is reflected in the Ageing Index (cf. Table 52). Due to lack of data on NUTS-3 level, no specific characterization can be provided for the age structure of TCNs.

The total number of female TCNs in Regen, Lower Bavaria, was 920, which is a share of 41.8% and thus on a low level compared to the national average (47.0%, 2018, see also Chart 77). While the number of female TCNs in the districts tripled in the last five years, the share was cut by half after the arrival of mainly male asylum seekers (54.8% to 27.4%) but rose again due to family reunification.



**Chart 77. Share of female Third Country Nationals in Regen, 2008-2018**

*Data source: Statistisches Bundesamt (Federal Statistical Office of Germany)*


## 4.1.4 EDUCATIONAL FEATURES OF THE REGION

### 4.1.4.1 EDUCATIONAL FEATURES OF ALPINE DISTRICTS

The education level of TCNs from 15 to 64 years differs remarkably from the total population in Upper Bavaria<sup>45</sup> and Swabia<sup>46</sup>. In Upper Bavaria, the share of people with lower education, i.e., less than primary, primary and lower secondary education (levels 0-2), is much higher among TCNs (38.2% compared to 15.6%, 2018), but has decreased by five percentage points since 2008. In Swabia, equally, the share of people with lower education is much higher among TCNs (46.2% compared to 18.7%, 2018), but has decreased by even 13 percentage points in the last ten years (see also Charts 78 and 79).


<sup>45</sup> Since EUROSTAT data only can be provided on NUTS-2-level, the NUTS-2 Upper Bavaria, where Berchtesgadener Land and Garmisch-Partenkirchen belong to, was selected.

<sup>46</sup> Since EUROSTAT data only can be provided on NUTS-2-level, the NUTS-2 Swabia, where Oberallgäu belongs to, was selected.



**Chart 78. Education level among total population and Third Country Nationals in Upper Bavaria, 2008-2018**


*Data source: Eurostat*



**Chart 79. Education level among total population and Third Country Nationals in Swabia, 2008-2018**

*Data source: Eurostat*

Regarding young people from third countries from 15 to 34 years, who are neither in employment nor in education and training (NEET), Upper Bavaria<sup>47</sup> and Swabia<sup>48</sup> showed (very) high rates over the last ten years. While NEET rates of the total population were (slightly) below the national average, the ones of TCNs were higher than the national average, but remained rather stable at about 18.6% respectively 19.3% (2018, see also Charts 80 and 81).




**Chart 80. Share of young NEETS (15-34y/o) in Upper Bavaria and Germany, 2008-2018**

*Data source: Eurostat*

47 Since EUROSTAT data only can be provided on NUTS-2-level, the NUTS-2 Upper Bavaria, where Berchtesgadener Land and Garmisch-Partenkirchen belong to, was selected.

48 Since EUROSTAT data only can be provided on NUTS-2-level, the NUTS-2 Swabia, where Oberallgäu belongs to, was selected.



**Chart 81. Share of young NEETS (15-34y/o) in Swabia and Germany, 2008-2018**


*Data source: Eurostat*

#### 4.1.4.2 EDUCATIONAL FEATURES OF NORTHERN BAVARIAN DISTRICT

The education level of TCNs from 15 to 64 years differs remarkably from the total population in Middle Franconia<sup>49</sup>. The share of people with lower education, i.e., less than primary, primary and lower secondary education (levels 0-2), is much higher among TCNs (56.3% compared to 36.8%, 2018) and has even increased during the crisis years (59.9%, in 2013, see also Chart 82).

<sup>49</sup> Since EUROSTAT data only can be provided on NUTS-2-level, the NUTS-2 Middle Franconia, where Neustadt an der Aisch – Bad Windsheim belongs to, was selected.






**Chart 82. Education level among total population and Third Country Nationals in Middle Franconia, 2008-2018**

*Data source: Eurostat*

Regarding young people from third countries from 15 to 34 years, who are neither in employment nor in education and training (NEET), Middle Franconia<sup>50</sup> showed high rates over the last ten years. While NEET rates of the total population were slightly below the national average, the ones of TCNs were higher than the national average and increased even more from 2017 to 2018 (19.8% to 28.3%, see also Chart 83).

<sup>50</sup> Since EUROSTAT data only can be provided on NUTS-2-level, the NUTS-2 Middle Franconia, where Neustadt an der Aisch – Bad Windsheim belongs to, was selected.




**Chart 83. Share of young NEETS (15-34y/o) in Middle Franconia and Germany, 2008-2018**

*Data source: Eurostat*

#### 4.1.4.3 EDUCATIONAL FEATURES OF EASTERN BAVARIAN DISTRICT

The education level of TCNs from 15 to 64 years differs remarkably from the total population in Lower Bavaria<sup>51</sup>. The share of people with lower education, i.e., less than primary, primary and lower secondary education (levels 0-2), is much higher among TCNs (56.3% compared to 36.8%, 2018) and has even increased during the crisis years (59.9%, in 2013, see also Chart 84).

<sup>51</sup> Since EUROSTAT data only can be provided on NUTS-2-level, the NUTS-2 Lower Bavaria, where Regen belongs to, was selected.



**Chart 84. Education level among total population and Third Country Nationals in Lower Bavaria, 2008-2018**

*Data source: Eurostat*

Regarding young people from third countries from 15 to 34 years, who are neither in employment nor in education and training (NEET), for Lower Bavaria<sup>52</sup>, no data were available. NEET rates of the total population, however, were below the national average.

## 4.1.5 ECONOMIC FEATURES OF THE REGION

### 4.1.5.1 ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF ALPINE DISTRICTS

The rural districts Berchtesgadener Land and Oberallgäu are prospering regions with a regional gross domestic product per capita that is higher than the EU and MATILDE average (see also Table 54). The rural district Garmisch-Partenkirchen is prospering as well but has a regional gross domestic product per capita that is lower than the EU and MATILDE average (see Chart 85).

<sup>52</sup> Since EUROSTAT data only can be provided on NUTS-2-level, the NUTS-2 Lower Bavaria, where Regen belongs to, was selected.


<i>ECONOMIC INDICATORS<sup>53</sup></i>	<i>Berchtesgadener Land</i>		<i>Garmisch-Partenkirchen</i>		<i>Oberallgäu</i>		<i>National average (2017)</i>	<i>EU average (2017)*</i>	<i>MATILDE regions average (2017)</i>
	<i>2017</i>	<i>Variation 2008-2017</i>	<i>2017</i>	<i>Variation 2008-2017</i>	<i>2017</i>	<i>Variation 2008-2017</i>			
<b>Regional GDP per capita at purchasing power standards</b>	30,600	1.7%	27,500	1.2%	30,200	2.3%	36,900	29,800	29,624
<b>Regional Gross value added: primary sector</b>	2%	-0.28 percent age points	1%	0.24 percent age points	2%	0.05 percent age points	1%	2% (7,098.5 million euro)	4%
<b>Regional Gross value added: secondary sector</b>	25%	3.9 percent age points	14%	1.44 percent age points	35%	4.25 percent age points	30%	27% (95,398 million euro)	30%
<b>Regional Gross value added: tertiary sector</b>	73%	-3.61 percent age points	85%	-1.68 percent age points	62%	-4.31 percent age points	69%	71% (254,090 million euro)	66%

**Table 54. Economic indicators in the Alpine districts, 2017**

*Data sources: Eurostat Gross domestic product (GDP) at current market prices by NUTS 3 regions; OECD Gross domestic product (GDP); Eurostat Gross value added at basic prices by NUTS 3 regions.*

BGL's position along the Munich-Salzburg axis and in proximity to Salzburg gave the region a strategic advantage in the national and European markets, while for GAP, the proximity to Munich is of vital importance. Oberallgäu, instead, is situated along the motorway A7 and in reach of the A96 connecting Lindau and Munich.

<sup>53</sup> \* Missing data for France for Regional Gross Value Added and Employment by sector; Average has been therefore calculated on the basis of 26 Member States.



**Chart 85. Gross Domestic Product trends in Alpine districts, 2008-2017**

*Data source: Eurostat, Gross domestic product (GDP) at current market prices by NUTS 3 regions*

Considering the economic structure, all three districts are classified as intermediate regions, therefore it is not surprising that the **primary sector**, today, accounts for only 1 to 2% of the gross value added (GVA) and 0.4 to 4.4% of the employees. Crop farming has been profitable only in the flatter areas in the north of the districts, while, gradually, the workforce especially in grassland and alpine farming, has moved from the primary to the secondary and tertiary sector in recent decades. Nowadays, the pillars of BGL's, GAP's and OA's agriculture are milk industry, mostly organized around small size businesses (with limited number of employees) and with a strong vocation for the export at national and international levels, also due to an intensive territorial branding.

The **secondary sector** contribution to the GVA in the districts varies between 14% (GAP), 25% (BGL) and 35% (OA). In BGL, e.g. energy engineering, ICT, plastics and metal processing or fine mechanisms are among the leading activities within this sector, while in GAP, automotive, mechatronics and measurement, wood, plastics and metal processing as well as energy, environment and medical engineering predominate. The leading activities in this sector in Oberallgäu are machine engineering and vehicle construction, food and packaging technology as well as energy and environmental engineering, while metal industry traditionally is important in the southern part of the district.

In the last decades, the Alpine districts displayed a strong marked tertiarization of its economy: the **service sector** represents between 62% (OA), 73% (BGL) and 85% (GAP) of the GVA in 2017 (while the average value of the other MATILDE regions is 66%). The driving forces of this tertiarisation process lay by one hand in the relative weight of non-market-oriented services (public education, health and public administration); and on the other hand, all three districts are among the most important tourism destinations in the Bavarian Alps. With their 3.7 (BGL), 5 (GAP) and nearly 8 million overnight stays per year (OA), the districts are classified with high tourism intensity and count on intense tourism flows both during both the summer and winter seasons (Berchtesgadener Land Tourismus GmbH 2020; Landratsamt Garmisch-Partenkirchen 2020; Landratsamt Oberallgäu 2020).

#### 4.1.5.2 ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF NORTHERN BAVARIAN DISTRICT

The rural district of Neustadt a.d. Aisch – Bad Windsheim is a prospering region in Northern Bavaria, however, with a regional gross domestic product per capita that is lower than the average of EU and MATILDE regions (see Chart 86). The driving forces behind this successful economic performance are related to several factors: NEA's position between the agglomeration areas Nuremberg-Fuerth-Erlangen and Wuerzburg-Schweinfurt as well as the motorways A3 Frankfurt-Nuremberg-Regensburg and A7 Wuerzburg-Ulm-Kempten that are tangent to the region are considered a strategic advantage in the national and European markets.


<b><i>ECONOMIC INDICATORS<sup>54</sup></i></b>	<b><i>Neustadt an der Aisch – Bad Windsheim</i></b>		<b><i>National average (2017)</i></b>	<b><i>EU average (2017)*</i></b>	<b><i>MATILDE regions average (2017)</i></b>
	<b><i>2017</i></b>	<b><i>Variation 2008-2017</i></b>			
<b>Regional GDP per capita at purchasing power standards</b>	27,200	2.3%	36,900	29,800	29,624
<b>Regional Gross value added: primary sector</b>	4%	-0.52 percentage points	1%	2% (7,098.5 million euro)	4%
<b>Regional Gross value added: secondary sector</b>	32%	2.95 percentage points	30%	27% (95,398 million euro)	30%

<sup>54</sup> \* Missing data for France for Regional Gross Value Added and Employment by sector; Average has been therefore calculated on the basis of 26 Member States.

<b>Regional Gross value added: tertiary sector</b>	64%	-2.43 percentage points	69%	71% (254,090 million euro)	66%
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**Table 55. Economic indicators in the Northern Bavarian district, 2017**

*Data sources: Eurostat Gross domestic product (GDP) at current market prices by NUTS 3 regions; OECD Gross domestic product (GDP); Eurostat Gross value added at basic prices by NUTS 3 regions*



**Chart 86. Gross Domestic Product trends in the Northern Bavarian district, 2008-2017**

*Data source: Eurostat, Gross domestic product (GDP) at current market prices by NUTS 3 regions*

Considering the economic structure, the **primary sector** in the rural region Neustadt a.d. Aisch – Bad Windsheim still accounts for 4% of the gross value added (GVA) (which is about the MATILDE average) and for 4.7% of the employees. Cultivation has always been very profitable in the western parts of the district due to soil favour. However, due to out-migration, mechanisation and better employment outcomes outside agriculture, gradually, the workforce has moved from the primary to the secondary sector and, finally, massively to the tertiary sector in recent decades. NEA's agriculture is characterised by sugar beets, fruit production and wine in the western, fish farming



(especially carps) in ponds in the eastern part of the district, mostly organized around small size businesses. The Steigerwald hill region is characterised by forestry.

The **secondary sector** contribution to the GVA of the province varied between 32% in 2017. Manufacturing, automotive, wood and plastics processing as well as musical instrument making are among the leading activities within this sector.

Like other regions in Bavaria, the economy in Neustadt a.d. Aisch – Bad Windsheim was characterised by a strong marked tertiarisation in the recent decades: the **service sector** represents 64% of the GVA in 2017 (which is slightly below the average value of the other MATILDE regions of 66%). The driving forces of this tertiarisation process lay by one hand in the relative weight of non-market-oriented services (public education, health and public administration); and on the other hand, in NEA being a destination for spa tourism and touristic day trips from surrounding cities. The district has 0.6 million overnight stays per year, especially during summer season (Landkreis Neustadt a.d. Aisch – Bad Windsheim 2020).

#### 4.1.5.3 ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF EASTERN BAVARIAN DISTRICT

<b>ECONOMIC INDICATORS<sup>55</sup></b>	<b>Regen</b>		<b>National average (2017)</b>	<b>EU average (2017)*</b>	<b>MATILDE regions average (2017)</b>
	<b>2017</b>	<b>Variation 2008-2017</b>			
<b>Regional GDP per capita at purchasing power standards</b>	29,300	2.2%	36,900	29,800	29,624
<b>Regional Gross value added: primary sector</b>	3%	-0.43 percentage points	1%	2% (7,098.5 million euro)	4%
<b>Regional Gross value added: secondary sector</b>	37%	4 percentage points	30%	27% (95,398 million euro)	30%
<b>Regional Gross value added: tertiary sector</b>	60%	-3.57 percentage points	69%	71% (254,090 million euro)	66%


**Table 56. Economic indicators in the Eastern Bavarian district, 2017**

*Data sources: Eurostat Gross domestic product (GDP) at current market prices by NUTS 3 regions; OECD Gross domestic product (GDP); Eurostat Gross value added at basic prices by NUTS 3 regions*

The rural district of Regen is a prospering region, with a regional gross domestic product per capita, which is comparable with the average of the EU and MATILDE regions (see Chart 87). The driving forces behind this successful economic performance are related to several factors: The opening of the Iron curtain in 1989 and the

55 \* Missing data for France for Regional Gross Value Added and Employment by sector; Average has been therefore calculated on the basis of 26 Member States.

2004 and 2007 EU enlargement of the European Union terminated the isolated position of the region and offered foreign markets and cheap labour force from Eastern Europe. The expansion of the national park pushed tourism in the 1990.



**Chart 87. Gross Domestic Product trends in the Eastern Bavarian district, 2008-2017**

*Data source: Eurostat, Gross domestic product (GDP) at current market prices by NUTS 3 regions*

Considering the economic structure, even if Regen is classified as a rural region, the **primary sector**, today, accounts for only 3% of the gross value added (GVA) and for 3.0% of the employees. Grassland farming was only feasible in the lower situated parts but has always been sufficient for subsistence only. Nowadays, it is done as a side job and is organized around participation in small and medium sized enterprises. In the recent decades, the workforce has moved from the primary to the secondary sector and partly to the tertiary sectors.

The **secondary sector** contribution to the GVA of the district was at 37% in 2017. Optoelectronics, automotive, plastics processing and mechanical engineering, glass production and refinement as well as timber industry are among the leading activities within this sector.

Due to structural transformation of the economy during the recent decades, the **tertiary sector** nowadays represents 60% of the GVA (2017, the average value of the other MATILDE regions is 66%). Tertiarisation process was fostered by the expansion of non-market-oriented services, e.g. public education, health, and public administration. Regarding the latter, two technology campuses of the Deggendorf Institute of Technology, where

experts develop application-related special solutions in cooperation with high-tech companies, were established in the district. Besides, located in the Bavarian Forest, Regen is one of the most important tourism destinations in the low-mountain ranges in Germany (Kordel & Weidinger 2016). With its 2.7 million overnight stays per year, the region is classified with high tourism intensity and counts on intense tourism flows both during the summer and winter seasons (ARBERLAND REGio GmbH 2020).

## LABOUR MARKET OF THE REGION

LABOUR MARKET INDICATORS <sup>56</sup>	Berchtesgadener Land		Garmisch-Partenkirchen		Oberallgäu			Neustadt a.d. Aisch - Bad Windsheim		Regen		National average (2017)	EU average (2017)*	MATILDE regions average (2017)
	2017	Variation	2017	Variation	2017	Variation	2008-2017	2017	Variation	2017	Variation			
Unemployment rate (%/ percentage points)	3.1%	-0.7	2.8%	-1.5	2.6%	-0.6		1.7%	-1.4	3%	-2.1	3.8%	8.1 %	8.4%
Employment by sector: primary (% , thousands of employees)	1.3	-18.3%	0.8	-15.4%	3.4	-	21.2%	2.2	-20.3%	1.2	-	1%	5% (353.98)	5% (6.75)
Employment by sector: secondary (% , thousands of employees)	12	12.2%	6.2	4.0%	23.6	20.2%		14.7	14%	14.5	23.5%	24%	23% (1,584.74)	26% (36.19)


56 \* Missing data for France for Regional Gross Value Added and Employment by sector; Average has been therefore calculated on the basis of 26 Member States.

Employment by sector: tertiary (% thousands of employees)	40.8	7.3%	38.1	12.1%	49.7	14.1%	29.8	12%	24.4	11.5%	75%	71% (4,830.33)	69% (97.63)
People at risk of poverty or social exclusion (average 2008-2018, %/percentage points)	13.8%	0.7	13.8%	0.7	12%	1.1	14.8%	1.4	13.8%	1.6	18.7%	21.6%	16.9%

**Table 57. Labour Market indicators in Bavaria, 2017/2018**

*Data sources: Unemployment: OECD Labour indicators, small regions TL3 and large regions TL2; National Statistical Institutes; Eurostat, Unemployment rates by sex, age, citizenship and NUTS 2 regions; Eurostat, People at risk of poverty or social exclusion by NUTS 2 regions.*


The relative weight of the three main economic sectors is reflected in the numbers of employees (see Table 57 and Chart 88 - *Employment by sector, 2017*). Employed people in the primary sector in the Upper Bavarian districts, i.e. BGL and GAP, were declining, while secondary sector in BGL and tertiary sector in GAP were increasing. The majority, in both rural districts, however, is working in the tertiary sector (40,800 employees and 38,100 employees). Similar developments are observable for Oberallgäu, Neustadt an der Aisch – Bad Windsheim and Regen. In all districts, the majority of the population is working in the tertiary sector (OA: 49,700 employees, NEA: 29,800, REG: 24,400).



**Chart 88. Employment by sector in Bavaria, 2017**

*Data source: Eurostat, Employment (thousand persons) by NUTS 3 regions, 2017*

These economic trends led all five districts in Bavaria close to full employment. The unemployment rates decreased after the economic crisis in 2008 with NEA having the lowest rate (1.7%). All figures are significantly lower than the national (3.8%), the MATILDE regions (5.7%) and EU27 (8.1%) average, confirming the strength of the labour market in the five Bavarian districts (see Chart 89 - *Bavaria - Unemployment rate trend 2008-2017*). The labour market in the four mountain districts is marked by high seasonality: in tourism and the construction industry, the demand for labour is intense for just some months of the year, while it drops during winter. This is particularly relevant for the high representation of foreigners in the seasonal labour market.



**Chart 89. Unemployment rate trends in Bavaria, 2008-2017**

*Data sources: OECD.stat, Labour indicators, small regions TL3 and large regions TL2; Eurostat, Total unemployment rate; National statistical offices of MATILDE countries*

The low unemployment rates combined with the increasing demand in specific sectors requires economic policies capable to secure the supply of workforce. In rural areas of Germany, the unemployment rate of the total population is lower compared to the nationwide share in 2018 (2.4% to 3.5%, see also Chart 89).

The shares of population at risk of poverty are between 12% (Oberallgäu) and 13.9% (BGL, GAP and NEA) for 2018. Thus, the risk of poverty is at a very low level compared to other MATILDE regions (17.3%), to the German national average (18.7%) as well as to the EU27 value for this indicator (21.6%, see also Table 57).


## LABOUR MARKET: FOCUS ON TCNS

Compared to 2008, in 2018 the employment rate of TCNs in Upper Bavaria<sup>57</sup> is noticeable lower (68.0%) than the one of the total population (80.3%). The rate of TCNs, however, increased in line with the general positive economic

<sup>57</sup> Since EUROSTAT data only can be provided on NUTS-2-level, the NUTS-2 Upper Bavaria, where Berchtesgadener Land and Garmisch-Partenkirchen belong to, was selected.



development in the region. The same development is observable for Swabia<sup>58</sup>, Middle Franconia<sup>59</sup> and Lower Bavaria<sup>60</sup>, whilst the employment gap between TCNs and total population ranges around 18%, which is smaller than in most other MATILDE regions.



**Chart 90. Development of the employment rates of Third Country Nationals in Bavarian NUTS2 regions, 2008-2018**

*Data source: Eurostat*

In primary sector, TCNs are not intensively hired in all five districts. More relevant, however, seems the secondary sector, whilst low-wage and temporary employment predominate. Regarding the latter, private companies, involved in mediating, have become important stakeholders. Target companies are automotive supply industries, for instance. Construction and skilled crafts and trades both play an important role in employment of TCNs. Due to the economic structure of the regions with owner-managed SMEs, who partly are in need for workforce, TCNs are welcomed there. Most important in TCN employment in tertiary sector is the hospitality industry, especially in GAP, BGL, OA and REG. Seasonal employment, however, is often a distinctive feature.

<sup>58</sup> Since EUROSTAT data only can be provided on NUTS-2-level, the NUTS-2 Swabia, where Oberallgäu belongs to, was selected.

<sup>59</sup> Since EUROSTAT data only can be provided on NUTS-2-level, the NUTS-2 Middle Franconia, where Neustadt a.d. Aisch – Bad Windsheim belongs to, was selected.

<sup>60</sup> Since EUROSTAT data only can be provided on NUTS-2-level, the NUTS-2 Lower Bavaria, where Regen belongs to, was selected.

The specific employment patterns of TCNs in Germany, and rural areas in particular, are illustrated in the following chart. Compared to the total population, the share of TCNs, who are employed part-time or temporary, is comparably higher, whilst self-employed TCNs are less frequent. Part-time employment is applying to nearly one third of the TCNs in rural areas even.


2018	Total Germany		Rural Areas Germany	
	TCN	TOTAL	TCN	TOTAL
Part-time employment	31.7%	26.8%	29.2%	26.7%
Self-employment	8.3%	8.8%	8.5%	8.8%
Temporary employment	23.4%	12.6%	22.8%	10.4%

**Table 58. Special employment patterns for total population and Third Country Nationals by degree of urbanization in Germany, 2018**

*Data source: Eurostat*

As discussed above, the unemployment rate in the Bavarian districts follows the nationwide developments from 2008 to 2018, but on a way lower level. Where data are available for TCNs<sup>61</sup>, a similar trend can be observed (see also Chart 91).

<sup>61</sup> For the NUTS-2 region Lower Bavaria, no data are provided.



**Chart 91. Unemployment rate trends of Third Country Nationals in Bavaria, 2008-2018**

Data source: Eurostat

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## 5. COUNTRY REPORT ITALY

Authors: Tobias Weidinger and Giulia Bergamasco, with contributions from Marzia Bona, Peter Laner and Andrea Membretti

Italy has a long history of emigration and significant internal migration that, particularly in the 1950s and 1960s, was characterized by rural to urban and South to North migration (Bonifazi & Heins 2000). Accordingly, during the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, migration policies in the country focused on the management of emigration and internal migration, based on the prevailing narrative that identified the country as a place of origin and transit rather than a destination for migration (Bona & Marchetti 2017).

The decade of the 1980s marked a turning point in the development and regulation of migration, particularly following the 1987 CENSIS report that for the first time highlighted a positive net migration in the country (Pugliese 2006). Despite the growing visibility of foreign labour migrants – e.g. revealed by the phenomenon of street vendors along Italian coasts (Calavita 2007) – immigration remained underrepresented in public debates and policies for a long time. As a latecomer to this phenomenon and due to the polarization of the national political spectrum during the 1990s, migration and asylum policies in Italy have been characterized as a highly divisive topic. Since then, policies are marked by a security and emergency approach (Colombo & Sciortino 2003; Campesi 2011; Marchetti 2012; Dal Zotto 2014). On the one hand, this approach is visible in recurring regularizations of migrants that led scholars to define the Italian system as “institutionalized irregularity” (Calavita 2007; Ferraris 2009, cit. after Pannia et al. 2018). On the other hand, this was marked by the adoption of legislative decrees, e.g. the North-Africa emergency (ENA) in 2011, following the Arab Spring that turned the Mediterranean Sea into the main refugee route to Europe. Due to its geographical position, the Italian peninsula had a key role with 50,000 arrivals in 2011 and a peak in arrivals by sea of 119,000 in 2017 (Pannia et al. 2018; Italian Ministry of Interior 2020). As a result, even if affected by important immigration flows since more than 30 years, Italy still lacks coherent immigration, asylum and integration policies (Schierup et al. 2006, cit. after Fullin & Reyneri 2011).

The governance of migration, asylum and integration in Italy follows a multilevel approach. After the Consolidated Law on Immigration (D. Lgs. 286/1998), conditions for entry and staying in the country are coordinated by the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Labour, while the governance of migration and integration involves also regional and local authorities as well as the third sector, particularly regarding welfare provisions that are functional for the integration of migrants. Following the federalism reform in 2001, these provisions turned a regional and local issue (Caponio 2010). Governance coordination at the territorial level shall be provided the Territorial Councils for

Immigration (*Consigli Territoriali per l'Immigrazione*), established by the Consolidated Law on Immigration as the connecting elements between central government and local administrations. Set up by each prefecture to monitor the presence of foreigners and their social and labour integration, in fact their functioning has been marked by severe deficiencies (SIRIUS 2018). The Consolidated Law on Immigration (D. Lgs. 286/1998) foresees a programmatic document to be issued by the government every 3 years, detailing socio-economic policies, measures in support of integration and entry quota for work permits, yet such a document has not been adopted regularly across the years (Pannia et al. 2018). Considering integration policies, Italy offers important good practices developed in particular through the involvement of local authorities and civil society, NGOs as well as the catholic and protestant churches.

Long-standing attention of academia, public opinion and policy makers has been devoted to the urban side of migration processes in Italy, neglecting rural and mountain areas as destinations of immigrants. Only recently, following the arrivals of asylum seekers and refugees triggered by the Arab spring, dispersal policies have been adopted to distribute them across Italian regions, triggering scholarly attention (see also chapter on forced migration). The interest revolved around the willingness and convenience for small municipalities to host forced migrants and the associated opportunities for local development, social innovation and revitalization of small communities (Membretti et al. 2017; Galera et al. 2018; OECD 2018; Perlik et al. 2019). The topic fostered public and political debates, particularly following highly mediatic cases such as the initiative activated in the southern town of Riace (Province of Reggio Calabria, Driel & Verkuyten 2019). Yet, little attention is still paid to labour migration towards rural and mountain regions, notwithstanding the long-standing issue of migrants' labour exploitation in the field of agriculture, especially but not limited to Southern Italy (Ambrosini 2005; Cicerchia & Pallara 2009; Colloca & Corrado 2013, see chapter on labour migration). In the last years, however, immigration to rural areas gained prominence and came to be seen as a key phenomenon “that helps to counter the continuous depopulation of remote rural areas” (Osti & Ventura 2012a, cit. after Bock et al. 2016, 76; Membretti et al. 2017; Dematteis et al. 2018)<sup>62</sup>. In 2015, for instance, the National Strategy for Inner Areas explicitly adopted foreigners as a crucial component in the development and regeneration of inner areas and as an answer to the problem of depopulation (Corrado & D'Agostino 2018).

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62 For an overview about migration to rural areas in Italy, see Corrado (2010), Osti & Ventura (2012b), Colloca & Corrado (2013), Corrado et al. (2014), Balbo (2015), Perlik and Membretti (2018) or Perlik et al. (2019). For further information on foreign immigration in the Alps, see the homepage of ForAlps, [www.foralps.eu](http://www.foralps.eu).

## LABOUR MIGRATION

The actual legal framework on labour migration is provided by the Bossi-Fini-law (189/2002) that tightened the entry and residence requirements and complicated entry procedures and “residence contracts”. According to this law, immigration of seasonal<sup>63</sup> and non-seasonal workers from third countries was and is only possible within the quotas<sup>64</sup> annually set by the government based on demands and requires present work contracts (Caponio 2010; Sahai & Lum 2013). The number of TCNs admitted to the country through the quota system, however, has been significantly reduced as a result of the economic crisis in 2011 (*Decreto flussi*; Dines & Rigo 2015) and maintained only “a limited access for those who have attended training programs in their countries of origin, high-skilled migrants and seasonal workers” (ibid. 15). Therefore, in the last couple of years, most immigrant workers have entered the country by means of overstaying short time visa for tourist or study purposes or applied for asylum (see also chapter on forced migration). This has forced them to work off-the-books for rather long periods of time, “until they gain entitlement to hold a registered job through a regularization drive” (Fullin & Reyneri 2011: 143) and also leads to the fact that numbers of immigrants are generally underestimated in population statistics (Sempredon et al. 2017). Following Ambrosini (2005), the main employment model for immigrants in Italy is characterised as the “5 P’s employment”: occasional (*precari*), heavy (*pesante*), dangerous (*pericoloso*), poorly paid (*poco pagati*) and socially penalized (*penalizzati socialmente*) and often in close contact with the informal economy. Overall, in 2018, about half of foreign employment is absorbed by only 12 professions, that are (in order of numeric relevance): domestic workers, personal care workers, office and shop cleaning workers, bricklayers, farm labourers, kitchen helpers, waiters, warehouse workers, clerks, porters, truck drivers and street vendors (ISTAT 2019). Reflecting the dual structure of the Italian labour market positions (Fellini & Guetto 2019), at the same time, Italy also offers high-skilled job opportunities to foreign immigrants, e.g. by means of the EU blue card (Directive 2009/50/EC, implemented through art. 27 of Law no. 286/1998, introduced by law no. 108/2012). However, interested persons need to cope with national restrictive legal frameworks, also regarding the possibility to recognize their education certificates. In high qualification positions of the tertiary sector (e.g. public administration, credit and insurance and education), the incidence of foreigners is less than two percent (ISTAT 2019).

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63 Directive 2014/36/EU regarding the conditions of entry and stay of foreigner seasonal workers, implemented by the Decree n. 203/2016.

64 The quota system itself was implemented in 1995 (Fullin & Reyneri 2011).

According to the analysis conducted in the frame of the SIRIUS project<sup>65</sup>, “work continues to be one of the main drivers of migration” in light of Italy’s economic and social structure, characterised by labour-intensive sectors, a myriad of small businesses, a relatively low demand for medium-high professions, and a weak welfare (Strozza & De Santis 2017: 100, cit. after SIRIUS 2018). As a result, foreigners are largely occupied in “a complementary labour market that generates occupational segregation – the so-called “ethnic specialisations”– in low-skilled jobs (which are precisely those that have been less affected by the recent negative economic cycle)” (SIRIUS 2018, 340), with consequences in terms of wage differences and a slowdown in the process of labour and social integration (Raffaele Addamo & Membretti 2020).

In agriculture, in particular, immigrants take low paid and physically demanding jobs that Italians do no longer want to do (Benvenuti & Cordini 2013; Sahai & Lum 2013). While harvesting in Emilia-Romagna is entirely mechanized, the majority of products in the South of Italy, e.g. tomatoes and citrus fruits, are still harvested manually (Dines & Rigo 2015). Key harvest areas that have been investigated include the Capitanata plain surrounding the city of Foggia (Puglia region; e.g. Curci 2008; Galossi 2011; Scotto 2016), Salerno and the Sele plain (Campania region, e.g. Natale et al. 2019) and the Gioia Tauro plain (Calabria region; e.g. Morrone 2010; Galossi 2011; Pugliese 2012; Garrapa 2014; Semprebon et al. 2017, Natale et al. 2019). In the latter fruit region, the first agricultural workers arrived in the late 1980s from Morocco and Senegal, while in 2000, migrants from other African countries, and, after the EU-enlargement in 2007, migrants from Romania and Bulgaria started to engage in seasonal harvesting, too (Semprebon et al. 2017). Today, the majority of workers comes from Eastern Europe, while 20% originates from sub-Saharan African countries (Dines & Rigo 2015). Due to European citizenship, the further group (both male and female) is employed semi-informally, which prevents any legal nuisances for employers in case of inspections (Semprebon et al. 2017). Migrants who are officially recruited through transnational seasonal contracts are also better-off as they can cover foreseeable requirements, while the latter group, i.e. sub-Saharan Africans (mainly male) largely work for small farms on an informal basis, often for a few days during the peak season (ibid; Corrado & D’Agostino 2018). In addition, immigrants working in agriculture have to stand long working hours with only short breaks and high temperatures in greenhouses, while their housing situation is poor and lacks basic facilities

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65 The H2020 Project SIRIUS investigates the Skills and Integration of Migrants, Asylum Seekers and Refugees across 8 European countries, more info: <https://www.sirius-project.eu/node/1>

(Sempredon et al. 2017). Gangmasters (*Caporali*)<sup>66</sup> illicitly mediate labour contracting and control and exploit the workers in everyday life (Scotto 2016). In sum, this led to political and social struggles, e.g. self-organized strikes over wages and working conditions, there and elsewhere in the 2010s (Soumahoro 2019). To some degree, even local citizens and farmers showed their solidarity (Dines & Rigo 2015). Throughout the year, most of the immigrants move across Italy from one harvest to another in order to take up jobs in agriculture or even apart (Dines & Rigo 2015; Marzorati et al. 2017; Sempredon et al. 2017). Corrado and D'Agostino (2018), finally, identified internal mobility dynamics in the region towards small centres, where migrants could find anti-cyclical jobs, e.g. in care work, allowing them to stay put (ibid.). Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, a labour gap occurred in agriculture that led the responsible minister to discuss the legalisation of undocumented migrants, which was finally adopted providing a onetime 6-monthly work permit for TCNs (Roberts 2020).

Another phenomenon discussed in the literature is pastoralism in mountain regions of the Alps and Apennines, where working and living conditions appear particularly hard (Nori 2015) as well as low-skilled Punjabi Indians in dairy farming, i.e. cheese production. Beginning in the 1990s and multiplying by ten since 1992, young men mostly without prior experiences in cow milking from the Punjab region in the North-west of India bordering Pakistan started to work in the cowsheds of small dairy farms dispersed across Northern Italy and the Lombardy region in particular (Sahai & Lum 2013). Punjabis mostly migrate on the basis of family relations and take residence on the farm as free accommodation is mostly provided there (ibid.). By means of chain migration of family members, today 90% of the workers in this sector are estimated to be Indian (ibid.). They are mostly employed with regular work contracts (Gardani et al. 2002) and are preferred by employers over Egyptians as the latter group is considered to be more conflictual and complains more about their working conditions (Sahai & Lum 2013). Nevertheless, caste hierarchies remain fundamental – also in everyday life (ibid.). Work in the cowsheds is seen as a temporary project by the Punjabis and as a means to achieve capital accumulation for other projects, such as setting up their own business in Italy or back in India (ibid.).

Foreigners' entrepreneurship in agricultural cultivation and animal breeding is low compared to industry and services (Benvenuti & Cordini 2013). However, they started to produce both local traditional food and ingredients for ethnic food chains. Most of the entrepreneurs are men between 20 and 40, are low educated and only spent a short amount of time in Italy yet (ibid.). Entrepreneurs originate from diverse countries, both EU and non-EU countries, i.e. Switzerland, Germany, France, Romania, United States, United Kingdom, Belgium, Albania, Tunisia or Venezuela

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<sup>66</sup> The gangmaster system (Caporalato) already exists since the 1970s (Scotto 2016).

(ibid.). While their highest concentration is in Tuscany and Sicily, regional concentration of certain nationalities occurred, e.g. Albanians in Tuscany, Macedonians in Piedmont, Serbians in Friuli-Venezia Giulia and Tunisians in Sicily.

Third country nationals were also recruited in the rural mining or quarry zones. There, they replaced the local workforce and formed a sort of ethnic colony as it was shown for Chinese in Piedmont (Dematteis 2010; cf. Barberis 2011, Membretti & Lucchini 2018) and for the extraction of porphyry in the Cembra valley, in the eastern part of Trentino (Bressan 2013).

In the secondary sector, a regional concentration of Chinese citizens was detected in the textile industry of Prato at the foothill of the Apennine mountains (Tuscany region; Baldassar et al. 2015a). Mostly originating from the coastal provinces of Zhejiang and Fujian in general and the Wenzhou prefecture in particular, where economy is also specialized in manufacturing goods, Prato became home to one of the largest and fastest growing populations of Chinese residents in Europe (Baldassar et al. 2015b; Lombardi et al. 2015)<sup>67</sup>. In the city with the highest share of foreigners' entrepreneurship among all entrepreneurs in Italy (Benvenuti & Cordini 2013), since the 1980s and 1990s a lot of textile firms are run by Chinese immigrants that – with the help of their Chinese employees – produce goods “made in Italy” (Lombardi et al. 2015). Chinese immigrants, thereby, tend to live close to their workplace (Ricucci 2010). In 2011, the public health sector of Prato recognized a 36.1% share of births from women of Chinese nationality among all recorded births, while babies born to non-Italian citizens represented 53% of the total (Bressan & Krause 2014).

In the service sector, half of the foreign women's employment is concentrated in personal care and housekeeping, where immigrants represent 68.9% of the total employment (ISTAT 2019). Numbers rose from 12,730 in January 2003 to 230,728 in January 2015 also following recurring regularizations enacted by the government to favour the emersion of irregular employment in the domestic sector (Greco & Zanetti 2017). This led Vietti et al. (2012) to speak of Italy as the “country of caregivers” (*Il paese delle badanti*). Thereby, this type of immigration has to be seen in the context of a structural tension between the southern European welfare system that is designed according to a male breadwinner model and the social consequences of women's rising labour participation rate (Sciortino 2004;

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67 According to the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, in 2018, the presence of Chinese citizens in Italy amounted to 309,110 individuals. The biggest communities are settled in Milan (about 29,000 individuals), Prato (about 23,000) and Rome (about 19,000, Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali 2018).

Caponio 2010). Moreover, the significant occupation of caregivers is related to the family-oriented Italian welfare model that tends to prefer economic transfer to families over the provision of public services (Fellini 2017). In the last years, several studies focused on female migrants in domestic services and especially elderly care, e.g. in the case of Cape Verdeans, Eritreans, Ethiopians and Somalis in Rome (Andall 2000), Eastern Europeans in Liguria, Lombardy and Trentino-Alto Adige (Boccagni & Ambrosini 2012; Ambrosini 2013) or Moldovan and Ukrainian migrant women in Reggio Emilia (Marchetti & Venturini 2014). Focussing on Ukrainian women in elderly care in rural Italy, Greco & Zanetti (2017) showed that fellow citizens firstly arrived in Campania, due to opportunities in the informal economy and commercial relationships between Naples and Odessa (Mazzacurati 2005; Vianello 2009). Chain migration of Ukrainians was also supported by the Polish social networks that had already been established in Bologna, Milan, Naples and Rome and that, together with the Catholic and Orthodox churches, provided support during the initial stages of the immigration (Greco & Zanetti 2017). The blurred distinction between work and leisure time limits the inclusion of live-in caregivers in the receiving society and renders them relatively invisible (ibid.)<sup>68</sup>. In everyday life, they mostly spent their free time with other migrant caregivers belonging to the same ethnic group seeking church services or public parks (Da Roit & Facchini 2010). However, to reach these, they rely on public transport with generally rather limited services due to the non-availability of a driver's license (Lucatelli et al. 2012). Apart from that, e.g. by means of sending remittances to their kids that live back in Ukraine and having video calls with them, they practice transnational motherhood (Vianello 2009). In order to maintain their positions when they are abroad to visit family and children, they leave their jobs to friends in the meanwhile (Vianello 2014). Migration to Italy, for them, is seen as a time-limited model mostly, as they are focused on returning to their country of origin (Ambrosini & Cominelli 2004; Greco & Zanetti 2017).

In 2015, Italy counted 233,772 foreign employees in the tourism sector, which represent nearly 20% out of the total number of employees. According to the Observatory on the labour market in the tourism sector, about one in four employees in tourism is of foreign origin (Federalberghi 2016). Among them, 57% were employed in Northern Italy (30% in the northeast and 27% in the north-west), 28.4% in Central Italy and only 12.7% in the southern regions and islands. As it happens for agriculture, low representation of foreigners in statistical data have to be read in light of prevailing irregular employment. In mountain regions, in particular, migrants are often employed in ski resorts and in local services of maintenance, cleaning and catering in touristic stations. The region of Trentino-Alto Adige/South Tyrol has the highest percentage of foreign workers (37.7%) out of the total number of employees in the touristic

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<sup>68</sup> Therefore, Vietti et al. (2012) also talk about "silent migration" (Una migrazione silenziosa).



sector. Regarding the type of employment, foreign workers are mostly workers (26.6%) or apprentices (23.8%) and are overrepresented in specific sectors such as bars and restaurants (73%) and accommodation services (25.3%). Moreover, especially during summer, the number of foreign workers can increase by almost 20% (Federalberghi 2016), reflecting a strong seasonality. Due to the Covid-19 pandemic induced shut down in 2020, 11,500 jobs were destroyed in hospitality industry between 9 March and 9 May, of which 4,500 were held by seasonal workers from outside (Province of South Tyrol 2020).

## FORCED MIGRATION

Until the 1990s, only citizens from former Soviet countries and Chileans in 1973 were recognized as refugees. In 1989, with the adoption of the Martelli law, this geographical limitation to the right to request asylum in Italy was lifted, as the arrivals of individuals from the Balkans, Kurds of Turkish, Iranian and Iraqi nationality and Afghans became more relevant (Colombo & Sciortino 2004). However, due to the change in the labour quota system (see chapter on labour migration), in recent years, seasonal labour migrants from sub-Saharan countries started to arrive as asylum seekers, too (Dines & Rigo 2015).

According to the Bossi/Fini law (189/2002), asylum seekers were accommodated in special first reception centres (*Centri di Accoglienza per Richiedenti Asilo*, CARA) run by the government for up to one year until they were transferred to collective centres for asylum seekers (*Sistema di per Richiedenti Asilo e Rifugiati*, SPRAR<sup>69</sup>). In the course of the North-Africa Emergency (ENA) program that was initiated in 2011, a large number of extraordinary temporary reception centres (*Centri di Accoglienza Straordinaria*, CAS) was developed. They were usually run by business enterprises with no prior experiences in dealing with refugees. After the end of the program, this form of accommodation became permanent and prevalent for asylum seekers following the enactment of a security decree in December 2018 (*Decreto sicurezza*, then converted to law 132/2018). According to the same law, SPRAR's reception facilities (renamed *Sistema di protezione per titolari di protezione internazionale e per minori stranieri non accompagnati*, SIPROIMI by the aforementioned law), are now reserved for individuals who have already been granted asylum. The SPRAR/SIPROIMI is based on the principle of decentraliation of reception services and on the involvement of municipalities and actors of third sector organisations. It explicitly aims to leverage territorial resources as stimulus for projects targeted to the specific needs of beneficiaries (Cittalia-Fondazione ANCI 2019). This channel offers integrated reception activities that consider newcomers as active protagonists in their

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69 However, they may also be moved from one centre to another for various reasons (Galera et al. 2018).

integration path and access to services as an essential factor for integration. As a result, the SPRAR/SIPROIMI is regarded as an example of European best practice (OECD 2018), which acts as an integral part of local welfare, creating “a system in dialogue with the territorial context that support the establishment of relations between asylum seekers and refugees and the community” (Cittalia-Fondazione ANCI 2019: 74).

Following the “National Reception Plan” (Legislative Decree 142/2015), asylum seekers and refugees are distributed across the Italian territory according to the availability of places (Galera et al. 2018), with a threshold of 2.5 asylum seekers and refugees per 1000 inhabitants. In tens of cases across the Italian Alps, however, their ratio to overall residents reached 10% (Perlik et al. 2019). The spatial distribution shows that the share of asylum seekers – compared to the distribution of the local population – is higher in rural areas than in urban ones (Proietti & Veneri 2019; cf. Galera et al. 2018). In July 2016, the Alpine municipalities have welcomed 10% and the Apennine municipalities 30% out of the 125,203 asylum-seekers registered in July 2016, leading Dematteis, Di Gioia & Membretti (2018) to speak of asylum seekers as “forced highlanders” (*montanari per forza*).

In the last years, several studies dealt with immigration of forced migrants to inner and mountain areas, e.g. in the province of Belluno (Galera et al. 2018), in the province of Bolzano (Marcher et al. 2017) or on the island of Sicily (Casati 2017)<sup>70</sup>. Corrado & D’Agostino (2018), instead, focussed on the situation of asylum seekers in Calabria and showed that the lack of support in the asylum centres coupled with long waiting periods in peripheral contexts pushed refugees to leave reception centres, leading to the fact that they lost their right to accommodation (ibid.). As a result, they had to work illegally in agriculture or had to find work in animal husbandry, floriculture, tourism or projects related to the reception of asylum seekers and foreigners (Cicerchia & Pallara 2009). In Badolato and Riace, Caulonia and Stignano, refugees contributed to save villages from abandonment as they took empty housing and started traditional economic activities, which become popular as the so-called “Riace model” (Corrado & D’Agostino 2018).

Against the backdrop of a ban on work during the first 60 days after the asylum application (Corrado & D’Agostino 2018) and the aim of SPRAR (and even of some CAS) to foster local development and community resilience in the Alps and the Apennines, asylum seekers and refugees, recently, have often been involved in taking care of local and

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<sup>70</sup> In addition, Tazzioli (2020) analysed the situation in Ventimiglia on the French-Italian Alpine border and Como on the Swiss-Italian border.

natural heritage. As part of bottom-up strategies, within several welcoming projects held in mountain communities, together with parks, local NGOs and natives, asylum seekers and refugees cleaned the woods, repaired small rural buildings and infrastructure or gave information to tourists, showing their potential positive impact on these local systems (Membretti & Galera 2017). In so doing, these temporary inhabitants became active and socially recognized subjects with innovative experiences of “social enterprise”, co-producing different narratives and practices with respect to the ones of top-down welfarism (Membretti & Cutello 2019; Perlik et al. 2019).

## STUDENT MIGRATION

The EU Directive 2016/801 regarding the conditions of entry and residence of Third Country Nationals for the purposes of research, study, training, voluntary service, pupil exchange schemes or educational projects and au pairing was implemented through the Decree no. 71/2018. In general, the majority of foreign students are descendants from working migrants, e.g. from Albania, Ecuador, Moldova, Morocco, Peru or Ukraine. Further immigration from third countries mostly encompasses young people from Cameroon, China, Iran and Russia (Bozzetti 2017). No specific studies that dealt with that issue could be identified that were carried out in rural areas.

## FAMILY MIGRATION

Family reunification is allowed based on family visa (Art. 29 of the Consolidated Law on Immigration). Eligible family members are wife/husband or registered partners; children under 18 or above 18 in cases of disability; parents who are not economically independent or above 65 years; the parent of an Italian child, if the latter is below 18 years old. Conditions to obtain the family visa are the regular permit to stay of at least one year of the family member already in Italy, the existence of sufficient financial resources and a suitable accommodation (Pannia et al. 2018).


It is noteworthy that, following the restriction of work-related permits (see also chapter on labour migration), family reunification represents the main entry channel for regular migration to Italy: 52.4% of all residence permits issued in 2018 (IDOS 2020). Previous research on family aspects, however, only dealt with urban contexts, e.g. Milan (Andall 2002) or Florence (Baldisserri 2005). No specific studies that dealt with that issue could be identified that were carried out in rural areas. Caponio (2010) only highlights a gap that can be found in research on second generations (ibid.).

## AMENITY/LIFESTYLE MIGRATION

In the last 10-15 years a new strand of studies has focused on the recent phenomenon of the “new highlanders” (*nuovi montanari*; Corrado et al. 2014, 2016), i.e. the internal migration of young people with a high level of education, willing to start self-entrepreneurial activities in the agro-sylvo-pastoral sector and driven by values based on sustainability, degrowth and nature from lowland cities, e.g. in Lombardy or Veneto to the Alpine valleys (Barbera et al. 2019; for Tesino and Vanoi, Province of Trentino, see Gretter et al. 2017). International lifestyle migration to Italy, instead, focussed on Germans (Seidl 2009) and US-Americans in Tuscany (Trundle 2014) as well as retirement migration from Germany, the Netherlands and the UK to the Marche (King et al. 2019).

## 5.1 SOUTH TYROL: TERRITORIAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE REGION

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Map 27. South Tyrol

### 5.1.1 GEOGRAPHICAL AND TERRITORIAL FEATURES OF SOUTH TYROL

<i>TERRITORIAL INDICATORS</i>	<i>2018</i>
Share of population living outside urban and intermediate municipalities	48.8%
Share of population living in mountain areas	> 50%
Share of territory covered by mountains	> 50%
Share of territory covered by agricultural fields	14.7%
Border region	Yes

**Table 59. Territorial Indicators of South Tyrol, 2018**

*Data sources: Eurostat Border typology; Urban-Rural typology; Eurostat Mountain typology; Eurostat Corine Landcover; Eurostat Degree of Urbanization (DEGURBA)*

The Autonomous Province of Bolzano/Bozen – South Tyrol<sup>71</sup> is located in the eastern part of the Alps at the national border to Austria and Switzerland. Together with the province of Trento and the Federal State of Tyrol, the province of South Tyrol is part of Euregio, a transnational co-operation structure established in 1998 to promote social, economic and cultural co-operation across the Italian-Austrian border<sup>72</sup>.

Covering an area of 7,400 km<sup>2</sup>, South Tyrol is Italy's largest province in terms of size and is classified as a mountain area. Therefore, only a small part is habitable and economically viable. On the other hand, it should be noted that the mountain landscape, with more than 37% covered with mountains over 2,000 metres high and peaks reaching almost 4,000 metres in height has become a driver for a flourishing year-round tourism industry.

The region is classified as predominantly rural (Eurostat 2018) as more than half of South Tyrol's population lives in rural areas, i.e. in municipalities with less than 10,000 inhabitants, while the rest lives in the main urban centres such as Bolzano, Bressanone, Brunico and Merano (ASTAT 2018). In the table above we refer to data that has been

<sup>71</sup> The official denomination of the province is as follows: In Italian, Provincia autonoma di Bolzano - Alto Adige; in German: Autonome Provinz Bozen - Südtirol; in Ladin: Provinzia autonoma de Bulsan. Here in after, it is referred as Province of Bolzano/Bozen or South Tyrol.

<sup>72</sup> Europaregion EUREGIO <http://www.europaregion.info/en/default.asp> (accessed last, 25.05.2020)



calculated based on municipalities, which also includes grid cells that are counted as rural. Hence, the actual share of population living in rural cells is higher than 48.8%.

The decrease in population over the past decades has mainly affected the inland and remote valleys, where agriculture has been progressively abandoned, while population growth has affected not only the urban areas at the bottom of the valleys but also the mountain municipalities, where the tourism sector has developed.


This situation, in contrast to remarkable rural out-migration of other regions in the Italian Alps, is linked to the fact that South Tyrol has long been carrying out an overall strategy supporting widespread mountain habitability and intensive touristic exploitation. As part of a policy in favour of local ethnic minorities (Membretti & Ravazzoli 2019), one of the aims of this intervention has been to support the German speaking population, mainly living in the inner valleys. On the other hand, the Dolomites mountain range – today UNESCO World Heritage – has been the object of a massive strategy investing in touristic facilities (ski slopes, mountain resorts, etc.). The abovementioned strategy also promoted the widespread presence of services, economic and productive activities and supports traditions such as closed farmsteads (the so called *Hof / maso*) that link people to the rural territory, guaranteeing a quality of life that is able to both keep the natives there, but also to attract new inhabitants (Ravazzoli 2020).

South Tyrol is classified as a mountain region, as more than 50% of the population lives in mountainous areas and more than 50% of the surface is covered by mountain areas (Eurostat 2018). When it comes to landcover, 42% of the region is covered by forests, 14.7% is covered by agricultural surface (Eurostat 2017), composed of extensively used alpine pastures but also of intensively used cultivation areas (apple, vineyards, etc.). It is noticeable that about 40% of the productive land presents a slope of more than the 30%, with evident difficulties in terms of cultivation and mechanization of agriculture (Tommasini 2012).

Despite the rural character of the region, the main city Bolzano is an important urban centre with more than 100,000 inhabitants and a commuting zone defined as a medium-size functional urban area (FUAs), with a commuting zone that is functionally interconnected to the city (Peeters 2011; Dijkstra et al. 2019).

South Tyrol has a relatively low population density of 71.8 inhabitants per square km (while the national average of Italy is 201 and the one of the MATILDE regions is 102), in line with the average over the Alpine region of approximately 74 inhabitants per square km (Elmi & Streifeneder 2018). One reason for this is the mountainous topography. The area available for permanent use, including those that have not yet been built on or settled, amounts only 6% of the total territory of South Tyrol (ASTAT 2012).

## 5.1.2 ACCESSIBILITY FEATURES OF SOUTH TYROL



**Map 28. Population distribution and accessibility of hospitals in South Tyrol**



The map above shows the distribution of population across the region and travel times to the closest hospital by car and makes the differences between urban and rural areas visible. The provision of services and goods of daily use is functioning in most municipalities, although remoteness is still a problem for some villages in secondary valleys when it comes to a need of specialised services like hospitals (Giuliani et al. 2017), as they are mostly located in the main regional centres (see map). The average weighted travel time of hospitals amounts 10.5 minutes by car, which is close to investigated rural regions classified as “intermediate” by the rural – urban typology. Municipalities are well equipped with primary schools, even if they are located in peripheral areas of the region. In average, people need 4.1 minutes by car to the next primary school and also secondary schools have a high accessibility. They are accessible within 6.4 minutes by car, which is not a big difference to the primary schools.

<i>ACCESSIBILITY of selected infrastructures</i>	<i>South Tyrol, 2016</i>	<i>MATILDE regions average, 2016</i>
Access to hospitals, travel time by car weighted by population (minutes)	10.5	14.2
Access to primary schools, travel time by car weighted by population (minutes)	4.1	5.9
Access to secondary schools, travel time by car weighted by population (minutes)	6.4	9.2
Access to train stations, travel time by car weighted by population (minutes)	8	10.5
Access to shops, travel time by car weighted by population (minutes)	3.4	5.2

**Table 60. Accessibility of selected infrastructures in South Tyrol, 2016**

*Data source: ESPON Profecy 2018*

Compared to other MATILDE regions, South Tyrol records one of the lowest average travel times to shops weighted by the resident population. The Autonomous Province supports the maintenance of important basic services in the most peripheral valleys, e.g. providing public subsidies to very small local grocery shops. The social care and health care systems are decentralised and mainly integrated and any private service provider in remote areas gets financial subsidies, if he or she takes over also the postal services (Giuliani & Hoffman 2016). Because of the low demand for services and goods in remote valleys, some municipalities developed alternatives for service provision. Cooperatives, consisting of private as well as public shareholders, are providing various basic services such as heating, internet, electricity, local grocery stores, etc. (Pellegrino et al. 2018).

Although services are well accessible by car, certain population groups (e.g. elderly, migrants and students) are dependent on public transport, which has lower flexibility (Ranković Plazinić et al. 2018). An investigation in Passiria Valley revealed that the average travel time to basic services by public transport is twice as high as the one by private car (Giuliani et al. 2017). This result depends e.g. on the low frequency and capillarity of public transport lines in remote areas. This is a particularly relevant disadvantage for certain TCNs, who could not dispose of a private car, especially in the early phase following their arrival and settlement. Mobility proves to also have a gendered aspect: the lack of adequate offers in terms of public transport can hit women more significantly, who depend on these services not only for commuting to work but also to access suitable childcare facilities. This makes it more difficult for them to find a job or to attend integration or language courses (Caritas Bolzano-Bressanone 2020).

The railway network only serves in the main valleys and is subject of necessary improvements by straightening and doubling the railway Bolzano - Merano, by a better connection from the Brenner axis to Pusteria Valley and by the electrification of the line in Venosta Valley in the upcoming years (STA 2020). Railway stations are accessible in average within 8 minutes by car, which is similar to other investigated mountainous regions in Austria and Germany. Nevertheless, there are still problems with cross-border transport at the national borders to Austria. Indeed, the national border IT-AT represents a partial barrier to public transport (Cavallaro & Dianin 2020). A transfer is needed for most of the Bolzano-Innsbruck connections (14 out of 21). Additionally, five out of the seven direct links currently available are EC trains (i.e. low appealing connections for commuters). The same does not apply to the Fortezza-Lienz line, which offers only direct cross-border services. The Brenner axis, which collects the northern Italian regions with Austria and Germany is one of the most important transport routes crossing the Alps. The combination with the national borders is a special characteristic of the region, which may be also important for migration flows.

Because of the above-mentioned policies and phenomena, i.e., the strategy supporting widespread mountain habitability, and the widespread presence of services, economic and productive activities that link people to the rural territory (Membretti & Ravazzoli 2019), the province of Bolzano is characterized by a fair distribution of services also in the inland valleys. This arrangement contributes blurring the distinction between urban and non-urban. Accordingly, South Tyrol presents itself as a “rur-urban territory”, where even small municipalities, although not physically located in an urban centre, can be regarded as “poles of our exploded city” (Micheletto 2008), with the main urban poles no longer holding the exclusive role of trade and services centres.

### 5.1.3 SOCIAL FEATURES OF SOUTH TYROL

<i>DEMOGRAPHIC INDICATORS<sup>3</sup></i>	<i>2018</i>	<i>Variation (2008-18)</i>	<i>National average</i>	<i>EU average</i>	<i>MATILDE regions average</i>
Population size	527,750	7.7%	-	-	425,252
Population density (inhabitants per km <sup>2</sup> )	71.8	66.8 / 71.8**	201	105.3	102
Median age of population	43.6	1.3 years*	46.3	43.1	45
Old-age dependency ratio (>65/14-64)	30	12*	35.2	30.5	33
Young-age Dependency Ratio	24.5	-0.4*	20.8	24.1	23
Aging Index (>65/<14)	122.8	7.4	168	124	148
Crude birth rate ( <i>births per 1000 inhabitants</i> )	10	-1.1	7.3	9.8	9.1
Total fertility rate ( <i>new-born per woman</i> )	1.72	-0.02*	1.29	1.54	1.58
Crude rate, natural population change (‰)	1.7	3.2 / 1.7**	-3.2	-1.0	-1.7
Crude rate of net migration (‰)	4.8	2.7 / 9.5**	1.1	2.6	3.6
Crude rate of total population change (‰)	6.5	4.6 / 11.9**	-2.1	1.6	1.9

**Table 61. Demographic indicators of South Tyrol, 2018**

*Data sources: Eurostat, Population (Demography, Migration and Projections)*

## DEMOGRAPHY

The population of South Tyrol has been constantly growing in the last century, a trend confirmed also in the period considered in this report: with a growth rate over the decade 2008-2018 of + 7.7%, the population reached 527,750 inhabitants in 2018 (cf. Chart 92). These data are even more significant if we compare them with the data at national level: in fact, in the same decade, the Italian population grew by only 3.1%. This specificity is reflected in the migratory flows. In the last twenty years, the percentage of foreign citizens among the total number of internal migrants has increased, in line with national trend.


<sup>73</sup> \* This is calculated only for the period 2014-2018 \*\* Minimum and maximum values recorded in the period considered.

As a result of the combination of the natural growth rate (1.7‰) and net migration rate (4.8‰), the crude rate of total population change of the province (+6.5‰) is higher than the average of MATILDE regions (1.9‰), and of the EU27 average (1.6‰), even more so compared to the Italian average that is negative (-2.1‰). The growth rate is the highest after the one of Bursa (that is, however, the only MATILDE region outside EU), to be considered as an outlier from this perspective.

In the frame of the spatial polarization between growing and declining population in the Alps, South Tyrol follows the trend displayed by the West, centre and North of the Alps, where the population has increased since 1980, in contrast with other areas (the southern and the eastern Alpine municipalities), that have experienced demographic decline. The reasons for the sustained rate of population growth include:

- Historical and political events that determined internal migration within the province (in particular forced movement of migrants from other Italian regions during the fascist regime, with the aim of “Italianizing” the province), as well as national and international migration towards South Tyrol (due to strong interconnection of the province with Central European countries, within the sphere of influence of Germany, like Poland or Czech Republic)
- Regional welfare policies that support families (childcare services, economic direct support, fiscal dimension, ethno-linguistic protection, etc.) and people living in even remote valleys (public transports, decentralised services of general interest, etc.
- Economic prosperity that has been favouring somehow the permanence of the population (even the youngsters) on the territory, reducing the push towards outmigration and favouring the early creation of family, due to full employment (Elmi & Streifeneder 2018).

With respect to the first aspect, family policies have successfully maintained a positive rate of natural population change. Average annual natural growth rate is 2.5‰, which places South Tyrol among the few MATILDE regions with a positive natural growth rate, although this indicator has been constantly decreasing from 3.4 in 2008 to 1.7 in 2018 (Medda-Windischer & Membretti 2020).



**Chart 92. Third Country Nationals over total population in South Tyrol, 2008-2018**

*Data sources: Eurostat, ISTAT*

The fertility rate, which indicates the average number of children per woman, amounts to 1.72 and has maintained a stable trend over the decade: a value, which is higher than the national and EU-27 average as well as the MATILDE regions average, even if well below the 2.1 threshold needed to sustain current population numbers. South Tyrol maintains a birth rate that is among the highest within the sample of MATILDE regions, although it has been decreasing from 11.1 to 10.


The net migration from outside the region hence plays a key role in explaining the total population change, although the natural increase due to positive birth rate is significative. In the last twenty years, the percentage of foreign citizens on the total number of internal migrants has increased, in line with national trends. On average, 60% of the “newcomers”, i.e. people who are newly registered at the demographic offices of the municipalities in the province, come from another South Tyrolean municipality, that means they are internal movers within the region, while 18% stem from other Italian provinces and 23% are from abroad (ASTAT 2020). New residents tend to concentrate in the larger municipalities (ESPON BRIDGES 2019). The urban poles remain the points of arrival and departure of migratory flows to and from abroad, while for internal flows, the situation is somewhat different. Internal migration has increased in the last twenty years and is also in favour of rural areas as a result of their social and economic configuration (e.g. touristic economies, decentralised small industrial plants, etc.). In the period 2000-2018, the flow

of migration from urban to rural contexts has increased significantly up to 30%, overtaking the reverse flow from rural to urban contexts, which was 23% for 2018 (Ravazzoli 2020).

Over the last ten years, the **migration balance** in the MATILDE region Bolzano-Bozen was **positive**, but was nearly cut by half during the economic crisis as the following graph indicates.

The **positive migration balance** results from the immigration of foreigners due to the fact that migration balance of nationals was negative in seven years between 2008 and 2018, showing that in recent years, the region reduced its attractiveness when it comes to immigration from other Italian areas, even offering jobs and a growing economy.

The **crude rate of net migration** is slightly higher than MATILDE average value. It reached the highest value in 2013. There was another decrease from 2013 to 2014. Since then it is slightly growing.



**Chart 93. Migration balance in South Tyrol, 2008-2018**

*Data source: Eurostat*

## DEMOGRAPHY: FOCUS ON TCNS

It is important to note that historically South Tyrol has an important presence of foreign citizens with EU citizenship. In 2017, they were 16,108 (33%) on a foreign population of 48,470 units. Germany represented the main country of origin, with a presence of 9.1 % on the total number of foreigners (Medda-Windischer et al. 2018). In line with the developments on the national level, the total number of TCNs – that includes residents, holders of residence permits, refugees and asylum seekers – increased until 2011. After a drop during the economic crisis in 2012, they rose until 2014. From then on, the increase of numbers of TCNs is slow. The share of TCNs among total population is slightly higher in the regional capital city Bolzano-Bozen (6.0%) compared to the national average (5.9%, 2018). This is also due to the distribution of asylum seekers that have been relocated in South Tyrol according to the 0.9% share defined by the national government. Of the circa 1,600 asylum seekers relocated in South Tyrol in 2017, almost half have been hosted in reception centres located in the city of Bolzano/Bozen (Medda-Windischer et al. 2018). The province of Bolzano-Bozen is characterised by a variety of people with foreign citizenship, whilst a change regarding quantitative terms and with respect to its composition can be observed from 2008 to 2018 (see table below). Considering Third Country Nationals, in 2008, the TOP10 of foreign citizenships included countries with whom Italy had a long-lasting migration history, such as Albania or Morocco. While numbers of North Macedonians remained quite stable over time in absolute numbers, other increased remarkably. Amongst them are individuals from Albania (+21.3%), Morocco (+26.4%), Bangladesh (+31.0%), Pakistan (+69.8%), India (+100.3%) and Ukraine (+126.3%).<sup>74</sup>

The distribution across different countries of origin of TCNs in South Tyrol can be traced back to three main different arrival phases: until 1994, foreign citizens in the province originated mostly from Germany, Austria and North Africa. In the second phase (1994-2006), foreigners arriving in South Tyrol originated mostly from the area of former Yugoslavia, Albania and Eastern Europe. The third phase, from 2006 onwards, is marked by the arrival of foreigners coming from Africa, Asia and South America (Medda-Windischer et al. 2018).

2008			2018		
1	Albania	4,387	1	Albania	5,323
2	Morocco	2,675	2	Morocco	3,382
3	Serbia and Montenegro (fc)	2,503	3	Pakistan	3,374
4	Pakistan	1,987	4	Kosovo	2,517

<sup>74</sup> For an overview on foreign citizens including EU citizens, see ASTAT (2019b).

2008			2018		
5	North Macedonia	1,909	5	North Macedonia	2,129
6	Tunisia	850	6	Ukraine	1,693
7	Bangladesh	790	7	India	1,292
8	Bosnia and Herzegovina	764	8	P.R. China	1,179
9	Ukraine	748	9	Bangladesh	1,035
10	India	645	10	Moldova	927

**Table 62. Total number of Third Country Nationals by citizenship (TOP10) in South Tyrol, 2008-2018**


*Data source: ISTAT*

## AGE AND GENDER STRUCTURE

The median age of population and the ageing index are constantly growing, which indicates an ageing society in South Tyrol. This is in line with the common European trend as well as with the trend recorded across the Alps, where the average age of the population is above the national average, e.g. the case of Italy and Germany (Elmi & Streifeneder 2018). Nevertheless, with an ageing index of 122, South Tyrol stands in a better position compared to the EU-27 (124), national (168) and MATILDE regions average (148). The ageing society is reflected by the old age dependency ratio, which is also constantly growing, while young age dependency is relatively constant. In light of this, health and nursing care gain relevance in the province and South Tyrol is currently reorganizing social services for elderly people to increase their accessibility across the territory (Valentin et al. 2011; ESPON BRIDGES 2019).

The distribution of TCNs according to the age groups is in line with the national composition and shows a great internal proportion of children and youngsters in derogation from the local population. While the number of males is higher up to the age group of 50-54 years old, where labour migrants but also refugees are usually predominant, women are in the majority for older age groups, and predominate among the generation 60+, also due to their engagement in elderly care.






**Chart 94. Age groups of Third Country Nationals in South Tyrol, 2018**

*Data source: ISTAT - Population and Households - Foreigners and Immigrants - Residence permits of non-EU citizens - Province and age class*

The total number of female TCNs in Bolzano-Bozen was 15,326 in 2018, which is a share of 48.2%. While the share of female TCNs grew to 50.2% until 2012, after the economic crisis, at stagnating numbers of females the share fell again due to increasing numbers of males among asylum seekers and refugees after the 2015 migration crisis.

As regards nationality, TCNs coming from Africa and Asia - in particular Pakistan - are prevalently male, while female TCNs mainly come from non-EU European countries, particularly from Albania (Medda-Windischer et al. 2018).




**Chart 95. Share of female Third Country Nationals in South Tyrol, 2008-2018**

*Data source: ISTAT*

#### 5.1.4 EDUCATIONAL FEATURES OF SOUTH TYROL

The percentage of young people aged 15 to 34 years, neither in employment nor in education or training (NEETS) in South Tyrol is slightly higher than the MATILDE average (9.9 against 9.2%) but it is the lowest value in the national panorama (12.4% against 24.1%, with values that reach 37.6% in Sicily). In the period between 2004 and 2017 the phenomenon increased similar to the national average (+4.2 percentage points). It is interesting to note that the phenomenon concerns young women (17.2%) more than young men (7.8%) (ASTAT 2019a). This is partially explained by the high share of young women bearing children in the region and who are thus neither in employment, nor in education, nor seeking these options (Osservatorio mercato del lavoro 2019b). The NEET rate shows significantly different values for the total population and TCNs over the last ten years. While NEET rates of the total population were far below the national average, the ones of TCNs were higher than the national average and increased even more in the aftermath of the economic crisis in 2012 (36.4%, 2012). They remained on a high level in the last five years and peaked again in 2018 (37.8%, 2018).



**Chart 96. Share of young NEETS (15-34y/o) in South Tyrol and Italy, 2008-2018**

*Data source: Eurostat*

The education level of TCNs from 15 to 64 years differs from the total population in South Tyrol. The share of people with lower education, i.e., less than primary, primary and lower secondary education (levels 0-2), is much higher among TCNs, but has decreased from 64.8% to 54.6% in the last ten years. Tertiary education of TCNs, however, increased to 14.7% in 2016, but decreased again to 11.2%. Some schools in small villages (e.g. Colle Isarco in Val d'Isarco) are still open only thanks to the presence of second-generation migrants. In the school year 2017/18, there were 2,321 foreign children enrolled in kindergartens (13.8%); 3,543 foreign students enrolled in primary schools (12.8 %); 1,927 foreign students enrolled in lower secondary schools (10.7%); 1,664 foreign students enrolled in upper secondary schools (8.4%); among them, the great majority (around 80%) were TCNs (Medda-Windischer et al. 2018).




Chart 97. Education level among Third Country Nationals and total population in South Tyrol, 2008-2018

Data source: Eurostat

## 5.1.5 ECONOMIC FEATURES OF SOUTH TYROL

<i><b>ECONOMIC INDICATORS</b></i>	<i><b>2017</b></i>	<i><b>Variation 2008-2017</b></i>	<i><b>National average (2017)</b></i>	<i><b>EU average (2017)<sup>75</sup></b></i>	<i><b>MATILDE regions average (2017)</b></i>
<b>Regional GDP per capita at purchasing power standards</b>	46,400	1.08%	29,100	29,800	29,624
<b>Regional Gross value added: primary sector</b>	5%	-0.58 percentage points	2% (34,109.9 million euro)	2% (7,098.5 million euro)	4%

75 Missing data for France for Regional Gross Value Added and Employment by sector; Average has been therefore calculated on the basis of 26 Member States.


<b><i>ECONOMIC INDICATORS</i></b>	<b><i>2017</i></b>	<b><i>Variation 2008-2017</i></b>	<b><i>National average (2017)</i></b>	<b><i>EU average (2017)<sup>5</sup></i></b>	<b><i>MATILDE regions average (2017)</i></b>
<b>Regional Gross value added: secondary sector</b>	22%	-1.87 percentage points	24% (369,230.9 million euro)	27% (95,398 million euro)	30%
<b>Regional Gross value added: tertiary sector</b>	73%	2.45 percentage points	74% (1,154,492 million euro)	71% (254,090 million euro)	66%

**Table 63. Economic indicators in South Tyrol, 2017**

*Data sources: Eurostat Gross domestic product (GDP) at current market prices by NUTS 3 regions; OECD Gross domestic product (GDP); Eurostat Gross value added at basic prices by NUTS 3 regions*

## ECONOMIC STRUCTURE

The Autonomous Province of Bolzano is a prospering region with the highest regional gross domestic product per capita compared to other MATILDE regions and one of the highest in Italy (see Chart 98). The driving forces behind this successful economic performance are related to several factors. First, the province's broad fiscal autonomy allows the provincial government to dispose of 90% of taxes collected in South Tyrol, a proportion significantly higher than for other regions in the country (Lechner & Moroder 2012). Along with this, the province's position along the Brenner axis gave the region a strategic advantage in the national and European markets (ESPON Bridges 2019). Finally, the development strategy enacted since the end of the Second World War – favouring a strong economic exchange in particular with the German speaking countries Austria and Germany as well as pluri-linguistic policies – represented competitive advantages for the provincial economy (Lechner & Moroder 2012), nowadays strongly interconnected with globalised commercial flows. After the economic crisis of 2008, the economy has been growing constantly except for the period between 2012-2014, mostly thanks to its sound infrastructural endowment and good transport services.



**Chart 98. Gross Domestic Product trends in South Tyrol, 2008-2017**

*Data source: Eurostat, Gross domestic product (GDP) at current market prices by NUTS 3 regions*

Even if South Tyrol is classified as a rural region, considering the economic structure, the primary sector, today, accounts for only 5% of the gross value added (GVA) (even if this value is more than double with respect to the EU and national averages) and for 6.4% of the employees. In the 1950s instead, agriculture alone was employing more than 40% of the total labour force. Traditional mountain farming has always been unprofitable and, gradually, the workforce has moved from the primary to the secondary sector and, in recent decades, massively to the tertiary sector.

A provincial survey realized in 1984 showed that as many as 60% of those active in agriculture were not producing enough income to survive (Tommasini 2012). In the last few decades, many farmers have been working in the fields alongside other activities, for example in handicrafts, slowly abandoning the **primary sector**, or maintaining a small agricultural production aimed at self-consumption, often with strong identity values, linked to ethno-linguistic belongings. Nowadays, the pillars of South Tyrol's agriculture are fruit production, milk industry and wine, mostly organized around small size businesses (with a limited number of employees and often a high level of mechanization at the valley floors, where it's achievable) and with a strong vocation for the export at national and international levels (ASTAT 2018), also due to an intensive territorial branding.

The **secondary sector** contribution to the GVA of the province varied between 22% and 24% in the period 2008-2017. Manufacture, automotive and technology are among the leading activities within this sector.

In the last decades, South Tyrol displays a strong marked **tertiarisation** of its economy: the service sector represents between 71% and 73% of the GVA in the 2008-2018 period (while the average value of the other MATILDE regions is 66%). On the one hand, the driving forces of this tertiarisation process lay in the relative weight of non-market-oriented services (public education and health, justice and public administration; all sectors developed within a regional welfare strategy that have been a fundamental part of the construction of regional autonomy). On the other hand, South Tyrol turned one of the most important tourism destinations in the Alps (Pechlaner et al. 2017). With its 33.2 million overnight stays per year, the region is classified as high tourism intensity (with an increasing warning about the massive socio-environmental impact of the so called “over tourism”, see Pechlaner et al. 2017) and counts on intense tourism flows both during the summer and winter seasons.


## LABOUR MARKET

<i>LABOUR MARKET INDICATORS</i>	<i>2017</i>	<i>Variation 2008-2017</i>	<i>National average (2017)</i>	<i>EU average (2017)</i>	<i>MATILDE regions average (2017)</i>
Unemployment Rate (% , percentage points)	3.1%	0.7	11.2%	8.1 %	8.4%
Employment by sector: primary (% , thousands of employees)	6.4% (18.8)	5.6%	4% (920.9)	5% (353.98)	5% (6.75)
Employment by sector: secondary (% , thousands of employees)	20.7% (61.0)	7.8%	17% (5,752.1)	23% (1,584.74)	26% (36.19)
Employment by sector: tertiary (% , thousands of employees)	72.8% (214.1)	14%	79% (18,465.1)	71% (4,830.33)	69% (97.63)
People at risk of poverty or social exclusion (%/percentage points)	11.3% (average 2008-2018)	1.1	27.3%	21.6%	17.3%

**Table 64. Labour Market indicators in South Tyrol, 2017**

*Data sources: Unemployment: OECD Labour indicators, small regions TL3 and large regions TL2; National Statistical Institutes; Eurostat, Unemployment rates by sex, age, citizenship and NUTS 2 regions; Eurostat, Employment (thousand persons) by NUTS3 regions; Eurostat, People at risk of poverty or social exclusion by NUTS 2 regions.*

The relative weight of the three main economic sectors is also reflected in the numbers of employees (see Chart 99). Since 2008, employed people in the primary sector reached the highest value in 2017, employment in the secondary sector was constantly growing from ca. 56,000 employed people in 2009 to 61,000 in 2017. This is an increase of approximately 7.8%. Employment in the tertiary sector is constantly growing, too, with a trend of +14% over the period 2008-2017. The growth in employment of the tertiary sector is one of the highest compared to other investigated regions of MATILDE, equated only by the German region of Oberallgäu.



**Chart 99. Employment by sector in South Tyrol, 2017**

*Data source: Elaboration by EURAC based on data from Eurostat, Employment (thousand persons) by NUTS 3 regions*

These economic trends led South Tyrol close to full employment. Although the unemployment rate increased in the recent years, i.e. from 2.7% in 2010 to 3.1% in 2017, this figure is significantly lower than the average recorded at EU-27 level (8.1%), national level (11.2%) as well as for the MATILDE regions (5.7%), confirming the strength of the labour market in the province of South Tyrol (See Chart 100).

South Tyrol's labour market is marked by high seasonality: in agriculture, tourism and the construction industry, the demand for labour is intense for just some months of the year, while it drops during other periods (Osservatorio del Mercato del Lavoro 2019a). This is particularly relevant for the high representation of foreigners in the seasonal labour market: The high share of fixed-term contracts in seasonal sectors can be considered one factor which – among others – influences the in-work poverty phenomena (Eurofound 2017).




The low unemployment rate combined with the increasing demand in specific sectors such as care services demands economic policies capable to secure the supply of workforce.

## LABOUR MARKET: FOCUS ON TCNS

Compared to 2008, the employment rate of TCNs in South Tyrol in 2018 is noticeable lower (61.0%) than the one of the total population (73.5%). The rate of TCNs especially dropped in the aftermath of the economic crisis in 2012 and only picked up slowly.

Seasonal foreign workforce in agriculture is very relevant during the apple and grape harvest (August-October). Among the 16,396 seasonal workers, 88% are foreigners (14,428) with an average work duration of 31.3 days (Osservatorio del mercato del lavoro 2019a). Most important are the shares of Romanians (35.7%), Slovaks (17.3%), Poles (13.1%) and Bulgarians (9.6%), while the Czechs are decreasing in importance (3.7%, *ibid.*). Between May and October 2019, 36% of all workers in the hospitality sector were foreigners (*Ibid.*). The main countries of origin of foreign workers are Slovakia (5% of employees), Romania (4%) and Hungary (3%, *ibid.*).



**Chart 100. Development of employment rates in South Tyrol, 2008-2018**

*Data source: Eurostat*

2018	Total Italy		Rural Areas Italy	
	TCN	TOTAL	TCN	TOTAL
Part-time employment	26.1%	18.4%	19.2%	17.4%
Self-employment	13.1%	20.6%	11.7%	22.4%
Temporary employment	22.3%	17.1%	32.5%	20.5%


**Table 65. Special employment patterns for total population and Third Country Nationals by degree of urbanization in Italy, 2018**

*Data source: Eurostat*

The specific employment patterns of TCNs in Italy are illustrated in the following chart. Compared to the total population, the share of TCNs, who are employed part-time or temporary is much higher, whilst self-employed TCNs are less frequently. Temporary employment is applying to nearly one third of the TCNs in rural areas even.

As discussed above, the unemployment rate in South Tyrol follows the nationwide developments from 2008 to 2018, but on a significantly lower level. Nevertheless, the unemployment rate of TCNs in the province of Bolzano-Bozen was and is much higher than the one of the total population (See Chart 101, below). It nearly doubled in the course of the economic crisis in 2012 but fell to the pre-crisis level until today. In rural areas of Italy, the unemployment rate of the total population corresponded to the nationwide share in 2018 (10.8% to 10.8%). It is important to note that the difference in the unemployment rate between the resident population with EU citizenship (including Italy) and residents from non-EU countries is very significant, being 2.4 % and 14.3 % in 2017 respectively (Medda-Windischer et al. 2018).<sup>76</sup>

<sup>76</sup> For a full picture of labour market trends in relation to the domestic and foreign population (including both TCNs and EU citizens), see Osservatorio sul mercato del lavoro (2020).




**Chart 101. Unemployment rate trends in South Tyrol, 2008-2017**

*Data sources: OECD.stat, Labour indicators, small regions TL3 and large regions TL2; Eurostat, Total unemployment rate; National statistical offices of MATILDE countries*

The share of **population at risk of poverty** fluctuated between 8.5% and 13.7% in the period of 2008-2018. Thus, the risk of poverty is at a very low level compared to other MATILDE regions (17.3%), to the Italian national average (27%) as well as to the EU27 value for this indicator (21.6%). Considering regional data provided by ASTAT, the share of families at risk of poverty is slightly higher (16.6%) and did not record significant variations from 2008 onwards (ASTAT 2015).

## 5.2 METROPOLITAN CITY OF TURIN: TERRITORIAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE REGION

Authors: Giulia Bergamasco, Marzia Bona, Elena Di Bella, Peter Laner and Andrea Membretti



Map 29. Province of Turin

## 5.2.1 GEOGRAPHICAL AND TERRITORIAL FEATURES OF THE METROPOLITAN CITY OF TURIN

<i>TERRITORIAL INDICATORS</i>	<i>2018</i>
Share of population living outside urban areas and intermediate municipalities	11.6%
Share of population living in mountain areas	<50%
Share of territory covered by mountains	>50%
Share of territory covered by agricultural fields	34.4%
Border region	Yes

**Table 66. Territorial indicators of Metropolitan City of Turin, 2018**

*Data sources: Eurostat Border typology; Urban-Rural typology; Eurostat Mountain typology; Eurostat Corine Landcover; Eurostat Degree of Urbanization (DEGURBA).*

The Metropolitan City (MC) of Turin is located in the northwest of Italy, in the region of Piedmont. It is surrounded by the Alps on the western and northern front. The Susa valley, one of the longest valleys of the Italian Alps, links the Metropolitan City of Turin with the neighbouring France through the Fréjus tunnel.

The region is classified as predominantly urban according to Eurostat Urban-Rural Typology, as the share of **population living in urban clusters is above 80%**, with **only 11.6% of the population living outside urban and intermediate municipalities** (Eurostat 2018).

More than 50% of the Metropolitan City of Turin's surface is covered by **mountain areas** (Eurostat 2018) but less than 50% of its population lives in mountain territories. The data represent, on the one hand, a territory characterized by the centripetal character of the city of Turin and the municipalities of the first belt. These are home to two thirds of the provincial population. Most of the flows of commuting workers from outer areas are directed towards them. On the other hand, it must also be noted that medium-sized urban centres, located outside the widespread urban centre of Turin, play a key role. It is the case of towns such as Ivrea, Cirié, Pinerolo or Susa. Such

centres are located at the confluence of the main valley axes and host administrative and health services, pointing to the vitality of rural and mountain areas and to the emerging polycentrism of this territory.<sup>77</sup>

When it comes to **landcover**, 28.2% of the region is covered by forests and 34.4% is covered by agricultural surface, representing 227,165.33 hectares (Eurostat 2011). About 62% of the agricultural land is used for cereals and arable crops, while 37% is used for permanent meadows and pastures. The region of Piedmont is the third most important region in Italy for breeding (ISTAT 2013).

The Metropolitan City of Turin is a second level local authority of wide area, established by the law “Delrio” (Law n. 56/2014).<sup>78</sup> The Metropolitan City of Turin replaced the Province of Turin and transferred to the Region of Piedmont key competences such as Agriculture, Tourism, Energy, Labour Policies and Vocational Training. This undermined the possibility to carry out policies of “vast areas” and to interpret the complexity of the provincial territory, which is defined in Italian as *metromontano* (merging of metropolitan and mountain) (Dematteis et al. 2017; Barbera 2020), due to the peculiar coexistence of strongly interconnected and interdependent mountain and urban areas.

This interdependency is underlined also by the peculiar movement – born in Piedmont and then spread at national level - of the so called “new highlanders” (*nuovi montanari*), that refers to an ongoing internal amenity migration from the metropolitan areas to the mountains, involving young and well-educated people in search of different lifestyles (Corrado et al. 2014; Barbera et al. 2018).


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<sup>77</sup> As noted in the Rota Report 2019, this is also supported by the loss of population in the capital, both towards the metropolitan area and towards the rest of the provincial territory. This process of sub-urbanization and urban sprawl has developed in the last twenty years and relates to the transfer of households from the capital to the belt, which has affected most western cities since the 1980s. In the Turin area, in the last twenty years, the most significant increases in residents have mainly affected municipalities in the second and third belts.

<sup>78</sup> See <http://www.cittametropolitana.torino.it/istituzionale.shtml> (accessed May 29th, 2020)



## 5.2.2 ACCESSIBILITY FEATURES OF THE METROPOLITAN CITY OF TURIN



**Map 30. Population distribution and accessibility of hospitals in the Metropolitan City of Turin**

<i>ACCESSIBILITY of selected Infrastructures</i>	<b>Metropolitan city of Turin, 2016</b>	<b>MATILDE regions average, 2016</b>
<b>Access to hospitals, travel time by car weighted by population (minutes)</b>	6.1	14.2
<b>Access to primary schools, travel time by car weighted by population (minutes)</b>	3.1	5.9
<b>Access to secondary schools, travel time by car weighted by population (minutes)</b>	4.7	9.2
<b>Access to train stations, travel time by car weighted by population (minutes)</b>	5	10.5
<b>Access to shops, travel time by car weighted by population (minutes)</b>	3.2	5.2

**Table 67. Accessibility of selected Infrastructures in the Metropolitan City of Turin, 2018**

*Data source: ESPON Profecy, 2018*

As shown by the data, the good availability of road infrastructure makes the territory of the metropolitan city of Turin easily accessible by individual vehicle at least on the main mobility axes. However, if we examine the quality of Local Public Transport (LPT), which is essential to ensure sustainable accessibility of the local population, exclusion becomes obvious. A recent study within the PITER Interreg Cuore Solidale project has brought to light interesting data in the Susa and Sangone Valley territory, among the areas best structured for the amount of infrastructure in the valley floor (in particular the Susa Valley, equipped with a motorway, two state roads, a railway line), but with a very high number of hamlets (about 600), which are not reached by major arteries. Since the 2000s, the planned construction of the Eurotunnel Turin-Lion, triggered protests especially in the Susa valley (the so called No TAV<sup>79</sup> movement), which represents a peculiar socio-political and cultural social movement that questioned the urban perspective adopted in the development of such infrastructural project (Wu Ming 1 2016; Della Porta & Piazza 2008).

In particular the lack of adequate transport between two poles, to reach essential opportunities and services such as work, education, hospitals, shops, friends and relatives (linked to lack or low level of LPT service, poor timetable, inaccessible means and stations, distance from stops, lack of information, cost of the service), measured between the main centres (Susa, Bussoleno, Oulx, Gaieno) and some of their nearby hamlets, is about 50%. To limit the level

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<sup>79</sup> TAV is the abbreviation for Treno Alta Velocità (High-speed train).



of mobility poverty in these areas, innovative collective transport services such as DRT or carpooling are being tested.

### 5.2.3 SOCIAL FEATURES OF THE METROPOLITAN CITY OF TURIN

<i>DEMOGRAPHIC INDICATORS<sup>80</sup></i>	<i>2018</i>	<i>Variation (2008-2018)</i>	<i>National average</i>	<i>EU27 average</i>	<i>MATILDE regions average</i>
<b>Population size</b>	2,269,120	1.8%	-	-	425,252
<b>Population density (inhabitants per km<sup>2</sup>)</b>	333.8	332.4 / 341.1**	201	105.3	102
<b>Median age of population (years)</b>	47.9	1.6*	46.3	43.1	45
<b>Old-age dependency ratio (&gt;65/&lt;14-64)</b>	40.2	2.6*	35.2	30.5	33
<b>Young-age dependency ratio</b>	20.5	-0.4*	20.8	24.1	23
<b>Aging Index (&gt;65/&lt;14)</b>	195.3	15.8	168	124	148
<b>Crude birth rate (births per 1000 inhabitants)</b>	6.7	-2.8	7.3	9.8	9.1
<b>Total fertility rate (new-born per woman)</b>	1.27	-0.12*	1.29	1.54	1.58
<b>Crude rate of natural population change (‰)</b>	-4.8	-4.8 / -0.9**	-3.2	-1.0	-1.7
<b>Crude rate of net migration (‰)</b>	0.6	-0.4 / 21.4**	1.1	2.6	3.6

80 \* This is calculated only for the period 2014-2018 \*\* Minimum and maximum values recorded in the period considered.


DEMOGRAPHIC INDICATORS <sup>80</sup>	2018	Variation (2008-2018)	National average	EU27 average	MATILDE regions average
Total population change (‰)	-4.2	-4.2 / 5.3**	-2.1	1.6	1.9

**Table 68. Demography indicators of Metropolitan City of Turin, 2018**

*Data sources: Eurostat, Population (Demography, Migration and Projections)*

## DEMOGRAPHY


With an area of 6,827 km<sup>2</sup> and its 2,269,120 residents, the Metropolitan City of Turin is the 4<sup>th</sup> largest city in Italy by number of inhabitants. Unsurprisingly, its **population density** of 333.8 inhabitants per km<sup>2</sup> is significantly higher than the Italian, EU27 and MATILDE regions averages. When considering the average value, it must be kept in mind that the valleys and inland areas have very low density, while Turin has a very high density. In the period 2008-2018, in contrast with the overall trend characterizing the region of Piedmont, the Metropolitan City of Turin recorded a modest increase of population (+1.8%) mostly determined by the increase in the number of TCNs (+35%) and only to a small extent related to the growth of national and EU citizens (+0.4%) (See Chart 102).



**Chart 102. Third Country Nationals over total population in the Metropolitan City of Turin, 2008-2018**

*Data source: Eurostat, ISTAT*

The **negative natural growth rate** (-4.8‰) is only partially counterbalanced by the **positive net migration rate** (0.6‰); the resulting negative **crude rate of total population change** of the province (-4.2‰) is significantly more pronounced than the Italian average (-2.1‰), the average of MATILDE regions (1.9‰), and of the EU-27 average (1.6‰). The gap is even more significant if compared with the crude rate of total population change of South-Tyrol (+6.5‰). These data are consistent with data at regional level, embracing the entire Piedmont region: In fact, the **net migration rate** in Piedmont is moderately positive if compared with other regions in Northern Italy. One possible explanation for this phenomenon can be the growth in the flow of Italians emigrating to foreign countries (IRES 2018). The positive **migration balance** in the Metropolitan City of Turin (See Chart 103) is thus the result of the immigration of foreigners that counterbalances the outmigration of nationals from this MATILDE region.



**Chart 103. Migration Balance in the Metropolitan City of Turin, 2008-2018**

*Data sources: Eurostat, ISTAT*

The **fertility rate** in the Metropolitan City of Turin amounts to 1.26 and has maintained a stable trend over the decade: This value is similar to the national average, and 0.3 percentage points lower than the national and EU-27 values. The **birth rate** is lower than the EU-27 and MATILDE regions averages, having significantly decreased from 9.5 to 6.7. It represents the lowest value among the MATILDE regions.

These data reflect a declining population situation, which is common to the whole region of Piedmont. According to the Institute of Social and Economic Research of Piedmont (IRES), the **decline of the natural population change** in the Piedmont region is among the most pronounced in Italy (-5.2‰). Demographic studies identify two main

reasons underlying this phenomenon: first, the decrease of the female population in fertile age, which in turn is a consequence of the drop in births recorded thirty years ago; second, the decrease in the propensity to have children (Centro Einaudi 2019).


It is interesting to note the significant difference in the fertility rate between women with Italian nationality and women with foreign citizenship, being 1.23 for the former and 1.96 for the latter in 2016. Moreover, as the median age of foreigners is relatively lower (33.6 years old) if compared with the total population (46.6 years old), the **foreign component has a largely positive natural population balance** (IRES 2018).

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## DEMOGRAPHY: FOCUS ON TCNS

In line with developments at the national level, the total number of TCNs increased until 2011. After a drop due to the effects of the economic crisis, their number remained rather stable (See Chart 104). The share of TCNs over the total population is slightly lower in this MATILDE region (4.9%) compared to the national average (5.9%, 2018).

According to the data provided by the Department of Welfare and Education of the Metropolitan City of Turin, that considers foreigners and not only TCNs, about 60% of foreigners live in the provincial capital of Turin. Yet, since 2015, the city records a decrease in the number of foreigners, while their number remained stable in the surrounding provincial territory. This leads the Department to conclude that “probably foreigners living in small municipalities are more sedentary than those living in big cities”, pointing to the attractiveness of small mountain municipalities (Città di Torino 2018: 12; Dematteis 2010; Dislivelli 2017; Membretti 2019).



**Chart 104. Number of Third Country Nationals in the Metropolitan City of Turin, 2008-2018**

*Data source: ISTAT*

## IMPORTANT NATIONALITIES IN THE METROPOLITAN CITY OF TURIN

In the Metropolitan City of Turin, 162 different countries of origin are represented among foreigners: 49.1% of them come from countries belonging to the European Union, while the remaining 51.9% are Third Country Nationals. Considering EU citizens, the Romanian community is the most represented in Piedmont since the 1990s: in 2017, there were 148,000 Romanian citizens in the region, representing 35.4% of the foreigners residing therein (IRES 2018). It further increased since Romania became a member of the European Union in 2007 (Città di Torino 2018).

Considering Third Country Nationals only, in 2008, the 10 most represented countries of origin of foreign citizens included countries with whom Italy had a long-lasting migration history, such as Albania, Morocco, Peru and the Philippines (See Table 69). While the number of Albanians, Brazilians and Moroccans remained quite stable over time in absolute numbers, others increased remarkably. Amongst them are individuals from the Philippines (+51.4%), Moldova (+64.4%) Egypt (+75.5%), China (+81.3%) and Nigeria (+132.7%). Compared to the national situation, which points to people with Albanian citizenship as the most important nationality in total numbers by far, Turin metropolitan area has a slightly different composition.

2008			2018		
1	Morocco	23,895	1	Morocco	24,398
2	Albania	9,713	2	P.R. China	10,566
3	Peru	7,500	3	Albania	9,896
4	P.R. China	5,829	4	Peru	9,057
5	Moldova	3,808	5	Nigeria	6,533
6	Egypt	3,242	6	Moldova	6,261
7	Nigeria	2,807	7	Egypt	5,691
8	Philippines	2,748	8	Philippines	4,161
9	Brazil	2,524	9	Brazil	2,741
10	Tunisia	1,948	10	Senegal	2,539

**Table 69. Total number of Third Country Nationals by citizenship (TOP10) in the Metropolitan City of Turin, 2008-2018**


*Data source: ISTAT*

## AGE AND GENDER STRUCTURE

Following South-Tyrol and the common European trend, the **median age** of population and **ageing index** are constantly growing also in Turin metropolitan area. With a median age of 47.9 and an ageing index of 195.3 in 2018, the Metropolitan City of Turin is the second, ranking among MATILDE regions for both values, following the Bavarian region of Garmisch-Partenkirchen. Consequently, from 2014 until 2018, the **old dependency ratio** has been constantly growing (+2.6) and the **young dependency ratio** has slightly reduced (-0.4).

In relation to the total population, the number of elderly people in the Metropolitan City of Turin has increased from 20% to 25%. This reflects a substantial improvement in life expectancy: in the last twenty years, the average age for women increased from 81 to 85 years, and for men from 75 to 81 (Centro Einaudi 2019).


The distribution of TCNs according to the age groups is in line with the age profile of TCNs at national level: While the number of males is slightly higher up to the age group of 40-44 years, women are the majority for older age groups, and predominate among the generation 60+ (See Chart 105). This may be related to the relevance of occupation in the position of caregivers and housekeeping that represent 31% of work contracts activated for foreigners (Città di Torino 2018).



**Chart 105. Age groups of Third Country Nationals in the Metropolitan City of Turin, 2018**

*Data source: ISTAT - Population and Households - Foreigners and Immigrants - Residence permits of non-EU citizens - Province and age class*

Considering the gender distribution of TCNs, women represent 54,842 or 49.5% of TCNs in Turin metropolitan area in 2018. The share of women grew to 52.4% until 2012, to fell back after the economic crisis. Some nationalities present a higher percentage of female citizens: this is the case for Brazilians, Moldavians, Nigerians and citizens of the Philippines (Città di Torino 2018).



**Chart 106. Share of female Third Country Nationals in the Metropolitan City of Turin, 2008-2018**

*Data source: ISTAT*

## 5.2.4 EDUCATIONAL FEATURES OF THE METROPOLITAN CITY OF TURIN

<i>EDUCATION INDICATORS</i>	<i>2018</i>	<i>MATILDE average</i>
<i>NEETS</i>	<i>16.1 %</i>	<i>9.2%</i>
<i>Tertiary education attainment 25-64</i>	<i>19.3 %</i>	<i>31.1%</i>
<i>Tertiary education attainment 30-34</i>	<i>30.4 %</i>	<i>37.5%</i>

**Table 70. Education indicators: Share of NEETS and education attainment in the Metropolitan City of Turin, 2018**


*Data source: Eurostat*

Considering the education participation and attainment of the total population in Turin metropolitan area, the share of young people not in education, employment or training (NEETS) exceed the national average by almost 7 percentage points. Regarding young people from third countries from 15 to 34 years, who are neither in employment nor in education and training (NEET), Piedmont<sup>81</sup> showed very high rates over the last ten years, like did Italy as a

<sup>81</sup> Since EUROSTAT data only can be provided on NUTS-2 level, the NUTS-2 Piedmont, where Turin belongs to, was selected.



whole. While NEET rates of the total population were far below the national average, the ones of TCNs were higher than the national average and increased even more after the economic crisis (37.0%, 2014). They remained on a high level in the last five years.




**Chart 107. Share of young NEETS (15-34y/o) in Piedmont and Italy, 2008-2018**

*Data source: Eurostat*

Considering the **attainment of tertiary education**, the Province of Turin (data from the Provincial Labour Observatory, active until 2015) has, historically and until recent years, a rate of young NEETs a few percentage points lower than the Piedmont average. It is worth remembering in this regard that, as far as access to education is concerned, in the first decade of 2000 in Turin, the school population increased and then decreased again in recent years (Centro Einaudi 2019). “This is mainly due to foreign families”, who immigrated from Eastern European countries or from non-EU countries before the 2010s, “growing strongly until 2012 and with an average number of children higher than that of Italian families. In high schools, the rate of schooling has strongly increased: from 80% in 1998 to the current 96%, of which 88% in secondary schools, the rest in vocational training courses, with a positive balance of pupils equal to +11% in Turin city” (ibid., 71-91). As far as the main trends are concerned, there is a decline in the number of students enrolled in technical schools (both in Turin and in the rest of the metropolitan city: -4% and -27%) and an increase in the number of students in scientific and classical high schools in the capital (+36% and +16%). Most of the demographic estimates agree that a decrease in the number of children and, therefore, in the number of students is expected in the next ten years (in Piedmont probably between -11% and -16%).

The **education level of TCNs** from 15 to 64 years differs remarkably from the total population in Piedmont<sup>82</sup>. The share of people with lower education, i.e., less than primary, primary and lower secondary education (levels 0-2), is much higher among TCNs and has even increased from 55.2% to 63.7% in the last ten years (See Chart 108).



**Chart 108. Education level among TCNs and total population in Piedmont. 2008-2018**

*Data source: Eurostat*

<sup>82</sup> Since EUROSTAT data only can be provided on NUTS-2 level, the NUTS-2 Piedmont, where Turin belongs to, was selected.

## 5.2.5 ECONOMIC FEATURES OF THE METROPOLITAN CITY OF TURIN

<i>ECONOMIC INDICATORS</i>	<i>2017</i>	<i>Variation 2008-2017</i>	<i>National Average (2017)</i>	<i>EU-27 average (2017)<sup>83</sup></i>	<i>MATILDE regions</i>
<b>Regional GDP per capita at purchasing power standards</b>	32,900	-0.6%	29,100	29,800	29,624
<b>Regional Gross value added: primary sector</b>	1%	0.03 percentage points	2%	2% (7,098.5 million euro)	4%
<b>Regional Gross value added: secondary sector</b>	27%	-0.73 percentage points	24%	27% (99,067.3 million euro)	30%
<b>Regional Gross value added: tertiary sector</b>	73%	0.71 percentage points	74%	71% (263,863 million euro)	66%

**Table 71. Economic indicators in the Metropolitan City of Turin, 2017**


*Data sources: Eurostat Gross domestic product (GDP) at current market prices by NUTS 3 regions; OECD Gross domestic product (GDP); Eurostat Gross value added at basic prices by NUTS 3 regions*

## ECONOMIC STRUCTURE

The Metropolitan City of Turin has a higher regional gross domestic product per capita compared to other MATILDE regions, the EU-27 average and the national average (see Chart 109). With regards to the **economic structure**, the regional gross value added of the first sector represent only 1%, 3 percentage points lower than the MATILDE

<sup>83</sup> Missing data for France for Regional Gross Value Added and Employment by sector: Average has been therefore calculated on the basis of 26 Member States.

regions average (even if the share of territory covered by agricultural fields is 34.4%). Turin has a strong tertiary sector representing 73% of regional the gross value added (7 percentage points higher than the MATILDE regions average).



**Chart 109. Gross Domestic Product trends in the Metropolitan City of Turin, 2008-2017**

*Data source: Eurostat, Gross domestic product (GDP) at current market prices by NUTS 3 regions*

## LABOUR MARKET

The percentage of employees in each sector correspond to the economic weight represented by their gross value added described above; an important increase of the number of employees in the third sector (+4.9%) in the period 2008-2017 has been recorded. On the contrary, the first and, even more the secondary sector have undergone a significant decrease (-8.8 and -13.0 respectively).

Taking a closer look at the positive picture of GDP and employment figures, however, we see a reality in full industrial decline and undergoing a profound transformation towards the tertiary sector. Compared to the beginning of the century, the industrial sector in Turin is strongly downsized, with almost a third fewer employees (in line with the national average), as well as the transport and construction sectors, which are also in sharp decline - more than the average. On the other hand, the hotel and restaurant sector has grown, although less than the average for metropolitan cities (Centro Einaudi 2019, see chart 19). At the same time, slow mountain tourism represents a growing sector ([www.sweetmountains.it](http://www.sweetmountains.it)).

LABOUR MARKET INDICATORS	2017	Variation 2008-2017	National Average (2017)	EU-27 average (2017) <sup>84</sup>	MATILDE regions average (2017)
Unemployment rate (%/percentage points)	9.6	3.9	11.2%**	8.1 %	8.4%
Employment by sector: primary (%/thousands of employees)	1% (9.3)	-8.8%	4%	5% (353.98)	5% (6.75)
Employment by sector: secondary (%/thousands of employees)	25% (250.3)	-13.0%	17%	23% (1,584.74)	26% (36.19)
Employment by sector: tertiary (%/thousands of employees)	74% (743.5)	4.9%	79%	71% (4,830.33)	69% (97.63)
People at risk of poverty or social exclusion (%/percentage points)	19.2 (average 2008-2018)	1.7	27.3%	21.6	17.3

**Table 72. Labour Market indicators in the Metropolitan City of Turin. 2017**

*Data sources: Unemployment: OECD Labour indicators, small regions TL3 and large regions TL2; National Statistical Institutes; Eurostat, Unemployment rates by sex, age, citizenship and NUTS 2 regions; Eurostat, People at risk of poverty or social exclusion by NUTS 2 regions, Eurostat Total Unemployment rate*


The key role played by car manufacturer FIAT (today FCA) in the past is now considerably reduced and, even if manufacturing and automotive continue to represent an important pillar of Turin's economy, since 2006, the year of the Winter Olympics in Turin, cultural tourism has been boosted and the calendar of cultural events and business tourism has been renewed. Turin and the province today represent just under half of Piedmont's tourist arrivals, in constant growth, with two million and 300 thousand tourists and an average stay of two and a half nights in 2018. Half of arrivals are in Turin and about 30% in the "Olympic Valleys" (the municipalities that hosted the Winter Olympics). This happens while the region of Piedmont is still maintaining a low tourist index (11th place in Italy). In Pragelato, there is the most relevant Romanian community in the Italian Alps, due to the labour migration of skilled workers from Romania during the construction of the Olympic infrastructures (ski slopes, etc., Membretti et al. 2017).

84 Missing data for France for Regional Gross Value Added and Employment by sector: Average has been therefore calculated on the basis of 26 Member States.

Moreover, being able to count on a respectable agricultural territory and zootechnical productions which, together with the agricultural and food processing sector, places the Turin area in second place in the Italian provinces, the food and wine sector has also developed.

Among the service sectors that are emerging, the Large Organized Distribution has to be mentioned (+34% in Turin - Rota Report), while retail trade continues to decline (-19%), in line with general data. Moreover, Turin is now fully entitled to be considered a "University City". In fact, after at least twenty years of strong growth, in the last ten years, the system of Italian universities has seen a reduction in the number of students enrolled (-12% between 2008 and 2018, the two universities in Turin are among the few in which the increase in enrolment has not stopped; the Politecnico - already growing in the previous decade (+4%) - has recorded a real boom in the last ten years, with the largest increase among all Italian universities: +34%.

Finally, the health pole represented by the future "City of Health" (Molinette Hospital) is a pole of excellence that attracts users, research and investments. Today, with Bologna, Turin overall remains the Italian metropolitan city most characterised by industry (which employs over a quarter of the total workforce, figure 2.7). As for the other sectors, in terms of incidence on the total number of people employed in the area, Turin ranks third among metropolitan cities in terms of ICT and technical-scientific professions, and fourth for the financial sector. On the other hand, Turin has a significantly lower than average employment in the construction sector (12th place among metropolitan cities), in commerce (14th), in the transport sector and in the hotel and restaurant sector (both 15th place). At the same time, the valleys and their economy witness the growth of sustainable production chains and slow tourism (Barbera 2017).




**Chart 110. Employment by sector in the Metropolitan City of Turin, 2017**

*Data source: Elaboration by EURAC based on data from Eurostat, Employment (thousand persons) by NUTS 3 regions.*

## LABOUR MARKET: FOCUS ON TCNS

Compared to 2008, in Piedmont, the employment rate of TCNs, today, is noticeable lower (57.8%) than the one of the total population (66.7%). The rate of TCNs especially dropped in the aftermath of the economic crisis in 2012 and only picked up slowly.



**Chart 111. Development of employment rates in Piedmont, 2008-2018**

*Data source: Eurostat*


Compared to the total population, the share of TCNs, who are employed part-time or temporary is much higher, whilst self-employed TCNs are less frequently. Temporary employment is applying to nearly one third of the TCNs in rural areas even. The special employment patterns of TCNs in Italy are illustrated in the following table.



2018	Total Italy		Rural Areas Italy	
	TCN	TOTAL	TCN	TOTAL
Part-time employment	26.1%	18.4%	19.2%	17.4%
Self-employment	13.1%	20.6%	11.7%	22.4%
Temporary employment	22.3%	17.1%	32.5%	20.5%

**Table 73. Special employment patterns for total population and Third Country Nationals by degree of urbanization in Italy, 2018**

Whilst the unemployment rate in Piedmont followed the nationwide developments from 2008 to 2018, the unemployment rate of TCNs in Piedmont was and is much higher than the one of the total population. It more than doubled during the economic crisis in 2012 and is still higher than the pre-crisis level today. In rural areas in Italy, the unemployment rate of the total population corresponded to the nationwide share in 2018 (10.8% to 10.8%).



**Chart 112. Unemployment rate trends in Piedmont, 2008-2017**

*Data sources: OECD.stat, Labour indicators, small regions TL3 and large regions TL2; Eurostat, Total unemployment rate; National statistical offices of MATILDE countries. Unemployment rate of TCNs, 2018)*

In 2018, the **share of population at risk of poverty** was 19.2%, with an increase of 2.1 percentage points from 2008. The peak values were recorded in 2016 and 2017, when the share exceeded 22% (22.9% in 2016 and 22% in 2017). Although the level is lower than the national average (-8.1 percentage points), the share is slightly lower with respect to the MATILDE regions average. However, it is important to note that for this particular indicator, an important difference in terms of values can be recorded among all MATILDE regions.

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
## 6. COUNTRY REPORT NORWAY

Author: Stefan Kordel, with contributions from Per Olav Lund and Signe-Lise Dahl

Norway has historically been considered a 'homogenous' country with regard to its ethnic composition. However, the presence of people with Sami, Finnish, and Roma origins leads to a certain heterogeneity. Due to intra-Nordic immigration, Norway achieved a positive immigration rate from the 1970s. Therefore, immigration was seen as problematic for several decades, accompanied by political reactions. Having recognized bad living conditions for immigrants in the 1970s, a temporary immigration ban was introduced to prepare the society for newcomers in 1974 and was transformed into a permanent law afterwards (Østby 2013). The long-term effects of the ban are still observable today, with a relatively low number of labour migrants from Non-EU countries. Under the Agreement on the European Economic Area (EEA), EU citizens enjoy the same rights as Norwegians with regards to work and settle (ibid.). The composition and absolute number of migrant workers changed in 2004 with the Eastern enlargement of the EU. As a result, immigration flows from Eastern European countries, e.g. Lithuania and Poland, recently became more important (Karlsdottir et al. 2018). TCNs arriving in Norway, nowadays, mostly encompass humanitarian migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees, as well as reuniting family members from this group or previously arrived labour migrants (Østby 2013, see also chapters on labour migration, forced migration and family migration).

As in other Nordic countries, population growth mostly depends on the high positive net migration rate in Norway, which was around 8.4 for the period 2007-2017, the highest among all Nordic countries (Sánchez Gassen 2018). As Heleniak (2018) puts it, international migration can be the main driver in positive population change, also in rural and mountain areas. The share of foreign-born inhabitants increased in nearly every municipality within two decades (1995-2015), whilst those changes occurred dispersed over the country (cf. Maps 12 and 13 in Finland report).

The Ministry of Justice has responsibility for the Government's immigration policy, whilst the Ministry of Education and Research is responsible for the integration policy. The Directorate of Immigration (UDI), under the Ministry of Justice, is the central agency for immigration administration in Norway. The Directorate of Integration and Diversity (IMDi), under the Ministry of Education and research, implements the integration policy and is the Ministry's executive agency. UDI makes the first instance decision on applications for citizenship, asylum, and most other applications under the Immigration Act. IMDi implements the Government's integration policies. Some of IMDi's key responsibilities include resettlement of refugees, administer grant schemes aimed at municipalities and voluntary organisations, give advice and build competencies to municipalities in their integration work etc.



**Chart 113. Migration balance 1958-2010**

*Source: Østby 2013: 109*

## LABOUR MIGRATION

In Norway, immigrants are considered as important resource on labour market, e.g. in the fishing industry, construction, and the health care sector. Labour migration is currently regulated in modifications after the Immigration Act (1988). Worth mentioning is a law from 1997 that regulates the principal model for integration in Norway, focusing primarily on job and language training programs and changes that were made with regards to obtaining work permits. The opportunity to receive a working permit was enlarged for applicants with higher-level skills compared to those with lower-level skills (Cooper 2005). For a worker to be able to apply for a residence permit for work purposes, he or she must have a concrete offer of employment. As regards applications for residence permits for skilled workers and seasonal workers, an employer can apply on the worker's behalf. In some cases, a worker can start working before the application has been considered, provided that they have received confirmation from the police ("the early employment scheme"). People who came to Norway as labour migrants and have a residence permit as a skilled worker with an employer in Norway can change employers without applying for a new residence permit. However, they must work in the same type of position as before.

From the 1960s, Norway experienced an influx of labour migrants from Southern Europe and South Asia, such as Yugoslavia, Turkey, Morocco or India. A considerable share of these immigrants resided in other EU member states (e.g. Denmark or Germany) and had to move on to Norway as a consequence of more restrictive policies there. As a result of continuous economic growth, labour migration is still an important source of immigration. For a long time, Pakistani have been the largest group of immigrants (Pettersen & Østby 2013). In the 1970s, the already mentioned temporary immigration ban was introduced and was transformed into a permanent law afterwards. Exemptions are made for family reunification and formation purposes (ibid.)

Norway, however, remains a popular destination for foreign workers due to high salary levels. Similar to many Western European countries, rural areas became important destinations for low-skilled working migrants, both EU citizens and TCNs. The northern and coastal regions are highly dependent on foreign labour in the fishery sector (Nordregio 2016). Apart, as Rye (2014) stresses, seasonal migrant workers “have become a particularly important feature of contemporary agriculture” (ibid. 328). He counts around 24,000 unskilled farmworkers, most of them seasonally employed. Farm migrants experience poor working conditions caused by structural disempowerment, i.e. weak negotiating positions towards employers and migrant workers’ frame of reference for wage levels, which are addressed as acceptable (Rye & Andrzejewska 2010). For the farms, the migrant workforce also brings along changes in the sociocultural work environments at the farm (Rye & Frisvoll 2007). In a study on EU-11 migrants, i.e., people from the new EU countries after the 2004 enlargement, Rye & Slettebak (2020) showed that they reside, where the most labour-intensive rural industries dominate, e.g. fish processing industry, agriculture and the hospitality sector and choose areas with higher unemployment and fewer refugees, probably to avoid competitive situations.

## FORCED MIGRATION

As with other Nordic countries, the arrival of asylum seekers and refugees from war and conflict zones in the Middle East represented a remarkable change in Norway’s immigration regime. Both the participation in the UNHCR resettlement programme and the arrival of asylum seekers form the humanitarian migration to Norway. The number of the former was reduced due to the increasing number of the latter since the 2000s and especially since 2014. Due to dispersal policies, these immigration processes affect rural municipalities more than other migration phenomena. The Directorate of Integration and Diversity (IMDI) manages to settle refugees across the country in cooperation with the municipalities, who are responsible for the practical implementation of policies. Accommodation in reception centres is voluntary for asylum seekers, although most stay in these centres until their status is confirmed. The number and spatial distribution of this group are greater than for instance in Denmark or



Finland, resulting in the presence of immigrants in more municipalities (Karlsdottir et al. 2018). This reflects the Norwegian integration policy of even distribution. In contrast to the argumentation of burden sharing, prevailing in Germany or Sweden, the policies argue for easier integration of each municipality's services (Drangslund et al. 2010). A relatively high number of reception centres (21 in 2020) finally results in a lower share of asylum seekers in the municipalities (<1% in most cases) (Karlsdottir et al. 2018, see Map 12 and 13 in Finland report). As illustrated in the map, asylum seekers are not only accommodated in coastal cities, such as Oslo, Bergen or Trondheim, but also in the inland areas.

Resettlement is a voluntary task for municipalities. A national committee determines the settlement requirement. Also, it defines the need to settle newly arrived refugees during the coming year and distributes the refugees among the counties. This distribution is based on the counties' populations, qualification services, housing markets and previous experience of settlement work, education and work opportunities. The national committee is chaired by the Directorate of Integration and Diversity and includes representatives of the state and municipal sectors. Those who are settled are former asylum seekers who have been granted a residence permit or resettlement refugees who have been granted a residence permit in Norway according to an agreement with the UNHCR. Refugees who need settlement assistance are to be offered housing in a municipality. Resettlement refugees are settled directly in the municipality when they arrive in Norway.

Humanitarian migrants often lack skills and qualifications required to participate in the Norwegian labour market, both in terms of formal skills and language competence (Heleniak 2018). Thus, integration policies are aimed at this specific group, based on the Introduction Act (2018), which requires the active participation in integration programs for targeted refugees between the ages of 18 and 55. The Act on an introduction programme and Norwegian language training for newly arrived immigrants<sup>85</sup> obliges the municipalities to offer an introduction programme. The aim of the programme is to provide each participant with fundamental skills in the Norwegian language and some insight into Norwegian society, as well as to prepare him/her for employment or further education as well as participation in the Norwegian society. Refugees and their families who have been granted a residence permit in Norway both have the right and obligation to complete this 2-year programme.

The largest grant scheme administered by IMDi is the "integration grant". The municipalities receive an integration grant if they settle refugees and persons who have been granted a residence permit on humanitarian grounds.

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85 <https://app.uio.no/ub/ujur/oversatte-lover/data/lov-20030704-080-eng.pdf>



Besides, the municipalities receive a grant for those who are given a residence permit as part of family reunification with these groups - both those who come to Norway at the same time as the main person and those who are reunited with this person at a later date. The integration grant is to cover the municipalities' average additional expenses related to settling and integrating these persons during the settlement year and the next four years. This includes costs related to housing, introduction programme/"salary" for those participating in the introduction programme, education, kindergarten, health services, job training, qualifying refugees for work, interpreting etc.<sup>86</sup>. The Norwegian State Housing Bank (NSHB) is supporting municipalities with housing financing schemes and has a scheme that encourages refugees to own their own house/apartment rather than renting. The NSHB is the government's main implementing agency for social housing policy. Their main financial services are housing allowance, start-up loan and housing grants. They also provide loans for construction and renewal of homes. *Housing allowance* is a government-financed support scheme directed towards households with low income, where these household can apply for partial coverage of housing expenses. *Start-Up loan* is a loan scheme offered by most municipalities directed toward household who can't get loan in private banks to finance buying a home. The loan can also be used for upgrading the home, or for refinancing the mortgage. *Housing grant* is to assist especially disadvantaged households to obtain acceptable homes. *Basic loan* is a financial aid directed toward household who want renewal or reconstruction of a home, or loans for building new homes. The loans are primarily used by municipalities and landlords to finance projects that provide social rental housing<sup>87</sup>.

The immigration is regulated in two laws, the *Immigration Act* (LOV-2020-05-26-48) and the *Introduction act* (LOV-2020-04-24-35), whilst we will sketch the latter here since it provides the framework for settlement and integration and thus, various impacts. *Introduction act* (LOV-2020-04-24-35).

Whilst the introduction programme for refugees also include training periods and internships at a local workplace, "the two-year introduction programme has been criticized for lack of preparations for the refugees' participation in the labour market. Refugees arriving without much education often end up competing with labour migrants over low-skilled jobs" (Nordregio 2016: 8). Immigrants in rural areas are highly affected by the economic regional situations, also when it comes to the decision whether to stay longer. Encouraging migrants to settle is considered the key to increase stability in rural regions (Aure et al. 2018). To limit rural-urban onward mobility of humanitarian migrants, Nordland county, for instance, introduced programmes for acquiring proper housing and thus increasing

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<sup>86</sup> <https://www.imdi.no/en/the-introduction-programme/the-introduction-programme/>

<sup>87</sup> <https://www.husbanken.no/english/>

staying aspirations (Jungsberg 2017). Introduction program has been subject of many evaluations and research projects since it was first introduced in 2004 (Djuve et al. 2015).

Having a closer look at the specific group of unaccompanied minors, 50 % of those who arrived in Europe in 2015 were accommodated in Nordic countries (45,765). Norway hosted the second most (5,297) after Sweden. 65% of them came from Afghanistan. With regards to the spatial distribution, the number of unaccompanied minors per 1,000 children is particularly high in some sparsely populated municipalities, such as Hyllestad and Ibestad in Norway, where unaccompanied minors represent around 10% of the total number of children aged 0-17 (Karlsdottir et al. 2018, see Map 13 in Finland report).

## STUDENT MIGRATION

Education	2018	2019	2018-2019 change in percent	Total immigration since 1990
-men	1,732	1,754	-1.3 %	36,850
-women	2,492	2,446	1.8 %	56,596
All education	4,224	4,200	0.6 %	93,446
Total immigration				
-men	19,016	19,688	-3.5 %	480,902
-women	18,428	18,291	0.7 %	425,687
All immigration	37,444	37,979	-1.4 %	906,589

**Table 74. Educational Immigrants in Norway, 2018-2019**

*Source: Statistics Norway*

The table above shows first time immigration from outside the Nordic countries<sup>88</sup>, i.e. Sweden, Finland, Denmark and Island). In 2018 almost half of the educational immigrants (47 percent) are from Asia included Turkey, and approximately 35% are from Europe. Seven percent is from Africa. Six percent is from North America and 5 percent is from South and Central America. The last percent is from Oceania.

88 Non-Nordic citizenship.

Despite high costs of living, Norway is a popular destination for international students because there are no tuition fees at public universities. Over 200 master's degrees are available in English, with many more taught in Norwegian. Around 15,000 foreigners are currently enrolled at Norwegian institutions of higher education. However, there are no data available about TCNs in specific.

In Norway there are 10 universities, six university colleges and five scientific colleges owned by the state. Norway also has a large number of private higher education institutions and 15 of them receive governmental support. The universities are located in the larger cities in Norway, and many of the university colleges are located in smaller cities and more rural areas. In the county Innlandet the university college Innland Norway University of applied science is located with six campuses. Norwegian university of Science and Technology in Trondheim also has a campus located in Innlandet (Gjøvik).

## FAMILY MIGRATION

Family migration in Norway is always linked to those forms of immigration previously discussed. Thus, the spatial distribution is expected to be similar. However, no specific statements can be made for rural and mountain areas.

Some types of residence permits entitle their holder to work in any type of job, for example, residence permits for family immigration, or permanent residence permits.


## AMENITY/LIFESTYLE MIGRATION

As in Sweden, lifestyle migration in Norway builds on the tradition of second homes and summer houses in rural areas (Farstad & Rye 2013). This phenomenon has gained increased attention both in academic and political debates since the 2000s. Norwegian second homes have traditionally been summer cottages with a relatively low standard, but both the standard of the houses and the duration of use have increased in recent decades (Rye 2015). In many rural areas, politicians and the local population project hopes for economic revitalization brought on by the permanent settlement of temporary second homeowners (ibid.). In some mountainous municipalities, more second homes than inhabitants are registered (see also regional profile on Innlandet). With a few exceptions describing conflicts between the local population and second homeowners (Farstad & Rye 2013), it is widely considered that positive effects of second homes predominate. However, in light of the Covid-19 pandemic, the government put in effect a law that instructed second homeowners to leave rural areas and return to their home cities, since local mayors argued that the rural health system was not prepared for a possible large influx of patients. Others have

pointed out the advantages of sparsely populated areas (Arnesen 2020). Third Country Nationals from outside the EU are sparsely involved in lifestyle migration processes in Norway so far.

## 6.1 INNLANDET: TERRITORIAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE REGION

Authors: Per Olav Lund, Signe-Lise Dahl, Trude Hella Eide and Maria Rønnebak



**Map 31. Innlandet: Oppland and Hedmark**

## 6.1.1 GEOGRAPHICAL AND TERRITORIAL FEATURES OF INNLANDET

TERRITORIAL INDICATORS	2018	
	Hedmark	Oppland
Share of population living outside urban areas	64.4%	69.1%
Share of population living in mountain areas	<50%	>50%
Share of territory covered by mountains	>50%	>50%
Share of territory covered by agricultural fields	5.8%	6.3%
Border region	Yes	No

**Table 75. Territorial Indicators of Innlandet, 2018**

*Data sources: Eurostat Border typology; Urban-Rural typology; Eurostat Mountain typology; Eurostat Corine Landcover; Eurostat Degree of Urbanization (DEGURBA).*

Hedmark and Oppland counties (now merged into Innlandet County<sup>89</sup>) cover an area of 52,590 km<sup>2</sup>, of which 49,864 km<sup>2</sup> are land and 2,726 km<sup>2</sup> are freshwater lakes and rivers. Innlandet is an area larger than Denmark and has the highest mountain, longest river and largest lake in Norway. Innlandet is also the only county in Norway without a coastline. It borders Sweden to the east. The county consists of 46 municipalities of both urban and rural qualities, with one-third of the population living in the four largest towns. 25 municipalities are defined as mountain municipalities, while five municipalities are defined as adjacent to these<sup>90</sup> (Arnesen et al. 2010). The largest municipality has approx. 35,000 inhabitants, while the smallest has a population of around 1,300 inhabitants.

Eleven national parks are situated entirely or partly in Innlandet. Parts of areas in Nord-Østerdalen are included in UNESCO's world heritage site Røros Mining Town and the Circumference. The Røros copper mine was active from 1644 – 1977. The Circumference is an area with a radius of 45 km where the copper company had exclusive rights to mine all mineral deposits and exploit all forests and waterways.

<sup>89</sup> Innlandet is a county in Norway, created on 1 January 2020 with the merger of the old counties of Oppland and Hedmark. Since in this regional report we also collected data for NUTS3 regions Oppland and Hedmark for the time range 2008-2018, we will refer to both regions.

<sup>90</sup> Municipalities bordering at least one mountain municipality.

Due to landscape attractivity and cultural tradition, second homes are in high demand in Norway, and Innlandet county has 85,384 of them, making it the county with the largest amount of second homes in Norway. In several of the mountain municipalities, there are more second homes than there are inhabitants.

The population density is low in the county, with 7.1 inhabitants per square km. The average in the MATILDE regions is 102. The main reason for the low density is that large areas are uninhabited mountain areas.

### 6.1.2 ACCESSIBILITY FEATURES OF INNLANDET

Innlandet county has six hospitals located in the largest towns. With a large geographic area and several elongated valleys, this means that people living in rural areas must travel for quite some time to reach a hospital, both in terms of distance and time. In order to increase accessibility, two local medical centres have been established in the two main valleys. To ensure proper medical care, ambulance centres have been established throughout the county.

Hospitals fall under the competency of the state and are centrally organized. The hospitals in Innlandet are managed and led by *Sykehuset Innlandet*. The local medical centers are a cooperation between the municipalities, who is responsible for primary care, and *Sykehuset Innlandet*.

The municipalities are also responsible for elementary and middle school. As local school is of great importance in many municipalities, there are traditionally many small schools with few pupils. Due to a weak municipal economy and/or too few pupils, the tendency is towards smaller schools merging to form larger educational districts. This restructuring leads to longer travel times for many pupils. It is also a common feature that elementary schools are located closer to where people live (i.e. sometimes in the periphery), while the middle schools are centralized in the municipal centers. This explains the longer travel time for pupils in the middle schools.


The main railway between the capital Oslo and the city of Trondheim to the north, goes through Innlandet. There are two railway tracks between Innlandet's largest town Hamar and Trondheim. Nine of the 11 largest towns in Innlandet have a train station. The roads in Innlandet have been through a rapid development in recent years, with an upgrade in standard and an increase in two-lane roads. In addition, new tunnels also contribute to shorter time distances. The upgrade to double railway tracks and upgrade and straightening of curbed tracks, combined with modern trains, has contributed to reduced distances and time for train travel.

<i>ACCESSIBILITY of selected Infrastructures</i>	<i>Hedmark, 2016</i>	<i>Oppland, 2016</i>	<i>MATILDE regions average, 2016</i>
Access to hospitals, travel time by car weighted by population (minutes)	20.3	36.7	14.2
Access to primary schools, travel time by car weighted by population (minutes)	8.9	11	5.9
Access to secondary schools, travel time by car weighted by population (minutes)	13.3	16.1	9.2
Access to train stations, travel time by car weighted by population (minutes)	12	18	10.5
Access to shops, travel time by car weighted by population (minutes)	7.4	8.5	5.2

**Table 76. Accessibility of selected Infrastructures in Innlandet, 2016**

*Data Source: ESPON Profecy, 2018*





**Map 32. Population distribution and accessibility of hospitals in Innlandet**

### 6.1.3 SOCIAL FEATURES OF INNLANDET

<b>DEMOGRAPHIC INDICATORS<sup>91</sup></b>	<b>Hedmark</b>		<b>Oppland</b>		<b>National average</b>	<b>EU average</b>	<b>MATILDE regions average</b>
	<b>2018</b>	<b>Variation 2008-2018</b>	<b>2018</b>	<b>Variation 2008-2018</b>			
<b>Population size</b>	196,966	4.1%	189,870	3.4%	-	-	425,252
<b>Population density (inhabitants per km<sup>2</sup>)</b>	7.5	7.2/7.5 **	7.9	7.7/7.9 **	17.2	105.3	102
<b>Median age of population (years)</b>	44.7	1.1*	44.1	1*	39.5	43.1	45
<b>Old-age dependency ratio (&gt;65/14-64)</b>	34.5	2.6*	33.3	2.4*	25.9	30.5	33
<b>Young-age Dependency Ratio</b>	24.8	-0.8*	24.9	-0.7*	27.1	24.1	23
<b>Aging Index (&gt;65/&lt;14)</b>	139.1	14.6	132.9	12.8	95.5	124	148
<b>Crude birth rate (births per 1000 inhabitants)</b>	8.2	-1.5	8.1	-2.1	10.4	9.8	9.1
<b>Total fertility rate (new-born per woman)</b>	1.5	-0.15*	1.5	-0.3*	1.56	1.54	1.58
<b>Crude rate of natural population change (‰)</b>	-2.8	-2.8/-1.6**	-2.1	-2.1/-0.8**	2.7	-1.0	-1.7
<b>Crude rate of net migration (‰)</b>	5	2.8 / 7.9 **	0.3	0.3/ 6.7 **	3.4	2.6	3.6
<b>Crude rate of total population change (‰)</b>	2.2	0.7/ 6.1**	-1.7	-1.7/ 5.7**	6.1	1.6	1.9

**Table 77. Demographic Indicators of Innlandet, 2018**

*Data sources: Eurostat, Population (Demography, Migration and Projections)*

<sup>91</sup> \*Variation is calculated only for the period 2014-2018; \*\* Minimum and maximum values recorded in the period considered.

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
## DEMOGRAPHY

The MATILDE region Innlandet is characterized by a **slightly positive population development** from 2008 to 2018. The main population growth can be seen in central areas close to the capital Oslo, and in the lowlands surrounding the lake Mjøsa. In the 25 mountain municipalities, we have seen a reduction in the population of about 1.9 % for the period 2008-2018.

The age structure in Innlandet as a whole is changing, with fewer children and youth, and a rising number of the elderly. From 2008 to 2018, the number of 0-19-year-olds was reduced by 6%, while people aged 65 and older rose by 22%. The increasing average age is greater in the mountain municipalities than for the rest of the county. In the age group 0-19-year-olds, the reduction is 12.6%, while the county average is 6%. Only four of the municipalities in the county are experiencing a growth of the 0-19-group in this period.


Crude rate of total population change of Innlandet is lower than the national level. The main reason for this is age-selective out-migration of the younger people to urban areas for higher education and work. The region's low regional birth rate and low fertility rate amplifies this development.

The total migration balance remained relatively stable between 2008 and 2018, as the following graph indicates. **Positive migration balance** invariably results from the **immigration of foreigners**, whilst migration balance was stable for nationals during the last ten years.



**Chart 114. Third Country Nationals over total population in Innlandet, 2008-2018**

*Data source: Eurostat*



**Chart 115. Migration balance in Innlandet, 2008-2018**

*Data source: Eurostat*

## DEMOGRAPHY: FOCUS ON TCNS

In line with the development on the national Norwegian level, the total number of TCNs in Innlandet steadily grew within ten years and nearly doubled from 9,894 to 19,613 (2008-2018), also by share from 2.7% to 5.07% in 2018, whilst it is still lower than the national Norwegian share (8.0%). The highest growth rate of TCNs in Innlandet can be observed from 2009-2010 (9.3%).

2008			2018		
1	Somalia	1,022	1	Eritrea	1,982
2	Bosnia and Herzegovina	1,012	2	Syria	1,903
3	Iraq	862	3	Somalia	1,714
4	Russian Federation	742	4	Thailand	1,287
5	Iran	694	5	Iraq	1,093
6	Vietnam	662	6	Afghanistan	1,054
7	Thailand	576	7	Bosnia and Herzegovina	889
8	Kosovo	471	8	Iran	866
9	Afghanistan	343	9	Russian Federation	783
10	Philippines	318	10	Philippines	736

**Table 78. Total number of Third Country Nationals by citizenship (TOP 10) in Innlandet, 2008-2018**

*Data source: Statistics Norway*

The MATILDE region Innlandet is characterized by a variety of people with foreign citizenship, whilst a change regarding quantitative terms and concerning its composition can be observed from 2008 to 2018 (see table). In 2008, the TOP10 of foreign citizenships included countries which were involved in armed conflicts or civil wars some years ago and are thus expected to be sources of (former) humanitarian migration processes, e.g. the Balkans (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo), in Africa (Somalia), and in the MENA region (Iraq). Furthermore, like other immigration regimes in Northern Europe, Russia plays an important role concerning the total numbers of TCNs in Innlandet. For Vietnam, the presence of TCNs is mostly associated with working permits.


For the majority of the countries, the numbers increased until 2018, e.g. Somalia and Iraq, but also Thailand, and, to a smaller extent, Russia. Decreasing numbers can only be detected for countries like Bosnia Herzegovina, for which one could assume return migration due to enhancing economic situation. People with citizenships from Syria and Eritrea increased in numbers, which stresses the importance of forced migration.

The composition of TCNs in Innlandet is fairly congruent with the NUTS-O scale, except Pakistani people, which seem to play a minor role in the MATILDE region. The majority of people from Pakistan and Norwegian-born to Pakistani immigrant parents in Norway, which count around 39,000 in Norway, mostly settle in Oslo or the surroundings. Immigration from Thailand is mostly family-related, i.e., Thai women marrying Norwegian men.

## AGE AND GENDER STRUCTURE

The age distribution of TCNs in Innlandet differ from those of the nationals. For 2018, Statistics Norway provide data, which indicate that there are relatively few young TCNs and people in their mid-fifties and older. Instead, in the age groups 24-48, TCNs overweigh nationals by share. This indicates that the vast majority of TCNs is at working age.

The total number of female TCNs in Innlandet was 10,231 in 2018, a share of 52.2 %. While the number of female TCNs steadily grew from 2008 to 2018, its share remained relatively stable.



**Chart 116. Share of female Third Country Nationals in Innlandet, 2008-2018**

*Data source: Eurostat*


#### 6.1.4 EDUCATION FEATURES OF INNLANDET

The education level of TCNs differs significantly from the total population in Innlandet<sup>92</sup>. The share of people with lower education, i.e., less than primary, primary and lower secondary education (levels 0-2), is much higher among TCNs and has not decreased from 2008-2016. For the total population, the share of people with tertiary education slightly increased, whilst it is assumed that TCNs do not take part in this development.

Young people with an immigrant background engage in higher education to a larger extent than Norwegian citizens, and women now constitute the majority of students. Youth with immigrant parents also outnumber Norwegians in the higher education system. In particular, youth with a background from China, Sri Lanka, India, Vietnam and Bosnia-Herzegovina engage in higher education. Young people with a Bosnian background have the lowest drop-out rate from upper secondary schools within five years. 87% of the girls and 85% of the boys complete their upper secondary education. In general, humanitarian immigrants have lower education than other immigrant groups.

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<sup>92</sup> NUTS-2 Innlandet is congruent to NUTS-3 Innlandet.




**Chart 117. Education level among Third Country Nationals and total population in Innlandet, 2008-2018**

*Data source: Eurostat*

The NEET rate (young people, aged 15-34 neither in employment nor in education and training) differs between total population and TCNs on national level, however, approximated more recently. The total NEET rate for Innlandet slightly increased previously, but dropped more recently and is on national average in 2018.





**Chart 118. Share of young NEETS (15-34y/o) in Innlandet and Norway, 2008-2018**

*Data source: Eurostat*

Figures for TCNs in Hedmark og Oppland, available for 2013-2015 show a decrease from 49.4% (2013) to 43.0% (2014) to 29.9% (2018). The main reasons for the low number of NEETS is that all inhabitants have a right to education, low student fees, available educational loan, and an education system where everyone who wants to take higher education theoretically has the possibility to do so.

## 6.1.5 ECONOMIC FEATURES OF INNLANDET

<b>ECONOMIC INDICATORS<sup>93</sup></b>	<b>Hedmark</b>		<b>Oppland</b>		<b>National average (2017)</b>	<b>EU average (2017)<sup>94</sup></b>	<b>MATILDE regions average (2017)</b>
	<b>2017</b>	<b>Variation 2008-2017</b>	<b>2017</b>	<b>Variation 2008-2017</b>			
<b>Regional GDP per capita at purchasing power standards</b>	28,500	1.1%	28,600	0.8 %	43,800	29,800	29,624
<b>Regional Gross value added: primary sector (% , percentage points)</b>	4%	-0.7	4%	-0.7	2%	2% (7,098.5 million euro)	4%
<b>Regional Gross value added: secondary sector (% , percentage points)</b>	23%	-1.8	23%	-1.8	34%	27% (95,398 million euro)	30%
<b>Regional Gross value added: tertiary sector (% , percentage points)</b>	75%	+2.7	71%	+2.2	64%	71% (254,090 million euro)	66%

**Table 79. Economic indicators in Innlandet, 2017**


*Data sources: Eurostat Gross domestic product (GDP) at current market prices by NUTS 3 regions; OECD Gross domestic product (GDP); Eurostat Gross value added at basic prices by NUTS 3 regions.*

93 Data for Regional Gross Value Added at NUTS3 level for Hedmark and Oppland were only available for tertiary sector. Data for primary and secondary sector have therefore been collected at NUTS 2 level.

94\* Missing data for France for Regional Gross Value Added and Employment by sector; Average has been therefore calculated based on 26 Member States.

## ECONOMIC STRUCTURE

The **primary sector** is well developed, and agriculture and farming is important, and Innlandet accounts for approximately 20 percent of Norway's total agricultural production. Innlandet is the largest forest county in Norway and about 40 per cent of the total production is from the region. The food industry and the wood industry are refining the commodities. Raufoss is one of Norway's most **important industrial areas** for commodity production. Important product groups are car parts, weaponry, and building parts bases on wood, plastic and metal. Sawmills are located mainly in the eastern part of the county. Norway's leading producer of glulam (timber) is in the county. Important destinations with industry timber also are professionally providers and international interest are i.e. Lillehammer (Olympics 1994, Youth Olympic Games 2016, World Cup in Nordic disciplines annually), Trysil (downhill skiing) and mountain areas like Dovrefjell, Jotunheimen and Rondane (cross country and hiking). In the **tertiary sector**, tourism is vital and many second homes in the more rural areas of the county contribute to local shops and merchandise providers.



**Chart 119. Gross Domestic Product trends in Innlandet, 2008-2017**

*Data source: Eurostat, Gross domestic product (GDP) at current market prices by NUTS 3 regions*

## LABOUR MARKET


The unemployment rate is lower in Innlandet than the EU average and Matilde regions. Economic growth, driven by the oil industry and economic optimism for the future, has contributed to low unemployment rates. Focus on unemployed and measures against unemployment contributes to lower rates.

<b>LABOUR MARKET INDICATORS<sup>95</sup></b>	<b>Hedmark</b>		<b>Oppland</b>		<b>National average (2017)</b>	<b>EU average (2017)</b>	<b>MATILDE regions average (2017)</b>
	<b>2017</b>	<b>Variation 2008-2017</b>	<b>2017</b>	<b>Variation 2008-2017</b>			
<b>Unemployment rate (%/percentage points)</b>	3%*	0.9	2.1%**	0.9	4.2%	8.1 %	8.4%
<b>Employment in primary sector (% , thousands of employees)</b>	6% (6)	20%	4% (6)	0%	2%	5% (353.98)	5% (6.75)
<b>Employment in secondary sector (% , thousands of employees)</b>	19% (18)	5.9%	48% (70)	9.4%	19%	23% (1,584.74)	26% (36.19)
<b>Employment in tertiary sector (% , thousands of employees)</b>	74% (70)	7.7%	48% (70)	7.7%	78%	71% (4,830.33)	69% (97.63)
<b>People at risk of poverty or social exclusion (%/percentage points)</b>	15.2% (average 2008-18)	1.8	15.2% (average 2008-18)	1.8	16%	22.5%	18.7%

**Table 80. Labour Market indicators in Innlandet, 2017**


Data sources: Unemployment: OECD Labour indicators, small regions TL3 & large regions TL2; National Statistical Institutes; Eurostat, Unemployment rates by sex, age, citizenship & NUTS 2 regions; Eurostat, People at risk of poverty or social exclusion by NUTS 2 regions.

95 \* Missing data for France for Regional Gross Value Added and Employment by sector; Average has been therefore calculated on the basis of 26 Member States. \*\*Last data available: 2016



**Chart 120. Employment by sector in Innlaandet, 2017**

Data source: Elaboration by EURAC based on data from Eurostat, *Employment (thousand persons) by NUTS 3 regions, Innlaandet*




**Chart 121. Unemployment rate trends in Innlaandet, 2008-2017**

Data sources: OECD.stat, *Labour indicators, small regions TL3 and large regions TL2*; Eurostat, *Total unemployment rate*; National statistical offices of MATILDE countries

## LABOUR MARKET: FOCUS ON TCNS

In Innlandet, the employment rate of TCNs is noticeable lower compared to the total population. A general trend for TCNs cannot be retrieved from the figures.

On the national level, labour immigrants have lower unemployment rates than refugees, although this difference was reduced over time, partly because the refugees attend a five-year introduction program with the aim of integrating them into the society. Another factor is the difference in education level. Refugees in general have a lower education level than working immigrants. As the education level in Norway is high, this leads to a competitive labour market for positions requiring basic education level (Statistics Norway).



**Chart 122. Development of employment rates in Innlandet, 2008-2018**

*Data source: Eurostat*

2018	Total Norway		Rural Areas Norway	
	TCN	TOTAL	TCN	TOTAL
Part-time employment	40.1%	25.7%	44.0%	27.4%
Self-employment	7.4% (2017)	5.8%	8.1% (2016)	6.3%
Temporary employment	21.0%	8.5%	23.2%	8.1%

**Table 81. Special employment patterns for total population and Third Country Nationals by degree of urbanization in Norway, 2018**

*Data source: Eurostat*

Special patterns of employment in Norway are illustrated in the above table: The share of part-time and temporary employed persons is much higher among TCNs than among total population, both in Norway as a whole, and in rural areas in particular. Data also points to a slightly higher share of self-employed TCNs.

For Hedmark and Oppland, TCNs unemployment rate was reported for 2015 and 2016. One could observe dramatically higher shares of unemployment rates among TCNs (33.6% in 2015 and 30.3% in 2016) compared to the total population (4.7% in 2015 and 4.6% in 2016).

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## 7. COUNTRY REPORT SPAIN


Author: Tobias Weidinger, with contributions from Raúl Lardiés Bosque and Nuria del Olmo Vicén

In the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, especially until the early 1980s, rural and mountain areas in Spain experienced a massive loss of population due to out-migration, resulting in an ageing population. Main reasons for leaving the regions were mechanisation in agriculture, working opportunities in rapidly industrialising areas boosted by the development plans launched at the end of the Franco period (1959-1975) and the establishment of the welfare state providing better access to health, social and educational services in urban areas (Rivera Escribano 2007; Bayona-i-Carrasco & Gil-Alonso 2013; Lardiés-Bosque 2018a). While some commuted on a weekly basis or relocated permanently to the big cities and the growing urban fringes (Rivera Escribano 2007; Oliva 2010), others, instead, emigrated to former colonies in South America and later also to other countries in Europe (Lardiés-Bosque 2018b). In the 1990s, however, parallel to out-migration, a process of repopulation started in some rural areas (Hoggart 1997; Soronellas-Masdeu et al. 2014), which was supported by the entry to the EU, the related economic boom and post-productivist economic alternatives, e.g. organic farming, (second home) tourism, construction or jobs in public administration and a better supply of infrastructure such as internet, which enabled teleworking (Bayona-i-Carrasco & Gil-Alonso 2013; Oliveau et al. 2019). Apart from urban residents and re-migrants who moved to the countryside for weekends, holidays or on a permanent basis (see also chapter on lifestyle migration), also foreigners started to arrive there (Oliva 2010; Bayona-i-Carrasco & Gil Alonso 2013; Lardiés-Bosque 2018b; see also chapters on labour and family migration). The accelerated arrival of the latter group in the 2000s, characterised as the 'golden age of immigration' by Lardiés-Bosque (2018b), was associated to neoliberalisation policies in the real estate sectors, e.g., the Land Act 1998 (López Rodríguez 2011). Many rural communities and its mayors wanted to participate in urban development with the help of urban developers. However, this development was interrupted by the economic crisis in 2008 followed by a decrease from 2013 on (Collantes et al. 2014; Lardiés-Bosque 2018b; Oliveau et al. 2019). Thereafter, non-economic factors linked with a better lifestyle gained importance for both the arrival and the locational choice of immigrants in Spain (Alamá-Sabater et al. 2017). In contrast, young Spaniards, who suffered unemployment, started to commute to cities or left Spain to Northern Europe (Roseman 2013; Lardiés-Bosque 2018a; see also Domínguez-Mújica et al. 2014).

To tackle socio-demographic and territorial imbalances between urban-metropolitan and coastal areas compared to rural and inland ones (Lardiés-Bosque 2018a), in the last years, immigration and repopulation initiatives are seen as a solution by politicians and associations to revive villages and towns (Camarero et al. 2012; Collantes et al. 2014). Lardiés-Bosque (2018a) and Coto Sauras (2019) presented these initiatives for the provinces of Huesca, Zaragoza and


Teruel (Aragón region) as well as Salamanca and Soria (both Castile and León region). González-Torres (2016), in addition, suggested to revive villages and towns by means of refugees in specific and drew on three places in the province of Guadalajara (Castile-La Mancha region).

As it is shown in Chart 123 and Map 33 for selected nationalities, immigrants as well as EU foreign citizens and third-country nationals in Spain, today, are not equally distributed over the country (Oliveau et al. 2019). A reduced presence of immigrants and foreigners is characteristic for small municipalities and rural areas, especially in the north and west of the country (Oliva 2010).



**Chart 123. Distribution of immigrants by size of municipalities in Spain, 2019**

*Data Source: Padrón Municipal de Habitantes, INE 2019*



**Map 33. Clustering and isolation of foreign nationals in Spain**

*Data source: Oliveau et al. 2019: 17*

National statistical data in Spain underestimate foreigners in general and third-country nationals in specific due to three aspects: illegal stays in Spain related to immigration policies, acquisitions of Spanish nationalities especially among Latin Americans and administrative procedures regarding (de)registration (Kreienbrink 2010; Collantes et al. 2014; Oliveau et al. 2019). With regard to the latter aspect, registration on municipal registers was made compulsory and provides access to public health, social and education services. For illegal immigrants mostly from African countries having bad prospects for granting asylum, registration in municipal registers with an address is a precondition for legalization. If foreigners do not renew their registration every two years, they are removed from the register (Oliveau et al. 2019). In addition, EU-migrants often do not register themselves as they fear perceived disadvantages or do not consider it as part of their self-images (Hof 2013; Kordel & Weidinger 2019).

According to the law known as LODYLE (Organic Law 4/2000 and 8/2000, amended by the Organic Law 2/2009), the central government has full normative and executive power to regulate the civil and political rights of citizens of

third countries (entry and settlement policies, family reunification policies, awareness, participation and co-development policies) as well as to determine the general bases for the social integration of foreigners (Strategic Plan for Citizenship and Integration, called PEI, 2007-2010). Autonomous communities (CCAAs) and local governments, instead, have the full or shared responsibility of management of the integration process, i.e. reception, housing, education, work, health or social services. Due to endogenous reasons such as the language or historical reality and the development of their welfare systems, as well as exogenous ones, such as the density and profiles of immigrants, the main welfare policies and the regional integration plans to immigrants (since the mid-2000s) differ between CCAAs. Multilevel governance is implemented through the institutional framework of the central government initially formed by the Higher Council for Immigration Policy (2001), by the Forum for the Social Integration of Immigrants (2001) and by the Interministerial Commission on Immigration (all at the National level).

## LABOUR MIGRATION

For low- and medium-skilled job-seeking migrants, Spain offers two main immigration pathways (Hooper 2019): first, the General Regime, which allows employers to sponsor specific migrants for a specific job, whereby local public employment offices carry out labour-market checks and verify that Spanish or EU nationals cannot fill this post. The second option is the Collective Management of Hiring in Countries of Origin (Collective Management System), which allows employers to “recruit groups of workers (primarily for seasonal agricultural roles) from countries with which Spain has signed a bilateral agreement” (Hooper 2019). Thereby, government-run selection committees identify and vet potential immigrants in countries of origin (ibid.). Since 1993, the recruitment of permanent and temporary working migrants was theoretically based on employer sponsorship and yearly quotas set by the central government (Kreienbrink 2007; Hooper 2019). From the employers’ perspectives, however, procedures took too long and quotas were considered too low and, as a consequence, resulted in overstays of tourist visas and illegal employment (Kreienbrink 2007; Hooper 2019). Accordingly, in the 1990s and 2000s, regularisation programmes<sup>96</sup> termed ‘normalizacion’ were launched to regularise individuals from Ecuador, Morocco and Romania who already lived in the country illegally using the given quotas (Kreienbrink 2007, 2008, 2010; Finotelli & Arango 2011). To replace the bureaucratic and lengthy procedures and ease access to the Spanish labour market, the Organic Law (4/2000) and the 2004 decree established a consultation process of the central government with employer associations and trade unions (The Tripartite Labour Commission for Immigration) to provide input on setting quotas and to adopt a list of hard-to-fill occupations for each Autonomous Community that are both updated on a three-

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96 These regularisations took place in 1985-1986, 1991, 1996, 2000, 2001 and 2005 (Kreienbrink 2007; Hooper 2019).

months basis (Hooper 2019). In addition, special bilateral agreements were concluded with countries such as the Dominican Republic (effective from 2002), Colombia, Ecuador and Morocco (2005) or Gambia (2007) in order to recruit seasonal agricultural workers for up to nine months per year, workers in in-demand sectors such as construction or hospitality for at least one year and three-month job-search visas for descendants of Spanish nationals who want to become employed in in-demand sectors (Hooper 2019)<sup>97</sup>. The economic crisis of 2008, then, led to high unemployment among migrants (Meier 2013). Whilst Moroccans tended to continue to stay in the country, as the situation was not better in the country of origin (ibid.), Latin Americans, who arrived more recently, often decided to move further north in Europe (Mas Giralt 2017). As the recession took hold and unemployment soared, Spain suspended or scaled back many of its policies to recruit TCNs. By means of the APRE programme (*Plan de Abono anticipado de Prestación a Extranjeros*), departures and returns should have been fostered (Hooper 2019). In 2018, after the melioration of the economic situation, the GECCO order (TMS/1426/2018), reinstated the renowned measures for both employers and potential employees, i.e. providing more opportunities for employers to hire third-country nationals outside of agriculture (European Commission 2018) and granting a limited number of three-month visas to immigrants to seek jobs in hard-to-fill occupations.

Due to rising living standards, a decline in wages in the 1990s and 2000s as well as stringent working conditions, Spaniards did no longer want to work in agriculture (Morén-Alegret & Solana 2004; Kreienbrink 2010; Camarero et al. 2012). Therefore, at that time, labour legislation benefited the recruitment of foreign low-skilled labour to cover certain specific job needs linked to industrial agriculture, e.g. picking a particular fruit harvest (Bayona-i-Carrasco & Gil Alonso 2013). Thereby, the province of Lleida in rural Catalonia, became 'a pioneer' in establishing triangular agreements between governments, workers' trade unions and employers' associations for organizing labour contracts with male immigrants from Morocco (Morén Alegret & Solana 2004). While the structure of immigrants was characterised by a marked masculinisation and single young men aged between 25 and 35 for a long time (Camarero et al. 2012; Soronelles-Masdeu et al. 2014), spouses of Moroccans joined a few years later, who only partly worked in agriculture or other sectors (Soronellas-Masdeu et al. 2014). In recent years, Moroccans in agriculture were often displaced by Latin Americans and Eastern Europeans (especially from Romania) (Hoggart & Mendoza 1999; Chattou 2000; Mendoza 2003; Morén-Alegret 2008; Camarero et al. 2012; Soronellas-Masdeu et al. 2014).

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<sup>97</sup> These agreements also entailed measures on migration management, i.e. cooperation on immigration, border management and returns (Hooper 2019).

With regard to regional differentiation, work places for immigrants can be found, for instance, in the Autonomous Community of Catalonia both in places in the mountainous areas in the Pyrenees, the hinterland and the coast, e.g. the agrarian plains of Segrià and Urgell (province of Lleida), Banyoles, Olot, La Selva and Alt and Baix Empordà (province of Girona) or, more recently, Benissanet alongside the Ebro river (province of Tarragona, Hoggart & Mendoza 1999; Morén-Alegret & Solana 2004; Morén-Alegret 2008; Bayona-i-Carrasco & Gil-Alonso 2013; Gonzalez Rodriguez 2019). Simultaneously, due to wine production, the Ebro valley in the neighbouring Autonomous Communities such as Navarra, La Rioja and Aragón provides further job opportunities for foreigners. The south-eastern and southern Autonomous Communities of Andalusia and Murcia offer jobs in labour-intensive greenhouse agriculture such as in El Ejido (province of Almería, e.g. Chattou 2000, Calavita 2007) or the Costa Tropical near Almuñécar (province of Málaga), in strawberry picking in the province of Huelva and the northwest coast of Cádiz (e.g. Gualda & Ruiz 2004; cf. Natale et al. 2019), or in the olive orchards in the province of Jaén. In Campo Arañuelo and La Vera (province of Cáceres) in the Autonomous Community of Extremadura, instead, tobacco cultivation is common among foreigners. Another primary activity occupied by TCNs is grazing, although there is not much data about it. The lack of generational replacement for these pastoral tasks on the one hand, and the knowledge of tending sheep and trading as well as the lack of alternative jobs on the other hand pushed many North Africans to carry out this work. In the province of Teruel (Autonomous Community of Aragón), for instance, 90% of the shepherders are of Moroccan origin.

For one-third of foreign-born men, especially from the Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa agriculture is the initial employment in Spain (Camarero et al. 2012). They use information and accumulating financial resources, skills and contacts to move on to urban destinations and find better-paid jobs outside agriculture (Collantes et al. 2014). Agriculture is also not the main source of employment for many (Camarero et al. 2012) as it provides only temporary contracts in most cases (ibid.). Thus, they are forced to go back to their country of origin outside the harvesting season (circular migration, López-Sala et al. 2016). Others move throughout the country according to the regional harvests, or have another job outside the harvesting season, e.g. in tourism (Viruela 2010; Camarero et al. 2012; Bayona-i-Carrasco & Gil-Alonso 2013). In the 2000s, many immigrants moved to central villages and found apartments as tenants or subtenants in the small Spanish rental market or even became house owners (Meier 2013). This was an effect of both family reunifications, changing housing preferences and regularization, which allowed them to access social housing (Camarero et al. 2012, 153; Lardiés-Bosque 2018b, 153). Nevertheless, discrimination among landlords and neighbours continued to occur – especially in comparison to Latin Americans or Eastern Europeans. This only changed in the course of the economic crisis, when real estate agents started to be more willing to rent to Moroccans instead of leaving apartments unoccupied (ibid.). Recently, the United Nations' special

rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, Philip Alston, criticised the housing situation of temporary agricultural workers in Huelva due to lack of access to electricity and adequate sanitation, which may increase the risk of infection during the Covid-19 crisis (OHCHR 2020).

Apart from agriculture, third-country nationals can also be found in fishing and mining. With regard to the further aspect, a regional focus is the Biscay bay (Autonomous Community of the Basque Country), where single male Senegalese and Moroccan families live in the hinterland (Pereira & Oiarzabal 2018). On site, Senegalese learnt the Basque dialect Euskera in addition to Spanish, many of them working in fishing in coastal municipalities. Due to the family structure, Moroccans established a Mosque in Markina-Xemein (province of Bizkaia) and taught the Koran and the Arabic language to their children (ibid.). With regard to the latter aspect, i.e. mining, e.g. Cape Verdeans and Pakistani immigrants are present, for instance, in Bierzo (Autonomous Community of Castile and León, Morén-Alegret 2008).

Construction is another important sector for working migrants, where about one third of all men are employed, often on a temporary basis (Camarero et al. 2012). Due to lower housing prices and following established commuting patterns of Spaniards in the construction sector (Oliva 2010), Eastern Europeans and Moroccans settled in villages and small towns 150kms from Madrid, outside of Barcelona, e.g. in Maresme (ibid.), in the hinterland of the Costa Blanca (Morén-Alegret 2008) or on Mallorca (Hof 2013). They commuted to either the respective urban centres or rural areas, where second residences were built (Camarero et al. 2012; Lardiés-Bosque 2018b). When the economic and construction boom ended, many of them continued to work in agriculture (Rodríguez-Planas & Nollenberger 2016) or left rural areas (Lardiés-Bosque 2018b).

With a spatial focus on the coasts and the Pyrenees, catering and tourism were discussed as workplaces for foreigners, especially Africans, Europeans and Latin Americans. In adventure tourism in Pyrenean villages, Latin Americans predominate (Bayona-i-Carrasco & Gil Alonso 2013; Soronellas-Masdeu et al. 2014). Wholesale (e.g. Chinese, Senegalese), courier and service delivery (Senegalese), sale of second-hand and electronic equipment, jewellery and flowers (Pakistani) are other service sectors, where TCNs are present. Domestic work including (live-in) care giving became another sector, where especially foreign women became employed (Martínez Buján 2010; Camarero et al. 2012; Díaz-Gorfinkiel & Martínez-Buján 2018; for Peruvians, see Escrivá Chordá 2003; for Ecuadorians, see IOÉ Collective 2001). This is because, firstly, family members as caregivers were often no longer eligible as many Spanish women entered the labour market or moved to cities or abroad and, secondly, the public social services were too weak to support families and the ageing of the population (Bernardi & Garrido 2008; Camarero et al. 2012;



Soronellas-Masdeu et al. 2014; Grande et al. 2016). Retirement migrants from Northern Europe generate an additional demand for these types of services (see also chapter on lifestyle migration).

Caribbean and Latin American women are mainly from urban or metropolitan areas of their countries, some even have higher education and often arrive without family and kids, who are left behind at least for a few years (Calavita 2007; Camarero et al. 2012; Soronellas-Masdeu et al. 2014). Women from Morocco or Algeria, finally, originate from cities and come to Spain with the help of family ties, e.g. husband or brother. In case workplaces are in very mountainous areas with poor communications, the hired women do not live on-site, but prefer to live in more accessible towns or villages (ibid.). However, rural areas are considered to have certain advantages, e.g. less cost-intensive living costs, which allows to spare money or becoming known as a good worker in the village more easily (ibid.). Despite the fact that domestic services provide a fix and stable income (ibid.), and only 34% are on temporary contracts (Camarero et al. 2012), a considerable number of immigrants used this kind of work to obtain information and accumulate financial resources, skills and contacts to move on to cities and better-paid occupations (Collantes et al. 2014).


## FORCED MIGRATION

Asylum policy in Spain is an exclusive competence of the central state (Arcarons 2016). The right for asylum (asylum provided by the state and refugee status according to the Geneva Convention of Refugees) was put into constitution in 1978 and was regulated in a law issued in 1984. While from 1994 on (Law 9/1994), only refugee status was obtainable, the Asylum Act of 2009 (Law 12/2009), additionally implemented subsidiary protection and incorporated mandatory EU norms (Arcarons 2016). Considering the priorities identified by the UNHCR and the EU, the national resettlement program is an extraordinary measure of care for people affected by wars or serious humanitarian crises. In 2020, Spain has offered to resettle 1,200 refugees, mainly from Syria and other countries.

The General Directorate of Migration (*Dirección General de Migraciones*, DGM) develops and manages the comprehensive reception and integration system for immigrants, asylum seekers, refugees, stateless persons, persons under the temporary protection regime and other subsidiary protection statutes. The services itself, however, are managed by NGOs and associations. Specifically, through the General Secretariat for Immigration and Emigration (*Secretaría General de Inmigración y Emigración*, SGIE) it is intended to comply with the obligations of both national and community regulations on the reception conditions for applicants and beneficiaries of international protection, in addition to promoting the reception and integration of this group (MEYSS-SGII, 2017). Currently, the Forum for the Social Integration of Immigrants, which is dependent from the General Directorate for



Integration and Humanitarian Care (*Dirección General de Integración y Atención Humanitaria*, DGIH, under the structure of the Ministry of Labour, Migrations and Social Security), is responsible for the 'comprehensive' reception and integration of asylum seekers, refugees and other beneficiaries of international protection, stateless persons and persons under the temporary protection regime.



**Chart 124. Structure and phases of the Spanish National System of Reception, Integration and Autonomy of refugees in Spain**

*Data source: Arcarons 2016: 112*

The Spanish reception system includes a three-phase programme that should enable migrants to live autonomously within 18 months – or 24 months in case of vulnerable profiles (Muela Longares 2019, cf. Chart 124). After the assessment of the profile and needs of the recipients in an evaluation and referral phase (*phase E.Y.D.*), asylum seekers have to spend the first six or nine months in one of the four Refugee Reception Centres (CAR) run by the state (Madrid-Alcobendas, Madrid-Vallecas, Sevilla or Valencia), or an NGO. Others, instead directly get provided a private accommodation in flats, which are located all over the Spanish territory (Arcarons 2016; Accem 2017)<sup>98</sup>. There is no policy of dispersal towards rural areas. Instead, the distribution to NGO-run accommodation as well as private

<sup>98</sup> In addition, Temporary Stay Centers for Immigrants (CETI) in Ceuta and Melilla are provided, which host both asylum seekers and immigrants who irregularly access these autonomous cities.

accommodation entirely depends on the offer of places by NGOs and associations<sup>99</sup>. Usually, private housing is offered in urban areas all over Spain. Therefore, the majority of asylum seekers is concentrated in cities, and, until now, no specific studies were carried out about the situation of asylum seekers or refugees in rural areas. Recently, however, there have been some experiences to boost the arrival of refugees to rural areas in Spain. Repopulating empty Spain with thousands of families of refugees and foreign migrants is already a real political option. The Diputación de Valladolid, i.e. the government of the province of the Autonomous Community of Castilla y León, has funded a study to assess what impact thousands of Syrian refugees and sub-Saharan migrants would have on the rural sector (El Confidencial 2017). In the province of Salamanca situated in the same Autonomous Community, they tried to explore the same route.

In the 2010s, the number of asylum seekers rose from 2,744 to 118,264 (2010 to 2019, CEAR 2020) and the length of the three phases was handled less flexible than before, while support within the second and third phase was drastically reduced (Arcarons 2016). Therefore, a Royal Decree as of September 2015 aimed to increase the capacity of the national reception system for the unaccompanied men from Syria and Ukraine as well as the applicants from Colombia, El Salvador, Honduras and Venezuela (Arcarons 2016; European Commission 2018), and to guarantee access to the system for all asylum seekers. In this course, the opportunity was provided to host asylum seekers in hotels for up to 30 days before they were distributed to their asylum reception centre or private housing, which went hand in hand with the creation of more than 1,000 Emergency Reception and Referral centres (CAED, Accem 2017).

## STUDENT MIGRATION

In the academic year 2014/2015, 3.6% of all students were TCNs, in turn, representing nearly two thirds of all foreign students (University system course 2015-2016, Ministry of Education, Culture and Sport). In the 2018/19 academic year, the Spanish universities - public and private - welcomed a total of 139,708 foreign students, either in degree, master or doctorate, which represents 8.8% of the total number of students, according to the report 'Data and Figures of the Spanish University System' (Ministerio de Universidades 2020). In undergraduate studies, the presence of students from outside Spain is less common (only 5.4% of the total), but they represent 22% among master's students and 26% in doctorates. If we consider the destinations of these students, Madrid, Catalonia and

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<sup>99</sup> A regulatory framework should safeguard the participation of Autonomous Communities in the balanced distribution of applicants and beneficiaries of international protection (European Commission 2018).

the Valencian Community are preferred by these students to pursue their studies. Apart from other EU countries, Latin America is the second big region by origin.

In order to attract and retain foreign talents, in 2018, the Students and Researchers Directive (2016/801/EU) was transposed and incorporates the right for intra-EU-mobility and simplifies the migration procedures for students. Accordingly, third-country nationals are allowed to remain in Spain to seek employment once the study ends (European Commission 2018). Due to the absence of a higher education centre in rural areas, no specific studies were carried out about students in rural areas so far.

## FAMILY MIGRATION

The regularisation in 2000 enabled third-country nationals to obtain temporary family reunification permits after only one year instead of after 18 to 24 months. Last changes in 2009 (Law 2/2009), aimed at decreasing economic dependency of family migrants and allowed spouses and older children to enter the labour market without prior administrative procedures (Pérez-Nievas & Vintila 2013). On the other hand, however, preconditions for family reunification were aggravated and required a longer-term residency, the provision of housing and sufficient financial means to meet the family's needs. Family migration to rural areas becomes manifested in mixed marriages, i.e. when foreign women from Latin America, e.g. from Colombia or Ecuador, move to their Spanish spouses (Sampedro & Camarero 2016, 2018). During the economic crisis of 2008, in addition, return migration of descendants of former emigrants to Latin American countries was reported, for instance, in rural Galicia (Oliva 2010; Camarero et al. 2012). The literature has paid little attention to other types of family migration to rural areas yet. Only Capote (2014) highlighted the role of families in migration decision-making among Moroccans settled in Andalusia, where chain migration of siblings was common as an 'escape mechanism' in the face of generational discontent. Pereira and Oiarzabal (2018), instead, pointed out that school-aged children who arrived to rural areas in the province of Bizkaia together with their labour migrant parents, are sent to the same school than locals and are not segregated like in urban areas.

## AMENITY/LIFESTYLE MIGRATION

The development of national and international lifestyle migration or residential tourism<sup>100</sup> in Spain is very much linked to good weather conditions alongside the coasts and its hinterland as well as on the Balearic and Canary Islands. In addition, comparably low costs of living, the tourism and the dynamic development of real estate business as a result of neoliberal policies, e.g. the Land Act 1998<sup>101</sup> (López & Rodríguez 2011), as well as the designation of protected natural areas, e.g. national or natural parks<sup>102</sup>, boosted this phenomenon (e.g. Casado et al. 2004; Haug et al. 2007; Oliva 2010; Hof 2013). While Hoggart (1997, Autonomous Community of Andalusia), Rivera Escribano (2007, Navarra) or Pinilla et al. (2008, Aragón) focussed on national counter-urbanities, i.e. working-class migrants, young couples or middle and upper classes, that arrived on the countryside as they seek cheaper places to live, a more natural lifestyle or utopia-like settings (Rivera Escribano 2007), others, instead, focussed on temporary or permanent international lifestyle migration of middle-class (pre)retirees from Central and Northern Europe. The latter processes are very much linked to previous tourist stays (Oliva 2010), started in the mid-1980s (Camarero et al. 2012) and have gained importance since then (O'Reilly 2000; Rodríguez et al. 2004; Kordel & Weidinger 2019). In the last years, intra EU-migrants preferred more individualised locations on the countryside such as in Catalonia or in the Pyrenees (Oliva 2010; Solana & Solana 2010; Bayona-i-Carrasco & Gil-Alonso 2013; see also Weidinger 2016). A second group of international lifestyle migrants, who arrived in rural Spain in the past years, are comparably younger 'lifestyle entrepreneurs' from Northern Europe, i.e. Denmark, Germany, Netherlands or United Kingdom (Stone & Stubbs 2007).

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100 In Spanish-speaking debates, the term "turismo residencial" is used more frequently (e.g. Mazón 2018).

101 The Land Act refined the category of land previously excluded from development to enable residential development to take place, allowed for greater flexibility of land uses and building controls, and reduced administrative controls (Cladera & Burns 2000).

102 Regarding the latter aspect, Prados (2006) and Pallarès-Blanch et al. (2014) coined the term naturbanisation. It argues that urbanisation processes, i.e. temporary or permanent population movements towards these areas arriving as tourists, second homers or permanent residents, are influenced by protected areas (ibid.). They refer to the examples of the Catalan High Pyrenees (Autonomous Community of Catalonia) and the Sierra Nevada (Autonomous Community of Andalusia, ibid.).

In light of the experiences with intra-EU lifestyle migrants and due to the dependency on real-estate business and construction sector in many regions, a new trend evolved after the 2008 crisis, when Spain adopted the 'Golden Visa' programme. Formally known as the Law to Support Entrepreneurs and their Internationalization, the programme aimed at constructing new economic connections with Asia and offered EU visa and eventual citizenship providing access to state services and family migration. From 2013 on, this investor permit grants Spanish residency to TCNs for one year (plus having the option of renewing this business visa in order to extend the stay), while it does not require residing in Spain for more than 183 days. It is sufficient to visit the country once during the period of residence. These visas, however, were reserved for privileged individuals only (Hof 2013; Holleran 2019): they are linked to investing in public debts (2 million €), holding shares of a Spanish company, depositing money in a Spanish bank (each 1 million €), acquire real estate assets (500,000€) or starting business projects considered of general interest. Within Europe, Spain has the highest number of visa awardees who invested 3,026 million € (until 2017). Until March 2018, 4,592 award holders and 20,163 dependents are counted, mainly originating from China, Russia, United States, Hong Kong and India, but also from Latin American countries (European Commission 2018; Transparency International and Global Witness 2018). The relevance is constantly increasing, as in the first 10 months of 2018, already 5,778 foreigners obtained a "golden visa" in Spain (Aranda 2018). As they are financially well-off individuals, they seek out expensive, pleasant places to live in urban and coastal areas. Russians, for instance, opted for Marbella on the Costa del Sol as well as the coast of Alicante (Aranda 2018).

## 7.1 HUESCA: TERRITORIAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE REGION

Author: Raúl Lardiés Bosque

The province of Huesca, bordering France, is the northernmost of the three provinces that make up the region (Autonomous Community) of Aragón, with a territorial extension of 15,556 km<sup>2</sup> (Map 34). Geographically, the southern half is characterised by summer aridity and flat territory due to the Ebro river depression and medium attitudes around 300-500m a.s.l. The northern half is mountainous as it is crossed by the Pyrenees, reaching attitudes of 3,400m a.s.l., and therefore very snowy during winter. The relief is contrasted between the mountainous north, corresponding to the central sector of the Pyrenees, and the south, where the plains of the Central Depression of the Ebro extend. 30% of the land is above 1,000 meters and 26% between 600 and 1,000 meters.

The population of the province was 228,409 inhabitants in 2009, and 220,461 in 2019 (Padrón Municipal de Habitantes, INE). Generally, the population of the province of Huesca is not decreasing, although these figures hide important demographic imbalances:

- 1) The population is concentrated in the capital city of Huesca with 53,132 inhabitants, which equals 24.1% of the total population of the province, and other 'comarcal' and medium capitals such as Barbastro or Monzón, Fraga, Sabiñánigo and Jaca (see yellow coloured surfaces in Map 34). The latter towns house between 9,000 and 16,000 inhabitants and act as centres of services for the rural areas.
- 2) With the exception of the capital of the province and the mentioned intermediate capitals, much of the territory of the province is quite empty and depopulated. Rural emigration processes to the main industrial areas of the country started in the 1950s and 60s, resulting in abandonment of many towns and villages in the Pyrenees as well as in lower situated parts of the province. The city of Zaragoza (670,000 inhabitants), which is the capital of Aragón, has also been, and continuously, attracting and concentrating population from inside Aragón (Pinilla & Sáez 2002).


As it is shown in Map 34, Huesca is characterized by the big extension of its rural territory, although only 30.8% of its population is rural (living in municipalities with less than 2,000 inhabitants). On the contrary, 16.5% of the population is living in semi urban/rural areas, and 52.6% in rural municipalities (with more than 10,000 inhabitants) (Padrón, INE)

Economically, the active population in the province is 108,500 people, which equals 49.2% of the total population (data from 'Encuesta de Población Activa', 2019; INE). The distribution of the active population by economic sectors was in 2019: 13.0% in agriculture and primary activities, 13.8% in industry, 6.9% in building and 62.4% in services. In rural areas, the service sector is mainly comprising tourism. In Huesca, the traditional presence of foreign workers in agriculture and first sector activities has always been important and higher than the regional average, but also a sector with lower productivity than the others (Lázaro Alquezar et al. 2008).

### 7.1.1 GEOGRAPHICAL AND TERRITORIAL FEATURES OF HUESCA

86.4% of Spanish territory is qualified as rural areas. However, some regions such as Aragón have a higher percentage, i.e. more than 90% (Government of Spain 2012). Much of the territory of the province of Huesca can be defined as rural, although only 39.4% of the population lives in rural areas (Table 82). With hundreds of abandoned small villages, much territory is empty and depopulated, as it was already mentioned above. To analyse the importance of rural population, data from the Padrón Municipal de Habitantes (INE) show that 47.7% of the 220,461 inhabitants of the province lived in municipalities under 10,000 inhabitants in 2019. On the other hand, 31.1% of the population lived in municipalities with less than 2,000 inhabitants, strictly defined as rural. Thus, this figure (31.1% given by the INE) is in line with the figure shown in Map 34.





**Map 34. Huesca**



<i>TERRITORIAL INDICATORS</i>	<i>2018</i>
Share of population living outside urban areas	39.4%
Share of population living in mountain areas	<50%
Share of territory covered by mountains	>50%
Share of territory covered by agricultural fields	40.5%
Border region	Yes


**Table 82. Territorial Indicators, Huesca, 2018**

*Sources: Eurostat Border typology; Urban-Rural typology; Eurostat Mountain typology; Eurostat Corine Landcover; Eurostat Degree of Urbanization (DEGURBA)*

The Pyrenees occupy more than half of the province of Huesca (>50%; Table 82), with three large units running longitudinally from east to west: Upper Pyrenees, Intra-Pyrenean Depression and Outer Sierras. The Upper Pyrenees are formed in turn by the Axial Pyrenees - where the oldest materials in the chain emerge (granites, quartzites, slates and limestones) and the highest heights are reached, with peaks such as the Aneto (3,404 m.), La Maladeta (3,309 m.) or Perdiguero (3,221 m.), and the Inland Pre-Pyrenees, made up of more modern rocks (limestones) and peaks such as the Monte Perdido (3,355 m.), Collarada (2,886 m.) or Tendeñera (2,853 m.).

The population living in mountain areas (mainly Pyrenees) is about 23% in 2019. Due to the rural character of the province, another territorial characteristic is that much territory (40.5%) is covered by agricultural fields (Tab. 82). Linked to this is the high registered number of economically active population working in agriculture and primary activities in 2019, which was 13.0% in the province of Huesca (compared to 5.8% in Aragón and 4.2% in Spain, *Encuesta de Población Activa*, INE).

## 7.1.2 ACCESSIBILITY FEATURES OF HUESCA



**Map 35. Population distribution and accessibility of hospitals in Huesca**

The geographic characteristics, i.e. the topography and physical relief, differ between the north and south of the province of Huesca and influence accessibility. Map 35 shows the less populated, mountainous North (Pyrenees), in red colours as accessibility to reach services such as hospitals is comparably worse there.

The geographical characteristics of the territory and the absence of a sufficiently articulated urban network limit the access to main services in the province of Huesca. Thus, the average time required to access hospitals was higher compared to other MATILDE regions (20.9 versus 14.2 minutes) in 2016. On the contrary, the time required to access other services such as primary or secondary schools was lower. This is the result of population concentration in the province. Nevertheless, access to these services from the small towns in the Pyrenees is much higher than the average. The same is true for access to shops, since many rural small towns do not have shops.

<b><i>ACCESSIBILITY of selected infrastructures</i></b>	<b><i>Huesca, 2016</i></b>	<b><i>MATILDE regions average, 2016</i></b>
<b>Access to hospitals, travel time by car weighted by population (minutes)</b>	20.9	14.2
<b>Access to primary schools, travel time by car weighted by population (minutes)</b>	4.8	5.9
<b>Access to secondary schools, travel time by car weighted by population (minutes)</b>	5.8	9.2
<b>Access to train stations, travel time by car weighted by population (minutes)</b>	14	10.5
<b>Access to shops, travel time by car weighted by population (minutes)</b>	6.6	5.2

**Table 83. Accessibility of selected infrastructures in Huesca, 2016**

*Data source: ESPON Profecy, 2018*

### 7.1.3 SOCIAL FEATURES OF HUESCA

The regional population density in Aragón was 28.2 inhabitants/km<sup>2</sup> in 2017, which is one of the lowest in the EU. It is the Spanish region with the fourth-lowest density and the one with the lowest density, if the most populated city, i.e. Zaragoza with over 50% of the regional population, is not considered. According to the report of the Economic and Social Council of Aragón (CESA 2018), some 86 municipalities with fewer than 100 inhabitants in Aragón have already entered what is called a “demographically terminal” cycle, i.e. they are municipalities with a high rate of aging and little biological replacement with a death rate higher than the birth rate.

However, also municipalities with more than 1,000 inhabitants are found to be in this cycle. In this context, the Autonomous Community of Aragón is one of the most affected areas by depopulation in Spain (Bielza de Ory 2003).

Over the last century, the depopulation trend continued, especially in the smaller population centres, in mountainous regions, inaccessible areas and places where agriculture is the main economy (for depopulation see Llamazares 2006). Depopulation and demographic decline, today, is no longer caused by emigration but by negative natural growth, decreasing birth rates and fertility, ageing of the population and the difficulty of demographic replacement (Ayuda et al. 2000). These are municipalities with zero natural growth (higher mortality than natality), where the population does not grow even with the arrival of immigrants.

For many decades the total population did not decline in Spain, but it has done so since 2015, and even since 2012 and 2013 in some regions (INE 2016). The economic crisis that broke out in Spain in the late 2000s has reduced natural and migratory growth to negative levels since 2015. The birth rate and fertility have continued to fall (from 1.44 children per woman in 2008 to 1.33 in 2015), the flow of foreign immigrants declined considerably, while many of those residing in Spain returned to their countries of origin, and a lot of Spain's young population emigrated.

<b>DEMOGRAPHIC INDICATORS<sup>103</sup></b>	<b>2018</b>	<b>Variation (2008-2018)</b>	<b>National average</b>	<b>EU average</b>	<b>MATILDE regions average</b>
<b>Population size</b>	219,174	-2.33%	-	-	425,252
<b>Population density (inhabitants per km<sup>2</sup>)</b>	14.1	14.1/14.6 **	93.1	105.3	102
<b>Median age of population (years)</b>	46	1.5*	43.6	43.1	45
<b>Old-age dependency ratio (&gt;65/14-64)</b>	35.1	1.1*	29.2	30.5	33
<b>Young-age Dependency Ratio</b>	21.3	0.1*	22.7	24.1	23
<b>Ageing Index (&gt;65/&lt;14)</b>	164.7	3.7	128	124	148
<b>Crude birth rate (births per 1000 inhabitants)</b>	7.5	-2	7.9	9.8	9.1
<b>Total fertility rate (new-born per woman)</b>	1.35	0.06 *	1.26	1.54	1.58
<b>Crude rate of natural population change (‰)</b>	-4.2	-4.2/ -1.5	-1.2	-1.0	-1.7
<b>Crude rate of net migration (‰)</b>	4.5	-3.7/ 12	7.1	2.6	3.6
<b>Crude rate of total population change (‰)</b>	0.3	-6.8/10.5	6	1.6	1.9

**Table 84. Demographic indicators of Huesca, 2018**

*Data sources: Eurostat, Population (Demography, Migration and Projections)*

103 \*This is calculated only for the period 2014-2018. \*\* Minimum and maximum values recorded in the period considered.

If we only focus on the global (provincial) figures, the province of Huesca does not show this depopulation tendency. Nevertheless, much of its rural territory is suffering from this phenomenon, showing many areas with increasing aging of the population due to low fertility and natality as well as increasing mortality. The population density in the province is around 14 to 15 inhabitants per km<sup>2</sup> within the 2008-2018 period (Table 84), representing one of the lowest densities of all MATILDE regions, which is also much lower than the Spanish national average (93.1 inhabitants per km<sup>2</sup> in 2018) as well as the EU average (105.3 inhabitants per km<sup>2</sup>).

The aging of the population is also shown in the medium age of the population of the province (46 years), which is also above the national and MATILDE regions average. In parallel, the proportion of old people (old-age dependency ratio) among the total population is higher, and the proportion of young people (young-age dependency ratio) is lower compared to both the average in Spain and the one among MATILDE regions.


Table 84 also shows the lower birth rate and fertility rate in the province of Huesca compared with the national and MATILDE regions average, which leads to a higher index of aging of the population. As a result, the rate of natural population change is quite negative (-4.2%), and even lower than the average in the MATILDE regions (-1.7%).

The only exception in demographic terms is the maintained arrival of immigrants, which is positive in some periods and contributes to the positive increment of the total population. It occurred during the pre-crisis period along the 2000s until 2008, when the arrival of immigrants implied positive population growth in many municipalities.

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## DEMOGRAPHY

The **evolution of the total population** of the province of Huesca from the 2000s to 2018 is not particularly **negative** (Chart 125), although this evolution hides internal differences between territories. In line with the development on the national level, the population in the MATILDE province of Huesca slowly increased until 2010. Following the structural crisis in the beginning of the 2010s, the numbers are slightly decreasing until today, as shown in the following chart.




**Chart 125. Third Country Nationals over total population in Huesca, 2008-2019**

*Data source: Padrón Municipal de Habitantes (INE, National Statistical Institute Spain)*

The proportion of foreign population in Huesca was 12.4% in 2018, while this figure was 10.4% for Aragón and 11.6% for Spain. Over the last ten years, the migration balance in the MATILDE region Huesca was changing a lot. From positive in 2008, it turned negative in 2009 as well as from 2012 to 2015. From 2016 on, however, it is increasingly positive again (Chart 126).

The **positive migration balance** is a result of immigration of foreigners because migration balance of nationals was negative in all years. The immigration of foreigners and the positive migration balance was important before the economic crisis starting in 2008 and after it, i.e. from 2015 on. From that year, the arrival of immigrants tended to recuperate in the context of a general situation of economic growth in the country, but numbers did not overpass the pre-crisis level.



**Chart 126. Migration balance in Huesca, 2008-2018**


*Data source: Estadística Migratoria; INE, National Statistical Institute Spain*

## DEMOGRAPHY: FOCUS ON TCNS

Most of the foreign population living in the province of Huesca are coming from other European countries; therefore, TCNs do not represent the most popular group. EU migrants are particularly originating from Romania. Representing the majority in many rural municipalities, they are working in the primary sector mainly.

In line with the development on the national level, the total number of TCNs decreased in the aftermath of the economic and structural crisis from 2008 on. Not before 2018, they started to rise again. TCN immigrants in Huesca were 11,663 in 2018 (compared to 75,739 in the province of Zaragoza). The share of TCNs among total population is slightly lower in Huesca (5.3%) compared to the national average (6.3%). The evolution of TCN immigration in Huesca, can be grouped into three phases (cf. Chart 127): First, rise until the economic crisis starting in 2010, second, decrease during the crisis (2010-2015), and third, slowly recuperation from 2015 on, due to the good economic situation. From 2016, immigrants arriving in Spain are predominantly from Latin America, especially from Venezuela, fleeing from the dictatorship of Nicolás Maduro and economic famine. Colombia follows Venezuela in the ranking, although among TCNs Morocco is still the country with the largest presence in Spain. These flows are mainly composed by temporary workers and their relatives.





**Chart 127. Development of Third Country Nationals in Huesca, 2008-2018**

*Data source: Padrón Municipal de Habitantes (INE, National Statistical Institute Spain)*

The MATILDE region Huesca is characterised by a variety of people with foreign citizenship of third countries, whilst a change regarding quantitative terms and with respect to its composition can be observed from 2008 to 2018 (Table 85). In 2008, the TOP10 of foreign citizenships included countries with whom Spain had a long-lasting migration history, such as Morocco, Ecuador or Colombia (see also Gomez-Bahillo et al. 2004). While numbers of Gambians, Moroccans and Ukrainians remained quite stable over time in absolute numbers, other increased or decreased remarkably. Amongst them are Ecuador, Colombia (- 55.7%), Algeria (- 19.8%), Dominican Republic (- 18.8%), China (+35.0%), Mali (+ 42.7%), and Senegal (+ 51.3%). The most important increase took place among Nicaraguans (+500%).

The main reasons for decline among some population groups are the high number of naturalizations, particularly for the population from Latin America (Ecuador and Colombia), and the high number of returns to the countries of origin in the years following the economic crisis, e.g. in the case of Ecuadorians. The increase in other groups is related to two factors: the growth of work activity in some sectors such as agriculture and livestock that mainly affects the sub-Saharan seasonal population from Mali and Senegal and the existence of intense migratory networks that explains the increase of immigrants from Nicaragua. For the latter group, also bad economic situation in the country of origin as well as cultural and linguistic similarities facilitated the decision to move to the region. In addition, the increase of jobs in the residential services sector, i.e. in nursing homes and in particular the increase of the demand for care for



elderly dependents (Romea Martínez 2019), has benefited the arrival of feminized migratory flows from Nicaragua (and other Latin American immigrants), forming a rapidly growing migratory chain that stands out against the migrant population of a family nature, most represented by the Ecuadorian and Romanian population. While Aragón is among the regions with the lowest number of residents of Chinese origin, it is characterized by more recent settlements of Chinese with a high proportion of self-employed workers. They often open businesses in sectors in which they are specialized, i.e. Chinese food restaurants, bazaars, clothing and shoe stores, hairdressing and the transfer of native bars and little shops. To avoid competition with their compatriots, they mainly work and live in rural areas (Zhong & Beltrán 2020).

2008			2018		
1	Morocco	3,235	1	Morocco	3,146
2	Ecuador	1,131	2	Mali	1,120
3	Colombia	1,115	3	Algeria	665
4	Algeria	829	4	Gambia	651
5	Mali	785	5	Senegal	619
6	Gambia	603	6	Ukraine	562
7	Argentina	548	7	Colombia	494
8	Ukraine	546	8	China	413
9	Dominican Republic	436	9	Nicaragua	396
10	Senegal	409	10	Dominican Republic	354


**Table 85. Total number of Third country Nationals by citizenship (TOP 10) in Huesca, 2008-2018**

*Data source: Padrón Municipal de Habitantes (INE, National Statistical Institute Spain)*

## AGE AND GENDER STRUCTURE

About the **age** of TCNs at level NUTS-3 (Huesca), no data are available from the INE (National Statistical Institute, Spain). Nevertheless, as an approximation, we can use data referred to total foreign population in Huesca (2018). According to these data coming from the Padrón Municipal de Habitantes (INE), 23,190 foreigners were registered in the Padrón in 2018, thereof only 11,663 TCNs. While only 15.2% of them had less than 14 years, 82.3% were between the age of 15 and 65 years, and 2.5% had more than 65 years. This corresponds to flows of population in the working age. With regard to **gender**, the total number of female TCNs in Huesca was 5,166 in 2018, which is a share of 44.3% (Chart 128). While the number female TCNs grew until 2010 and in 2018, they fell in-between these years. During the last ten years, the share rose slightly, but is still on a low level compared to the national average (49.8%, 2018). However, there are differences between nationalities, since immigrants from Morocco working and living in rural

areas are mostly men. On the contrary, among Colombians and Dominicans women are more numerous, mainly occupying jobs in the domestic sector and care for children and the elderly.




**Chart 128. Share of female Third Country Nationals in Huesca, 2008-2018**

*Data source: Padrón Municipal de Habitantes (INE, National Statistical Institute Spain)*

#### 7.1.4 EDUCATIONAL FEATURES OF HUESCA

The education level of TCNs from 15 to 64 years differs remarkably from the total population in Aragón<sup>104</sup>. The share of people with lower education, i.e., less than primary, primary and lower secondary education (levels 0-2), is much higher among TCNs (56.3% compared to 36.8%, 2018, see Chart 129) and has even increased during the crisis years (59.9%, in 2013).

<sup>104</sup> Since EUROSTAT data only can be provided on NUTS-2-level, the NUTS-2 Aragón, where Huesca belongs to, was selected.



**Chart 129. Education level among Third Country Nationals and total population in Aragón, 2008-2018**

*Data source: Eurostat*

Regarding young people between 15 and 34 years coming from third countries, who are neither in employment nor in education and training (NEET), Aragón<sup>105</sup> showed very high rates over the last ten years, like did Spain as a whole. In comparison with other MATILDE regions, the percentage of NEETS in Aragón is also slightly higher (10.1% versus 9.2%). While NEET rates of the total population were slightly below the national average, the ones of TCNs were higher than the national average and increased even more after the economic crisis (42.5%, 2013). They decreased on a high level in the last five years. Nevertheless, a positive aspect is that the percentage of population with tertiary education attainment is higher in Aragón than in other MATILDE regions.


The increase of the NEET population is directly related to the high rate of youth unemployment, particularly affecting unskilled youth, with early school leaving. This prevents them from continuing and obtaining specialized training, making it difficult for them to access the labour market. Other causes of the increasing number of NEETS are of sociocultural nature, i.e. the devaluation of the studies and the fact that studying currently does not guarantee a future job or an adequate position in the society. Early school leaving and unemployment is also affecting people

<sup>105</sup> Since EUROSTAT data only can be provided on NUTS-2-level, the NUTS-2 Aragón, where Huesca belongs to, was selected.

with disadvantaged socio-economic and cultural environments in which a culture of effort and dedication is not fostered or who start from another culture, language and characteristics, which translates into added difficulties to achieve success within the educational system (Ruiz Mosquera 2017).

Although there are few studies, one refers to immigrants working in agriculture in the region of Murcia (Cutillas Fernández & Moraes Mena 2018). Children of migrant families have a higher risk of educational failure and register an earlier drop out of the school system. In rural areas like this one, with development of the agricultural sector and with great growth of the agri-food industry, the young children of immigrants tend to join the tasks of the fields, as a quick way to earn money and improve the social position of their parents.

Chart 130 shows that between 30 and 45% of young immigrants are included in the group of NEET, while highest percentages were reached particularly during the period of the past economic crisis (2012 to 2015). These figures are higher among immigrants than among the native population and show that the effect of the economic crisis was stronger and more negative among immigrants than among the local and native population.



**Chart 130. Share of young NEETS (15-34y/o) in Aragón and Spain, 2008-2018**

*Data source: Eurostat*

### 7.1.5 ECONOMIC FEATURES OF HUESCA

From the economic point of view, Aragón stands out as a region with a high regional GDP per capita (31,900€ in 2017), also in comparison with the Spanish average of 27,600€ and the MATILDE regions average of 29,624€ (Table 86). Maybe this is one of the factors that justify the higher proportion of TCNs immigrants in Aragón compared to the whole of Spain.

<i>ECONOMIC INDICATORS</i>	<i>2017</i>	<i>Variation 2008-2017</i>	<i>National average (2017)</i>	<i>EU average (2017)<sup>106</sup></i>	<i>MATILDE regions average (2017)</i>
Regional GDP per capita at purchasing power standards	31,900	-0.5%	27,600	29,800	29,624
Regional Gross value added: primary sector (% percentage points)	15%	3.9	3%	2% (7,098.5 million euro)	4%
Regional Gross value added: secondary sector (%, percentage points)	24%	-7.8	22%	27% (95,398 million euro)	30%
Regional Gross value added: tertiary sector (% percentage points)	60%	+3.9	75%	71% (254,090 million euro)	66%

**Table 86. Economic indicators in Huesca, 2017**

*Data sources: Eurostat Gross domestic product (GDP) at current market prices by NUTS 3 regions; OECD Gross domestic product (GDP); Eurostat Gross value added at basic prices by NUTS 3 regions.*

## ECONOMIC STRUCTURE

Considering the added value by economic sectors (Table 86), there are also differences between Aragón and the other MATILDE regions. In Aragón, the added value of the **primary sector** is higher than the MATILDE regions average due to the presence of the agri-food sector and the importance of irrigated crops that increase the added value of productions. A regional focus is in the Ebro Valley, although this area is situated outside the province of Huesca. In this sector of the agri-food industry, the manufacturing of feed is one of the most important activities related to the production of fodder and fattening of livestock, in addition to meat activity. The manufacture of flour

<sup>106</sup> Missing data for France for Regional Gross Value Added and Employment by sector; Average has been therefore calculated on the basis of 26 Member States.


and semolina (derived from the cereal) is also important due to cereal production, as is the manufacture of olive oils and the production of wine.

The added value of the **industrial (secondary) sector** is slightly lower in Aragón compared to the MATILDE regions average (24% and 30%, respectively). The most important company is Opel-PSA Group factory (former General Motors) located in Figueruelas (Zaragoza), where 470,371 vehicles were produced in 2019 and which generates about 23% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in Aragón.

Finally, the presence of the **service sector** in the GDP of Aragón is also lower (60%) in comparison with the average of the MATILDE regions (66%). The service economy of Aragón is characterized by logistics in particular. With an area of 13,117,977 m<sup>2</sup> Logistics Platform (called 'Plaza'), which is located in Zaragoza, is the largest logistics facility on the European continent. Its management, execution and promotion are entrusted to Aragón Plataforma Logística SAU, a company wholly owned by Corporación Empresarial Pública de Aragón, as single shareholder company of the Aragón Government. In a study of over 90 logistics parks from 30 European countries carried out by the German specialist consultant Deutsche GVZ and the Institute of Shipping Economics and Logistics in Germany, the quality of its services and intermodality led to the fact that the Platform was ranked in 5th position in the European Freight Villages, being the best in Spain.

Another important technology park is Walqa, located on the outskirts of the city of Huesca is Walqa. The park was founded in 2002 with a total area of 53 hectares. Within the 14 buildings, local, regional, national, multinational, new entrepreneurs, universities and technology centres are situated mainly working on information technology, biotechnology and renewable energy.

As it was mentioned above, Aragón stands out as a region with a high regional GDP per capita (Chart 131). Huesca, as a part of Aragón, also stands out with a higher figure, which decreased during the economic crisis (2009-2015), but increased afterwards. A similar evolution took place in Spain, although the GDP is lower, as also in the other MATILDE regions.



**Chart 131. Gross Domestic Product trend in Huesca, 2008-2017**

*Data source: Eurostat, Gross domestic product (GDP) at current market prices by NUTS 3 regions*

All the province, but in particular its northern part (*Alto Aragón*) has very positive aspects in indicators such as profitability and productivity. In addition, it is well-placed in international trade, but also stands out in the real estate sector as well as agriculture and the agri-food industry. Irrigation in the two large irrigated areas through which the Canal of Aragón and Catalonia passes is crucial for the cultivation of alfalfa, corn and fruit trees.

The most important activities in the industrial sector are agri-food, metal products, chemistry, machinery, non-metal products and wood. It is also necessary to highlight metallurgy, medical instrumentation, and paper and graphic arts. Regarding innovation in the energy sector, since the 2000s there has been an increase in the development of renewable energy with the creation of wind and solar farms. Nevertheless, the service sector is the most important one, with tourism being the root of many municipalities and local areas especially in the Pyrenees. Trade and restaurants, in turn, generate the most jobs in service industry.



## LABOUR MARKET

Unemployment is the main weakness of the Spanish economy as figures are higher than in the average MATILDE regions, although unemployment in Aragón and Huesca tends to be lower than in the whole of Spain (9.2% versus 17.2% in 2017, cf. Table 87). In the case of Aragón, there is a double explanation for its low level of unemployment: economic dynamism in areas of Huesca near Catalonia and other areas of the same province and Zaragoza, both well connected with the main consumer markets of Madrid and the proximity to Barcelona. Also, at the same time, Huesca has a serious demographic problem; the depopulation affects especially a good part of Huesca and, above all, Teruel, which means no surplus labor (EL PAÍS 2018).

<b>LABOUR MARKET INDICATORS</b>	<b>2017</b>	<b>Variation 2008-2017</b>	<b>National average (2017)</b>	<b>EU average (2017)*</b>	<b>MATILDE regions average (2017)</b>
<b>Unemployment rate (%/percentage points)</b>	9.2%	3.7	17.2%	8.1 %	8.4%
<b>Employment in primary sector (% thousands of employees)</b>	15% (15.2)	0.7%	4%	5% (353.98)	5% (6.75)
<b>Employment in secondary sector (% thousands of employees)</b>	18% (18.1)	-34.4%	17%	23% (1,584.74)	26% (36.19)
<b>Employment in tertiary sector (% thousands of employees)</b>	67% (67.6)	-3.6 %	79%	71% (4,830.33)	69% (97.63)
<b>People at risk of poverty or social exclusion (%/percentage points)</b>	17.7% (average 2008-2018)	0.6	26.6%	22.5%	18.7%


**Table 87. Labour Market indicators in Huesca, 2017**

*Data sources: Unemployment: OECD Labour indicators, small regions TL3 and large regions TL2; National Statistical Institutes; Eurostat, Unemployment rates by sex, age, citizenship and NUTS 2 regions; Eurostat, People at risk of poverty or social exclusion by NUTS 2 regions.*

In contrast to the average MATILDE regions, the other figures show the higher proportion of employment in the primary sector in Huesca and the lower proportions of employment of the industrial and service activities (cf. Table 87).

The share of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion in Huesca is lower than the national average of Spain (15.8% versus 26.6%) and the MATILDE regions average (cf. Table 87). This is probably linked to the lower unemployment rate and the low labour pressure due to the depopulation in the province.

Currently, due the Covid-19 crisis, there has been a drop in employment in Aragón of around 4.7% of the total, mainly affecting the construction sector (-7.5%), and services (-5.4%). Industry instead is only affected to a lesser extent (-3.0%). Instead, jobs were created in the residential care services (2.3%), healthcare (2.0%), the plastics and rubber industry (1.8%), as well as in the agricultural and livestock sector (1.4%). This indicates a positive fact, given that immigrants are mainly absorbed in residential care services and in the agricultural and livestock sector (Economía Aragonesa 2020).




**Chart 132. Employment by sector in Huesca, 2017**

*Data source: Eurostat, Employment (thousand persons) by NUTS 3 regions*

## LABOUR MARKET: FOCUS ON TCNS

Compared to 2008, the employment rate of TCNs in Aragón<sup>107</sup>, today, is noticeable lower (56.7%) than the one of the total population (67.9%). The rate of TCNs, which was even higher than the one of the total population in 2008 (70.2% compared to 69.9%), especially dropped in the aftermath of the economic crisis in 2008 and did not pick up yet (Chart 133).



**Chart 133. Development of employment rates in Aragón, 2008-2018**

*Data source: Eurostat*

If we compare employment patterns in the whole of Spain and in rural areas, the presence of part-time employment is lower in rural areas of Spain, and also among TCN immigrants (Table 88). We can see the same pattern for self-employment, which is always lower among TCN immigrants, and particularly in rural areas. On the contrary, temporary employment is higher among TCNs than for the total of Spain, and also higher in rural areas. The explanation for this is that many of the jobs occupied by TCNs are linked to temporary jobs in agriculture, construction, and services (mainly tourism). To summarize, these figures show the important job instability among


<sup>107</sup> Since EUROSTAT data only can be provided on NUTS-2-level, the NUTS-2 Aragón, where Huesca belongs to, was selected.

TCNs, and particularly in rural areas.

2018	Total Spain		Rural Areas Spain	
	TCN	TOTAL	TCN	TOTAL
Part-time employment	21.6%	14.5%	15.9%	13.7%
Self-employment	12.7%	15.2%	10.8%	23.4%
Temporary employment	45.2%	26.9%	46.2%	31.1%

**Table 88. Special employment patterns for total population and Third Country Nationals by degree of urbanization in Spain**

*Data source: Eurostat*



**Chart 134. Unemployment rate trends in Aragón, 2008-2017**

*Sources: OECD.stat, Labour indicators, small regions TL3 and large regions TL2; Eurostat, Total unemployment rate; National statistical offices of MATILDE countries*

Whilst the unemployment rate in Aragón<sup>108</sup> followed the nationwide developments from 2008 to 2018, the unemployment rate of TCNs in Aragón was and is much higher than the one of the total population. Partly, this is

<sup>108</sup> Since EUROSTAT data only can be provided on NUTS-2-level, the NUTS-2 Aragón, where Huesca belongs to, was selected.

due to the fact that they are occupations with highest possibilities of having the greatest loss of employment during a crisis and the greatest presence of foreigners in these occupations (Medina et al. 2010). Unemployment among immigrants tripled during the economic and structural crisis and is still higher than the pre-crisis level today (23.3%, 2018). In rural areas in Spain, the unemployment rate of the total population corresponds to the nationwide share in 2018 (15.3% to 15.4%).

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## 8. COUNTRY REPORT SWEDEN

Author: Stefan Kordel, with contributions from Jan Amcoff, Ulf Hansson, Tina Mathisen, Micheline van Riemsdijk and Susanne Stenbacka

Historically, Sweden is a country of high diversity. Until the end of the 1960s, there was a high demand of labour migrants in small- to medium-scale manufacturing industries throughout the country (Rauhut & Johansson 2011). Between 1970 and 1985, the importance of refugee and family migration was rising and since the mid-1980s the immigration to Sweden is dominated by refugees and tied movers (SCB 2004; Rauhut & Johansson 2011).

A study on immigration during the 1990-2010 period showed that net migration is, like in other Nordic countries, the most important source for population growth (Hedlund et al. 2017) and Sweden issued the most residence permits in Nordic countries, mostly for asylum seekers and family reunification (Karlsdottir et al. 2018). For sparsely populated areas and remote regions in Sweden, a positive international net migration is paralleled by a negative interregional net migration and a negative net fertility rate (Glesbygdsverket 2008; Galera et al. 2018).

A peculiarity of Sweden's liberal immigration policy, which is continued despite the rising influence of the right-wing populist party of Sweden Democrats (*Sverigedemokraterna*), is its equality policy, promoting that all legal migrants living in Sweden for at least one year or are assumed to live there for at least this period of time, have the same access to healthcare, social security and other social services as Swedish nationals. The arrival of humanitarian migrants with a peak in 2015/16 resulted in modifications of integration policies with a special emphasis on integration of asylum seekers and the aim to share the burden between regions and municipalities all over the country. Furthermore, more responsibility was given to the municipalities and the local sphere, while, simultaneously, activation policies that aim to integrate refugees into work as soon as possible were strengthened (Karlsdottir et al. 2018; Wikström & Ahnlund 2018). Alongside these developments, integration is not only addressed as a benefit for migrants themselves, but also as a potential for ageing societies and depopulating areas. When Hedlund et al. (2017) asked if immigration could be a solution for rural decline by means of a retrospective to the period 1990-2010, they firstly sketched demographic effects of newcomers and pointed out an increase from 5.4% of foreign born people in sparse rural area in 1990 to 8.6% in 2010 (dense rural: 3.4% to 9.1%). Moreover, they showed an increased heterogeneity of countries of origin: while in sparse rural areas the highest increase was among immigrants from Asia, Western Europe, Africa and the Middle East, in dense rural areas Eastern European migrants increased remarkably (ibid.; see also Hedberg & Haandrikman 2014). The migrants are, compared to the majority population, younger and the share of male is higher. But there are also more diverse aspects of the migrant

population. Demographic implications depend on the countries of origin. While among immigrants from Middle Eastern countries and Africa, male predominate, the ratio is reversed among newcomers from Asian countries. With regard to age structure, people aged 64+ and coming from Middle East and Africa are rare. The study of Hedlund et al. (2017) also revealed differences in labour market integration, considered of growing relevance in Sweden's integration policy. Compared to immigrants from Nordic countries, those from Africa and Middle East had a remarkably lower employment rate in rural areas (63% vs. 28%), whilst also the urban-rural employment gap was higher among this group, indicating higher unemployment rates in rural areas, keeping in mind that the majority of people from this group spent less time in Sweden than others. Interestingly, self-employment among immigrants is slightly higher than among native born Swedes, while people "from Asia, Africa and the Middle East were over-represented in the retail, hotel and restaurant sector in rural areas (20-33% of employed and 62-83% of self-employed compared with 13% of both employed and self-employed for natives)" (ibid. 408f.). The study finally concludes that keeping people in rural areas is crucial making use of the potential stimuli of migrants for local labour markets.

According to Stenbacka (2013), rural places cannot be seen as passive recipients or defenders of the local, but agents in globalisation. In her study on refugee migration to some rural areas she found that municipalities see receiving refugees as an important municipal strategy for creating a resilient environment from both an economic and a social perspective. In another study of her (2018), leaning on the concept territorialised cosmopolitanism, she argued that rural areas can be understood as cosmopolitan; and that local institutions are important arenas for formal and informal connections where rural cosmopolitanism and hospitality might be played out.


## LABOUR MIGRATION

Labour migration became a relevant phenomenon in Sweden in the post-war decades, with Finns, Yugoslavs and Greeks as the main national groups. This was followed by migrants from Turkey and other countries in the 1960s/70s (Eimermann & Karlsson 2018; Migrationsverket 2020a). The very legislation until the end of the 1960s was modified upon request of the unions, resulting in a system allowing labour migrants to enter the country based on the assessment of the competence needed in the country's labour market. As a consequence, labour migration decreased to very small extents during the last decades of the 20th century and the first years of the 21st.

Today, labour migration is regulated in the Aliens Act, which was amended in December 2008 to facilitate labour migration. The current labour immigration policy is demand-driven and open to all workers irrespective of their skill or educational level. Thus, employers, rather than any state authority, are responsible for the assessment of

competence shortages. Before applying for a permit, the migrant must have a job offer in hand. Minimum salary requirements apply, and in some cases proof of health insurance. Highly skilled migrants can apply for an EU Blue Card or an ICT permit. In order to qualify for a Blue Card, the applicant must have completed "180 credits of tertiary education or five years of professional experience and a salary at least one and a half times the average gross salary in Sweden" (Migrationsverket 2020b). There is no numerical limit on labour immigration from countries outside the European Economic Areas or a requirement to recruit only in shortage occupations. Consequently, Sweden's labour immigration has been labelled as one of the most liberal among the OECD countries (OECD 2011). However, labour migration amounts to only 6,000 persons per year, an approximate 75% are men, 35% women. Their most common origins are India and China (25%), while their most common occupations are within IT and engineering sectors or hospitality industry.

Despite figures of TCNs employed in agriculture, fishery and forestry recently decreased, immigrant employment in this sector is quite important (Parusel 2015). Especially seasonal working migrants contribute to maintaining specific realms, e.g. berry picking, where Thai women are essential (Webster 2016). Around 5,000 Thai berry pickers come to Sweden every year for approximately 70 days (Hedberg et al. 2019, cf. Chart 135). This specific migration system started with seasonal unorganised migrant workers from eastern and central Europe who, in line with the Right of public access (*allemansrätten*) picked the berries and sold them to Swedish producers. Since the 1980s, they started to come from more distant locations such as Thailand or Vietnam (Jonsson & Uddstål 2002; Hedberg 2013). Currently, companies, who want to invite and employ seasonal workers, have to guarantee minimum wages and care about transport and facilities (Hedberg et al. 2019).



**Chart 135. Foreign agricultural workers in Sweden 2009-2014**

*Source: Swedish Migration Agency, 2019, quoted in Hedberg, et. al. 2019: 14<sup>109</sup>*

Other important sectors hiring TCNs encompass IT sector and, to a lesser extent, construction, manufacturing and the service sector (Parusel 2015). A certain regional variety can be observed as a result of specific regional and local constellations.

A considerable amount of Swedish municipalities as well as the private sector recently engaged in attraction of immigrant workers to fill labour shortages. The policies targeted migrants who previously lived in other parts of Sweden and those who lived abroad. Whilst for the former group, municipalities provided specific integration measures, for the latter, which represent a smaller share, they also get involved in legal advices, e.g. regarding visa and working permits (Oliveira & Costa 2017).

<sup>109</sup> For 2009-2014, the workers fall under the occupational group “Agricultural, fishery and related labourers”, for 2015-2017 under the occupational group “Berry pickers and planters”.

## FORCED MIGRATION

Larger flows of forced migrants, primarily from Europe, arrived in Sweden during and after the second world war. During the 1970s, more long-distance refugees were received, e.g. from Chile. Kurdish refugees and their families arrived at the beginning of the 1980s (Eimermann & Karlsson 2018). Simultaneously, in the early 1980s and 1990s, more than 50,000 Iranian refugees migrated to Sweden (Kelly & Hedman 2016), whilst people from former Yugoslavia entered Sweden in the 1990s. The refugee immigration has increased to an all-time-high during the 2000s and 2010s, when Afghans, Iraqis, Somalis and Syrians made up large portions. In 2015, Sweden had the highest number of asylum seekers ever, i.e. 160,000 individuals, which in turn led to immigration breaking a record in 2016. The statistics for 2017 were also affected by the large number of asylum seekers in 2015, as many had to wait a long time for a decision to stay in Sweden. However, in 2018 as well as 2019, the numbers dropped (21,502 in 2018 and 22,000 in 2019; SCB 2020). The Top 3-countries Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq represented nearly 75% of all applicants for the period 2006 to 2020.

During the second half of the 1980s and the first years of the 1990s, the “whole-of-Sweden-strategy” (*Hela Sverige-strategin*) was implemented in order to prevent a concentration of forced migrants in metropolitan areas (Rauhut & Johansson 2011). Accordingly, forced migrants were sent to municipalities with vacant dwelling, i.e. depopulating areas. However, as migrants were free to move once they received a residence permit, the regional effects became smaller than intended as individuals stayed or moved to areas, where compatriots already lived. A new legislation in 1994 introduced two selectable trajectories for asylum seekers, ABO and EBO: ABO means that the authorities arrange and pay for accommodation at a given location, while within EBO, instead, the asylum seeker arranges and pays for an accommodation at a location of his or her choice. Since EBO often means that the asylum seeker ends up at relatives or compatriots’ dwellings in large housing estates in the surrounding of larger cities, the affected municipalities – responsible for social services – have complained. Since 2020, 32 municipalities have therefore been given the right to restrict EBO in selected residential areas to address segregation, while asylum seekers are encouraged to settle elsewhere, especially in peripheral, rural areas (for spatial distribution of asylum seekers, see Maps 12 and 13 in Finland report). These changes – introduced in January 2020 – means that if the applicant chooses



to settle in a particular municipality with areas described as socially and economically challenging (*sociala och ekonomiska utmaningar*) that individual loses his or her right for financial support (Migrationsverket 2020c).<sup>110</sup>

An asylum-seeker has access to a range of services, delivered by a range of agencies. The municipalities have a responsibility for education (up to the age of 16) whereas the regions provide emergency healthcare and dental care, to which an asylum seeker is entitled. In the case of underaged children, they are entitled to the same healthcare and dental care as children resident in Sweden. Asylum seekers can seek employment and the Swedish Employment Agency (*Arbetsförmedlingen*) is responsible for the provision and assistance in looking for employment, however an asylum seeker cannot partake in labour market initiatives/programmes. Finally, the County Administrative Boards – acting on behalf of the state – co-ordinate early interventions as well as securing provisions and capacity, particularly in the context of children arriving without guardians or parents (SKR 2020). An asylum seeker does not have the right to partake in Swedish for Migrants (SFI) as asylum seekers are not residents *per se*, i.e. registered residents. However, various providers such as the adult education association *Folkuniversitetet* offer courses in Swedish for asylum seekers.

For the specific group of unaccompanied minors, there are traces in recent history for Sweden, receiving, for instance, 70,000 children from Finland during World War II, 10,000 of whom remained after the war (Gärdegård 2017). In 2015, Sweden received more than 35,000, mostly coming from Afghanistan (78% of all unaccompanied minors). In some rural municipalities, the share of minors who came as refugees is quite high, for instance Åsele and Sorsele in Sweden (see also Map 13 in the Finnish profile). In all of these municipalities, unaccompanied minors made up around 10 percent of the total number of children (0-17 years).

The municipal social services are responsible for the welfare and housing of the unaccompanied minors as well as providing counselling and contact with the migration authorities. Both children who are seeking asylum and have been granted a residential permit have the right to attend school in Sweden. Nevertheless, feelings of otherness play a role in school, while separate preparatory classes for unaccompanied minors lead to a lack of natural meeting places between the newly arrived and the local youth (Wernesjö 2015). Although these structural factors are similar

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110 The following municipalities have areas listed as 'socially and economically challenging': Borlänge, Borås, Botkyrka, Eskilstuna, Filipstad, Gävle, Göteborg, Halmstad, Helsingborg, Huddinge, Järfälla, Jönköping, Karlskrona, Katrineholm, Kristianstad, Landskrona, Linköping, Malmö, Motala, Norrköping, Nyköping, Perstorp, Sandviken, Stockholm, Södertälje, Trollhättan, Uddevalla, Uppsala, Västerås, Växjö, Åstorp och Örebro.

in both urban and rural areas, rural areas described as relatively ethnically homogenous, might function to amplify the experienced otherness leading to a sense of non-belonging. The opposite might also be true, i.e. that the small-scale character increases feelings of being seen and then enhance the building of a place-identity (Mathisen & Stenbacka 2015).

Since March 1<sup>st</sup>, 2016, a law termed “municipal placement” (*kommunplacering*) regulates that all Swedish municipalities also have a duty to receive newly-arrived refugees, i.e. persons who recently got granted asylum (Karlsdottir et al. 2018), and have to assist in finding accommodation (Stenbacka 2018). Quota refugees and refugees with residence permits are entitled to help for housing, they are localised to a municipality by the Swedish Migration Agency. The number of new arrivals a municipality receives “depends on its size, labour-market structure, total number of newcomers (including unaccompanied minors) and number of asylum seekers already in residence” (Migrationsverket 2020d). As a consequence, a more even distribution all over the country could be detected. Besides some municipalities in mid-Sweden with high rates, the largest shares can be found in the sparsely populated municipalities in the inner (Western) parts of Norrland (*ibid.*). A reason behind this distribution is the surplus of housing in these parts of the country, as well as municipalities’ strategies to increase the population, i.e. considering refugees as a resource every municipality has the right to access (Stenbacka 2012). Those municipalities who built up integration infrastructure also experienced in-migration of secondary refugees and could create path-dependency in the long run (*ibid.*).

Support by the Swedish state is provided during the first two years with regard to economic assistance, e.g. housing and daily needs, and organised via the Swedish Board of Migration. When two years have passed, the migrants are considered to be inhabitants of the municipality where they are staying, and thus is it the responsibility of the municipality to care for housing and other needs. Since 2010, the labour market agency became increasingly involved (Stenbacka 2012) and labour market integration was reformulated. Target groups for the so called introduction programme are refugees and their reunited families. “While participation in the programme is not mandatory, those who chose not to participate have no right to receive any economic support” (Irastorza & Bevelander 2017: 272). Two tools constitute the most important pillars of the policies for this migrant group: firstly, the introduction benefit that aims to provide stronger economic incentives for participants and spouses, and, secondly, the introduction guides, i.e., persons who support refugees to find employment. After severe criticism from the Swedish National Accounting Office (2014), the program for introduction guides was disbanded in 2015.

The report argued that the program focused too much on social assistance and too little on labour market integration. The civil society in Sweden has shown to be important, particularly in the initial phases of reception and

welcoming into the local community, this is shown for example in the arrangement of language cafes (Dalademokraten 2016) and the collection and distributing of furniture and clothes. Another issue concerns the participation/engagement of TCN's in voluntary organisations, the information regarding this is limited. However, studies have shown that there is an absence of and difficulty in recruiting TCN's to participate in voluntary associations (MacKay et al. 2016; Arora-Jonsson 2017). Arora-Jonsson writes about the characteristics of many rural organisations and how they value tradition and culture, and as a side-effect integration practices are about assimilation rather than multi-culturalism

With regard to employment of humanitarian migrants, a study on refugees arrived in Sweden between 2000 and 2009 by Vogiazides & Mondani (2019) shows that opportunities for employment are higher in regions at the extremes of the population density distribution, i.e., Stockholm area and sparsely populated rural areas. Irastorza & Bevelander's (2017) study on labour market integration of this group revealed lower employment levels than labour migrants or natives, however, a positive converging trend over time is reported. Refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iran and Ethiopia have better employment outcomes than those from major source countries, whilst the latter are characterised by lower duration of stay in Sweden. According to the authors, this argument supports the assumption of accumulating human capital over time. As it was shown by Eimmermann and Karlsson (2018) people from the Middle East and North Africa have high rates of self-employment in the rural tourism-related sector (ibid.) and especially run small restaurants such as pizzerias. Included in the tourism sector are work in hotels, restaurants, conference activities, travel and transport. In their case study in Värmland and West Bothnia (both bordering Norway), they found that the entrepreneurs had previously worked in restaurants or tourism, both in Sweden and elsewhere, and heavily relied on social ties with their family and co-ethnic networks in start-up and development (ibid.). Of particular interest is that while they lived in cities, they regularly commuted to their restaurants in rural areas. Self-employment there was a result of rising competition in cities and was seen as a temporary measure to provide better future opportunities for their children (ibid.).

## STUDENT MIGRATION

In Sweden, around one fourth of all students enrolled at universities come from abroad, whilst the majority are foreigners from EU countries. The number of TCNs for whom visa for study purposes were issued had a peak in 2010 (14,188). After the introduction of tuition fees in 2010, numbers decreased to 6,836, but are increasing since then (2015: 9,410). As in many other countries, the most important countries of origin are China and India (Universitetskanslersämbetet 2014; Parusel 2015). Student migration to rural areas, however, is by far less relevant than working and forced migration, since universities are only located in urban centres or regional capital cities.

## FAMILY MIGRATION

Strongly related to other forms of immigration presented above, immigration for family purposes, i.e., family reunification and family formation, was most frequent in Sweden since the 2000s (2014: 38% of all residence permits, Parusel 2015). Those people are mostly relatives of former asylum seekers, e.g. Syrians and Somalis (Parusel 2015). In response to the large number of asylum seekers in 2015, the Swedish authorities implemented restrictive measures including temporary instead of permanent residency permits for refugees and persons in need of subsidiary protection, and more stringent rules for family reunification. An applicant needs to be able to support him- or herself and family members through regular employment and provide housing of a sufficient size and standard (Swedish Migration Agency 2020). Since this type of migration is linked to forced and working migration, the spatial patterns are assumed to be similar.


A peculiarity in Swedish rural areas are Thai women arriving through transnational marriages (Hedberg & Haandrikman 2014; Webster 2017). They often become economically active as small entrepreneurs, offering small eateries, massage shops or Asian grocery stores. The likelihood of Thai women to become self-employed is much higher than among other migrant women (Webster 2017).

## AMENITY/LIFESTYLE MIGRATION

In Sweden, lifestyle migration mostly derives from a domestic culturally mediated tradition of second homes and summer houses in rural areas (Müller 2007) as well as the availability and relative affordability of real estate in the Swedish countryside (Webster 2017), while, since a few decades, foreign citizens from other EU countries, e.g. German citizens increasingly have become involved (Müller 2002). Initially, Southern Sweden was considered as most popular destination for temporary migration processes. Recently, however, sparsely populated areas in mid Sweden or tourist destinations in the North marketed themselves on Expat fairs and attracted newcomers, mostly from Western Europe, e.g. the Netherlands or Germany (Eimermann et al. 2013), who partly see entrepreneurship in tourism as a part of their self-chosen lifestyle (Eimermann 2016; Carson & Carson 2018). So far, there is no empirical evidence that third country nationals are involved in lifestyle migration processes to rural Sweden.

## 8.1 DALARNA COUNTY: TERRITORIAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE REGION

Authors: Jan Amcoff, Ulf Hansson, Tina Mathisen, Micheline van Riemsdijk and Suanne Stenbacka



Map 36. Dalarna

## 8.1.1 GEOGRAPHICAL AND TERRITORIAL FEATURES OF DALARNA COUNTY

<i>TERRITORIAL INDICATORS</i>	<i>2018</i>
Share of population living outside urban and intermediate municipalities	36.8%
Share of population living in mountain areas	<50%
Share of territory covered by mountains	<50%
Share of territory covered by agricultural fields	3.3%
Border region	Yes

**Table 89. Territorial Indicators of Dalarna, 2018**


*Data sources: Eurostat Border typology; Urban-Rural typology; Eurostat Mountain typology; Eurostat Corine Landcover; Eurostat Degree of Urbanization (DEGURBA)*

Dalarna (*Dalarnas län*) is situated in the western inland of Sweden (see also map 38). The county contains municipalities of various character. In the north there are mountains and forests including ski-resorts and hiking areas (see also Table 89). In the south there are small industrial towns that have faced an economic restructuring. Around the lake Siljan there are municipalities characterised by tourism industry and services. The region is classified as predominantly rural (Eurostat 2018) as more than half of its population lives in rural areas, i.e. in municipalities with less than 10,000 inhabitants. In the table above we refer to data that has been calculated based on municipalities, which also includes grid cells that are counted as rural. Hence, the actual share of population living in rural cells is higher than 36.8%.

## 8.1.2 ACCESSIBILITY FEATURES OF DALARNA COUNTY

The map below shows travel times to the closest hospital by car and the distribution of population across the region. The provision of services and goods of daily use is functioning in most municipalities, although remoteness is still a problem for some villages. Specialised services like hospitals are located in the main regional centres Borlänge and Falun as well as the municipality centres Avesta, Ludvika, Mora and Säter. The average weighted travel time of hospitals amounts 17.3 minutes by car, but as the map shows there are several smaller municipalities and villages with a much longer travel time (see also Table 89).





**Map 37. Population distribution and accessibility of hospitals in Dalarna**

<i>ACCESSIBILITY of selected infrastructures</i>	<i>Dalarna, 2016</i>	<i>MATILDE regions average, 2016</i>
Access to hospitals, travel time by car weighted by population (minutes)	17.3	14.2
Access to primary schools, travel time by car weighted by population (minutes)	6.3	5.9
Access to secondary schools, travel time by car weighted by population (minutes)	15.1	9.2
Access to train stations, travel time by car weighted by population (minutes)	8	10.5
Access to shops, travel time by car weighted by population (minutes)	5.2	5.2

**Table 89. Accessibility of selected infrastructures in Dalarna, 2016**

*Data source: ESPON Profecy 2018*

Primary schools are locally distributed and located also in peripheral areas of the region. On average, people need 6.3 minutes by car to the next primary school. Travel time to secondary schools is higher, in average 15.1 minutes which is higher than the MATILDE regions average.

The average travel times to shops are low, i.e. 5.2 minutes. The reason for this is that the major part of the population in the region lives in cities or in municipality centres. Village shops exist, but they are decreasing in number, which also affects social life in these communities. (SVT Nyheter 2015). The project *Lanhandelsutveckling Dalarna* (Development of village shops in Dalarna, funded by the Rural Development programme), aimed at increasing cooperation and improving the development of services. The project, however, ended in 2019 (Lanhandelsutveckling Dalarna – Kommersiell serviceutveckling 2020).

Although services are well accessible by car, certain population groups (e.g. elderly, migrants and students) are dependent on public transport, which is limited. This is particularly relevant as a disadvantage for TCNs, who could not dispose of a private car, especially in the early phase following their arrival and settlement. The railway network serves the main municipality centres and constitutes an important vein for all kinds of travels, e.g. related to studies or work.



## 8.1.3 SOCIAL FEATURES OF DALARNA COUNTY

<i>DEMOGRAPHIC INDICATORS<sup>11</sup></i>	<i>2018</i>	<i>Variation (2008-18)</i>	<i>National average</i>	<i>EU average</i>	<b>MATILDE regions average</b>
<b>Population size</b>	286,165	3.83%	-	-	425,252
<b>Population density (inhabitants per km<sup>2</sup>)</b>	10.2	9.8/10.2**	25	105.3	102
<b>Median age of population</b>	44.5	-0.6 *	40.6	43.1	45
<b>Old-age dependency ratio (&gt;65/14-64)</b>	40.6	2.6*	31.7	30.5	33
<b>Young-age Dependency Ratio</b>	28.5	2.5*	28.4	24.1	23
<b>Aging Index (&gt;65/&lt;14)</b>	142.9	-3.9	111.9	124	148
<b>Crude birth rate (births per 1000 inhabitants)</b>	10.6	0.5	11.4	9.8	9.1
<b>Total fertility rate (new-born per woman)</b>	1.94	-0.03*	1.76	1.54	1.58
<b>Crude rate, natural population change (‰)</b>	-0.3	-1.9/ -0.1**	2.3	-1.0	-1.7
<b>Crude rate of net migration (‰)</b>	3.9	-0.8/ 12.7**	8.5	2.6	3.6
<b>Crude rate of total population change (‰)</b>	3.6	-1.7/ 12.4**	10.8	1.6	1.9

**Table 90. Demographic indicators of Dalarna, 2018**

*Data sources: Eurostat, Population (Demography, Migration and Projections)*

## DEMOGRAPHY


An important factor that affects Swedish data on demography and migration is that it is fairly easy to become a Swedish citizen. Basically, what is required is 5 years of legal residence (4 years if you are a refugee). There are no requirements of knowledge about the country, to speak Swedish, to be able to support oneself, etc. which is common in other countries. Concluding from this, it could be argued that foreign citizenship is not the most appropriate attribute to delimit people of third country background in Sweden. Therefore, this attribute is not often used, and as a consequence only a limited amount of data is published and accordingly presented here.

<sup>111</sup> \* This is calculated only for the period 2014-2018 \*\* Minimum and maximum values recorded in the period considered.

The population in Dalarna was slightly increasing from 2008 to 2018 (see also Table 90). Between 2000 and 2018, the number of foreign-born persons in Dalarna more than doubled from 17,031 to 37,163 people, an estimated 13 percent of the total population in the region. The main reason for this is increased immigration during the 2000s. As an example, at the start of 2016, there were close to 8,500 asylum seekers registered by the Swedish Migration Agency (*Migrationsverket*) in Dalarna (2019: 1,377). As a result, the foreign-born population in the region has doubled whereas the number of domestic births decreased during the same period from 261,228 persons to 250,028 people (Region Dalarna 2020). In sum, despite the decreased birth rate, the population has **increased due to immigration**. Furthermore, some 60% of the foreign-born population has arrived within the last ten years.


The share of foreign citizens (not to be mixed-up with the 13% of foreign born) in Dalarna increased from 4.0% in 2008 to 7.3% in 2017 when it peaked. Since then, it has decreased to 7.1% in 2019 (see also Chart 136). There are no data on the share of TCNs among the foreign citizens in Dalarna, but in Sweden, overall, the share of TCNs over foreigners increased from 48% to 61% during the 10-years period. If the shares in Dalarna are similar, this would mean an increase from 1.8% TCNs in 2008 to 4.4% TCNs 2018, followed by a decrease to 4.3% in 2019. An explanation for the recent drop in the share of foreign citizens as well as the absence of data can be found in the generous Swedish regulations of citizenship mentioned above. Therefore, country of birth is a more common and suitable measure.

Measured this way, the share of foreign-born population in Dalarna increased from 9 to 15% over the period displayed in the figure. Again, based on national figures, the share of inhabitants in Dalarna born in third countries may have increased from 5 to 10% of the population.



**Chart 136. Foreign citizens over total population in Dalarna, 2008-2018**


Source: Statistic Sweden



**Chart 137. Foreign-born population over total population in Dalarna, 2008-2018**

Source: Statistic Sweden

The **migration balance is reported as positive** from 2008 to 2018, with a peak in 2016 (see also chart 138). Due to a lack of data on protagonists, however, no differentiation between foreigners and nationals can be made. It can be assumed that the arrival of humanitarian migrants in 2015 and 2016 resulted in a peak of the migration balance. As the following graph illustrates, Dalarna has a negative migration balance towards the rest of Sweden, i.e. more people are (still) moving to the bigger cities rather than from them, but the region has a positive balance towards other countries. Dalarna has also a steady birth deficit. In total, this has resulted in a growing population during the last years.



**Chart 138. Migration balance in Dalarna, 2008-2018**

*Source: Statistics Sweden*

## DEMOGRAPHY: FOCUS ON TCNS

### IMPORTANT NATIONALITIES IN DALARNA COUNTY

The most common origins of Dalarna's population with third country background were a few countries in the Middle East and north-east Africa. Although two of the countries – Somalia and Iraq – were among the top 10 already in 2008, most of these people are newcomers to Dalarna (see also Table 91). Almost half of the 2008 population originates from Iraq. The large number of refugees arriving from countries such as Afghanistan, Eritrea and Syria in

2015 is noticeable. As a result, nationalities such as Chileans, and Lebanese have been “overtaken” (Region Dalarna 2020).


2008			2017		
1	Iraq	1,520	1	Syria	4,814
2	Somalia	1,129	2	Somalia	3,966
3	Ex-Yugoslavia (fc)	991	3	Eritrea	2,039
4	Turkey	850	4	Iraq	1,691
5	Thailand	830	5	Thailand	1,373
6	Russia (incl. SU)	574	6	Turkey	1,183
7	Iran	464	7	Afghanistan	1,125
8	USA	339	8	Russia (incl. SU)	901
9	P.R. China	337	9	Ex-Yugoslavia (fc)	848
10	Philippines	280	10	Iran	796

**Table 91. TOP 10 Third Countries of Birth in Dalarna, 2008-2017**

*Source: Database PLACE at Uppsala university*

## AGE AND GENDER STRUCTURE

The population of third-country-background in Dalarna is young and shows also a clear male surplus (see also Chart 139). It is most striking in age group 18-30, where there are up to 398 men per 211 women (for the age of 18). The particularly common age of immigration among young men, i.e. 17 years, is accentuated in the figure. This is due to the large number of unaccompanied young people, mainly adolescent males who applied for asylum in 2015 and onwards.



**Chart 139. Age and gender-structure of Dalarna population born in third countries, 2018**

*Source: Database PLACE, Dept of Social and Economic Geography, Uppsala Universitet*

#### 8.1.4 EDUCATIONAL FEATURES OF DALARNA COUNTY

There are no data available on Eurostat and National statistics to describe the educational profile of TCNs. Primary education or lower, however, is more common among the TCB (third country-born) - population compared to other inhabitants. The share of TCB-individuals with low levels of education is higher in Dalarna compared to the rest of Sweden. Small variations can be found between urban and rural areas.

## 8.1.5 ECONOMIC FEATURES OF DALARNA COUNTY

<i>ECONOMIC INDICATORS</i>	<i>2017</i>	<i>Variation 2008-2017</i>	<i>National average (2017)</i>	<i>EU average (2017)<sup>112</sup></i>	<i>MATILDE regions average (2017)</i>
<b>Regional GDP per capita at purchasing power standards</b>	30,300	0.6%	36,700	29,800	29,624
<b>Regional Gross value added: primary sector (% , percentage points)</b>	4%	0.39	2%	2% (7,098,5 million euro)	4%
<b>Regional Gross value added: secondary sector (% , percentage points)</b>	30%	-8.47	25%	27% (95,398 million euro)	30%
<b>Regional Gross value added: tertiary sector (% , percentage points)</b>	66%	8.08	73%	71% (254,090 million euro)	66%

**Table 92. Economic indicators in Dalarna, 2017**


*Data sources: Eurostat Gross domestic product (GDP) at current market prices by NUTS 3 regions; OECD Gross domestic product (GDP); Eurostat Gross value added at basic prices by NUTS 3 regions*

## ECONOMIC STRUCTURE

Tourism is a hugely important employment sector and Dalarna accounts for the fourth largest number of 'guest nights' behind the three largest regions in Sweden, i.e. Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmö (Tillväxtverket, 2017). The Swedish Agency for Economic and Regional Growth (*Tillväxtverket*) also highlights the fact that Dalarna – in comparison with the rest of Sweden – has fewer small enterprises as well as lower number of individuals with a

<sup>112</sup> Missing data for France for Regional Gross Value Added and Employment by sector; Average has been therefore calculated on the basis of 26 Member States.

high-school/post-primary education as well as an ageing population (above 65). Of the Sweden's gross domestic product, GDP, only 2.3 per cent is produced in Dalarna and the gross regional product (GRP) is also below the national average (Norlén et al. 2019, see also Table 92 and Chart 140). Both in Dalarna and in Sweden as a whole, the proportion of employed persons has increased in recent years. The difference in employment rates between those born in Sweden and abroad is large, which can mainly be explained by the fact that it takes time for new arrivals to establish themselves in the labour market (Region Dalarna 2020).



**Chart 140. Gross Domestic Product trends in Dalarna, 2008-2017**

*Data source: Eurostat, Gross domestic product (GDP) at current market prices by NUTS 3 regions*

## LABOUR MARKET

The unemployment rate is higher in Dalarna (9.2%) compared to the national average (6.7%) and MATILDE regions average (8.4%, see also table 93 and chart 141). Dalarna experiences the same weight of economic sectors as MATILDE regions average. The share of employees in the primary sector is slightly higher in Dalarna compared with the national average (3.8% compared to 2%), but it is below the EU average and MATILDE regions' average (5%). The




share of employment in the secondary and tertiary sectors is in line with national, EU and MATILDE regions' averages (see also Chart 141).

<b>LABOUR MARKET INDICATORS</b>	<b>2017</b>	<b>Variation 2008-2017</b>	<b>National average (2017)</b>	<b>EU average (2017)</b>	<b>MATILDE regions average (2017)</b>
<b>Unemployment Rate (%/percentage points)</b>	9.2%	+3.7	6.7%	8.1%	8.4%
<b>Employment in primary sector (% thousands of employees)</b>	3.8% (5)	25 %	2%	5% (353.98)	5% (6.75)
<b>Employment in secondary sector (% thousands of employees)</b>	24.8% (32)	-11.1%	20%	23% (1,584.74)	26% (36.19)
<b>Employment in tertiary sector (% thousands of employees)</b>	71.4% (92)	8.2 %	78%	71% (4,830.33)	69% (97.63)
<b>People at risk of poverty or social exclusion (%/percentage points)</b>	19.3% (average 2008-2018)	3.3	18%	21.6%	16.9%

**Table 93. Labour market indicators in Dalarna, 2017**


*Data sources: Unemployment: OECD Labour indicators, small regions TL3 and large regions TL2; National Statistical Institutes; Eurostat, Unemployment rates by sex, age, citizenship and NUTS 2 regions; Eurostat, Employment (thousand persons) by NUTS3 regions; Eurostat, People at risk of poverty or social exclusion by NUTS 2 regions.*

Regarding people at risk of poverty, a high share of individuals with a refugee background in certain areas faces difficulties in accessing the labour market – especially compared to majority Swedes (EAPN 2018).



**Chart 141. Employment by sector in Dalarna, 2017**

Data source: Elaboration by EURAC based on data from Eurostat, Employment (thousand persons) by NUTS 3 regions



**Chart 142. Unemployment rate trends in Dalarna, 2008-2017**

Data sources: OECD.stat, Labour indicators, small regions TL3 and large regions TL2; Eurostat, Total unemployment rate; National statistical offices of MATILDE countries

## LABOUR MARKET: FOCUS ON TCNS

Due to a lacking availability of data for Dalarna, Eurostat data for rural Sweden are used as an approximation. The specific employment patterns of TCNs in Sweden are illustrated in the following table:

2018	Total Sweden		Rural Areas Sweden	
	TCN	TOTAL	TCN	TOTAL
<b>Part-time employment</b>	28.1%	22.6%	28.9%	24.6%
<b>Self-employment</b>	5.9%	8.6%	7.7%	10.5%
<b>Temporary employment</b>	46.6%	12.4%	54.0%	14.9%


**Table 94. Percentage of employees by degree of urbanization in Sweden, 2018**

*Data source: Eurostat*

Compared to the total population, the share of TCNs who are employed part-time is slightly higher. Temporary employment is also much more widespread among TCNs compared to nationals, especially in rural areas. The share of TCNs among self-employed workers is lower than among total population, but slightly higher in rural areas than on national average.

The unemployment rate both nationwide and in rural areas was decreasing from 2008 to 2018. However, unemployment among TCNs increased to a plateau of about 30% nationwide. In rural areas, the situation is more volatile for TCNs. Since 2016, the share is 5% higher than the national average (see also Table 96). For the MATILDE region Dalarna or surrounding NUTS-2, no specific data can be provided due to lack of data.

In Sweden as a whole, 61% of the adults with a 'third country background' (including pensioners) have had some contact with the labour market. In Dalarna the figure is 55%, for the other grouping, the proportions are 69% and 66% respectively. There is also a difference between rural and urban areas, with a higher proportion not having had contact with the labour market in rural areas. This might be because of a more limited service sector in rural areas, a sector that often functions as an opportunity for entering the labour market. Another reason might be more limited migrant networks.



**Chart 143. Unemployment rate trends in Sweden by degree of urbanisation, 2008-2018**

*Data sources: Eurostat*

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## 9. COUNTRY REPORT TURKEY<sup>113</sup>

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Since World War II, rural areas in Turkey were characterised by out-migration to cities and abroad due to mechanization in agriculture, neo-liberal agricultural policies and investments in railway connections to urban centres as well as job opportunities there (Adaman & Kaya 2012; Öztürk et al. 2018; cf. Erman 1998; Guresci 2013, Ertürk 2020). In addition, starting from the second half of the 1980s, individuals of Kurdish origin as well as Christian Assyrians were displaced internally (IDP) by security forces or the PKK (Kurdish Workers Party) and had to leave their villages and towns in the Southeast as a result of the armed conflict (Adaman & Kaya 2012)<sup>114</sup>. Simultaneously, a growing number of asylum seekers arrived from non-European countries, especially from Iran and Iraq (Kirişçi and Karaca 2015), which were considered an additional security threat (Kirişçi 2004, 2014). During that time, the UNHCR oversaw Turkey's asylum policy, provided basic assistance and accommodation and ensured the resettlement of asylum seekers from Turkey. In 1998, the government fostered the reintegration of Kurdish IDPs and refugees with the "Return to Villages and Rehabilitation Project" (RVRP), which was supported by the UNHCR, the European Council and the European Commission (Adaman & Kaya 2012). The implementation, however, was severely hampered by the upsurge in violence between the Turkish army and Kurdish militants since 2004, the continuing presence of around 60,000 village guards, up to a million landmines in the border region to Syria and Iraq and a lacking development in the region (ibid.). In parallel, in the last years and not least fostered by the economic crisis after 2007, re-migration and multi-local living arrangements could be detected among the aforementioned groups as well as urban middle-classes (e.g. Öztürk et al. 2018; see also chapter on lifestyle migration). Today, 92.3% of Turkey's population lives in cities and towns, compared to only 7.7% in villages (Ertürk 2020).

It is important to notice that the Turkish immigration policy in the last 20 years followed the ideal to align Turkey with the EU acquis as part of the accession of Turkey to the European Union, e.g. when the country introduced visa requirements according to the EU negative visa list or the implementation of an Integrated Border Management Strategy to tackle irregular migration and trafficking in human beings (Sert 2013; Kaya 2017; Sonmez Efe 2017; Gökalp-Aras & Mencütek 2019). Due to the fact, that the country does not only focus on the EU, Turkey also has bilateral agreements and still maintains a rather liberal Visa regime in order to attract skilled and highly skilled

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<sup>113</sup> TCNs are not an applicable term in the Turkish context. Therefore, instead all foreign migrants are considered.

<sup>114</sup> Assyrians also moved abroad, mostly to Sweden (Adaman & Kaya 2012).

international individuals (Bertan Tokuzlu 2007; Kaya 2017; Sonmez Efe 2017; Kaya 2019). With regard to Turkey's current asylum policy, in particular, the UNHCR plays an important and significant role.

In the Turkish context, integration is a contested term, since there is an ongoing debate about the dichotomy of two political and societal discourses with regard to the presence of high numbers of Syrian refugees in the country: integration versus return. The latter one, however, is prioritised by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) government. It is hard to claim that there are officially formulated comprehensive integration policies aiming at the incorporation of migrants and refugees into the wider societal context of the country since the Turkish state does not formally recognize the fact that the country has turned into a country of immigration. Although the Ministry of Interior has already issued a Migrant Integration Strategy Document, which was shared with the relevant public bodies in 2019, it is not yet publicized due to the negative public perception of the term integration. However, a legal formulation of integration policies was first made in the Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP) in 2014 drawing on the term “harmonization” (İçduygu 2016). The Law also addressed the foundation of the Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM) to be responsible for the integration of migrants.

## LABOUR MIGRATION

The legal background for labour migration is structured by the Law on Residence and Travel of Foreigners in Turkey (Law no. 5683/2012), which regulates that foreigners need a residence and work permit to work and live in the country. Before, it was common among migrants, e.g. from Armenia or Georgia, to illegally use a 90-day tourist visa for entering and working in Turkey and renew the visa by going to the closest border crossing point and re-entering the country after its expiry (Kaya 2017). However, with the new law, a suspension of 90 days was introduced, which led to the fact that many of them overstayed the period of legal stay and continued to work illegally (Rittersberger-Tiliç, 2015; Kaya 2017)<sup>115</sup>. Likewise, the length of temporary work permits – that start from one year – do not correspond the duration of employment of these international seasonal workers (Sonmez Efe 2017). Following the aim of the Turkish state to attract highly skilled international work force (including descendants of Turkish origin migrants residing in the EU as well as individuals from the rest of the world; see also family and lifestyle migration),

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<sup>115</sup> A similar law was implemented in 2007 to keep away Bulgarians and Romanians that were active in different kinds of trading activities including suitcase trade. After the implementation of the suspension of 90 days, migrants from Armenia, Georgia and the Middle East started to fill in the gap in the informal market, e.g. in care taking, house-cleaning and suitcase trading (Kaya 2017).

the Law on International Work Force (Law. No. 6735/2017) eased work permit applications (Rittersberger-Tılıç, 2015). With the “Turquoise card for qualified foreigners”, applicants now can apply on their own, if they graduated with internationally accepted studies in the academic field, come to the forefront in a scientific, industrial and technological area that is considered to be strategic in terms of the country, or those who have made or are anticipated to make significant contribution to the national economy (Kaya 2017). EU citizens, furthermore, got granted certain privileges in the application process. Initially, the card is given for three years, while, subsequently, an application for the permanent card is possible (ibid.).

Today, one-fourth of the employment in Turkey is in agriculture (Beleli 2013), where jobs in small family enterprises and large agricultural production companies are characterised as “3D” (dangerous, demeaning and dirty, Dedeoğlu & Bayraktar 2019; cf. Beleli 2013). While hazelnuts, tea and tobacco are typical products of the north, e.g. the coastal Black Sea region (Adaman & Kaya 2012), in the south, especially in the Çukurova region alongside the Mediterranean sea surrounding the city of Adana, both industrial cotton and soy, peanuts, corn, fruits and vegetables are cultivated (Semerci & Erdoğan 2017). Until now, most of the workforce was only needed for the harvesting seasons. Since the 1990s, landless local farming families were being replaced by internal seasonal workers, in particular women and children<sup>116</sup> originating from the rural areas in southeast and east of Anatolia, including Arabs, Kurds and Roma (Adaman & Kaya 2012; Mura 2016; Dedeoğlu & Bayraktar 2019). While some migrated to only one location per year, others, instead, “spend a significant part of the year away from their place of residence and migrate to a series of locations” (Beleli 2013: 21; cf. Kavak 2016). In the last years, in addition, international seasonal workers started to arrive in Turkey (for an overview, see Kaplan et al. 2016). Their quantification, however, is difficult due to lacking statistical data and a lacking legal status for seasonal migrant workers as well as undocumented employment (Sonmez Efe 2017). While men from Georgia are engaged in tea and hazelnut picking in the Black Sea region, Azerbaijanis cut fodder for animals in Eastern Anatolia based on short-term circular migration (Dedeoğlu 2018) and Afghan men typically stay in Turkey for two or three years and work as shepherds in remote rural areas in Central Anatolia (Atasu-Topcuoğlu 2019). Since 2011, both internal and international seasonal workers are being replaced by Syrian refugees (Sonmez Efe 2017; Dedeoğlu & Bayraktar 2019; see also chapter on forced migration).

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116 In Turkey, children can be employed in certain sectors, when they reached the age of 15, while, with the age of 14, they are already allowed to take up ‘light jobs’ that are not detrimental to their development, health and safety as well as school attendance (Beleli 2013).

In the mining sector, Chinese individuals predominate in Chinese-led companies in the Zonguldak province in the Black Sea region (Töksöz & Ulutaş 2012), while in the construction sector, subcontracting to small firms that hire immigrants by means of short-term contracts is widespread (Sonmez Efe 2017; Çınar 2019). As Çınar (2019) showed, the workers in this sector are mainly male and originate from Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (ibid.; see also Akpınar 2009; Sadunashvili 2016). However, the labour market assumes a “multi-layered, hierarchically stratified structure that is defined in terms of identities, allegiances, and places of origin” (Çınar 2019: 69), leading to the fact that most working teams are not mixed, but homogenous.

The sectors of entertainment and tourism provide further employment opportunities for international migrants. Since the 1990s, destinations of those that often originate from ex-soviet countries such as Azerbaijan, Georgia, Russia or Ukraine are the big cities and the touristic regions alongside the Black and the Mediterranean Sea (Töksöz & Ulutaş 2012; Özgür et al. 2014; Sonmez Efe 2017). While women from Georgia got involved in prostitution leading to problems such as sexual harassment and violence (Sonmez Efe 2017; Sadunashvili 2016), women from Russia as well as men from Azerbaijan, who are mostly highly educated, could be found in tourism (Özgür et al. 2014, for the Antalya region). Parallel to the increase of tourist flows from these regions, also migrant flows rose, resulting in marriages with Turkish nationals among Russians and more permanent stays among Azerbaijanis including family reunion (ibid.).

International migrants in live-in housekeeping, babysitting and care have to be considered an urban phenomenon and stem from the insufficiency of institutional care services due to a family-centred welfare regime (Erdogdu & Töksöz 2013) and an increasing female participation in the labour market. Acquired by means of intermediary firms (ibid.), most of them are female and originate from former Soviet Union, e.g. Georgia (Sadunashvili 2016) or Moldova (Töksöz & Ulutaş 2012). They migrate cyclically to see family and kids and consider their stay in Turkey as a temporary life-project (Erdogdu & Töksöz 2013). Simultaneously, in science and education, foreign scientists and teachers can be found in universities and foreign-language schools, however, these are normally based in big cities (Kaya 2017).


## FORCED MIGRATION

Before 2014, Turkey only granted refugee status to European asylum seekers according to the Refugee Convention ratified in 1951 (Adaman & Kaya 2012). In the course of the EU accession negotiations, however, the country revised its immigration and asylum policies and adopted the “Law on Foreigners and International Protection” (LFIP, Law no. 6458/2014).

This law provided the opportunity to confer the refugee status including temporary protection to individuals regardless of their country of origin and offered three categories: refugees, conditional refugees, i.e. individuals to be resettled in a third country, and individuals under subsidiary protection (Rittersberger-Tılıç, 2015; Sonmez Efe 2017). The LFIP maintains the previous dispersal policy of assigning each applicant to a specific province, where they are required to register with the Provincial Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM) and where they have to stay until the end of their international protection (Art. 71). The law does not commit itself to providing shelter to international protection applicants, as they “shall secure their own accommodation by their own means” (Art. 95, cf. Kaya 2020). However, the Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM) can set up “reception and accommodation centres” for the accommodation, nutrition, healthcare, social and other needs of both international protection applicants and status holders. At present, there are seven centres in operation, located in the cities of Erzurum, Gaziantep, İzmir, Kırklareli, Kayseri, Van and Yozgat. While residence in reception and accommodation centres for asylum applicants became the norm<sup>117</sup>, a legal refugee status included a work permit (Kaya 2017; for labour market integration, see below) and access to basic social services, including education, health care and social assistance at their place of registration (Dedeoğlu & Bayraktar 2019; Saracoğlu & Bélanger 2019).

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117 The responsibility of operating those centres as well as providing integration measures was partly transferred to the civil society arguing that it is a religious duty to help (Yılmaz et al. 2019).



**Chart 144. Changes in the geographical spread of the Syrian population in Turkey, 2013-2018**

*Source: Adalı & Türkylmaz 2020: 210*

From 2011 on, as a result of political shifts and regional conflicts, a mass influx of Syrians took place, which was considered only a temporary phenomenon by the Turkish government and was therefore fostered by an open-door policy to increase their power in the region (Sonmez Efe 2017; Yılmaz et al. 2019). As war lasted longer, however, the temporary protection for them was extended in the 2014 regulation mentioned above. Today, due to its geographical position as a transit country on the way to central Europe, Turkey is home to the largest number of refugees in the world and houses at least 3.6 million Syrians (ibid.). Regarding the latter group, many of them live in the metropolitan areas of Istanbul and Izmir (İşeri 2019; Yılmaz et al. 2019, see darker coloured regions in Chart 144). Others instead stayed in the border cities and regions in the Southeast, such as Şanlıurfa, Gaziantep or Hatay, where language barrier is smaller as the region is majorly populated by Arabs or Kurds and where kinship ties can be upheld due to chain migration (Kavak 2016). On site, large-scale camps (not to be mixed with the Reception and Accommodation Centres refugees mentioned above) provide housing to those who are subject to the “temporary protection” regime. The number of camps in ten border cities has remained steady in 26, however only 3.8% or 139,150 individuals of the more than 3.5 million Syrian refugees are accommodated there as of 11 April 2019 (for latest figures, see DGMM 2020).

Until 2016, when the Law on Work Permits for Foreigners under Temporary Protection (Law no. 8375/2016) became effective, working was not officially allowed for refugees under temporary protection and took place on an irregular basis (Yılmaz et al. 2019). The new law, then, provided the opportunity for employers to apply for work permits for Syrian refugees who hold temporary identity cards and have resided in Turkey for six months (Dedeoğlu & Bayraktar 2019). However, employers have to prove that there is no Turkish citizen to fill the job and have to ensure that no more than 10% of the employees are Syrians. In companies with less than 10 employees, only one work permit can be granted even (ibid.; Saraçoğlu & Bélanger 2019). As a consequence of the “unreality” and “ineffectiveness” of this regulation given the structural conditions of the Turkish labour market (ibid.), only a bit more than 20,000 work permits were granted since then (Yılmaz et al. 2019)<sup>118</sup>. The majority still works in the labour-intensive segments of the informal sector, where the introduction of Syrians led to an increase in labour supply, a downward pressure on the wages as well as deteriorating working conditions and bargaining power of all workers (ibid.; Kavak 2016; for a contrary perspective, see Erzan et al. 2018). Therefore, work of underaged children became widespread to increase the household income (Dedeoğlu & Bayraktar 2019).

In the rural provinces in the South and Southeast<sup>119</sup>, where Syrians first entered Turkey, a huge demand for temporary labour in agriculture exists (Kavak 2016; see chapter about labour migration). Thus, Syrian families, i.e. both men, women and their underaged children, started to work as day labourers (Yalçın & Yalçın 2019, for the example of Mardin) or became involved in internal seasonal migration, circulating according to the harvest period from one place to another, e.g. to Antalya to pick citrus fruits or to the Sultandagı district of Afyonkarahisar to pick cherries (Kavak 2016; Semerci & Erdoğan 2017; Atasü-Topçuoğlu 2019). Others, instead move to the most important cropping area, i.e. the Çukurova region, for a basis of up to 11 months a year, e.g. January or February to August or November (Semerci & Erdoğan 2017). Jobs are mostly organised by Turkish intermediaries (dayıbaşı), who also charge for and take care of accommodation, food and transport (among the provinces but also to the fields) as well

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118 Doğan-Yenisey (2019) argues that the number of work permits granted to Syrians was around 65.000 in 2019.

119 In metropolitan centres and urban areas, instead, Syrians (mostly men) found work in manufacturing, e.g. shoe and leather-garment textile industry (Korkmaz 2019; Pinar et al. 2019; Saraçoğlu & Belanger 2019; for Istanbul and Izmir), in construction (Çınar 2019, for Diyarbakır in South-East Anatolia), in clothing sweetshops (Dedeoğlu & Bayraktar 2019, for Istanbul) and in tourism (Alrawadie et al. 2019, for Istanbul). Their underaged children, especially boys, also work in textile and weaving industry or are engaged as shopkeepers or porters for shops (Lordoğlu & Aslan 2019, for Şanlıurfa and Mardin). For a general overview on the situation in Istanbul, see Kaya and Kırac, 2016).



as in case of health problems. Therefore, they have an increasing influence and bargaining power (Kavak 2016; Dedeoğlu & Bayraktar 2019). Work in agriculture is characterised by low wages, which are about half of the official minimum wage (even lower for women and children), and bad working conditions including long working hours or discrimination at the workplace (Kavak 2016; Tören 2018; Atasü-Topçuoğlu 2019; Dedeoğlu & Bayraktar 2019; Kaya 2020). The everyday life is characterised by a double burden of women, who, besides the work on the fields, also have to take care of the housework and the childcare (Atasü-Topçuoğlu 2019; Dedeoğlu & Bayraktar 2019), while men take care of shopping and the contact with intermediaries (ibid.). In a quantitative survey conducted in the Adana Plain, it was found that 78% of the seasonal migrant agricultural workers migrated from rural areas in Syria and thus have an affinity for agricultural work and an “ability to endure life in tents” (ibid., 20; see also Atasü-Topçuoğlu 2019). In addition, low levels of education and illiteracy were very common among the predominantly young respondents (Dedeoğlu & Bayraktar 2019).

## STUDENT MIGRATION

Foreign students in Turkish universities are mainly originating from Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Nigeria, Pakistan and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (Kaya 2017), while exchange students in the course of Erasmus are mostly Germans or Polish (ibid.). Following the idea of “brain gaining”, in the last couple of years, Turkey also tried to attract students from politically unstable countries such as Yemen or Syria (ibid.). In addition, the Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP, Law no. 6458/2014) included work permits for international MA and PhD students upon arrival and work permits for BA students after two years stay (ibid.).

## FAMILY MIGRATION

The Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP, Law no. 6458/2014) regulated that a residence permit with a duration of more than one year is sufficient for family unification. The residence permits of family members, however, are bound to the person who has the residence permit. If this person dies, the others only get a short-term residence permit (Kaya 2017). Apart from the fact that also European spouses of Turkish citizens move to Turkey in the course of family reunion (Kaya 2017), family migration, in the last couple of years, however, is mostly characterised by return migration of first and second generation Turkish emigrants including Assyrians and Kurds and their descendants, especially from Germany (“Euro-Turks”, Kaya 2017: 18). These migration flows are either on a cyclical basis, i.e. spending 6 months here and 6 months there, or permanently, e.g. for retirement (Adaman & Kaya 2012; Kaya 2017). The second generation Turkish emigrants, who are often highly-skilled, mostly work in



underqualified positions in Istanbul and other big cities “to search for alternative lifestyles, to work in international companies, tourism sector, IT sector, or to study” (ibid. 17; see also chapter on lifestyle migration).


## AMENITY/LIFESTYLE MIGRATION

Studies about temporary and permanent lifestyle migration previously dealt with internal migration of urban middle-class professionals to the Aegean and Mediterranean coast tourist areas and the hinterland, e.g. Sirince, Yesilyurt, Adatepe, Yeni Orhanli or Yagcilar. Individuals, for instance, bought and renovated old houses or started to live in gated communities on-site, which are used as a holiday or second home as well as for retirement. Some of them also get involved in tourism (Young 2007; Öztürk et al. 2018).

International lifestyle migration was discussed for two groups, i.e. international retirement migrants and Turkish-German second generation (see also chapter on family migration). The further group mainly bought properties during the 2001 financial crisis, when the Turkish local currency depreciated (Balkir & Kirkulak 2009) and originates from Germany, the UK, the Netherlands and Nordic countries (Nudralı 2009; Ertuğrul 2016; Kaya 2017). While English-speaking citizens prefer the south-western provinces of Muğla and Aydın at the Aegean coast as well as the Western part of the province of Antalya at the Mediterranean coast, the Eastern part of Antalya has become attractive both for Germans and Nordic retirees (ibid.). Retirees mostly live segregated in gated communities with their own fellow citizens indicating very little intercultural dialogue (Balkır & Südaş 2014), while special infrastructures such as shops, restaurants, cafés and newspapers are provided (Kaya 2017). The latter group, i.e. Turkish-German second generation was found to move to the same region as the German retirees, where they get involved in tourism, mobilising their human capital of educational qualifications, language skills and life experience, while enjoying a better work-life balance (Kılınç & King 2017).

## 9.1 BURSA: TERRITORIAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE REGION

Authors: Ayhan Kaya and Fatma Yilmaz-Elmas



Map 38. Bursa region

The degree of urbanisation classification of Eurostat is not available for Turkey. As an alternative, rural regions can be identified through their population density<sup>120</sup>. In 2018, 92.3% of Turkey's population lived in cities and towns, and only 7.7% lived in villages (Ertürk 2020), i.e. in municipalities with less than 2,000 inhabitants. One has to keep in mind, however, that Law No. 6360 of 2012 re-scaled urban areas by absorbing rural ones. Between 2012 and 2019, the number of towns and sub-municipalities dropped from 1,977 to 386, while the number of villages dropped by 47% (34,434 to 18,280, TUIK results of Address Based Population Registration System, 2007-2019; see also Dik 2014). This makes it hard to statistically separate between the current neighbourhoods in cities and the new ones in rural areas, i.e. the previous villages (UKKS 2014).

### 9.1.1 GEOGRAPHICAL AND TERRITORIAL FEATURES OF BURSA REGION

<i>TERRITORIAL INDICATORS</i>	<i>2018</i>
Share of population living outside urban and intermediate municipalities	No data available
Share of population living in mountain areas	>50%
Share of territory covered by mountains	>50%
Share of territory covered by agricultural fields	45%
Border region	No

**Table 90. Territorial Indicators of Bursa, 2018**

*Data sources: Eurostat Border typology; Urban-Rural typology; Eurostat Mountain typology; Eurostat Corine Landcover; Eurostat Degree of Urbanization (DEGURBA)*


The province of Bursa is located in the Southeast Marmara Region, surrounded by provinces Bilecik and Adapazarı at its East, Kocaeli, Yalova, İstanbul and Marmara Sea at North, Kütahya at South, and Balıkesir at its West (see also Map 38). Although the province stands on the north-western slopes of Mount Uludağ (2,543 m), it is located in a pit area wherein Yenisehir, Bursa and Inegöl plains and, İznik (298 m<sup>2</sup>) and Ulubat (1,134 m<sup>2</sup>) lakes are the primary collapsed

<sup>120</sup> Village Law No. 442 of 1924 identifies the areas with population below 2,000 as "village", between 2,000-20,000 as "town" and above 20,000 as "city". According to the administrative status of settlements, Turkish National Statistics Agency (TUIK) issues population statistics based on separation of province/district centres and towns/villages. On the other hand, another basic criterion used by TUIK when producing statistics is the population threshold. The data coverage of TUIK for the localities within the borders of Turkish Republic specifies that the localities with population 20,001 and above are defined to be urban areas, and localities with population 20,000 and below are defined as rural areas.

areas. In the north, the Marmara Sea forms a 135 km long coastline. Total surface area of the province of Bursa is 11,027 km<sup>2</sup> and 17% of the land is made up of plains. The plateaus also cover 48% of its total land, while mountains cover approximately 35% of the land surface (see also Table 90). The mountains are generally in the form of chains of mountains running across the direction of east to west. Bursa Plain consists of alluviums dragged by streams. Its land has a volcanic structure.

In terms of land use, the province covers an area of 1,088,638 hectares. Fields cover 44% of the total land. The other 44% of its land is covered by forest, which is around 472,000 ha. More specifically, Bursa's lands are covered with 35% mountains and uplands, 48% plateaus and 17% plains (Bursa İli 2018 Yılı Çevre Durum Raporu 2019). 42% of agricultural land is used as farmland, 14% as vegetable plot, 12% as orchard, 2% as vineyard and 12% as olive grove. Compared to 2006, there is a decrease in agricultural land by around 17%, mostly due to a decrease in soil fertility (Bursa İli 2018 Yılı Çevre Durum Raporu 2019). Turkish National Statistics Agency (TUIK 2020a) issued total agriculture arable land as 211,356 ha in 2018. Nevertheless, there has been observed an increase in vegetable, fruit and olive fields where higher value-added products are grown (Özkan & Kadagan 2019). Bursa's proximity to Istanbul makes it an important hub for agricultural production to provide fresh vegetables, olive, tomatoes etc. processed in the factories located in Karacabey in the West of the province, for instance.

## 9.1.2 ACCESSIBILITY FEATURES OF BURSA REGION



**Map 39. Population distribution and accessibility of hospitals in Bursa**



<i>ACCESSIBILITY of selected Infrastructures</i>	<b>Bursa, 2016</b>	<b>MATILDE regions average, 2016</b>
Access to hospitals, travel time by car weighted by population (minutes)	12	14.2
Access to primary schools, travel time by car weighted by population (minutes)	10.7	5.9
Access to secondary schools, travel time by car weighted by population (minutes)	11.8	9.2
Access to train stations, travel time by car weighted by population (minutes)	44	10.5
Access to shops, travel time by car weighted by population (minutes)	10.6	5.2

**Table 91. Accessibility of selected Infrastructures in Bursa, 2016**

*Data source: ESPON Profecy 2018*

Bursa is connected to the rest of the country mainly by highways. The new highway built in 2019 connects Istanbul with Izmir via Bursa (Road Traffic Technology 2020). The city is also connected to Istanbul via ferryboats regularly operating on the Marmara Sea. The city does not have railways connecting it to the rest of the country. There is only one train station at the southern edge of the city in the district of Büyükşehir, where the Izmir-Ankara train stops (Rail Turkey En 2020), explaining the high duration of 44 minutes to access train stations (MATILDE regions average is 10.5 minutes, see also table 91). The city has a metro/tram line operating in the central districts (UrbanRail 2020). Against this background, the travel to access services is mostly held by means of cars and metro/trams. In contrast to the densely populated city, the travel time to access services in sparsely populated parts of Bursa is relatively higher than across other MATILDE regions (see also Map 39).

### 9.1.3 SOCIAL FEATURES OF BURSA REGION

<b>DEMOGRAPHIC INDICATORS<sup>121</sup></b>	<b>2018</b>	<b>Variation (2008-18)</b>	<b>National average</b>	<b>EU average</b>	<b>MATILDE regions average</b>
<b>Population size</b>	2,936,803	20.4%	-	-	425,252
<b>Population density (inhabitants per km<sup>2</sup>)</b>	284.2	237.4/284.2 **	106.2	105.3	102
<b>Median age of population</b>	34	1.4 *	31.7	43.1	45
<b>Old-age dependency ratio (&gt;65/14-64)</b>	12.6	1.4*	12.6	30.5	33
<b>Young-age Dependency Ratio</b>	31.4	-0.3*	36.8	24.1	23
<b>Aging Index (&gt;65/&lt;14)</b>	39.9	4.3	36	124	148
<b>Crude birth rate (births per 1000 inhabitants)</b>	14.2	-2	15.3	9.8	9.1
<b>Total fertility rate (new-born per woman)</b>	1.9	1.9 *	2	1.54	1.58
<b>Crude rate, natural population change (‰)</b>	8.6	8.6/10**	+10.1	-1.0	-1.7
<b>Crude rate of net migration (‰)</b>	10.8	3.2/11.6**	4.6	2.6	3.6
<b>Crude rate of total population change (‰)</b>	19.5	12.1/27.5 **	14.7	1.6	1.9

**Table 92. Demographic indicators in Bursa, 2018**

*Data source: Eurostat, Population (Demography, Migration and Projections)*

## DEMOGRAPHY


According to address-based population registration system, the Bursa province has 3,056,120 inhabitants as of 2019 (TUIK 2020b, see also table 92). Population in urban area consists of 54.8% (1,982,898 inhabitants) and population in city area consists of 46.2% (1,412,701 inhabitants) of the total population of the province. Population density is 293.2 persons/km<sup>2</sup>. Total fertility rate for Bursa is 1.74 in 2019 with a decrease compared to the previous year, where it was 1.87. The decrease in fertility rate mostly results from the processes of urbanization and growing economic and financial pressure.

121 \* This is calculated only for the period 2014-2018 - \*\* Minimum and maximum values recorded in the period considered.

The MATILDE region Bursa is characterized by an impressive **population increase** of nearly 400,000 persons (2018 compared to 2010, which is in line with the national trend, cf. Chart 145).

2019 figures collected by TUIK (2020a) shows that 0-14 age group population of Bursa is 660,134. Young population (15-24 age group) has the share of 419,397 persons in total population. Accordingly, proportion of young population (15-24 age group) in total population is 13.7%. in the age group 15-64, there are 2,113,125 persons, which corresponds to 69% of the population of the province. This is above the ratio of Turkey in terms of population of the same age group which is 67.8%. Age 65 and over population is also 282,861 (9.3%) close to that of Turkey (9.1%) in terms of ratio (own calculations). For the province of Bursa, total age dependency ratio is indicated as 44.6 (44.5 in 2018) below the general ratio in Turkey (47.5) whereas elderly dependency ratio (age 65 and over) is 13.39 in 2019 (12.89 in 2018). Elderly dependency ratio (age 65+) is close to that of Turkey (13.4).

Regarding population per gender, the province of Bursa has a balanced demographic structure divided in half by genders, accordingly male population is 1,530,956 whereas female population is 1,525,164 (2019 figures, TUIK 2020b). Considering young population (15-24 age group) by gender, male population is 216,406 persons and female population is 202,991.




**Chart 145. Development of total population in Bursa, 2008-2018**

*Data sources: Eurostat*



Over the last ten years, the **migration balance** in the MATILDE region Bursa was **positive** and rose as the following graph indicates. Most of the provinces whose population growth rates are above the average in Turkey are those with high industrial production capacity and high tourism and agricultural potential. Bursa is one of these provinces due to the aforementioned characteristics. Bursa, therefore, is among the first five provinces receiving migration in Turkey. It is also one of the main destinations for internal migrants because of the vicinity with Istanbul. However, given the net migration figures, Bursa is also among the migrant-sending provinces. Migration balance table below confirms this fact clearly. The positive migration balance is the result of immigration of foreigners due to the fact that migration balance of nationals was very small in all years.




**Chart 146: Migration balance of foreigners in Bursa, 2016-2018**

*Data source: Eurostat*

## DEMOGRAPHY: FOCUS ON FOREIGNERS

According to the data issued by TUIK (2020a) in 2019, the population of foreign nationals in Bursa is 48,595. From 2017 to 2018, there was a considerable increase (26,198 to 44,798). It is important to note that these figures are issued according to address-based population registration system and do not include the Syrians under temporary protection.

In line with the development on the national level, the total number of migrants (including Syrians under temporary protection) increased significantly in the last years. The share of migrants among total population is slightly higher in Bursa (7.4%) compared to the national average (5.9% in 2018, TUIK 2020a, see also Chart 146). According to the Directorate General of Migration Management (2020), the number of Syrians under temporary protection in Bursa is 176,143 by the date of June 5, 2020 (total Syrian population under temporary protection in Turkey is 3,581,636, *ibid.*). Accordingly, the share of Syrians among the total population was 5.4% (own calculations).



**Chart 147. Foreigners including Syrians under temporary protection over total population in Bursa, 2017-2018**

*Data source: own calculations based on TUIK 2020a*

## IMPORTANT NATIONALITIES IN BURSA

As of 2019, the official record covering the population of foreign nationals in Bursa is 48,595 (TUIK 2020a, excluding Syrian population under the temporary protection, foreigners holding visas or residence permits shorter than 3 months with the purpose of training, tourism, scientific research etc.). The main foreign nationals with residence permits in Bursa are Azerbaijanis (7,273), Syrians (6,483), Russians (4,784), Iraqis (2,659), Kazakhs (2,625), Bulgarians (3,130), Greeks (3,099), Germans (2,030), Uzbeks (1,629), Kyrgyzes (1,452) and Kuwaitis (1,263). Besides, Afghans (987), Turkmen (749), Iranians (500), Egyptians (825), Georgians (545), Palestinians (761), Ukrainians (821) and Jordanians (678) are the other foreign nationals counting more than 500 individuals.

## AGE AND GENDER STRUCTURE

Due to lack of data, no specific characterization for the age structure and for the gender structure of foreigners can be provided.

### 9.1.4 EDUCATIONAL FEATURES OF BURSA REGION

The 2018 literacy rate in Bursa was 97.7% (TUIK 2020a, without foreigners). Population by literacy status (6 years of age and over) in total population is 2,687,754 out of which 2,601,247 is literate. Proportion of literate male (age 6+) consists of 99.2% and the proportion of literate female (age 6+) is 95.7%. According to population by education status (age 15+), high school or vocational school at high school level graduate in total is 591,122 which corresponds to 25.9% of the total population in Bursa. Thereby, males are overrepresented (30% compared to 21.8%). Due to lack of data on NUTS-2 and NUTS-3 level, no specific characterization for foreigners regarding the educational background can be provided.

## NEETS

Due to lack of data on NUTS-2 and NUTS-3 level, no specific characterization regarding the individuals under 35 neither in formal or informal education or training (NEET) can be provided for foreigners.

### 9.1.5 ECONOMIC FEATURES OF BURSA REGION

<i><b>ECONOMIC INDICATORS<sup>122</sup></b></i>	<i><b>2017</b></i>	<i><b>Variation 2008-2017</b></i>	<i><b>National average (2017)</b></i>	<i><b>EU average (2017)<sup>123</sup></b></i>	<i><b>MATILDE regions average (2017)</b></i>
<b>Regional GDP per capita at purchasing power standards</b>	22,200	Growth rate: -4.3%	19,600	29,800	29,624

<sup>122</sup> \* Data refers to 2011.

<sup>123</sup> Missing data for France for Regional Gross Value Added and Employment by sector; Average has been therefore calculated on the basis of 26 Member States.

<b>Regional Gross value added: primary sector</b>	6%*	n.a.	Missing data	2% (7,098.5 million euro)	4%
<b>Regional Gross value added: secondary sector</b>	41%*	n.a.	Missing data	27% (95,398 million euro)	30%
<b>Regional Gross value added: tertiary sector</b>	53%*	n.a.	Missing data	71% (254,090 million euro)	66%


**Table 93. Economic indicators in Bursa, 2017**

*Data source for national average of gross value added by sector: TUIK 2020c*

Bursa is the fourth most economically developed province in Turkey. Having vast and fertile plains as well as vast and richly varied forests in the surrounding mountainous region, the geographical location gives the province of Bursa a special feature of a rare agricultural region along with an industrial and trade centre of Turkey. The climate and geographical structure provide Bursa with a fertile environment to produce various **agricultural** products. The province has also become an important agriculture-based industry centre (see also Table 93). Almost every sub-sector of the food industry operates in the province. Leading factories operating in the food industry sector as well as the import-export industry in the fields of feed, poultry, livestock and dairy products are centered in the region due to the agricultural sector and animal husbandry. Its **secondary sector** also displays a strong concentration of automotive manufacturing, textile and furniture production, and an increasing **service sector** that supports production and development activities in the secondary sector. In addition to its plains and water resources, the mountainous feature also makes Bursa attractive for winter tourism. A total of 1,625,275 tourists came to Bursa in 2018, 370,387 of whom were foreigners. However, this is still below 1% of the total number of 39,000,488 foreign tourists that have visited Turkey in 2018 (enBursa 2019; Ministry of Culture and Tourism 2019).

According to data indicated by Bursa Chamber of Commerce and Industry (BTSO, 2020), the amount of import in 2018 was 8,518,026 (in thousand \$), while export was worth 15,869,442 (in thousand \$). The Turkish Statistical Institute (TUIK, 2020a) issued the 2018 data on GDP per capita in \$ and Turkish Lira (TL) as 11,095 respectively 52,372. In Turkey, the share of the top 10 provinces in the GDP share exceeds 65 percent. In other words, all the remaining 71 provinces can only get 35 percent share. Bursa is among the provinces with the highest GDP share (see also Chart 148). Considering the total exports made by provinces in the years between 2007-2016, following Istanbul (693,745 million USD), Bursa reached a total export of 99,375 million USD (BEBKA 2018). Entrepreneurship indicators,

particularly, the number of big companies established in Bursa, have a considerable share in this table. Considering the number of companies in lists such as AllWorld, ISO 500, ISO 2. 500, Capital 500 or Forbes 500, Bursa is among the leading ones in the lists, within top five alongside Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, and Kocaeli (ORAN 2013).



**Chart 148. Gross Domestic Product trend in Bursa, 2008-2017**

*Data source: Eurostat, Gross domestic product (GDP) at current market prices by NUTS 3 regions*

## LABOUR MARKET

<i>LABOUR MARKET INDICATORS</i>	<i>2017</i>	<i>Variation 2008-2017</i>	<i>National average (2017)</i>	<i>EU average (2017)</i>	<i>MATILDE regions average</i>
Unemployment rate (%/percentage points)	9.1%	2.1	10.9%	8.1 %	8.4%
Employment in primary sector (% , thousands of employees)	Missing data	Missing data	20,3% (6,021)	5% (353.98)	5% (6.75)
Employment in secondary sector (% , thousands of employees)	Missing data	Missing data	18,8% (5,421)	23% (1,584.74)	26% (36.19)
Employment in tertiary sector (% , thousands of employees)	Missing data	Missing data	60,8% (17,535)	71% (4,830.33)	69% (97.63)

<b>LABOUR MARKET INDICATORS</b>	<b>2017</b>	<b>Variation 2008-2017</b>	<b>National average (2017)</b>	<b>EU average (2017)</b>	<b>MATILDE regions average</b>
<b>People at risk of poverty or social exclusion (%)</b>	15.7%	13% / 16.8%	41.3%	21.6%	17.3%


**Table 94. Labour Market indicators in Bursa, 2017**

*Data sources: Eurostat Gross domestic product (GDP) at current market prices by NUTS 3 regions; OECD Gross domestic product (GDP); Eurostat Gross value added at basic prices by NUTS 3 regions. Risk of poverty: TUIK; National average employment by sector: TUIK 2020d*

However, the data gathered in previous years indicate that the NUTS 2 region TR41, which encompasses Bursa, Eskişehir and Bilecik provinces, has a lower rate of unemployment among both males and females in the 15 – 24 age group and the above 25 age group compared to the average rate in Turkey. The unemployment figures between 2007 and 2011 indicate that the average rate of unemployment in Turkey was oscillating between around 20 % to 25 % while it was around 16 - 19 % in the TR41 region.<sup>124</sup> The main source of the relatively lower levels of unemployment in Bursa and its districts is the diversity of industrial, agricultural and service sectors providing jobs for the locals as well as the foreigners.

One of the main reasons why the unemployment rate remained high and above the average of Turkey until 2010, can be interpreted as unregistered employment (see also Chart 149). In 2010, the informality rate was 19.4% for men and 41.5% for women in Bursa. Especially, the unregistered employment ratio in the female unpaid family labour in agriculture points directly to unregistered labour and therefore causes high increase in unemployment rate not only for Bursa but also for Turkey in general. By sector, 94% of women in agriculture were unregistered in 2010 for Bursa. By 2013, general informality rate has fallen to 24.5%. In parallel to this trend, the rate of the unregistered employment in Bursa decreased to 24.2% although the informality rate for female employment remained unchanged. This was mainly due to the increase in female employment in industrial sector increased by 10,000 people where the unregistered employment is relatively lower than in the agricultural sector (Toksöz 2016; see also Kılıç 2017).

<sup>124</sup> For more information on the socio-economic indicators of TR41 between 2007 and 2011, see [http://bebka.org.tr/admin/datas/yayins/kalkinmagostergeleriyle\\_eylul12\\_internet.pdf](http://bebka.org.tr/admin/datas/yayins/kalkinmagostergeleriyle_eylul12_internet.pdf) (in Turkish language).



**Chart 149. Unemployment rate trends in Bursa, 2008-2017**

*Data sources: OECD.stat, Labour indicators, small regions TL3 and large regions TL2; Eurostat, Total unemployment rate; National statistical offices of MATILDE countries; Unemployment rate of TCNs, 2018 (\*available at NUTS2, \*\*available by degree of urbanization),*

## LABOUR MARKET: FOCUS ON FOREIGNERS

Due to lack of data on NUTS-2 and NUTS-3 level, no specific characterization regarding the employment rates of foreigners can be provided. Focussing on Syrians, most of the youngsters, however, are employed in agriculture, textile and service sector. High rates of youth employment are found in the textile sector, as the Syrians who are settled in Bursa mostly originate from Aleppo with an earlier expertise on textile production. A relevant share of Syrian youngsters under temporary protection is employed in agricultural sector, especially in the western districts of the city. There is also a group of Syrian migrants who are mostly working as seasonal agricultural workers in the fields as well as in the preservation factories such as TAT Konserve, whose employment rate increases during summertime (Dedeoğlu & Bayraktar, 2019).

## UNEMPLOYMENT RATE OF FOREIGNERS

Due to lack of data on NUTS-2 and NUTS-3 level, no specific characterization regarding the unemployment rates of foreigners can be provided. As the Syrians under temporary protection prefer to be employed in informal sectors in

order to enjoy the benefits of the Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) Program introduced by the EU in 2016 (WFP 2019), there are no reliable data on their unemployment rate.



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## 10. COUNTRY REPORT UNITED KINGDOM (WITH FOCUS ON SCOTLAND)

Authors: David Spenger and Tobias Weidinger, with contributions from Simone Baglioni and Francesca Calò

Due to the “highland clearances”, i.e. the removal of small farmers (crofters) to introduce large scale sheep farming (Richards 2007), as well as harsh living conditions and the desire to improve one’s living standards, the Scottish highlands and islands were characterized by rural depopulation and out-migration to cities in the lowlands and to England as well as by emigration to mainly other countries of the British empire from the 19<sup>th</sup> century on. The latter process was also facilitated by the Emigration Act of 1851 and the implementation of the Highlands and Islands Emigration Society (Flinn 1977). Starting in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, however, also internal migration, i.e. return migrants, professionals such as teachers or doctors and counter-urbanites especially from other parts of the UK could be detected (Boyle 1995, see also chapter on lifestyle migration).

Today, rural areas in Scotland comprise 98% of the total land mass (Scottish Government 2018a), which are inhabited by 17% of the total population. However, in recent years, the population in these areas has grown at a faster rate than in the rest of the country mainly due to immigration, whilst, simultaneously, an ongoing ageing process can be observed. Several studies, especially conducted in the mid-2000s, show that minority groups in these areas are facing challenges in developing social capital and networks as well as exclusion and racism (de Lima 2006). In 2016, a specific Race Equality Framework for Scotland was enacted to promote race equality and tackle racism and very recently, a campaign about the integration of migrants (#WeAreScotland) has been launched.

Migration policy is mainly reserved to Westminster, which governs access to the UK and the processing of visas, asylum applications and refugee status. Therefore, at a subnational level it is not possible to initiate any macro-level policy. Only in terms of integration frameworks and policies, there is evidence that some scope for variegated responses to migrants, asylum seekers and refugees exists within devolved contexts (Mulvey 2010). Outside of the borders issues and the naturalisation process, most policies that could affect integration processes, such as health, education, some aspects of welfare and housing are delegated. As a consequence, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland could in fact establish integration frameworks which diverge from the integration strategy (or the lack thereof) of the UK central Government (Mulvey 2018).

Recently, a narrative of a dynamic two-way integration process and engagement was promoted in the New Scots 2014-2017 strategy, whilst an integration infrastructure based upon this dynamic two-way process was advocated by the Scottish Government (Meer et al. 2018). In fact, the recent “New Scots Refugee integration 2018-2022 strategy” clearly defined the integration path detailing the responsibility both on the displaced and the settled population in



different fields such as employability, welfare, housing, education, health and social connections. In Scotland, and in particular in Glasgow, multi-agency networks that include several different stakeholders have been established to promote services aimed at integrating migrants, refugees and asylum applicants (Meer et al. 2018). Although a higher degree of responsibility has been devolved to communities, the austerity measures promoted by Westminster and the reduction of budgets at the local level raises questions regarding how local authorities and third sector organisations can really continue to offer services.

## LABOUR MIGRATION

The ongoing ageing process and age-selective out-migration of young people to the cities and larger towns are challenging the economic development of Scottish rural and remote areas. Until now, EU-citizens from countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) that accessed the EU in 2004 are filling positions in labour-intensive agriculture, for instance. The recruitment of workers through the so-called Seasonal Agricultural Workers Scheme (SAWS) follows a longer tradition in UK/Scotland and started even before freedom of movement was guaranteed also for EU-citizens from CEE. The recruitment follows a variety of channels, either directly by farms, by labour providers or through workers already living in the UK (Mostafa 2018). Additionally, empirical evidence shows that word of mouth and networks are driving forces in identifying companies and websites, which were to be trusted (de Lima & Wright 2009). Most seasonal farm workers are relatively low skilled (ibid.; Mostafa 2018) and are accommodated on the campsite at farms, in caravans, hostels or porta cabins (ibid.).

TCNs, instead, have to apply to various visas to access the labour market in the UK. Three different visa tiers have been established and are currently operating: Tier 1, Tier 2 and Tier 5. TCNs can apply before arriving to the UK to Tier 1 visas if they are willing to open a business activity in the UK (with investment of at least £50,000), they represent an exceptional talent or promise in the field of science, humanities, engineering, medicine, digital technology or the arts (endorsement has to be granted by the Home Office), they aim to invest at least £2 million in the UK<sup>125</sup> or they are graduate entrepreneurs with an endorsed idea from the Department of International Trade or from a UK Higher Education institution. A Tier 2 visa can be requested if a non-EU migrant has received a skilled job offer by one of the recognised and licenced sponsors. Sponsors must offer a salary higher than £30,000 or a job that

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<sup>125</sup> Established in 1994, the Golden Visa programme allows for residency-by-investment and requires residence in UK of 185 days per year. Between 2008 and 2018, 3,805 persons including 6,640 dependents received such visas. Awardees were mainly citizens from China and Russia (Transparency International and Global Witness 2018).

is included in the shortage occupation list. The Tier 2 visa also includes migrants who are involved in intra-company mobility, are ministers of religion or are an elite sportsperson. Non-EU migrants can apply for the Tier 5 visa if they are willing to volunteer in a charity, they have been sponsored to work as a sportsperson or creative worker, they are aiming to participate in a work exchange programme for a short time, they are employed under international law (e.g. working for a foreign government) or they are working for a religious order. The Tier 5 visa (Youth Mobility Scheme) also offers the possibility for young people between 18 and 30 years old from specific countries<sup>126</sup> to spend a period of up to two years in the UK.


Although eligibility rules are very different across the different schemes, all non-EU migrants must have a valid clearance for entry under these routes. Most of the visas request a specific endorsement from a public sector organisation (e.g. the Home Office) or a sponsorship from a list of licensed companies. When an endorsement or the sponsorship is not requested, a high level of skills is necessary, an amount of investment is requested (such as for Tier 1) or there are restrictions concerning the eligible countries (such as for the Youth Mobility Scheme). These regulations clearly increase the barriers to access the UK labour market for non-EU migrants. Most non-EU migrants who are subject to immigration control are also unable to access "public funds" (such as jobseekers' allowance or tax credits), although they can use public services like the National Health Service (NHS) and education. Finally, through the Immigration Act 2014 and 2016, an NHS surcharge (Immigration Health Surcharge) to cover the entire period of the visa has been introduced in the immigration application for all non-EU migrants. With regard to migration policy, the focus "is to allow only highly skilled workers from outside the EEA, with an annual limit of 20,700 workers. Unskilled and low skilled labour needs should be satisfied from within the expanded EEA labour market" (UK Government 2013). Already in 2008, the Home Office UK introduced a new points-based entry system for migrant workers from outside Europe. However, it did not consider Scottish peculiarities of skills gaps or labour shortages. Following the UK Immigration Bill 2016, the immigration of TCNs for work purposes categorises individuals according to their qualification level in four different groups: high value migrants, skilled workers, temporary workers, commonwealth citizens with ancestry; or "other" (McAreavey & Krivokapic-Skoko 2019). Looking at labour migration from third countries to rural areas of Scotland, however, there is a lack of scientific literature and their relevance can only be described by quantitative data so far.

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<sup>126</sup> The list of countries encompasses Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, Japan, Republic of Korea, Monaco, New Zealand and Taiwan.

## FORCED MIGRATION

Like other countries in the EU, the UK applies a dispersal policy, which aims at controlling and determining a geographically even distribution of asylum seekers throughout the country, and also to rural areas. This scheme has also implications for further movement of asylum seekers when granted or refused refugee status (Stewart 2011). Apart from the availability and concentration of accommodation as well as the capacity of local health, education and other support services, one key element of national dispersal policy is to consider the level of risk of increased social tension by “placing” asylum seekers in a given area (National Audit Office 2014). Following the Immigration and Asylum Act, the national dispersal policy of asylum seekers implemented in 2000 included a compulsory dispersal to reduce pressure from core areas of receiving asylum seekers, like London and the South East of England (Stewart 2011; Politowski & McGuinness 2016, see also Chart 150, below). As a reaction to this policy, there were emerging coalitions of villages in rural areas to stop the housing and accommodation of asylum seekers (Hubbard 2005; Dhillon 2006). Therefore, according to a report of the National Audit Office (2014), the “[d]ispersal accommodation is located in particular areas in the community where the local authority has agreed to take asylum seekers up to a defined cluster limit” (ibid.: 11). It is assumed that there will be no more than one asylum seeker per 200 residents, based on the 2001 census (ibid.).



**Chart 150. Asylum procedure and accommodation in the UK**

*Source: National Audit Office Analysis 2014: 10*

Though the National Asylum Support Service (NASS) was administrated by the UK Government, accommodation provisions had been outsourced – at least up to recently – to a combination of local authorities, private landlords and

housing associations (Meer et al. 2018). Under the terms of Commercial and Operational Managers Procuring Asylum Support Services (COMPASS), UK Home Office has concluded contracts with private companies, e.g. Clearel, G4S, the Mears Group and Serco, in order to organize accommodation of asylum seekers (ibid.). While the Home Office is responsible for the dispersal accommodation, the standards of housing are regulated by the Scottish Government.

Concerning asylum applicants, the Scottish Government decided to focus on integration from the moment asylum seekers arrive in Scotland and not only when refugee status has been granted. This means that while rights to work and to access mainstream benefits are still restricted for asylum seekers (due to the Westminster immigration rules), education, healthcare, and free English courses are instead available not only to refugees but also to asylum applicants and rejected asylum seekers. In 2014, the Scottish Government, some Departments of the UK Government such as the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP), third sector organisations and local governments established a collaborative approach to support people seeking protection. The vision behind the so-called “New Scots Refugee Integration Strategy” already mentioned above is that newcomers should become active members of Scottish communities and develop strong social relationships (Euracademy Association 2016; Martzoukou & Burnett 2018). Based on the conceptual framework provided by Ager & Strang (2008), the first strategy, which was valid until 2017, focused on several key areas of integration, covering health, employability and welfare rights, education, communities and social connections as well as housing (ibid.). The second strategy, running from 2018-2022, was built on the first strategy and defined four key objectives of integration policies in Scotland (Scottish Government 2018b):

1. “Refugees and asylum seekers live in safe, welcoming and cohesive communities and are able to build diverse relationships and connections.
2. Refugees and asylum seekers understand their rights, responsibilities and entitlements and are able to exercise them to pursue full and independent lives.
3. Refugees and asylum seekers are able to access well-coordinated services, which recognise and meet their rights and needs.
4. Policy, strategic planning and legislation, which have an impact on refugees and asylum seekers, are informed by their rights, needs and aspirations.” (ibid.: 15).

With regard to rural and remote areas in Scotland, there is a lack of empirical evidence on the presence and impacts of asylum seekers and refugees, and up to now, only anecdotal points from other parts of the country can be

reported. Results from other rural areas in the UK suggest that “the context matters”, as rural areas are of high diversity. For instance, in a study conducted in a small town in England, Garner (2013) could identify a strong pattern of racialisation of asylum seekers by transforming a heterogeneous group into a homogenous one. Simultaneously, in the context of England and Wales, also Lymperopoulou (2019) argues that “less ethnically diverse local authorities with a dominant migrant group and socio-economically deprived local authorities are most at risk of experiencing higher pressures on social cohesion” (ibid.: 1). On the other hand, Guma et al. (2019) showed in their study conducted in three different places in Wales that reception and integration of refugees is highly contributing to a process of place-making, which includes the emergence and strengthening of local networks, activities and also narratives.

## STUDENT MIGRATION

Despite high tuition fees, Scotland attracts a relatively high proportion of international students compared to other OECD countries (21.5%) and was ranked second behind Luxemburg (44%) in 2014 (Scottish Government 2018c). From the Scottish Government (2018c), they are considered as a chance to face demographic challenges and were therefore encouraged to stay in Scotland for two years after graduation in the course of the “Fresh Talents Initiative” in 2004. The initiative aimed at bringing in up to 8,000 prospective workers from overseas per year within a 5-year period (de Lima & Wright 2009).

The immigration of students mainly originating from third countries such as China and the United States is basically concentrated to the big university cities, e.g. Glasgow, Edinburgh, Dundee and Aberdeen (Scottish Government 2018c), while the University of the Highlands and Islands, which is distributed in several places within the most northern NUTS2-region “Highlands and Islands”, received only 125 students from third countries in the academic year 2018/19, with the majority coming from USA (25 students), Azerbaijan (15) and Australia and Canada (10 each, HESA 2020). An outstanding example of studying in smaller towns, however, is the University of St. Andrews, situated on the east coast of Fife between Dundee and Edinburgh. Thanks to its high prestige, it is an internationally well-known university and had enrolled 3,745 students from third countries in winter term 2018/19, mainly from USA (1,920 students), China (460), Canada (165), India (110), Hong Kong and Malaysia (100 each, HESA 2020).

## FAMILY MIGRATION

Under family reunion rules, immediate family members of refugees already living in Scotland are allowed to settle in the country. Additionally, under EU law, refugees in Europe, including unaccompanied minors, also have the right to join family in the UK under the Dublin III regulation (Scottish Government 2018b). In 2018, the UK accepted 1,028


transfers on family reunion grounds in the context of these regulations, whereas 159 were children joining relatives in the UK (Gower & McGuinness 2020). After the Brexit transition period, these regulations will not be applied in the UK anymore (ibid.).

## AMENITY/LIFESTYLE MIGRATION

Lifestyle migration in Scotland is mainly a domestic phenomenon, occurring among nationals in their mid-lives or (pre)retirement looking for the rural idyll. They settle in outlying areas like rural districts on the Orkney islands, like Rousay, Eday and Stronsay (Jones et al. 1986) or the Isle of Bute (Philip & McLeod 2016) that were partly visited before as tourists. Until now, no information is available about TCNs who moved to rural Scotland as lifestyle migrants.

## 10.1 EAST AYRSHIRE AND NORTH AYRSHIRE MAINLAND: TERRITORIAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE REGION

Authors: Simone Baglioni and Francesca Calò



**Map 40. East Ayrshire and North Ayrshire mainland**



## 10.1.1 GEOGRAPHICAL AND TERRITORIAL FEATURES OF EAST AYRSHIRE AND NORTH AYRSHIRE MAINLAND

<i>TERRITORIAL INDICATORS</i>	<i>2018</i>
Share of population living outside urban and intermediate municipalities	Missing data
Share of population living in mountain areas	<50%
Share of territory covered by mountains	<50%
Share of territory covered by agricultural fields	43.1%
Border region	No

**Table 95. Territorial Indicators of East Ayrshire and North Ayrshire Mainland, 2018**


*Sources: Eurostat Border typology; Urban-Rural typology; Eurostat Mountain typology; Eurostat Corine Landcover; Eurostat Degree of Urbanization (DEGURBA).*

East-Ayrshire and North-Ayrshire mainland form a peri-urban area made of two respectively distinct local authorities, in which a large share of the territory (43.1%) is made of agricultural fields, pointing to the absence of any large city in the area and to the predominance of a rural connotation (see also Map 40 and Table 95). The population in East Ayrshire concentrates around the largest town, Klimarnock (over 46,000 inhabitants), whilst, besides Cumnock, which forms the second-largest town in terms of population, smaller towns and villages, e.g. Darvel, Hurlford or Stewarton, predominate. The administrative headquarter of North-Ayrshire, Irvine, counts about 34,000 inhabitants according to the 2011 census, whilst the second largest settlement, Kilwinning counts about 18,000 inhabitants. Other major population centres include Largs, and the “Three Towns” - Ardrossan, Saltcoats and Stevenston.

The region is classified as intermediately rural, as the share of population living outside urban areas is below 50%. Yet, due to the limited availability of statistical data, it has not been possible to calculate the exact share of population living outside urban areas.



## 10.1.2 ACCESSIBILITY FEATURES OF EAST AYRSHIRE AND NORTH AYRSHIRE MAINLAND



**Map 41. Population distribution and accessibility of hospitals in East Ayrshire and North Ayrshire mainland**

<i>ACCESSIBILITY of selected Infrastructures</i>	<i>East Ayrshire and North Ayrshire mainland, 2016</i>	<i>MATILDE regions average, 2016</i>
Access to hospitals, travel time by car weighted by population (minutes)	7.5	14.2
Access to primary schools, travel time by car weighted by population (minutes)	2.8	5.9
Access to secondary schools, travel time by car weighted by population (minutes)	11.5	9.2
Access to train stations, travel time by car weighted by population (minutes)	5	10.5
Access to shops, travel time by car weighted by population (minutes)	3.4	5.2

**Table 96. Accessibility of selected Infrastructures in East Ayrshire and North Ayrshire mainland, 2016**

*Data source: ESPON Profecy 2018*

Issues of accessibility are provided in Table 96: compared to MATILDE regions average, the region shows a better performance for accessibility for hospitals (7.5 versus 14.2 minutes, see also Map 41), schools (2.8 versus 5.9 minutes), train stations (5 versus 10.5 minutes) and access to shops (3.4 versus 5.2 minutes), while the opposite is true for access to secondary schools, where the Scottish region has an indicator of 11.5 minutes and the MATILDE regions of 10.5 minutes. Hence, the selected region shows a greater overall accessibility than the other regions selected in the project, which may be explained by its peri-urban character, but also by the Scottish approach of an even spatial distribution of key services such as those for health care and education.

### 10.1.3 SOCIAL FEATURES OF EAST AYRSHIRE AND NORTH AYRSHIRE MAINLAND

<i>DEMOGRAPHIC INDICATORS<sup>127</sup></i>	<i>2018</i>	<i>Variation (2008-18)</i>	<i>UK average</i>	<i>EU average</i>	<i>MATILDE regions average</i>
Population size	251,687	-0.01%*	-	-	425,252
Population density (inhabitants per km <sup>2</sup> )	147.8	147.4-148.1**	273.8	105.3	102
Median age of population (years)	45.2	1.5***	40.1	43.1	45
Old-age dependency ratio (>65/14-64)	33.2	3	28.6	30.5	33
Young-age Dependency Ratio	25.7	0.5*	28.1	24.1	23
Aging Index (>65/<14)	129	9.2	101.7	124	148
Crude birth rate ( <i>births per 1000 inhabitants</i> )	9	-1.8****	11	9.8	9.1
Total fertility rate ( <i>new-born per woman</i> )	1.56	(missing data)	1.68	1.54	1.58
Crude rate, natural population change (‰)	-3.4	-3.4/-2.8**	1.8	-1.0	-1.7
Crude rate of net migration (‰)	1.9	-2.3/ 1.9**	3.9	2.6	3.6
Crude rate of total population change (‰)	-1.5	-3.3/ 0.4**	5.6	1.6	1.9

**Table 97. Demographic indicators of East Ayrshire and North Ayrshire mainland, 2018**

*Data source: Eurostat, Population (Demography, Migration and Projections)*

## DEMOGRAPHY

The Scottish MATILDE region is marked by a trend of **population decline** which started in the early nineties. In the period 1991 to 2017, the population of North Ayrshire declined by 1.4%, while the general population in Scotland has grown (Fraser of Allander Institute 2018). The key destination for people leaving the area being Glasgow, the largest

127 \* Variation for the population size is calculated between the years 2011-2018; \*\* Minimum and maximum values recorded in the period considered; \*\*\* Variation calculated for the period 2014-2018; \*\*\*\* Variation calculated for the period 2011-2018.

nearby city, which suggests that population decline is provoked not only by an ageing trend but also by an outflow of those seeking better employment opportunities or further education as the selected region has no university. North Ayrshire has a projected demographic decline of 7% between 2016 and 2041, one of the greatest in Scotland, while East Ayrshire is forecasted to have a depopulation rate of 3% in the same period (ibid.). Consistently with such an assumption, the share of young people and those on working age is projected to decline while those of pensionable age will increase.

	Children	Working Age	Pensionable Age
East Ayrshire	-8%	-9%	18%
North Ayrshire	-11%	-15%	17%
Scotland	-2%	1%	25%


**Table 98. Population in East and North Ayrshire projection 2016-2041**

*Source: Fraser of Allander Institute 2018: 7, based on ONS figures*

In sheer numbers, the population residing in this area is half the MATILDE regions' average, but it has a higher density than those (still, with a lower density than the Scottish average). The median age of the population (45.2) is slightly higher than the national average (40.1), while it is in line with the MATILDE regions average of 45 years. It has a higher aging index (129) than the national average (101.7), although it is smaller than the MATILDE regions one (148). This is reflected by the smaller crude birth rate compared with the national one (9 against 11), which is though in line with the MATILDE regions' average set at 11.1 (see Table 97). Finally, its crude net migration rate is positive (+1.9) but smaller than both the national (+3.9) and the MATILDE regions one (+3.6), which, again, confirms the general trend in population decline (see Table 97).

## DEMOGRAPHY: FOCUS ON TCNS

Looking at the migration balance of the total population in the region of East Ayrshire and North Ayrshire mainland, a highly dynamic development can be observed. In the period under consideration (2008-2018), the **migration balance** ranged between +330 (in 2008) and -400 (in 2012). In 2018, however, it was slightly positive (+50, see also Chart 152).




**Chart 151. Third Country Nationals over total population in East Ayrshire and North Ayrshire mainland, 2008-2018**

*Data source: Annual Population Survey, ONS, based on rounded numbers*


The share of TCNs among total population in the MATILDE region was far lower than the share of TCNs in South Western Scotland<sup>128</sup>, which is the corresponding NUTS2-region and also includes the city of Glasgow. Between 2008 and 2015, in East Ayrshire and North Ayrshire mainland it fluctuated between 0.4 and 0.8% (see chart 151).

<sup>128</sup> Since EUROSTAT data can only be provided on NUTS2 level, the NUTS-2 South Western Scotland, where East Ayrshire and North Ayrshire mainland belongs to, was selected.



**Chart 152. Migration balance in East Ayrshire and North Ayrshire mainland, 2008-2018**

*Data source: National records of Scotland, based on rounded numbers*



**Chart 153. Share of TCNs in East Ayrshire and North Ayrshire mainland and Scotland, 2008-2015**

*Data source: Annual Population Survey, ONS, own calculations based on rounded numbers*

## IMPORTANT NATIONALITIES IN EAST AYRSHIRE AND NORTH AYRSHIRE MAINLAND

In 2008, the TOP3/4 nationalities of TCNs in the MATILDE region East Ayrshire and North Ayrshire mainland were countries with whom the UK had a long-lasting migration history, such as Pakistan, India, Australia or Canada. Since then, the importance of Canadians grew.

2008	1	Pakistan	<500	2018	1	Canada	1,000
	2	India	<500		2	China	<500
	3	Australia	<500		3	India	<500
	4	Canada	<500		4		


**Table 99. Ranking of TCNs immigrants by nationalities in East Ayrshire and North Ayrshire mainland, 2008 and 2018.**

*Source: Annual Population Survey, ONS, based on rounded numbers*

## AGE AND GENDER STRUCTURE

As for NUTS3-region East Ayrshire and North Ayrshire mainland data regarding the share of female TCNs are not provided, in the following graph data from South Western Scotland<sup>129</sup> had been taken into consideration. The graph shows several ups and downs of the share of female TCNs. While in 2008, the share was at its peak (54.5%), only two years later it was at its trough (44%). Due to lack of data on NUTS-3 level, no specific characterization for the age structure of foreigners can be provided.

<sup>129</sup> Since EUROSTAT data can only be provided on NUTS2 level, the NUTS-2 South Western Scotland, where East Ayrshire and North Ayrshire mainland belongs to, was selected.



**Chart 154. Share of female Third Country Nationals in South Western Scotland, 2008-2018**

*Data source: Annual Population Survey, ONS, own calculations based on rounded numbers*

#### 10.1.4 EDUCATION FEATURES OF EAST AYRSHIRE AND NORTH AYRSHIRE MAINLAND

Education indicators	2018	MATILDE average
NEETS	9.2%	9.2
Tertiary education attainment 25-64	43.8%	31.1%
Tertiary education attainment 30-34	45.4%	37.5%


**Table 100. Education indicators for total population in East Ayrshire and North Ayrshire mainland, 2018**

*Source: Eurostat*

The selected Scottish region has a higher share of its 25-64 old population with a tertiary education attainment level (43.8%) than the MATILDE regions average (31.1%). This is also consistent, if we consider those in the 30-34 age category, where scores are 45.4% respectively 37.5% (MATILDE regions average). This reflects the general higher than average share of the UK population with tertiary education compared to the EU average. Moreover, despite being a deprived area and one without a university based in its boundary, North Ayrshire mainland (but not East Ayrshire) has a larger proportion of school leavers that end up in positive destination (that is in higher education, further education, training, voluntary work, employment and activity agreements) (Fraser of Allander Institute 2018). The share of NEETS (9.2%) is equal to the one of MATILDE regions (9.2%), reflecting the problems of the Scottish



labour market to include young people. For education level of TCNs, we consider South Western Scotland, i.e., including Glasgow. As the graph indicates, the share of tertiary educated TCNs is similar and was slightly growing since 2012 (see Chart 155). More current data, however, are not available.



**Chart 155. Education level among Third Country Nationals in South Western Scotland, 2008-2012**

*Source: Eurostat*

### 10.1.5 ECONOMIC FEATURES OF EAST AYRSHIRE AND NORTH AYRSHIRE MAINLAND

<i>ECONOMIC INDICATORS<sup>130</sup></i>	<i>2017</i>	<i>Variation 2008-2017</i>	<i>National average (2017)</i>	<i>EU average (2017)<sup>131</sup></i>	<i>MATILDE regions average</i>
<b>Regional GDP per capita at purchasing power standards</b>	15,900	-0.5%	32,200	29,800	29,624
<b>Regional Gross value added: primary sector (%, percentage points)</b>	2%	-0.7	1%	2% (7,098.5 million euro)	4%
<b>Regional Gross value added: secondary sector (%, percentage points)</b>	33%	-5.1	20%	27% (95,398 million euro)	30%
<b>Regional Gross value added: tertiary sector (%, percentage points)</b>	66%	+5.7	79%	71% (254,090 million euro)	66%


**Table 101. Economic indicators, East Ayrshire and North Ayrshire mainland, 2017**

*Sources: Eurostat Gross domestic product (GDP) at current market prices by NUTS 3 regions; OECD Gross domestic product (GDP); Eurostat Gross value added at basic prices by NUTS 3 regions.*

131 Missing data for France for Regional Gross Value Added and Employment by sector; Average has been therefore calculated on the basis of 26 Member States.

## ECONOMIC STRUCTURE

In 2017, the regional GDP per capita was set at 15,900€ for the selected region, compared to 14,900€ in 2008, indicating a certain resilience to recover from the crisis years when the GDP per capita went down to 13,700€. However, when compared with both the national (32,000€) and EU (29,800€) average, the GDP data prompt a less prosperous area (see Table 101 and Chart 156). Such an outcome reflects the structure of the economy in the region, which is different from the Scottish one: East and North Ayrshire mainland have fewer businesses in finance, information and professional services that accounted for much of the Scottish economic growth in the last decades. The service sector, for instance, has grown by 40% in the last years compared to 3% of the production industries, which form a consistent share of the selected regions' economic infrastructure (Fraser of Allander Institute 2018). Moreover, while productivity in Scotland has increased, in the regions it has steadily declined since 2004, hence the productivity gap between East Ayrshire and North Ayrshire mainland and Scotland has dramatically widened. This is the result of the different economic infrastructure between the two, and the consequent smaller investments in business, research and development in the region (ibid.).



**Chart 156. Gross domestic product trends in East Ayrshire and North Ayrshire mainland**

*Data source: Eurostat, Gross domestic product (GDP) at current market prices by NUTS 3 regions*

## LABOUR MARKET


<i>LABOUR MARKET INDICATORS</i>	<i>2017</i>	<i>Variation 2008-2017</i>	<i>UK average (2017)</i>	<i>EU average (2017)</i>	<i>MATILDE regions average (2017)</i>
Unemployment rate (%/percentage points)	5.8%	2.3	11.2%	8.1 %	8.4%
Employment in primary sector (%, thousands of employees)	3	50%	4% (920.9)	5% (353.98)	5% (6.75)
Employment in secondary sector (%, thousands of employees)	15	-21.1%	17% (5,752.1)	23% (1,584.74)	26% (36.19)
Employment in tertiary sector (%, thousands of employees)	57	3.6%	79% (18,465.1)	71% (4,830.33)	69% (97.63)
People at risk of poverty or social exclusion (€/percentage points)	Missing data	Missing data	Missing data	21.6%	17.3%

**Table 102. Labour market indicators in East Ayrshire and North Ayrshire mainland, 2017**

*Unemployment: OECD Labour indicators, small regions TL3 and large regions TL2; National Statistical Institutes; Eurostat, Unemployment rates by sex, age, citizenship and NUTS 2 regions; Eurostat, People at risk of poverty or social exclusion by NUTS 2 regions.*


The United Kingdom has a highly tertiarised economy and is one of the countries in Europe with the highest number of employees working in the **tertiary sector** (primarily in services, related to banking and insurance, but also retail), and the economy of the selected Scottish region is no exception in that, having almost 8 out of ten of its workforce employed in the tertiary sector (76%) while that is 69% for MATILDE regions (see also Table 102 and Chart 157). However, being a peri-urban area, the selected region has also a higher than UK average share of the workforce in the primary sector (4% versus 1%). Thus, the primary sector in this region is comparable with the MATILDE regions average.

Labour market performances are weaker in East Ayrshire and North Ayrshire mainland than in Scotland in general, however, as Charts 158 and 159 below show, for 2008-2017 respectively 2004-2017, unemployment has decreased also in the selected regions.




**Chart 157. Employment by sector in East Ayrshire and North Ayrshire mainland, 2017**

Source: Elaboration by EURAC based on data from Eurostat, *Employment (thousand persons) by NUTS 3 regions*.



**Chart 158. Unemployment rate trend in East Ayrshire and North Ayrshire mainland, 2008-2017**

Sources: OECD.stat, *Labour indicators, small regions TL3 and large regions TL2*; Eurostat, *Total unemployment rate*; National statistical offices of MATILDE countries.



**Chart 159. Unemployment 2004-2018: Scotland compared to the 3 Ayrshire local authorities**

*Source: Fraser of Allander Institute 2018: 13, based on data from ONS*

## LABOUR MARKET: FOCUS ON TCNS

For East Ayrshire and North Ayrshire mainland we could not find reliable data regarding employment rates of TCNs. Available data on NUTS2-level for South Western Scotland (2008-2012) show that the employment rate of the total population remains relatively stable. In comparison, the employment rate of TCNs can be described as more dynamic. This includes seasonal differences, but also the post-crisis economic adjustments (see also Chart 160).


Special employment patterns represent a relevant share of the UK labour market which has experienced a flexibilization/deregulation in the past decade. A third of its workforce is employed part-time while more than one of every ten active persons is a self-employed (see also Table 103). Data on special employment situations in rural areas indicate a smaller share of part-time workers, but a higher share of self-employed. Temporary forms of

employment are more diffused among TCNs than overall population, which suggests a higher risk of incurring in a condition of precarious work among the former.

2018	Total UK		Rural areas	
	TCNs	TOTAL	TCN	TOTAL
Part-time employment	24.2%	24.6%	26.7%	27.6%
Self-employment	15.2%	13.8%	13%	20.2%
Temporary employment	9.5%	5.5%	n/a	5.1%

**Table 103. Special employment patterns for total population and Third Country Nationals by degree of urbanisation in UK, 2018**

*Data source: Eurostat*



**Chart 160. Employment rate in South Western Scotland, 2008-2012**

*Data source: Eurostat*

## UNEMPLOYMENT RATE OF TCNS, 2018

Comparing the unemployment rate of TCNs and the total population on a national level, it can be identified a similar general trend of stability until 2013 and of decline from 2014-2018. Nevertheless, the gap between the level of unemployment of TCNs and the one of the total population does not narrow across the time, which speaks for the many barriers that still obstruct TCNs joining the labour market.

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## PART C: CONCLUSION

### 1. OUTCOMES OF THE TERRITORIAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC ANALYSIS. A PRELIMINARY CATEGORISATION OF MATILDE REGIONS

Author: Andrea Membretti

With the adoption of a regional and multi-dimensional approach, the territorial and socio-economic aspects of the MATILDE regions have been seen to influence the impact that migration can have on society and the economy, in addition to enabling different forms of migrant inclusion and societal enactment.

Starting from the assumption that “place matters”, the analysis and subsequent categorisation of the MATILDE regions begins from the assumption that **the local and spatial dimension frames ongoing societal reproduction and change** (Goffman 1974), which, because of their structural and social conditions, seems particularly evident in rural and mountain territories. Building on the criteria discussed in the introduction, this report aimed to:

- Provide an overview of processes of immigration in European rural and mountain areas.
- Define the framework and identify the main dimensions for selecting and analysing the MATILDE regions.
- Outline the MATILDE regions in terms of their socio-economic and territorial characteristics, focusing on the immigration of third country nationals (TCNs).
- Provide a first categorisation of these regions.

The investigation of the MATILDE countries and, especially, regions, has been driven by two main questions:

How can we appropriately analyse the social, economic and territorial roles of mountain and rural regions within the European Union?

How can an accurate and multi-dimensional description of regional performance improve public opinion and help local actors and policymakers, at different scales, understand these roles and enhance local resources to overcome marginalisation?

## 2. PATTERNS OF IMMIGRATION OF TCNS TO MATILDE COUNTRIES AND REGIONS IN THE LIGHT OF WIDER STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATIONS

Authors: Stefan Kordel and Tobias Weidinger

In rural and mountain areas, an increasing number of migrants has arrived in the last half century and induced various processes of demographic and socio-economic transformation (Bock et al. 2016; Kordel 2017). The portraits of the MATILDE regions show us that, **historically**, the MATILDE countries and regions have faced different phases of immigration, accompanied by economic and political transformation processes there or elsewhere. In the 1970s, in places like Austria and Germany for example, crucial points of change were marked by economic upswing and resulting labour shortages, which also affected industrially influenced rural areas. Specific national and regional economic constellations and contexts, e.g. economic clusters in a certain region, resulted in a highly selective influx of immigrants by means of particular **border regimes and visa policies**. In a globalised world, national and regional economic developments are affected by broader transformations, e.g. export orientation, but also by single events. The economic and financial crisis of 2008, for instance, marked an important turnaround in migration dynamics, especially in Southern Europe. Following a phase of massive immigration, there was a phase of remigration to Latin American and African countries due to lack of employment. Besides, in the 1990s and even before, immigration to European rural and mountain areas occurred in the course of the political transformations in former communist states, e.g. when late repatriates of German descent as well as Jewish migrants emigrated from Russia and arrived in the German countryside, or were even placed there by the authorities. Recently, people have arrived in rural and mountain areas as a result of armed conflicts and (civil) wars, in places such as Afghanistan (since the 2000s), ex-Yugoslavia (in the 1990s), Iraq (in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s), Iran (in the 1980s), Somalia (since the 1980s), Syria and Venezuela (both since the 2010s). The placement of people in rural and mountain areas, e.g. of asylum seekers or resettlement refugees, was and is often based on allocation schemes and **dispersal policies** (e.g. Austria, Finland, Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden and the UK).

Nevertheless, the 2010 decade in particular is often seen as a time when some rural and mountain areas were first confronted with immigration of TCNs. Accordingly, some MATILDE regions such as Haskovo (Bulgaria) or Regen (Germany) may be classified as relatively novel destinations for TCN immigration (in other words, New Immigration Destinations (NID)) (Winders 2004, McAreavey 2018), whilst others such as Huesca (Spain), the Metropolitan City of Turin (Italy) and Vorarlberg (Austria) have developed a certain migration history with continuous flows of immigrants that have led to a **path-dependency of regions** (Rodríguez-Pose & Berlepsch 2020). As a result of relationships forged during colonial times and spatial proximity to non-EU countries, specific migration regimes were established

and are still upheld, for example between Spain and Latin American countries, between Italy and Spain and North African countries, or between Scandinavian countries and Russia.

The country reports and profiles of MATILDE regions show a huge **diversity of migrants** in rural and mountain areas, with regard to their socio-demographic profile, countries and regions of origin, as well as in their motivations for migrating and their aspirations to stay.

According to the questions set in the introduction, we ask:

1. **Why** are particular migration phenomena relevant in rural and mountain areas?
2. **To what extent** is the immigration process relevant in rural and mountain areas, both quantitatively and qualitatively, bearing in mind potential changes evoked by immigration?
3. **What protagonists** take part in the migration phenomenon and how has the composition of immigrants changed over time?


**Labour migration** is one important process in rural and mountain areas and is supported by more or less restrictive visa regulations in individual countries. Temporary working permits are common, for instance, in the agricultural sector, for example in Southern Europe or Scandinavia, where migrant employment is marked by seasonality. The development of non-agricultural activities introduced new opportunities, among them an increasing demand for services related to an ageing population, in tourism and construction or the food industry and distribution. Finally, ethnic niches of employment, in places like restaurants or grocery stores, are particularly relevant in rural areas. On the other hand, highly-skilled migration is less relevant in rural areas, since apart from hidden champions, workplaces that need qualified employees are often scarce. Some occupations are highly gendered, e.g. men in construction or women in (health) care or specific agricultural activities such as berry picking.

Migration for humanitarian reasons, i.e., **forced migration**, was partly the result of dispersal policies. The ex-Yugoslavian, Iraqi or Somalian citizens who arrived in the 1990s were still reflected in the 2008 top ten TCN lists of the majority of MATILDE regions (e.g. the Austrian, German and Finnish ones; Innlandet, Norway and Dalarna, Sweden); Today, however, Syrian and Iraqi but also Afghan, Eritrean or Venezuelan citizens have also become important. Forced migrants have had a remarkable impact on the shape of rural and mountain areas to date, with regard to population size for example, as well as socio-demographic composition or housing and labour markets. Simultaneously, the most recently arrived asylum seekers and refugees, especially from 2013 onwards, have

challenged social cohesion at a very local level, but also increased awareness of issues of rural development. The latter aspect is related to the provision of social, educational and mobility infrastructures, for instance. The arrival and settlement of humanitarian migrants has exposed deficits in rural and mountain municipalities.

Although **family migration** is well reflected in the number of entry permits issued and very important numerically, it is always interrelated with other processes of migration. The majority of family migrants have to prove that they have the means of subsistence, mostly via a relative already living in the country. **Student migration** is only important in those rural and mountain areas that have universities or university campuses (e.g. Germany, Austria or the UK/Scotland). The majority of people engaging in **amenity/lifestyle migration** are still EU citizens. However, in the course of second home development, either because regional economies are related to construction and real estate, as is the case in Spain for example, or for historical reasons, as with Russian citizens in Scandinavian countries, TCNs become increasingly important at a regional and local level. Due to their relatively privileged socio-economic status, they have massive implications for local economies and social cohesion.


The aforementioned immigration processes are of varying degrees of importance in MATILDE regions. Taking a closer look at TCNs, however, their presence is remarkable, both in absolute numbers and as a relative share of the whole, as shown on the following map. Unsurprisingly, the absolute number of TCNs is higher in the less rural MATILDE regions such as the Metropolitan City of Turin (Italy) or Bursa (Turkey).



**Map 42. Number and share of Third Country Nationals (TCNs) in MATILDE regions**

With regard to their socio-demographic profile and gender profiles in particular, there is a balanced gender share with a slight predominance of female TCNs in Nordic MATILDE regions, and a slight predominance of males in other MATILDE regions (up to 58.2% male TCNs in Regen, Germany), as shown in the maps below. In almost all MATILDE regions, the share of female TCNs decreased from 2008 to 2018.





**Map 43. Development of proportional gender distribution and total number of Third Country Nationals (TCNs) in MATILDE regions**

Immigration is taking place in the context of wider **fundamental transformation processes**. Such changes can be categorised as demographic and economic. The former encompasses ageing processes, which is characteristic of most MATILDE regions. However, the ageing index varies among the MATILDE regions, ranging from 39.9 in Bursa (Turkey) to 200 in Garmisch-Partenkirchen (Germany). The changing demographic structure results in challenges for regional economies, e.g. through the lack of workforce, as well as for social cohesion. Moreover, **depopulation** is taking place at a different rate across MATILDE regions. Since natural population development (i.e., the crude birth rate), is negative for most (although this has been mitigated most recently in German regions for example), migration dynamics either reinforce this development or reduce population loss. However, the **relevance of immigration for total population change** is crucial from 2008 to 2018. Whilst other MATILDE regions experienced this development earlier, in Germany and Austria immigration has resulted in a population turnaround only in the second half of the decade, not least due to the arrival of asylum seekers. Population developments, in particular, have been considered for the categorisation of MATILDE regions, as presented in the following section.

Besides, one can observe **transformation processes in rural economies**. Diversification and especially tertiarization characterises MATILDE regions to a different extent, resulting in shifts in shares of GDP and employment. Whilst economic activities in some MATILDE regions are more focused on one sector (e.g. the Metropolitan City of Turin and South Tyrol, both in Italy; Innlandet, Norway; Berchtesgadener Land and Garmisch-Partenkirchen, both in Germany, in which the third sector represents more than 70% of the regional GVA), other regions have diversified as a result of restructuration and structural change in the last decades (e.g. Voralberg and the region of Unterkärnten in Carinthia, both in Austria; Ostrobothnia, Finland; Huesca, Spain; and Bursa, Turkey). Finally, changing rural economies have an impact on the attractiveness of the region for immigration, especially since immigration regimes are driven by economic demands to a certain extent.

### 3. A FIRST CATEGORISATION OF THE MATILDE REGIONS BASED ON QUANTITATIVE INDICATORS

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The MATILDE regions were originally selected based on their **territorial and socio-economic characteristics** as well as the **presence and distribution of TCNs**, to include regions with significative numbers of migrants with respect to local contexts. The regions have been described using **existing regional typologies** (based on criteria such as population density, degree of urbanisation and spatial distribution of population) and by **collecting and analysing specific structural and socio-economic indicators** (e.g. accessibility of infrastructures, employment sector, etc.).

On the basis of a statistical analysis conducted on the MATILDE database (deliverable 2.2), the regions have been classified into **four categories**, based on their **socio-economic performance** and their **territorial features**, in line with MATILDE's basic assumptions and theoretical framework. In fact, within the MATILDE theoretical framework, migration impact assessment will be conducted in WP3, WP4 and WP5 considering first of all how TCNs contribute to modifying territorial demographic balances/imbances in relation to the degree of rurality/urbanity of each region.

#### 3.1 STEPS OF QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

**DIMENSION 1: Socio-economic performance:** statistical analysis of the first dimension, **socio-economic performance**, was conducted on a dataset containing 21 regions and 9 indicators: five of the variables were related to demographic aspects and their variation from 2008 to 2018 (1. Population growth rate; 2. Population density; 3. Old-age dependency ratio; 4. Crude rate of natural population change; and 5. Crude rate of net migration), while the other four are related to economic aspects (6. Annual growth rate of Gross Domestic Product (GDP); 7. Unemployment; 8. Risk of Poverty and 9. Share of Young people not in Education, employment or training (NEETS)). Changes in demographic and economic aspects have been considered for the period 2008-2018. Descriptive statistics for each indicator and correlations between the variables have been explored.

The Principal Component Analysis (PCA) has been performed on four demographic variables to reduce the number of indicators in order to consider the most significant ones. Population density was not used as it is highly correlated with Population growth rate. According to the total variance criteria, the first indicator (Population growth rate) already explains 64.6% of the variation. An important result therefore arises: the indicator **population growth rate** is strongly correlated with the first dimension of socio-economic performance (0.91) and could itself summarise this

dimension. This result encouraged us to consider the population growth rate as the only demographic aspect that differentiates MATILDE regions. In respect of the distribution of the Population growth rate, the threshold value was decided by considering 0 as a cut value. Subsequently, two groups were created: **regions with negative population development**, consisting of the regions with a population growth rate equal to or less than 0, and regions with **positive population development**, characterised by a population growth rate greater than 0.

**DIMENSION 2: Territorial features:** the second dimension taken into consideration refers to the regions' **territorial features**. Eurostat's **Urban-Rural typology** was used to categorise this dimension. We acknowledge the limited explanatory power of this classification, which is based exclusively on population density and therefore fails to capture crucial aspects considered in the database, such as the use of land and the accessibility index. However, the selection of a single indicator at this preliminary stage was necessary to conduct a quantitative analysis. The criteria used to represent the territorial aspects of the regions will be further discussed in deliverable 2.4 (Conceptual paper) and in the next phases of the project.

On the basis of the Eurostat typology, two groups of regions were established: **“more rural”** and **“less rural”**. The first modality considers the regions characterised as “predominantly rural” in relation to the Eurostat Urban-Rural Topology. “Less rural” considers regions such as “intermediate” and “predominantly urban” in line with the Eurostat Urban-Rural Typology.


By combining the categorisations resulting from Dimension 1 – Socio-economic performance and Dimension 2 – Territorial features, **the 21 MATILDE regions were classified into four groups** as presented in the following table and chart:

1. more rural & negative population growth ( $n = 4$ ),
2. more rural & positive population growth ( $n = 7$ ),
3. less rural & negative population growth ( $n = 3$ ),
4. less rural & positive population growth ( $n = 7$ ).

A one-way ANOVA (Analysis of variance)<sup>132</sup> was conducted to determine differences between the means of the groups created in demographic and economic indicators. The differences between the four groups were statistically significant in the case of population growth rate ( $F(3, 17) = 5.60, p = .007$ ), population density ( $F(3, 17) = 6.44, p = .004$ ) and crude rate of net migration ( $F(3, 17) = 12.85, p = .000$ ). For the rest of the indicators the differences were not statistically significant.

### 3.2 INVESTIGATING THE NEXUS BETWEEN DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSFORMATIONS AND TERRITORIAL FEATURES

As a result of the statistical analysis, and on the basis of the two main dimensions selected (population growth and level of rurality), the MATILDE regions have been divided into four sub-groups, as shown in the following Chart.



**Chart 161. Categorisation of MATILDE regions into 4 groups based on population growth and territorial features**

<sup>132</sup> One-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) is used to determine whether there are any statistically significant differences between the means of two or more independent groups.

Name of MATILDE region	MATILDE country	Groups
Regen	DE	more rural & negative pop growth
Oberkärnten	AT	more rural & negative pop growth
Unterkärnten	AT	more rural & negative pop growth
North Karelia	FI	more rural & negative pop growth
Neustadt an der Aisch-Bad Windsheim	DE	more rural & positive pop growth
South Tyrol	IT	more rural & positive pop growth
Bludenz-Bregenzer Wald	AT	more rural & positive pop growth
Ostrobothnia	FI	more rural & positive pop growth
Dalarna county	SE	more rural & positive pop growth
Hedmark	NO	more rural & positive pop growth
Oppland	NO	more rural & positive pop growth
Huesca	SP	less rural & negative pop growth
Haskovo	BG	less rural & negative pop growth
East Ayrshire and North Ayrshire mainland	UK	less rural & negative pop growth
Garmisch-Partenkirchen	DE	less rural & positive pop growth


Metropolitan City of Turin	IT	less rural & positive pop growth
Berchtesgadener Land	DE	less rural & positive pop growth
Oberallgäu	DE	less rural & positive pop growth
Klagenfurt-Villach	AT	less rural & positive pop growth
Rheintal-Bodenseegebiet	AT	less rural & positive pop growth
Bursa	TR	less rural & positive pop growth

**Table 104. Categorisation of MATILDE regions into 4 groups based on population growth and territorial features**

Considering the distribution of the 21 regions, the great majority (14, or 2/3 of the total, from Northern Europe to Turkey) have experienced overall **positive population growth** in the last ten years. From the analysis of demographic development in the period 2008-2018, it emerges that the **positive population increase for almost all these regions is strongly related to immigration flows**, even if the nature of these flows varies from one case to another. The weight of internal and international movements of people (EU migrants or TCNs), varies consistently across regions. The recent presence of asylum seekers and refugees within these processes has acquired a significant role in some MATILDE regions. One third of MATILDE regions show negative demographic balances that are not compensated by immigration flows. These **territories** - that range from the Nordic regions of Finland (North Karelia), Great Britain (East Ayrshire and the North Ayrshire mainland), Germany (Regen) and Austria (Oberkärnten and Unterkärnten), to the Mediterranean regions of Spain (Huesca) and Bulgaria (Haskovo) – have experienced more significant **ageing processes** as well as a **decrease in their birth rates** compared to others.


The following set of maps shows total population change and its relation to natural change and net migration in two different time frames, 2008-2012 and 2013-2018. Regions marked in different shades of green are those experiencing population growth. Whilst from 2008-2012 only Bursa (TR), Oberallgäu (DE), Ostrobothnia (FI) and South Tyrol (IT) showed positive natural change, in the latter period, Vorarlberg (AT) also had a surplus of births.






**Map 44. Population development in MATILDE regions 2008-2012**





**Map 45. Population development in MATILDE regions 2013-2018**



**Map 46. Population development through migration in MATILDE regions 2008-2017**

A final and interrelated consideration is that, with respect to their **territorial** features, MATILDE regions are divided into two sub-groups that are substantially equivalent, with 11 cases classified as “more rural” and 10 as “less rural” (see also Map 2. MATILDE regions according to Urban-Rural Typology in the Introduction). The positive demographic performance of the last ten years, which is essentially the result of immigration flows, is evenly distributed across these two groups of regions. Interestingly, 1/3 of the regions showing a positive population growth are rural and mountain ones. An in-depth analysis of the different performances of regions in relation to their territorial features, and to the connected aspects of the rural-urban interactions, will be developed in Work Package 3, Work Package 4 and Work Package 5.

### The vision ahead

Andrea Membretti, MATILDE Scientific Coordinator

The first indicator of the **resilience of a territory** is its capacity to maintain a stable demographic balance. **Attracting new inhabitants** is the explicit aim of some regional strategies while in many other situations it seems just the result of spontaneous socio-economic processes: newcomers arrive and settle down for different reasons and the main reasons to choose certain MATILDE regions remained labour opportunities and quality of life, when it was not a matter of forced migration.

Yet, the **precariousness of this demographic performance should not be overlooked**. Immigrants and TCNs in particular, may be only temporarily residing, like seasonal workers. They may be prevented from entering the territory for different reasons, as shown by the recent Covid-19 measures. They may decide freely to leave a region if working conditions, housing facilities, local policies or even the constraints imposed by new national laws make it unprofitable to continue living there. Finally, they can relocate from rural and mountain areas back to urban ones, as is happening in some European countries as a result of policies that aim to re-centralise the reception of asylum seekers and refugees.

Ultimately, the effective and long term contribution of newcomers to the socio-demographic resilience of a region seems to be connected to the concrete possibilities offered by the local system in terms of developing both **effective rights of citizenship** (civil, political, economic, social and even cultural ones) and a genuine **sense of belonging** to the place and local communities. That is, in the end, if the system offers real opportunities of inclusion and recognition, together with a shared and even negotiated vision of the future. Only if newcomers recognise a place as their own territory, investing resources in building homes and family and social relations (that is, enacting

new processes of territorialisation), can they represent a “real” reversal factor in the long term with respect to processes of demographic decline.

If Europe has a regional heart, as we assumed in the introduction to this report, the sustainable and fair development of EU countries and regions could benefit from an improved **balance between urban and rural/mountain areas in terms of population distribution**, including TCNs as well as all the other demographic groups. In view of the next steps of our research, and in particular of the evaluation of the *migration performance* of each region - that is, their capacity to attract, integrate and valorise immigrants as a factor in local development and socio-territorial cohesion - it seems relevant therefore to pave the way both theoretically and methodologically for **investigating the nexus between demographic change and territorial features**.

## 4. OUTLOOK ON THE NEXT DELIVERABLES

Author: Stefan Kordel

Deliverable 2.1 sketched the variety of territorial and socio-economic characteristics of MATILDE regions, representing the context of arrival and providing the basis for migrants’ personal development and contribution to the region. Sensitive to the heterogeneity of regions and the evolution of migrants’ presence in rural and mountain areas, this report will guide the social and economic impact assessment (Work Packages 3 and 4). Moreover, the country reports and regional profiles will serve as a basis for further elaboration in local case studies (Work Package 5) with regard to selected aspects as well as in Task 6.1 on integration goals and political strategies in MATILDE countries.

D2.1. aimed to provide an overview of spatial characteristics and development of the presence of TCNs in MATILDE regions. Whilst very general trends can be observed in MATILDE regions, e.g. economic development or employment situation as well as the increasing (quantitative) significance of TCNs in almost all MATILDE regions, the identification of explanatory factors as well as the differentiation of economic sectors or groups of immigrants is not possible. After looking more closely at data coverage at NUTS-3 level, it became obvious that data availability is either poor or does not provide sufficient explanation for processes of immigration. However, this knowledge is a precondition for conducting the impact assessment and has to be enhanced throughout the subsequent deliverables and Work Packages.

Based on the insights of Deliverable D2.1., D2.4 (**Report on the conceptual frameworks of migration processes in rural areas**), will further elaborate on explanatory frameworks for immigration processes (e.g. rural mobilities) and

aspirations to stay (e.g. place-based-belonging) as prerequisites for impact. Moreover, concepts that are able to explain the spatial patterns of immigration processes, like path-dependency and New Immigration Destinations (NIDs), will be sketched.

In accordance with conceptual approaches on the impact of TCNs (D2.4.), **Work Package 3** will benefit from D2.1. since the diversity of protagonists in each single MATILDE region have become obvious. Socio-demographic and socio-economic profiles may differ both across and within MATILDE regions and may, finally, have a strong influence on quantity and quality of social impacts. The same can be expected for **Work Package 4**, both with regard to migrants' integration in employment markets and to the overall structure of rural economies in MATILDE regions.

Finally, for **Work Package 5**, dealing with local case studies by means of a participatory and action research approach, this report sensitises and prepares the fieldwork phase, since stimuli for further research are provided. Depending on the specific aims of each MATILDE case study, scientific and local partners are encouraged to differentiate more and diminish gaps in knowledge of TCNs presence and impacts. Taking the country reports and regional profiles as a starting point, the local approach, including immersing to the field, promises to enhance our knowledge of TCNs impact in rural and mountain areas.

Finally, D2.1 has provided a basis to further explore the governance of migration in MATILDE regions, which will be fully explored in Work Package 6 (Task 6.1), devoted to integration goals and political strategies in the MATILDE countries. In the light of the influx of migrants, each MATILDE country developed **integration policies**, targeted mostly at selected groups, for example asylum seekers and refugees. One can state from the reports that the local level has a crucial role for the implementation of policies. Migration governance aspects will be elaborated in further depth in **Work Package 6**.

